The Real Reason China Wants Taiwan

I think there's a chance that if we enter war with nuclear allied Russia and China, the United States as we know it, we may take a risk of it ceasing to exist. Of course. Okay, I'm glad you appreciate that. That's good. Because many people are like, what are you talking about? United States cease to exist? No, I actually think well, in a nuclear conflict? Yes. Well, because we don't have nuclear defense capability. No. Now, my view is, this is also another heresy that I think have recently managed to cross last night, which is that I think our commitments to go to war in that situation, or to at least even militarily engage in that situation, should change if it's before or after we have semiconductor independence in this country. Oh, yeah. I mean, I think so. I agree completely. But I, for people who aren't following this, explain what you mean. Yeah, yeah. So this is a, you know, long history here. But for historical circumstances that, you know, are long and unfortunate, we are dependent on a tiny island nation off the southeast coast of China, for our entire modern way of life. These lights wouldn't work, the phones in our pockets wouldn't work, these, you know, TV screens and cameras wouldn't work, if it weren't for leading edge semiconductors that are manufactured by basically one company and a set of companies around them, TSMC on Taiwan, that power our entire modern way of life. That's just a hard fact. How we got here, it's a long story. I think it's sad that we are where we are, but we are where we are. China has two reasons to want to go for Taiwan. Okay, one is a nationalistic reason, which is that back in 1949, they had this complicated civil war, Chiang Kai-shek, yeah, you know, went to Taiwan and claimed that that was actually where the real Republic of China was based. And Mao Zedong said, No, no, it's the Communist Party of China out of Beijing. And for the longest time, actually, the US and the UN recognized actually the real China as being run out of Taipei. But at some point along the way, switched to saying no, it's actually run out of Beijing. And so there's this nationalistic thing going on that's super complicated history over there. But there's a more modern motivation for Xi Jinping, which is, wait a minute, if I now have control over that island, I have control over the entire United States, because I now have the economic leverage to get to a deal that the US wouldn't have said yes to. And I think what Xi Jinping is going for is the basic deal where he says, I get to make your stuff as long as I get all of your IP and everything else in return. And right now, if he says that to the US, we're not going to go for that deal. But if he's squatting on the semiconductor supply chain, well, then that's how we ultimately get to parity consummate the codependent relationship. And I think that's step one of a broader conquest of the modern West. How hard would it be to achieve, as you said, semiconductor independence of the United States, it's not going to be easy, but I'm confident that with focus, I can lead us there by the end of my first term in office. And my basic rule of thumb on this one, Tucker is just to be very practical looking at this from American interests. I do not consent to Xi Jinping, holding an economic gun to our head and lording that over for the next 100 years of the future of the United States. But if we're no longer dependent on that tiny island nation, then I will not send our sons and daughters to die over somebody else's nationalistic dispute. How difficult is it? I mean, it's it's interesting. And you said the complex history that I'm not familiar with behind it, but how complex is it to build your own semiconductor? It's complicated because a lot of it relies on know how. So it's not just raw production capability, but it's the know how of how you actually make it. And so I think that requires pulling people from, you know, DSMC in Taiwan to the United States. And I think that that's something that we should be intensely focused on right now. There's new, you know, giant projects, manufacturing projects in Arizona, near where I live, actually in my home state of Ohio, that are going to be steps forward in that direction. I also think that like it or not, a relationship with South Korea and Japan is going to have to play a role in speeding up our semiconductor self-reliance as well. Samsung is the next best leader. It's not even an American company. After DSMC, there's like a big jump down. Then it's Samsung. Then there's a big jump down. There's Intel and everybody else here. So I think that it's going to require and I don't like multilateral trade agreements. But if we're going to have to do them, let's keep it bilateral, bilateral agreements with Japan, with South Korea. That's a big part of what's going to be required. And so my view is, let's think about first term in office as it relates to this dimension of foreign policy and the Ukraine war on terms that help pull Russia out of China's hands. That's going to require rebuilding a lot of trust. I think I'm up for that job. And I believe that Putin can trust us to follow our self-interest as long as we trust him to follow his reopen economic relations with Russia, freeze the current lines of control, make a permanent commitment that NATO will not admit Ukraine to NATO. But in return, we can if not disband that Russia China alliance, I get India back on side. And, you know, if there's a guy who's going to rebuild trust with India, it better be a guy with the name Vivek Ramaswamy, who might be up for that task. But, you know, getting India on on side to say, you know what, we're going to be making sure that in a conflict situation in Taiwan, that we're at least on side with the United States. But then more importantly, get semiconductor self-sufficiency in the United States, reduce our economic dependence on China. If we're there by the end of my first term, by the end of 2028, the stakes are now just a lot lower with respect to what's actually happening in Taiwan. And if, you know, is it preferable for China to annex Taiwan even after that scenario? No, probably not. But that's a different bar for whether or not we're going to actually be willing to send our sons and daughters to die over it. And in the meantime, there's one aspect of our national defense that surprisingly nobody's talking about, Tucker, which is actually our national defense of the homeland, where we have actually badly missed the plot for super EMP attacks, cyber attacks, nuclear defense. You know, we help Israel build an Iron Dome, how about an equivalent of an Iron Dome for the United States and our own homeland. And so that's where I'm focused in my first term. If I on foreign policy, if I can get us to semiconductor independence, if I can get us to significantly reduced, if not total economic independence from China, weaken the Russia China alliance by ending the war in Ukraine, that actually keeps China at bay from not having an economic gun to our head over our modern way of life, at which point we then have a different set of commitments were after that we're going to be in good shape, no matter what happens. And so I wasn't, you know, planning to get into some foreign policy detour, but that's that's the way I'm thinking about the first term that all of that makes sense. You think so? We're not. I'm not sure what is controversial about any of that. Well, I think what's controversial about it is how far those priority it's weak. That's what I've heard yesterday. Yeah. I mean, from whom? Well, from a lot of Republicans, actually. And is there a dumber group? I mean, then then the foreign policy Republicans. I'm not talking about Republican voters. I mean, the members of Congress, the low IQ guys from including your state, I hate to say it, Texas, who make their entire career about seeming strong, including Reagan and under whose watch the country has become demonstrably weaker. It has become. And that doesn't lead to strength, actually. Where are we now? And the funny part is our transgender army. Like, seriously, people also miss this, Tucker. This makes me uncomfortable as they get very upset when I say this. I think there's a chance that if we enter war with nuclear allied Russia and China, the United States, as we know it, we may take a risk of it ceasing to exist. Of course. Okay, I'm glad you appreciate that. That's good. Because many people are like, what are you talking about? United States cease to exist? No, I actually think well, in a nuclear conflict. Yes. Well, because we don't have nuclear defense capability. No, you know, defense, national defense has not been about defense for a very long time. Right. And so by the way, super EMP capabilities take out our electric grids. We have, you know, 60 Chinese transformers that are in the midst nodes in our own electric grid, they could shut down our modern way of life. With that, you want to talk about actual cyber attack capabilities, we're better on offense, we have no defensive capabilities. And so, you know, when I think about a modern foreign policy vision, I'd revive a modern Monroe Doctrine, you don't mess with the United States on our own soil, we are not okay with a Chinese spy balloon flying over half our country, we are not okay, we do not consent to a Chinese spy base off the southeast coast of the United States or in Cuba, spying on the southeast corridor of the United States, we're not okay with intentionally pumped fentanyl, you know, the raw materials, literally coming, I'm not making this up from Wuhan, to Mexican drug cartels that are intentionally been pumped across our southern border as part of really a one sided opium war. No, we're not okay with that. Or with interference in the western hemisphere or with China having control over the Panama Canal, something that people forget as well. No, we're not okay with that. But that is also our top priority. Protect the homeland and the interests of citizens here at home. That is how America is strong and actually leads on the global stage. And so the irony is, at least like the, you know, the Reagan version of this was, yes, all of that projection piece through strength, but strategic defense initiative, nuclear defense here at home. Now we're in the worst of all worlds where you have a generation of people who vaguely remember the slogans and feel like they want to puff their chest but can't really do it super confidently. So they're like doing it as like a second language. Well, altogether forgetting about the actual defense of the homeland. It's even worse because the piece through strength part, well, the strength part actually provokes that which we're not even prepared to handle back at home. And, you know, so I end up talking to a lot of neocons actually, in terms of, you know, bolstering me up, because they don't have the right strategic vision. But they know all like the names of like, you know, what an Ohio class SSGN versus SSBN is, and I don't know these things. All the war porn. They love that. I mean, I wasn't born with this knowledge, but I'm gonna be US president, I better darn well and trained to know it. And so I'm probably talking to more liberal hegemony, neocon people training me not because I'm taking their views. I deeply disagree with them, but they, you know, know the lexicon. And so, you know, I want to put myself in a position where it's easily dismissible. This guy doesn't know what a what an Ohio class SSGN versus a versus SSBN is, well, okay, well, now I do. It turns out it took all of about 30 minutes to get that one under our belt. But it doesn't matter. You're missing the plot if you're actually failing to actually advance. Is there a single neocon with a happy personal life? Like, imagine I haven't drilled into it dinner at Bill Kristol's house, the misery. Do you know what I mean? Like, it doesn't seem like I don't want to psychoanalyze here. But it does seem like their project has nothing to do with helping the United States in any way. And it is psychosexual or something. They're for war, war, as long as other people fight it. I mean, it's like a syndrome.