TT Ngô Đình Diệm với thế bế tắc chính trị năm 1955 | Khi Đồng Minh nhảy vào, Chương 10 | NAMDUONGTV

Welcome to FBNC's June 10 Today's world news Here are today's outstanding stories from the book When the Alliance of the Rich by Professor Nguyễn Tiến Hưng with the content The House of Reconstruction is Lost In June 1954, the Geneva Conference began to debate the issue of the Ocean. The Minister of National Defense sent Mr. Ngô Đình Diệm to Cairns and appointed him as Prime Minister. He said, Your Majesty, after many years of deliberation, I have decided to go to prison. But when you said you were afraid of the country's corruption and did not allow you to be released, you immediately took a life sentence. A life sentence led you on a dangerous journey. When the new prime minister came to Saigon, the situation was very difficult. In fact, all military, political, social and economic rights were controlled by the French, either directly or indirectly. Knowing Mr. Diệm's anti-French spirit, when he was just in power, France persuaded the US ambassador to agree to cancel Mr. Diệm's plan. Then the Chief of Staff publicly revolted, causing an uproar in Vietnam at first. In the context of the political crisis, at the end of 1954, France and Britain proposed a solution asking Mr. Bảo Đại to appoint Mr. Diệm as Deputy Prime Minister. However, Mr. Diệm proved his love for the country and his extraordinary ability in an extremely difficult political situation. The song of the Giang Giang band in Thanh Duong in the morning that day, the main church, also known as the Church of Germany, was full of people, the atmosphere was solemn and peaceful. For several weeks, the band had to practice some songs for a century When the famous American Mr. Francis Bellman came to visit Vietnam, he was a guest of the new Prime Minister. Part of the band were young people who had just been transported by the US ship from the north to move to the south. Among them was the author, Mr. Nguyễn Tiến Hưng. From a war-torn place, this is enjoyed by the peaceful and free atmosphere of the southern capital. We are very spiritual. The city of Saigon, where the poet Ngo Dinh Diem returned from the US, is now visited by Duc Hong Y of New York. Everyone is full of enthusiasm. The thoughts of our young people are so simple. No wonder, in the fall of that year, the arrangements on the political chessboard in the South were so confusing and dangerous. In the face of Prime Minister Diem, I saw Mr. Lam Lam smiling, but calm. Hardly anyone knows the difficulties Mr. Bao Dai invited Mr. Diem to be prime minister three times. The fourth time, he just accepted. The first time was in 1949, after Mr. Diem contributed to the transfer of Mr. Bao Dai from Hong Kong to be prime minister, he was invited to be prime minister. The second time was in 1951, when Mr. Diem was still in the US. All three times, Mr. Diem refused and said that he could not do anything when the French were still involved in Vietnamese politics. When the French passed the independence treaty on June 4, Mr. Diem just accepted. When appointing Mr. Diem, Mr. Bao Dai only referred to the opinion of Foreign Minister Dulles. In the signing of the Vietnamese Dragon, Mr. Bao Dai wrote about the background and the reason for appointing Mr. Diem as follows. We no longer trust the French. In Geneva, the Americans are our allies. In Saigon, Prime Minister Bảo Lộc met the fierce opposition of the countries in a rally led by Mr. Ngô Đình Nhu. This rally did not recognize all the decisions that could be made by Geneva. I invited the leaders of all political and religious movements in Vietnam to ask for their opinions. I let them know what had happened, that everything had been arranged in advance where the country would be divided. I gave them the need to set a new direction and suggested that Mr. Bảo Lộc should be replaced by Mr. Ngô Đình Diem to lead the government. Why did you choose Mr. Diem? Mr. Bao Dai replied as follows. Before using Diem, I knew he was difficult. I also knew he was very stubborn and very confident. But in this situation, there is no one to choose. In fact, for many years, the Americans have known him and admired his determination and determination. In front of them, he was a character capable of dealing with the situation. So Washington was willing to support him. Thanks to his achievements and his brother's presence at the front of the National Assembly, he was enthusiastically supported by many countries. These things once broke the heart of the government and the Bảo Lộc government. I knew his intention. I gave him the role of Ngô Đình Diem and Mr. Bảo Lộc. Whenever I needed to change the government, I had to call him. He always refused. Now the situation is very bad. The country may be cut in half. He needs to lead the government. And, Your Majesty, it is impossible. He replied, I am sorry. After many years of thinking, although I respected his intention, but now I call for his patriotism. He has the right to refuse his responsibility. Vietnam's indifference forced him to do so. After a quiet meeting, he finally replied, Your Majesty, in that case, I would like to accept the death that he offered. At that moment, on June 16, 1954, Mr. Ngô Đình Diem decided to resign. However, when Mr. Bảo Đại came to the country and did not allow him to resign, he had to accept the death. A death has given him many dangers right from the beginning to continue the journey to the end of the road where he was waiting for him. The first steps When appointing Mr. Diem, Mr. Bảo Đại only asked for the opinion of Foreign Minister Dunless, not the U.S. But how did Mr. Dunless know about Mr. Diem? This story began in 1950. That year was the 5th anniversary of the 5th anniversary of the 25th anniversary Mr. Diem returned to the U.S. in September and October and then went to Vatican City. There he was advised by Pope Pius XII. Then he went to the U.S., Switzerland and France to meet some Catholics. In early 1951, he returned to the U.S. and lived at the Maryknoll Church in Blackwood, New Jersey. Through the East Belmont, he met some Catholic priests, especially two Bishops John Kennedy and Joseph McCarthy. The most important person was Mr. Mansfield. Because of his opinion, Washington respected him as a political science professor and East Asian historian at Montana State University before he became a politician. In the summer of 1954, Mr. Mansfield studied in Vietnam. When he returned, he reported on the dark situation in the South at that time. In the case of a collapse, the U.S. should consider ending all aid to France and the U.N. After Mansfield's report, President Eisenhower just wrote a letter on October 23, 1954 to Prime Minister Diem to announce that from now on the U.S. will provide direct aid to Vietnam without passing through France. But then the U.S. changed its mind. After Mr. Diem settled the issue of Pingxuan in April 1955, the U.S. really supported him. So it's not that the U.S. supported Mr. Diem right from the start. In fact, his support was very weak. At the end of June 1954, Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem returned to Saigon. By the end of August 1954, that is, after two months when Mr. Diem just took office, only two months, U.S. Ambassador Donald Heath suggested that we pay attention to find another leader. The following month, that is, September 1954, General Secretary Nguyen Van Hinh publicly opposed the prime minister. In early December 1954, President Eisenhower's special envoy, General Collins, suggested that the U.S. should only support Mr. Diem for a few more weeks. In early April 1955, General Collins clearly suggested five steps to get rid of Mr. Diem. At the end of April 1955, U.S. Ambassador Ngo Dinh Diem returned to Saigon. That is, only in September 1954 did the U.S. want to replace Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. When the new prime minister returned to Saigon, in fact, all military, political, social, and economic rights were controlled by the French, either directly or indirectly. When Mr. Diem landed at Tan Son Nhat airport on June 13, 1949, the people of Do Thanh knew little about him. In fact, on the day of the coronation of General Bao Dai five years earlier, that is, June 13, 1949, General Bao Dai was greeted by General Ngo Dinh with the presence of French officials, generals, military generals, and others. Then the airport drove him along the long road called Rue de Châtelet-le-Gourne. When he arrived at the office, he saw that the Nododome was still under the French control. This camp was only fully handed over by Le Lys on September 7, 1954. The security personnel in the camp were again a group under the control of the French government. In addition, the French military did not agree because the French also sponsored some religious forces. From the Nododome camp to the right is the city of Catignac. At the beginning of the street is the famous French hotel of the company Nantan. At the end of the street is the port of Nantan, which is the largest part of the interior budget. On the streets from Rue Echolles to Eau Ruie, the shops selling a lot of French products such as Pastos, Martins, Pegasus bicycles, Mobilet motorbikes, Nuit de Rien flowers. If you want to go far, you can go to Chemin de Fille The United States is one of the places where France invests the most. The Lager beer factory, one of the largest production facilities in the Middle East, has nearly 3,000 workers. Then the high-speed plantations of Michelin, coffee, tea. So how can France give up? France wants to cling to the South, but has to face the French government. The French president is still in Cannes. The Vietnamese military is still in the United Nations. General Nguyen Van Hinh, the son of former Prime Minister Nguyen Van Tam, is a former officer in the French Air Force. The police are held by Binh Xuyen. Even the Security Force for the Deputy Prime Minister's Office was also sent by the police. So Mr. Diem is already in the United States. It's not difficult to get rid of Mr. Diem. The only obstacle is the US policy towards Mr. Diem. However, at that time, the US support for Mr. Diem was not strong. The US did not know much about Mr. Diem's ability because he had just returned to Saigon. In fact, the number of people who support Mr. Diem is the easiest lobby with the US ambassador right in Paris. And just over a month after Mr. Diem returned to the country, the US ambassador in Paris, Douglas DeLong, called Washington to report on the meeting with the Secretary of State of the United Nations, which means that for the US, this new leader must have the ability to get rid of Mr. Diem to end the ruin of the colonial era. Therefore, French Minister Lausome immediately raised three points to criticize Mr. Diem, as Ambassador DeLong reported. Paris, August 4, 1954 1. The government must truly represent the people. 2. It must organize an early geopolitical reform. 3. It must correct Mr. Baudet's budget to establish a republic in the coming months. Mr. Lausome thought that the Diem government was not capable of carrying out any of these three points. However, Mr. Lausome said that because Mr. Diem is a high-level person, if he could arrange everything smoothly with the delegates and be supported by them, he would not object to Mr. Diem continuing to hold the position of prime minister under the condition that Mr. Diem must act on the above points 2 and 3, that is, to reform the territory in the coming months. Firstly, it must be supported by the people. This is a long-term job. Most people do not know about Mr. Diem. How can it be proved that the people will support him when he is in power for more than a month? Secondly, a geopolitical reform is the most difficult job outside the war, when the land is still the most important part of the country. Thirdly, in front of an emperor, a prime minister is not an easy task, especially in a religious environment. Maybe this is a plan of France at that time to put Mr. Diem in a trap. If Mr. Diem is shy, has an attitude, or acts easily, Mr. Baudai can sign Mr. Baudai. Many writers have mentioned that it is not because of Mr. Diem. On the contrary, as Mr. Landers has revealed, when he had to do this job, he was in great pain. About these three points, in the palace, Ambassador de Laurent reported Mr. LaSom's opinion that 1. Mr. LaSom noticed that the United States 2. Mr. Diem's process is optimistic, so he will oppose both the local reform and the removal of Mr. Baudai. Therefore, Mr. LaSom suggested that in order for the South to have a winning chance in the general election, that is, in 1956, there must be a new government. The U.S. ambassador is keen to find a new prime minister. In July 1952, Legation in Saigon became an ambassador. Donald Heath became an ambassador. The next question of LaSom is who will be part of the new government. LaSom suggested General Nguyễn Văn Tâm, General Nguyễn Văn Hình's father, to be the prime minister and hoped Mr. Diem would stay to hold the position of Deputy Chief of Police or Defense Minister. LaSom said the new government could help boost the removal of Mr. Baudai when the time came. Mr. Diem was very supportive of the move, so let him continue his work to attract the North to move to the South. For Mr. Baudai, LaSom said there should be no action to remove him at this time On August 26, US Ambassador Donald Heath was invited to a party at the home of a French billionaire named Jacques-Raphael Leclerc. When Mr. Leclerc arrived, he found out that it was just a political meeting attended by General Nguyễn Văn Hình, the leaders of the religious and some French officials. At the party, people accused Mr. Diem of being an incompetent politician. Mr. Diem did not listen to Mr. Leclerc's advice on two points. First, Mr. Diem should reduce Mr. Nguyễn's role, and second, Mr. Diem should oppose the Cabinet to get the support of the people. Therefore, the next day, Mr. Diem called Washington and said that there were rumors in Vietnam that France was behind a plot to overthrow Mr. Diem. Mr. Hinh publicly opposed Mr. Diem and even bragged that he could kill Mr. Diem just by lifting his phone up. On September 11, 1954, Mr. Diem came to a decision that he would send Mr. Hinh to study abroad for 6 weeks and had to leave the country within 24 hours. In fact, Mr. Diem arranged to send Mr. Hinh to the U.S. for research, as revealed in the following statement. Mr. Diem asked me to consider inviting Mr. Hinh to the U.S. to stay away from the battlefield while Mr. Diem had time to strengthen his military power. Although there was an order, General Hinh expressed his indifference. Mr. Hinh wore a shirt, rode a big motorcycle, ran around the streets of Saigon. A week later, Mr. Hinh was arrested and asked to intervene. On the same day, Mr. Diem announced that Mr. Hinh had revolted. Mr. Hinh gave a armored vehicle to protect his private property and dispatched a force to protect his private property. During the next 6 weeks, the dispute between Diem and Hinh reached a critical point. Before the critical situation, General O'Donnell, the head of the U.S. State Council, said that Mr. Hinh's involvement in the dispute made the ambassador angry and he reported about Washington. Saigon, September 16, 1954, during the dispute between Mr. Diem and General Hinh, General O'Donnell said that although there were shortcomings, General Hinh was the most capable to control the army. I agree that the best thing is to let these two people get over the differences before considering this possibility. I need to meet Mr. Diem later. But contrary to my advice, Mr. O'Donnell came to Mr. Hinh's private property to discuss for up to 2 hours. He asked Mr. Hinh what his attitude was towards Mr. Diem. And of course, he received Mr. Hinh's natural answer that he is a loyal military man, loves the country, has no political ambition and is always ready to work with the prime minister. Mr. O'Donnell forgot that Mr. Hinh and Mr. Diem had a problem. Mr. Diem asked me to consider inviting Mr. Hinh to the US while Mr. Diem had time to strengthen military power. However, Mr. O'Donnell opposed both the replacement of Mr. Hinh and the way to replace him. He concluded that if he had to choose between the two, he would choose Hinh instead of Diem. In the midst of instability when the command of the army faced opposition, on September 20, there were 15 ministers in Mr. Diem's cabinet who resigned. Mr. Hinh's army was also ready to attack or pressure Mr. Diem to resign. Fortunately for Mr. Diem, on September 12, just 48 hours before the coup began, four leaders of the Hoa Hao faction and four of Cao Dai, especially General Trinh Minh The, changed their positions to stand on Mr. Diem's side. Mr. Diem and Mr. Nhu also had some arrangements even when the US used some money to buy the other side. Although Mr. Diem was supported by Foreign Minister Dulles along with some US and Vietnamese officials, he was not strong enough to overwhelm General Hinh, who was also supported by Mr. Bao Dai, General O'Donnell. In addition, right in Washington, the US government's support On September 22, 1954, in a memo, General Secretary Arthur R. Ford noted Foreign Minister Dulles that military aid to the East including training and equipment for the military here should be carried out with a low priority and not let it affect the development of allied forces elsewhere. In addition, the Secretary-General also said that the political situation in the South was not yet stable, so it was not the time for the United States to play a major role in supporting and training the Vietnamese military. At the end of September, there were major changes in power. At the critical moment, a meeting between France and the US on Vietnam was held in a tense atmosphere lasting three days in Washington from September 27 to September 29, 1954. The result of this meeting has shown that since then, the balance of power in Vietnam has really changed. It has fallen into the hands of the Americans and the French. During the Vietnam War, Mr. Bảo Đại said, It makes no sense to say that I put myself out of all these changes. The French solution has ended and Washington has become Mr. Diệm's official sponsor. Mr. Bảo Đại said that it was not wrong because even though he was deeply involved in the economic and financial field in the South, now France is not capable and convenient enough After the Second World War, France had to ask the US to sponsor the war in the East. Even after the Geneva Accords, the budget of the French military still had to rely on US money. One of the results of the September meeting was that France gave in and accepted US support for Mr. Diệm. For Vietnam, representatives of France and the United States agreed that their government must support Mr. Ngô Đình Diệm in establishing and maintaining a strong diplomatic relationship with the United States. To achieve this goal, France and the United States will encourage all anti-communist parties in Vietnam to fully cooperate with the government of Mr. Ngô Đình Diệm to oppose Diệt Minh in a strong way and build a free and prosperous Vietnam. The version of the meeting stated that in the current situation, the two sides agreed to consider five main issues Mr. Bảo Đại, Mr. Hinh, and Mr. Hồ Chí Minh. First, Mr. Bảo Đại must be aware that his actions to strengthen the Diệm government will greatly affect the support for Vietnam by both French and US governments. Second, Mr. Diệm must be encouraged to use appropriate measures and within the government's authority to support our actions. To Mr. Bảo Đại, the suggestion is that it is very important to support the Diệm government, but because it is difficult to replace him at the moment, we should find a solution and let him replace both France and the United States to support Mr. Diệm. Third, for the French, the measures of both countries must be closely coordinated. The French must know the position of both countries to support Mr. Diệm. 10. Congressman Mike Manfield Born in 1903, passed away in 2001. A person with a great influence in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee has delivered to the Eisenhower government a report right after his visit to Saigon, emphasizing his support for Mr. Diệm and believes that only Mr. Diệm can lead a non-communist government in Vietnam. On the same day, the United States also acted as a pressure. The President of the United States said in a statement that the United States would not provide long-term assistance to the Vietnamese military if there was any doubt about the loyalty of the Chief of Staff and senior officers. In addition, if necessary, the Ambassador can meet Prime Minister Diệm to inform him that the United States would not provide long-term assistance to the Vietnamese military. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. In addition to revealing that the Eisenhower government was about to send an important letter to Prime Minister Diệm in a few days, Diệm said the letter was intended to solve the issue of the establishment of a military-civilian government as a necessary condition for the democratic system. The letter analyzed the issue in detail before reaching six conclusions, including the removal of Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. On October 21, the U.S. Secretary of State sent two U.S. ambassadors to Paris and Saigon a telegram to urge more support for Mr. Diệm. In our opinion, such a situation will create conditions in South Vietnam similar to the situation that has led to the demobilization of half of Vietnam, although it can be re-established internally in a short time. Fourth, replacing Mr. Bảo Đại when there is a parliament. Although we also agree with Mr. Mendez Frank to continue to maintain Mr. Bảo Đại in his current role as Secretary of State, replacing him will be a chance to get him out of the war. Fifth, the U.S. established a military counseling agency MAAG. On October 20, the U.S. approved the earliest start of a military training program by the MAAG military counseling agency in Saigon, with personnel and other resources currently in place. We hope that this step, along with the signing of President Eisenhower's letter to Prime Minister Diệm, will strengthen Mr. Diệm's power in relations with the French and other Vietnamese groups. Sixth, to sum up, unless Mr. Diệm receives full support from the United States and France, his chances of success are very low, but if he gets that support, his chances will definitely be much higher. The U.S. will directly support the South Vietnamese government from now on, not through the West. As mentioned in paragraph 8 of the October 1, 1954 letter to Prime Minister Diệm, I have instructed the U.S. ambassador in Vietnam to consider Mr. Diệm as the leader of the government. How can a U.S. program support Mr. Diệm? Mr. Diệm, how can a U.S. program directly support your government be able to support Vietnam during this time of challenge, provided that your government is ready to ensure the standards of aid use when supported? This statement was widely circulated in Saigon and Paris the next day. It has another immediate effect as it proves that on the head of General Collins, Ambassador Heath in Saigon expressed his dissatisfaction about this matter. Only two days later, on October 26, the U.S. ambassador in Washington came to the U.S. Department of State to protest. According to a memo of Mr. Diệm's speech, Mr. Diệm said that Mr. Diệm is very stubborn because although Mr. Hinh gave in and accepted the order from Mr. Diệm, Mr. Diệm also opposed the letter of President Eisenhower when it was announced that this letter had caused a lot of uproar in Saigon and it destroyed all that we had agreed with each other in Washington before. So it gave Mr. Diệm complete freedom without asking him a prerequisite to establish a stable and strong government as we had agreed with each other. But whatever Mr. Diệm said, Foreign Minister Dulles still doubted. Mr. Diệm said, We all know that, but because France did not support Mr. Diệm, a stable government was not established. The general was confused, so Mr. Dulles concluded that to succeed, Mr. Diệm needed support from all sides, including France. And the support must be clear and continuous, not just words. The tense situation between Mr. Diệm and Mr. Hinh was resolved on November 12, 1954, the day after General Collins came to Saigon as a special envoy of President Eisenhower. He arranged with General Ely to put pressure on General Bảo Đại about General Hinh. On November 13, General Bảo Đại instructed General Hinh to go to France for reference, then keep him there for the reason that this was a strategic retreat. We would like to open here to Mr. Diệm, who spoke in a very bold and attractive voice on the first floor like this. Tomorrow, the general will return. Will Mr. Diệm still sit there or not?