Thousands of Russian men are leaving the country amid fears of another military draft, with border crossings surging, requests for emigration assistance climbing and the Kremlin tightening enforcement of military recruitment requirements.
By yourNEWS Media Newsroom
A growing number of Russian men are leaving their homeland amid concerns that President Vladimir Putin is preparing another military mobilization to replenish forces fighting in Ukraine, despite repeated Kremlin denials that a new nationwide call-up is planned. Reports of increased border crossings, rising demand for emigration assistance and stricter military recruitment procedures suggest that anxiety over compulsory service is spreading as Russia’s invasion enters its fifth year.
The latest departures follow Russia’s September parliamentary elections, which some military-age men viewed as a potential turning point for government recruitment policy. Although Moscow has not announced a new mass mobilization, fears that the Kremlin could expand conscription after the vote have prompted individuals and families to seek refuge in neighboring countries.
According to an October 12 investigation by The Economist, the emerging departure wave includes young professionals, students and other men worried about being compelled to participate in the war. Their decisions reflect concerns about military service as well as broader frustration over restrictions on personal freedoms and the deteriorating economic conditions associated with the prolonged conflict.
Among those who recently left was a 35-year-old Moscow advertising worker identified as Dmitry, who departed Russia on September 18, the opening day of the country’s parliamentary elections. Before leaving, he wrote “criminal” on his ballot in protest against the government, then traveled to the airport and boarded a flight to Istanbul.
His departure illustrated the choices facing Russians who oppose the war or fear compulsory military service but have few opportunities to challenge government policy.
“It’s hard to believe your own state can just suddenly send you off to be slaughtered, but we’ve already seen it happen,” Dmitry told The Economist.
The concern is rooted in Russia’s September 2022 mobilization, when Putin ordered approximately 300,000 reservists called into military service following major Russian battlefield setbacks. The announcement triggered a large exodus of military-age men, overwhelming border crossings and driving up transportation and housing costs in neighboring countries.
Four years later, organizations assisting Russians seeking to avoid military service report another substantial increase in demand for assistance.
Grigory Sverdlin, who leads Idite Lesom, a volunteer organization helping Russians avoid military recruitment and leave the country, said requests for assistance have risen approximately 50% since spring.
The organization’s activities include helping individuals understand recruitment rules, navigate restrictions and identify options for avoiding compulsory service.
Anastasia Burakova, founder of Kovcheg, an organization supporting Russian emigrants, reported an even sharper increase. She said inquiries have climbed eightfold since July, indicating that growing numbers of people are actively investigating the possibility of leaving.
“We are now seeing a smaller but better-prepared wave of emigration,” Burakova told The Economist.
Unlike the sudden departures that followed Putin’s 2022 mobilization announcement, the current movement appears to involve people making arrangements before any new nationwide call-up is formally declared.
Potential emigrants are researching travel requirements, arranging financial resources, contacting assistance organizations and seeking temporary housing abroad. Those preparations suggest that some Russians are attempting to avoid the difficulties encountered during the previous mobilization, when border congestion and rapidly changing government rules complicated departures.
Neighboring Georgia has become one of the principal destinations because Russian citizens can enter without obtaining a visa in advance.
On August 18, approximately 20,000 people crossed from Russia into Georgia by land, roughly three times the typical daily volume reported by The Economist.
The increase came amid widespread rumors about additional mobilization measures and growing uncertainty surrounding the Kremlin’s plans for replenishing military personnel.
Other reporting has identified similarly elevated traffic along the border.
An August investigation by Politico into Russia’s military recruitment preparations reported that more than 113,000 people crossed into Georgia through the Upper Lars checkpoint during a single week.
The checkpoint, located along the mountainous route connecting Russia and Georgia, has become an important exit point for Russian citizens seeking to leave by car or other ground transportation.
The reported figures demonstrate unusually heavy cross-border movement, although they do not establish that every traveler was fleeing military service. Border statistics can include tourists, commercial travelers, returning residents and people entering neighboring countries for other purposes.
Nevertheless, the increases have occurred alongside independently reported growth in requests for draft avoidance and emigration assistance.
Georgia has also experienced significant political and economic effects from previous waves of Russian migration. The arrival of large numbers of Russian citizens after the 2022 invasion increased demand for rental housing, altered local labor markets and generated public debate over the country’s relationship with Moscow.
Armenia, another destination for Russian emigrants, has experienced additional housing pressure during the latest period of uncertainty.
Rental prices in parts of Armenia have reportedly increased between 30% and 50% since spring as demand from incoming Russians added to existing pressure on the housing market.
The sharp increases have created difficulties for some local residents while also illustrating the financial resources that certain emigrants are willing to spend to avoid remaining in Russia.
Many of those leaving are not necessarily committed to permanent emigration. Some hope to return if military recruitment concerns diminish or political conditions change, while others are seeking longer-term residence abroad.
The uncertainty surrounding their decisions reflects the Kremlin’s continuing refusal to confirm plans for another mobilization.
Before September’s parliamentary elections, Putin dismissed reports of an impending call-up as a hostile effort to undermine confidence in the government.
“That’s utter rubbish. It’s an information attack on Russia,” Putin said, according to The Economist.
Russian officials have repeatedly maintained that the military can meet its personnel requirements through voluntary recruitment and contract service rather than another large-scale mobilization.
The government has offered substantial financial incentives to recruits, including signing bonuses, elevated military salaries and benefits for families.
Those payments have become an important part of Russia’s effort to sustain its military operations while avoiding the political consequences of another compulsory call-up.
However, recruitment incentives have been accompanied by reports of coercive practices and increasingly restrictive administrative measures.
Military recruitment offices have allegedly pressured students, unemployed men and other vulnerable individuals to sign contracts for military service, sometimes using threats or misleading assurances about the conditions under which they would serve.
The Russian government has also strengthened its ability to track potential recruits through electronic summonses and centralized military registration systems.
Under the revised procedures, military summonses can be issued electronically, reducing the ability of individuals to avoid notification by changing addresses or declining to collect documents.
Once a summons becomes legally effective, authorities can impose restrictions on international travel and certain other activities.
These measures have raised concerns that the Kremlin could conduct more extensive recruitment without announcing a mobilization comparable to the September 2022 decree.
The electronic system also creates uncertainty for men considering departure, because administrative restrictions can take effect before they are physically contacted by military recruitment officers.
The potential for sudden travel restrictions has encouraged some Russians to leave while their documents remain valid and border crossings are still possible.
In the Russian city of Penza, reports of aggressive recruitment efforts have reportedly prompted residents to organize groups intended to protect men from detention and forced military processing.
Such accounts have contributed to public anxiety about the extent to which recruitment authorities are operating within established procedures.
Independent verification of individual allegations can be difficult because Russia has imposed extensive restrictions on media organizations and public criticism of the military.
Russian authorities have also strengthened legal penalties for desertion, unauthorized absence and refusing military orders, increasing the risks faced by men already serving in the armed forces.
The consequences are especially severe for soldiers attempting to leave the military after signing contracts or receiving mobilization orders.
The government has maintained wartime measures allowing military contracts to remain in effect beyond their original terms under specified circumstances, limiting opportunities for personnel to leave service.
These restrictions have made draft avoidance and military desertion distinct but increasingly connected concerns among Russians opposed to continued participation in the war.
The Associated Press reported in September on Russians leaving because of draft fears and worsening domestic conditions, describing an emerging departure movement driven by multiple pressures rather than a single government announcement.
Among the factors cited were Ukrainian drone attacks inside Russia, increasing restrictions on internet access, economic uncertainty and government pressure on political opponents.
Ukrainian long-range drone operations have expanded significantly during 2026, bringing the consequences of the war into areas far from the front lines.
Attacks on industrial facilities, transportation infrastructure and other targets have disrupted daily life in parts of Russia, contributing to uncertainty among residents who previously experienced relatively little direct exposure to the fighting.
Airports have periodically suspended operations because of drone threats, while some regions have experienced fuel supply disruptions and interruptions affecting commercial activity.
The increasing reach of Ukrainian attacks has reinforced concerns that Russia’s war is becoming more difficult to separate from ordinary civilian life.
Economic pressures have added to the unease.
Russia continues to devote substantial government resources to military operations, weapons production and payments to soldiers and their families.
The prolonged conflict has strained parts of the civilian economy, including industries facing labor shortages and difficulties accessing foreign technology or investment.
Military recruitment has also created competition for workers, particularly in regions where signing bonuses and military salaries exceed earnings available through ordinary employment.
These financial incentives may encourage some Russians to enlist, but they also highlight the resources required to sustain military manpower during a long conflict.
Russia’s economic difficulties have been compounded by international sanctions, restrictions affecting financial transactions and continuing uncertainty over trade relationships.
The combination of military demands and domestic pressures has shaped the environment in which younger Russians are deciding whether to remain in the country.
Government restrictions on internet services and online communications have become another significant concern.
Russian authorities have expanded efforts to control digital platforms and limit access to information considered threatening to national security or political stability.
Restrictions on messaging services, independent news outlets and opposition organizations have reduced avenues for public criticism of the government.
For some Russians, the combination of censorship, surveillance and recruitment fears has made departure attractive even without a confirmed mobilization order.
Political activists and individuals associated with opposition movements have also reported increased pressure from law enforcement.
The AP documented cases involving Russians who cited political harassment, restrictions on civil liberties and concerns about potential detention as reasons for leaving.
Their experiences indicate that the latest emigration movement extends beyond military-age men directly concerned about conscription.
Families, professionals and political dissidents are also seeking opportunities abroad amid uncertainty about Russia’s future.
The broader departure trend presents challenges for Moscow because many emigrants possess professional qualifications and work experience that could otherwise contribute to the domestic economy.
Earlier waves of migration included technology workers, entrepreneurs, medical professionals and other skilled employees.
Although some eventually returned, others established businesses or permanent residences in neighboring countries and elsewhere.
A renewed exodus could deepen existing workforce shortages, particularly if departures remain concentrated among younger adults.
The Kremlin faces a competing military challenge: maintaining sufficient personnel to sustain operations in Ukraine after more than four years of combat.
Russia has relied heavily on contract soldiers and financial incentives, while its 2022 mobilization provided a substantial additional pool of personnel.
The continuation of intense fighting has required the armed forces to replace casualties, rotate exhausted units and maintain personnel levels across an extensive front.
Ukrainian officials have warned that Moscow could mobilize hundreds of thousands of additional troops, although those assessments have not been accompanied by a publicly confirmed Russian decision to initiate another nationwide call-up.
Estimates concerning Russia’s manpower requirements vary, and neither Moscow nor Kyiv has released complete independently verifiable casualty figures.
The scale of losses and the requirements of future operations remain important factors in assessing whether the Kremlin may eventually consider broader compulsory recruitment.
Western analysts have also examined whether Russia’s existing contract recruitment system can continue providing enough personnel without significantly expanding the draft.
The financial cost of attracting volunteers has increased as regional governments compete to meet recruitment targets.
In some areas, signing bonuses have risen substantially, illustrating the pressure on authorities to persuade additional men to enlist.
Those payments impose continuing demands on regional and federal budgets, particularly when combined with military salaries, equipment expenses and benefits for wounded veterans and families of deceased soldiers.
The Kremlin must therefore weigh the financial cost of voluntary recruitment against the political and economic consequences of compulsory mobilization.
The 2022 call-up demonstrated that mandatory service can generate substantial public anxiety and prompt large numbers of people to leave the country.
At that time, Russia experienced long lines at border crossings and rapidly rising prices for airline tickets to countries that continued accepting Russian travelers.
The departures included men who feared being sent to the battlefield without adequate preparation, as well as families unwilling to risk separation or involvement in the war.
Putin’s government eventually stabilized the immediate situation, but the experience left a lasting impression on potential recruits.
The current wave reflects those memories.
Individuals who witnessed the previous mobilization are now attempting to prepare for the possibility that similar measures could return, even though official statements continue to reject the prospect.
For organizations such as Idite Lesom and Kovcheg, rising requests for assistance offer evidence of public concern that may not be reflected in official Russian statements.
The groups provide information and support to people seeking alternatives to military service or considering relocation, including those who face administrative and financial difficulties.
Their reported increases in inquiries suggest that fear of compulsory recruitment is influencing decisions well before any formal mobilization announcement.
At the same time, the number of inquiries cannot be equated directly with the number of people who ultimately leave Russia.
Some individuals may seek information without traveling, while others may leave temporarily and later return.
The current movement also remains smaller than the extraordinary departure wave recorded during the initial mobilization in 2022, according to organizations tracking emigration.
Its distinguishing feature appears to be the level of preparation among those considering departure.
Rather than responding to an unexpected announcement, some Russians are arranging documents, transportation and accommodations while attempting to anticipate future government restrictions.
That preparation may reduce the logistical difficulties associated with leaving, but it does not eliminate uncertainty about immigration rules or employment prospects in destination countries.
Georgia and Armenia continue to provide relatively accessible options, although rising living costs and changing political circumstances can complicate longer-term relocation.
Other Russians have traveled to Turkey, Central Asian countries and additional destinations where entry requirements may be less restrictive than in much of Europe.
International travel options have become more limited since the invasion of Ukraine, particularly because of aviation restrictions, visa policies and reduced direct connections with Western countries.
Those limitations can make overland routes and regional destinations particularly important during periods of heightened demand.
The Kremlin has sought to discourage speculation about mobilization by portraying such reports as attempts to spread panic.
However, the government’s denials have not eliminated public concern, partly because officials rejected similar speculation shortly before the September 2022 mobilization.
That history has weakened confidence among some Russians who fear that new recruitment measures could be introduced with little warning.
The introduction of electronic summonses and other administrative restrictions has further complicated efforts to assess the government’s intentions.
Such systems can support routine military registration and recruitment, but critics argue that they also provide the infrastructure needed for a larger mobilization if political leaders decide to pursue one.
The existence of those capabilities does not establish that a new nationwide call-up has been ordered.
Nevertheless, the expanded recruitment system has increased uncertainty among individuals who could be subject to military service.
The broader consequences extend beyond Russia’s borders.
Neighboring countries must accommodate new arrivals, while businesses and housing markets respond to changing demand.
Governments also face questions about residence permits, employment eligibility and how to handle Russian citizens seeking protection from possible military recruitment.
Some countries have welcomed Russian emigrants as a source of skilled labor and business investment. Others have expressed security concerns or imposed restrictions on Russian citizens following the invasion of Ukraine.
These differing approaches influence where Russians can relocate and whether they are able to establish stable lives outside their country.
The latest reports indicate that Russian emigration is again becoming an important measure of domestic uncertainty surrounding the war.
The movement has not reached the scale of the 2022 exodus, and no new nationwide mobilization has been announced. However, increased border traffic and sharp growth in requests for assistance demonstrate that recruitment fears are affecting decisions among military-age Russians.
For Putin, the challenge involves maintaining sufficient forces to continue military operations while avoiding another politically disruptive call-up.
For those leaving, the decision often comes down to whether they trust official assurances that compulsory mobilization will not return.
As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues, the combination of battlefield demands, stricter recruitment enforcement and declining confidence in government statements is prompting more people to make preparations before the Kremlin announces its next steps.
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