WASHINGTON — Calls for the United States to reduce its economic dependence on China are intensifying as Washington confronts a difficult question: How far can America separate critical industries from its largest strategic competitor without disrupting businesses, consumers and global supply chains?
The issue was raised Monday by a reader of Real News with Lucretia Hughes, who called for the United States to “delink and de-risk from China.”
The distinction between those two ideas matters.
“Decoupling” generally means substantially separating the American and Chinese economies. “De-risking” is a more targeted strategy aimed at reducing dependence on China in sectors considered essential to national security while allowing trade in less-sensitive products to continue.
The United States is already moving in that direction.
U.S. goods imports from China fell to about $308.7 billion in 2025, down nearly 30% from the previous year, according to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. American goods exports to China totaled approximately $106 billion, leaving the United States with a goods trade deficit of about $203 billion.
The decline was substantial.
But it did not mean America stopped buying foreign goods.
Instead, portions of the U.S. supply chain shifted elsewhere.
The United States recorded a $178 billion goods deficit with Vietnam in 2025, while its deficit with Taiwan nearly doubled to approximately $147 billion, according to federal trade data.
That illustrates one of the central challenges confronting policymakers.
Moving production out of China does not necessarily bring manufacturing back to the United States.
Sometimes it simply moves it to another country.
China also remains deeply embedded in international manufacturing networks, making complete economic separation far more complicated than imposing tariffs on finished Chinese products.
U.S. Census Bureau figures show that through July 2026, Americans had still imported approximately $156.4 billion in goods from China, while exporting about $65.2 billion.
The national-security argument for reducing that dependence is strongest in strategically important sectors.
Semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications equipment, batteries, critical minerals and components used in defense and energy infrastructure have become central to Washington’s debate over supply-chain security.
The concern is straightforward.
A country that depends heavily on a geopolitical competitor for materials or components necessary to operate its economy or military could find that dependence used against it during a crisis.
The debate has increasingly spread beyond the United States.
European governments are confronting Chinese industrial overcapacity and their own dependence on critical materials. Germany and France are now pushing the European Union to strengthen its ability to respond when foreign governments restrict essential supplies.
China’s enormous manufacturing capacity also remains a source of friction.
At recent G20 trade talks, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer criticized industrial overproduction, particularly from China, arguing that excess production can undercut manufacturers elsewhere. Trade ministers acknowledged the broader excess-capacity problem but failed to reach a comprehensive agreement.
But Washington is not pursuing complete economic isolation.
The Trump administration and China recently released reciprocal lists covering roughly $30 billion in products from each country that could receive reduced tariff treatment. The products are primarily nonsensitive goods, while strategically important sectors such as semiconductors and electric vehicles were excluded.
That approach offers a possible blueprint for what “de-risking” could look like.
America can continue buying toys, household products and other ordinary consumer goods from China while simultaneously insisting that critical medicines, military components, advanced computer chips and essential infrastructure cannot depend overwhelmingly on a geopolitical rival.
There are costs to that strategy.
Rebuilding domestic manufacturing capacity requires factories, skilled workers, energy, raw materials and significant investment. Moving production to the United States or allied countries can also increase costs compared with sourcing products from the world’s lowest-cost producer.
Consumers could ultimately pay some of those costs.
Supporters of reshoring argue that the additional expense should be viewed partly as an investment in national security, American employment and supply-chain resilience.
The numbers already show that America’s economic relationship with China is changing.
Total U.S. goods and services trade with China fell approximately 25% in 2025, according to USTR.
The harder question is what comes next.
America does not have to stop trading with China to recognize the danger of depending on China for products the country cannot afford to lose access to during a confrontation.
That makes the emerging strategy less about shutting China out of the American economy entirely and more about deciding what America must once again be capable of producing for itself.
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