The federal cybersecurity agency has issued a 13-page election security framework ahead of the Nov. 3 midterms, urging paper ballots, established chain-of-custody procedures and protections against cyberattacks, insider threats and physical disruptions.

By yourNEWS Media Newsroom.

Federal cybersecurity officials released a new security framework Thursday outlining steps state and local election administrators can take to protect voting infrastructure before the Nov. 3 midterm elections.

The 13-page plan from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency identifies potential vulnerabilities involving election software, voter registration databases, insiders and physical threats while directing election officials to security services available from the federal government at no cost.

The document arrives after Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin directed CISA in July to develop a national election infrastructure security plan. Mullin initially said the plan would be released by mid-August.

“In July of this year, Secretary Mullin tasked CISA with developing the Election Infrastructure Security Plan, which had been developed to help partners defend against cyber and physical threats to election infrastructure,” the document states.

“Election security is not a partisan issue. Election security is national security.”

CISA, which was established within the Department of Homeland Security in 2018, has previously alerted states to foreign threats targeting election systems. The newly released plan, however, does not identify a specific threat to the 2026 election from Russia, Iran or China.

Instead, the framework concentrates on vulnerabilities election administrators could encounter across different parts of the voting process.

Among the risks identified are exploitable software flaws, attacks against voter registration databases, threats originating from people with authorized access and physical disruptions such as the bomb threats reported at some polling locations during the 2024 election.

The agency said many security safeguards already embedded in election administration were developed specifically to reduce opportunities for manipulation from within.

“Many longstanding election practices such as handling ballots in bipartisan teams of two, allowing observers to be present during ballot counting, and maintaining chain-of-custody procedures—were specifically designed to reduce the likelihood and impact of insider threats,” the plan reads.

CISA said those established practices can address many potential risks when properly implemented.

The agency also emphasized the importance of maintaining a physical record of votes that can be independently examined.

“Use paper ballots that can be easily reviewed to ensure transparency, auditability, and resilience against software failures or manipulation,” the report reads.

According to the plan, the broader objective is “to ensure the American people can trust voting systems and know that physical safety measures will be in place when they go to their assigned polling locations to cast their votes.”

The document also says DHS has “consistently supported CISA’s delivery of cybersecurity and physical security services to election officials.”

Concerns about the security of election technology have extended beyond software and computer networks to the hardware supply chain.

Mullin said in an Aug. 27 letter that components used in many voting machines operating in the United States are manufactured in China, raising concerns about reliance on equipment originating from a foreign adversary.

“Voting machines with components manufactured by foreign adversaries introduce significant security risks,” Mullin said. “These vulnerabilities mean that malicious actors could potentially compromise election infrastructure at any stage of the supply chain, even before the machines are assembled or deployed. If a component is tampered with during manufacturing, it could serve as a point-of-entry for hackers, allowing for the possibility of synchronized attacks across multiple machines and jurisdictions.”

The warning followed the release of additional information this summer concerning Chinese activity involving American voter data.

In July, the leaders of four U.S. intelligence and national security agencies supported key elements of President Donald Trump’s assertion that China had engaged in election interference through efforts targeting U.S. voter registration information.

A fact sheet released by the White House Government Transparency Task Force said China and entities acting on its behalf had purchased, stolen or hacked voter information involving as many as 220 million Americans. According to the task force, some of the information was not publicly available.

The fact sheet also drew a distinction between interfering with election infrastructure and actually altering election results.

Under the definition cited by the task force, a foreign government does not have to successfully change vote totals for its activity to qualify as election interference.

“That definition includes a foreign power’s targeting of voter registration infrastructure or data,” the task force states, citing declassified documents produced by the U.S. intelligence community.

With the November election approaching, CISA’s newly released framework focuses on giving election administrators tools to prevent, identify and respond to disruptions while maintaining voting systems that can be independently checked.

The plan emphasizes existing election safeguards, paper ballots and federal cybersecurity and physical-security assistance as officials prepare for threats that could arise from computer systems, insiders, supply chains or disruptions at polling locations.

Original article