Satellite imagery shows extensive construction at seven facilities associated with China’s nuclear weapons infrastructure as independent estimates indicate Beijing’s arsenal has expanded to about 620 warheads and work continues on new missile silos.

By yourNEWS Media Newsroom.

New satellite imagery shows China expanding infrastructure at seven locations associated with its nuclear weapons program, providing another indication of the scale of Beijing’s nuclear buildup as questions intensify over weapons production, missile deployment and the possibility of renewed nuclear testing.

A Telegraph investigation using satellite images and analysis from nuclear and geospatial specialists identified significant development at Pingtong, Zitong, Lop Nur, Jiuquan, Mianyang, Jinta and Guangyuan.

The imagery documents new buildings, tunnels, boreholes, security infrastructure and other construction associated with different stages of China’s nuclear program. The images themselves do not establish how many weapons China has produced, nor do they demonstrate that Beijing has carried out an undeclared nuclear explosive test.

At Pingtong, a facility experts believe is associated with production of nuclear weapon “pits,” the fissile cores at the center of nuclear warheads, satellite imagery shows expanded security infrastructure and growth of a nearby support community that includes apartment buildings, an athletics field and bus facilities.

Renny Babiarz, a geospatial intelligence expert, said the development fits a broader expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s leadership.

“I think there was a decision made [under Xi] to develop the nuclear weapons program — to invest in it, and to expand it,” Babiarz said. “China sees itself as a global superpower and is challenging the U.S.”

Other sites appear to perform different functions within the nuclear weapons enterprise.

At Zitong, specialists identified a structure approximately 600 meters long that they described as a shock tube. Such facilities can be used to study how weapons, components and materials respond to intense pressure and shock waves without necessarily conducting a full nuclear explosive test.

Attention has also centered on Lop Nur, the remote site where China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964 and subsequent nuclear weapons tests before its last publicly acknowledged test in 1996.

Recent satellite imagery shows new tunnels, boreholes and other construction at Lop Nur. Experts examining the site say those additions could expand China’s ability to conduct testing or related experiments, although the structures alone do not establish that an explosive nuclear test has occurred.

Patricia Lewis, a nuclear physicist and arms-control expert, said physical testing remains an important consideration when countries develop substantially different weapons.

“You can’t really develop a new nuclear weapon without a test,” Lewis said. “That’s in the back of the mind for everyone when it comes to China, which is developing new weapons.”

China has repeatedly denied allegations that it has secretly resumed nuclear explosive testing.

Its embassy in London defended Beijing’s nuclear policy in a statement to The Telegraph.

“China pursues a highly responsible, consistent and transparent nuclear policy. China adheres to a defensive nuclear strategy and a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and always keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security,” the embassy said.

“China does not engage in a nuclear arms race and contributes stability and certainty to the world,” it added.

Independent estimates nevertheless show China’s stockpile continuing to grow.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that China possessed approximately 620 nuclear warheads in January 2026, up from approximately 600 a year earlier. SIPRI said China’s arsenal is expanding faster than that of any other nuclear-armed state, although the Chinese stockpile remains substantially smaller than those of the United States and Russia.

SIPRI estimates that Washington and Moscow together still possess nearly 86% of the world’s nuclear warheads.

China’s expansion is not confined to warhead-related facilities.

By January, SIPRI said China had loaded hundreds of missiles into three large silo fields in the northern part of the country while continuing work on 30 additional silos in mountainous regions farther east. The institute said China’s force structure could eventually give it at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles as either the United States or Russia by the end of the decade, depending on how Beijing chooses to deploy its weapons.

The buildup has increased scrutiny of activity at Lop Nur.

U.S. officials alleged in February that China secretly conducted a low-yield nuclear explosive test there on June 22, 2020. Beijing rejected the accusation.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization has said its International Monitoring System detected two very small seismic events near the relevant area on that date, 12 seconds apart, but that they were well below the approximately 500-ton TNT-equivalent level at which the network can reliably identify events consistent with nuclear test explosions.

Because of their small size, the organization said available monitoring data alone could not determine their cause with confidence.

Robert Floyd, executive secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, has emphasized those technical limitations while arguing for stronger international verification mechanisms. In a February statement on nuclear testing and arms control, Floyd warned that nuclear testing restrictions remain critical as international arms-control structures weaken.

The monitoring uncertainty is significant because very low-yield experiments are inherently more difficult to identify conclusively than traditional nuclear weapon tests.

The CTBTO said its network detected all six declared North Korean nuclear tests and can identify nuclear test explosions with yields of approximately 500 tons of TNT or greater. Smaller events, however, can leave signals too limited to determine confidently whether they resulted from nuclear activity, conventional explosions or natural seismic events.

The renewed focus on Chinese nuclear infrastructure comes as the international arms-control system faces a broader transition.

New START, the final bilateral treaty limiting deployed strategic nuclear forces in the United States and Russia, expired Feb. 5. The agreement restricted deployed strategic launchers and warheads for the world’s two largest nuclear powers but did not impose limitations on China.

China has resisted calls to join U.S.-Russian strategic arms negotiations, pointing to the much larger American and Russian arsenals.

At the same time, Beijing is developing a more diverse nuclear force that includes land-based missiles, submarine-launched systems and aircraft while constructing hundreds of missile silos.

That combination has complicated longstanding assumptions about China’s nuclear posture.

Beijing continues to publicly maintain a no-first-use policy and says it possesses only the minimum nuclear capability necessary for national security. Its rapid infrastructure development, however, has prompted outside analysts to examine whether China’s future nuclear force could become significantly larger or operate differently from the comparatively limited deterrent it maintained for decades.

The seven sites identified in the satellite investigation offer evidence of physical expansion across multiple portions of that weapons infrastructure.

What the imagery cannot establish on its own is equally important.

Construction at nuclear-related facilities does not reveal precisely how many warheads China has manufactured. New tunnels and boreholes at Lop Nur do not demonstrate that an explosive nuclear test has occurred. A shock-testing installation does not necessarily indicate preparations for a full-scale nuclear detonation.

Those conclusions require additional intelligence, monitoring information and other evidence.

The satellite photographs instead provide a view of the resources China is committing to nuclear-related facilities at the same time that independent researchers are documenting growth in its estimated stockpile and missile infrastructure.

With the U.S.-Russian New START framework now expired and China’s arsenal remaining outside comparable numerical restrictions, that physical expansion is becoming an increasingly significant factor in the future of global nuclear arms control.

Original article