Internal military records reviewed by experts allegedly show Sudan’s armed forces produced as many as 290 chlorine-filled munitions, tested chemical bombs and sought to conceal evidence of their use, deepening scrutiny of a government already accused by Washington of violating international chemical-weapons law.
By yourNEWS Media Newsroom
A collection of internal Sudanese military records allegedly documents a covert program that produced as many as 290 chlorine weapons and sought to hide evidence of chemical attacks, according to a Washington Post investigation published Saturday.
The materials — including videos, documents, voice notes and text messages — indicate that the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, diverted chlorine intended for drinking-water treatment, manufactured chemical warheads inside military facilities and conducted tests of improvised aerial bombs in remote desert areas.
The records also describe efforts to disguise evidence that chemical agents had been used after alleged attacks against opposing forces in 2024.
More than two dozen Western intelligence officials, chemical-weapons inspectors and human-rights experts reviewed portions of the material and considered it credible, according to the Post. Those specialists nevertheless cautioned that conclusively establishing the existence, scale and use of the alleged weapons program would require access to sites inside Sudan that investigators have been unable to obtain since the country’s civil war began.
Sudanese military leader Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, whose forces control Khartoum, has denied that Sudan developed or employed chemical weapons.
The newly disclosed files identify SAF officer Tariq Madani as the alleged organizer of the program.
Madani was already under U.S. scrutiny before the documents became public. The Treasury Department sanctioned him in June in his role as managing director of Target Multiactivities Company Ltd., a Sudanese company that Treasury said imported explosives from suppliers in Egypt and India for bombs used by the SAF.
When the Post contacted a telephone number associated with Madani in the leaked communications, a man identifying himself as Tariq denied knowing anything about the production of chemical weapons.
Among the material reviewed was a technical document describing a bomb designed to combine conventional explosives with a toxic chemical agent.
The weapon was described as containing 15 kilograms of chlorine gas and 20 kilograms of explosives.
Arabic-language instructions characterized the munition as having a “dual-effect” design intended “to conceal any evidence of the use of chemicals,” according to the Post’s translation.
The apparent concept was to combine chlorine with an explosive blast, potentially making it more difficult afterward to determine that a chemical agent had also been released.
Other communications suggest production occurred on a substantial scale.
In an exchange dating to late 2024, an officer reported that hundreds of bombs had been assembled at Merowe Air Base and that 106 had already been used.
Another message allegedly sent to an officer involved in air operations contained a video showing a victim with severely charred skin.
The accompanying message consisted of two words: “Your cooking.”
Independent specialists examined key portions of the digital material for evidence of fabrication.
Catalin Grigoras, a digital-forensics expert at the University of Colorado Denver, and Hafiz Malik of the University of Michigan-Dearborn analyzed important audio and visual files and found no evidence that they had been manipulated.
That forensic finding does not independently establish where the images were recorded, who created the weapons described in the documents or whether chlorine was used in a particular attack. It does provide additional support for the authenticity of the digital files examined by the experts.
The evidence described by the Post adds new detail to chemical-weapons allegations that have surrounded Sudan’s military for more than a year.
Washington formally determined last year that Sudan had violated international law through the use of chemical weapons.
The United States subsequently imposed additional sanctions in mid-2026 after Khartoum failed to meet conditions required under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act.
The latest documents potentially provide a more detailed picture of how such a weapons program operated.
Rather than describing isolated battlefield use of an available industrial chemical, the material allegedly depicts an organized process involving the procurement of chlorine, construction of specialized munitions, testing, storage and measures intended to obscure evidence after attacks.
Chlorine is widely used for legitimate civilian purposes, including water treatment. The files reviewed by the Post allege that supplies intended for drinking water were redirected into military production.
That distinction is important under international chemical-weapons rules because chlorine itself is not prohibited when used for peaceful purposes. Using a toxic chemical as a weapon, however, falls under international prohibitions governing chemical warfare.
Sudan has been formally bound by those restrictions for more than a quarter-century.
The country acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1999, making it one of the treaty’s 193 member states.
The convention prohibits participating governments from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling or using chemical weapons.
It also establishes verification mechanisms administered by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, including inspections designed to determine whether countries are complying with treaty obligations.
Sudan’s continuing civil war has prevented investigators from obtaining the type of physical access specialists say would be necessary to conclusively assess the alleged stockpile described in the documents.
That limitation leaves some critical questions unresolved.
The materials reportedly indicate that hundreds of munitions were produced and more than 100 used, but independent inspectors have not been able to enter the relevant military facilities, examine the alleged production sites or physically account for the weapons.
The reported size of the stockpile — as many as 290 chlorine munitions — consequently rests on documentary and digital evidence rather than an internationally verified weapons inventory.
The allegations nevertheless fit within an escalating series of U.S. actions directed at Sudan’s military leadership.
Burhan himself was sanctioned by the Treasury Department in January 2025.
Later findings by the State Department formally accused Sudan of chemical-weapons use, followed by additional punitive measures when the government failed to satisfy American compliance requirements.
Madani’s June designation broadened that scrutiny to an individual now identified by the leaked materials as the alleged architect of the chemical-weapons operation.
Treasury’s action against him at the time focused on his role at Target Multiactivities and the company’s acquisition of conventional explosives rather than the chemical-weapons allegations now detailed in the internal files.
The new evidence could therefore add another dimension to existing investigations of Sudan’s military procurement and weapons programs.
It also arrives shortly before Burhan is expected to appear before world leaders in New York.
The Sudanese leader is scheduled to address the high-level debate of the United Nations General Assembly, which runs from Sept. 22 through Sept. 28.
His appearance would come as his government confronts both existing U.S. findings of chemical-weapons use and new documentary allegations describing how Sudan’s armed forces may have manufactured, deployed and attempted to conceal a stockpile of chlorine munitions.
Burhan continues to deny that his military either developed or used such weapons.
Without access to the locations identified in the records, independent investigators cannot fully verify the alleged program or determine the current status of the reported stockpile.
But the combination of internal military communications, weapons-design documents, production accounts, videos and forensic analysis provides a substantially more detailed body of evidence surrounding allegations that Sudan’s military developed a clandestine chemical capability during the country’s civil war.
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