A federal audit found that maintenance delays cost the Navy more than 15,000 operational days and an estimated $3.4 billion from fiscal 2016 through 2025, while warning that additional submarine backlogs could generate another $3.1 billion in costs by 2030.
By yourNEWS Media Newsroom
The U.S. Navy lost more than 15,000 operational days and incurred an estimated $3.4 billion in costs over the past decade because attack submarines were sidelined by maintenance delays, according to a new Government Accountability Office audit.
The congressional watchdog found that submarines and their crews were at times kept pier-side despite being unable to contribute to military operations, creating substantial costs while reducing the number of vessels available for deployment.
“Lost operational days include delays completing depot maintenance and active idle time,” the GAO report states. “Active idle time describes a period when an attack submarine and its crew must remain pier-side because they are no longer certified to conduct normal operations and cannot be inducted into a maintenance period.”
The problem could become significantly more expensive over the next several years.
“Inactive idle time for submarines has grown and is projected to worsen,” the GAO warned, adding that “without mitigation, 15 attack submarines will enter inactive idle time from fiscal year 2026 through fiscal year 2030.”
GAO estimated those submarines could collectively accumulate more than 14,000 days of inactive idle time during that five-year period, costing the Navy approximately $3.1 billion to operate and support vessels that are no longer contributing to missions.
The report also found that only about 11% of attack-submarine depot maintenance conducted at public shipyards was completed on schedule during fiscal years 2016 through 2025.
“Further, the U.S. Navy only completed about 11 percent of attack submarine depot maintenance on time at the public shipyards, from fiscal years 2016 through 2025,” the report states.
GAO investigators said the maintenance problem has persisted since at least fiscal 2008.
The watchdog recommended that the Navy pursue more efficient methods for decommissioning attack submarines and develop an inactivation plan designed to reduce the amount of time ships and crews remain idle while waiting for available dry-dock capacity.
The Navy “verbally concurred” with both recommendations but did not submit written comments on the audit or provide a timetable for implementing the proposed changes.
The findings come as the federal government carries a national debt of approximately $40 trillion, intensifying scrutiny of federal spending and long-running procurement and maintenance inefficiencies.
A separate Judicial Watch report highlighted the GAO findings and characterized the spending as billions of dollars used to sustain submarines and crews that “provide no operational capability.”
As of fiscal 2025, the Navy operated 44 attack submarines, according to the audit.
Those vessels are among the military’s most heavily requested assets because they perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, launch Tomahawk cruise missiles against targets ashore and support carrier and other naval battle groups.
Their availability depends heavily on access to shipyards capable of performing complicated maintenance, repairs, reactor work, refueling and eventual decommissioning.
The Navy relies primarily on four public shipyards for that work: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.
The service itself has described those facilities as “obsolete” and inefficient.
Maintenance at the sites can include overhauls, alterations, refits, restorations and nuclear refueling, all of which require significant time and specialized infrastructure.
The backlog becomes especially difficult when older submarines designated for decommissioning remain in line for scarce dry-dock space.
GAO distinguishes that problem as “inactive idle time.”
Under that scenario, a submarine has already been designated for retirement but cannot enter a shipyard because no dry dock is available to defuel its nuclear reactor.
“As a result, the submarine and its crew must remain pier-side until a shipyard has the capacity in a dry dock to defuel their nuclear reactor,” the GAO said.
That differs from “active idle time,” which occurs when an otherwise operational attack submarine can no longer conduct normal missions because it is waiting to enter a scheduled maintenance period.
Both situations consume personnel and operating resources while leaving vessels unavailable for operational missions.
The result is a maintenance bottleneck in which submarines awaiting repairs compete for infrastructure with older vessels awaiting decommissioning.
GAO said that pattern has reduced fleet availability while producing billions of dollars in avoidable operating and personnel costs.
Attack submarines are particularly sensitive to maintenance delays because the Navy’s existing fleet is already heavily tasked by combatant commanders around the world.
Every extended period spent pier-side reduces the service’s ability to deploy submarines for intelligence collection, strike missions and broader fleet operations.
The audit therefore framed the maintenance problem as both a financial and readiness issue.
GAO concluded that without a more efficient approach to inactivating and decommissioning submarines, the Navy risks carrying the same backlog into the next decade while paying billions more to sustain ships and crews that are unable to contribute to operational requirements.
The watchdog’s two recommendations focus on relieving that bottleneck: evaluate more efficient decommissioning options and establish a comprehensive plan for reducing inactive idle time.
Whether the Navy will implement those changes, and how quickly, remains unclear after the service verbally agreed with the recommendations but provided no written implementation schedule.
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