National Security Briefing to the American People: Banning Foreign-Adversary Voting Systems

National Security Briefing to the American People

Banning the use of foreign-adversary voting systems components is imperative to saving the Republic. What the FCC Database that records components in use reveals about the hardware inside U.S. voting systems should outrage every American.

This briefing presents a National Security case with clear and convincing evidence, and a clear precedent for banning foreign-adversary electronic components and the voting systems they have been used in from U.S. elections. The material in this briefing relies heavily on research done by Compliance Testing LLC — an ISO 17025 accredited test laboratory recognized by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Canada, and Europe — together with a small group of subject-matter experts who can be described as cyber special forces operators.

How did we arrive where we are?

Since before electronic vote tabulation arrived in the U.S. we have been engaged in a fight between the American System of Economics and the Imperial System of Economics that we fought to break away from in the late 1700’s, and the War of 1812. Understanding this will help to explain why we face an existential threat imposed upon the American people by the globalist oligarchy.

The American System of Economics promoted by Alexander Hamilton and Henry Clay promoted personal industry and work product invested internally. In Federalist No. 11 (1787) Hamilton used the phrase “American system,” calling for the states to unite in creating one powerful system independent of European control to become self-sufficient as a nation.

The Imperial System, on the other hand, promoted the pillaging of colonies for a central good in Europe. The East India Company was created to do just that in the 1600’s, to advance the slave trade, and the trafficking of drugs (opium), and to harvest the natural resources of a colony, whisking them off to another land, not investing them into national growth in the land from whence they came. In other words, reliance on other nations, the opposite of self-sufficiency, globalization.

The City of London (not the city but the organization) could not stand a successful, sovereign America. So, how do you control a nation and its population that seeks to be free? Compromise their election system in a way that is hard, if not impossible, to detect. Then convince the population that all is well, and “there is nothing to see here, so just move on.” You also have to infiltrate their government all the way down to the county level to make sure your selections –oh no, not elections, but selections– are placed in positions of power to guard the secret of the coup d’état.

While the compromised legacy media vilifies the good guys for researching the probability of compromised systems and spins their CIA-generated propaganda lines, the number of talented watchdogs and whistleblowers has increased significantly. Their mission is to examine all of the various election tampering vectors —pathways— that are now proven to exist, much to the media complex’s chagrin, with ODNI declassification of documents that have kept election fraud perpetrated on the American people a secret for two decades. The rise of the machines, a hat tip to the Terminator, has been in the open for some time, sold as a secure, inexpensive, and convenient means to tabulate votes. But aren’t votes supposed to be counted as whole integers and not fractions? Governors, legislators, and county elections officials have been sold on a false claim, and now seem married to it.

Critical Infrastructure designation…

On January 6, 2017, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson designated U.S. election infrastructure as a critical infrastructure subsector. He classified it as a subsector of the existing “Government Facilities” critical infrastructure sector (one of the 16 sectors defined under the framework stemming from Presidential Policy Directive 21 and related authorities). But did state executives, lawmakers, courts, and county elections officials listen? NO they did not. Instead, they pushed on, expecting the vendor’s promise of speed, security, and convenience.

Key points from Johnson’s statement

• Rationale: “Given the vital role elections play in this country, it is clear that certain systems and assets of election infrastructure meet the definition of critical infrastructure, in fact and in law.” The move aimed to make election systems a formal, enduring priority for DHS cybersecurity assistance and protections amid growing concerns over sophisticated cyber threats (including Russian activity targeting the 2016 election).
• What “election infrastructure” covers: Storage facilities, polling places, and centralized vote tabulation locations; plus related information and communications technology such as voter registration databases, voting machines, and other systems used to manage the election process and report/display results on behalf of state and local governments.
• What it does: Elevates election infrastructure within the National Infrastructure Protection Plan so that requesting state and local officials receive prioritized DHS cybersecurity help (threat intelligence, vulnerability assessments, incident response support, etc.). It also signals domestically and internationally that these systems receive the protections associated with critical infrastructure.
• What it does not do (emphasized by Johnson): It is not a federal takeover, regulation, oversight, or intrusion into elections. It changes nothing about the primary role of state and local governments in administering and running elections. Assistance is voluntary and available upon request.

Johnson had publicly floated the idea in August 2016 and consulted state election officials. Many expressed neutrality or opposition, citing concerns about federal overreach into a traditionally state-run process. Whether ego or power broker control, the course was set for failed elections. Johnson delayed formal action until after the 2016 election. The designation was announced the same day U.S. intelligence released a declassified assessment on Russian interference efforts.

His successor, then-Secretary John Kelly, reaffirmed the designation in 2017. It has remained in place and underpins ongoing federal support structures (including coordination through what became CISA) for election cybersecurity. The designation is administrative (under existing DHS authorities for critical infrastructure prioritization) rather than a new statute creating federal control over elections.

Electronic gadgets that allegedly count votes are named specifically… 

Imagine aircraft on the deck of a U.S. aircraft carrier, engaged in active patrol duty. During routine maintenance, an aircraft maintenance technician finds a problem in the avionics package of this $109 Million fighter jet. The mission-critical part has to be replaced. He goes to replace it and finds the replacement chip is prohibited, made in China, an adversary of America. The aircraft is grounded, and so are all the other aircraft on the ship, to verify that they do not have such a chip in their systems.

An F-35A Lightning II (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Jose Miguel T. Tamondong)

Election systems are also mission-critical because if they fail, the people’s voice is silenced. Such is the case we face today, and despite the evidence, elected officials continue to make fools of themselves by claiming that nothing is wrong.

The central facts can be verified by any reader in roughly ten minutes using nothing but public databases. Voting system manufacturers like Dominion, Sequoia, and others utilize commercial computers as their election equipment. Many of these commercial computers, including Dell, Canon, Samsung, Fujitsu, and others, often include pre-certified wireless transmitter modules manufactured in China.

Now, why do you think a foreign adversary would want to have a wireless transmitter module on a computer counting votes in America?

The component certifications recorded at the FCC are under publicly searchable FCC IDs, and documented on any incorporated Transmitter module, which has its own FCC regulatory label also showing where it was manufactured, and the computers are using transmitters showing “Made in China” or a “Product of China.” The chain of evidence summarized:

• Specific computer manufacture models used in voting systems by Voting Machine Companies are publicly documented in election-office disclosures of the state’s Voting System inventories, showing which commercial computers are used.
• The commercial computer’s wireless components are documented in their public service manuals and FCC filings.
• Each unique wireless module transmitter carries a unique FCC ID number that shows, in the FCC’s public equipment-authorization database, components with an FCC ID and includes labels that require the country-of-origin for the transmitter modules (routers). These transmitter modules enable remote data connectivity of the voting systems. This kind of access can be misused in elections.

On March 23, 2026, the FCC banned foreign-produced consumer transmitters/routers and added them to its “Covered List” based on National Security concerns. The wireless modules documented inside U.S. voting Systems fall under the same National Security logic and rationale the FCC has already applied to ban “out of country” made routers. A coalition of subject-matter experts is prepared to present the underlying evidence directly to officials with authority to assess and act on the voting systems.

U.S. voting systems in current use contain China-made wireless precertified transmitter modules, under publicly searchable FCC IDs and verifiable in the FCC’s own equipment-authorization database. Review of the pictures of the components below shows them being made in China. The same regulatory logic and rationale that the FCC ban applied on March 23, 2026, to ban foreign-produced consumer routers/transmitters from the U.S. market, for National Security concerns, a severe “supply-chain vulnerability” and “cybersecurity risk” to “critical infrastructure”— applies to these China-made modules. DHS-CISA has designated U.S. voting systems used in elections as critical infrastructure. The National Security Council has independent authority to act in this matter. A small coalition of subject-matter experts is prepared to present the underlying evidence.

I. Foreign-Adversary Wireless Hardware Inside U.S. Voting Systems

The Verifiable Supply Chain: Dominion Voting Systems and Sequoia Election Systems — the two largest U.S. voting-system providers — DO NOT manufacture the computers used as part of its election equipment. These Voting System vendors integrate commercial off-the-shelf PCs and tablet computers as voting system devices (i.e., Dominion’s documented inventory includes Dell-branded systems OptiPlex, Latitude, Precision, and PowerEdge models), shipped with wireless networking modules supplied by Intel, Realtek, Qualcomm, and Broadcom. ES&S and Sequoia equipment likewise rely on commercial PC platforms with comparable wireless options. Many of the base computers used by voting system companies contain transmitter modules. Each is an FCC-certified transmitter with its own FCC ID, its own grantee code, and its own country-of-origin disclosure on file with the Commission. The computers do not covertly add transmitting modules; it is a normal device feature anyone would buy these days. However, if made by and misused a voting system could be mispurposed using foreign adversary transmitters. The risk is very serious. Serious enough for the FCC to ban foreign-made routers to be used in the U.S. https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/NSD-Routers0326.pdf

The FCC Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) maintains a public database of every certified transmitter authorized for use in the United States. The database is available at apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/GenericSearch.cfm.

Entering the first three to five characters of the FCC Grantee Code into the first search field returns the official transmitter grant, the grantee, the certified frequency bands, and the country of manufacture.

No private access or specialized expertise is required. The search interface uses two fields: the first three to five characters of the FCC ID in the Grantee Code field, and the remaining characters in the Product Code field.

Specific Modules Documented in Voting Systems: The following table lists wireless transmitter modules confirmed to be components in the Dell models used in Dominion and other voting systems. The Dominion / Dell chain has been verified at the FCC-ID level and is documented below; the broader pattern — commercial PC platforms containing China-made FCC-certified wireless modules — applies across the U.S. voting-systems industry, including Sequioa and ES&S equipment.

Each component listed below carries an FCC ID recorded in the Commission’s public equipment-authorization database to a wireless transmitter manufactured in China.

Exhibit: Intel 8260NGW FCC Declaration — Confirming Wireless Capability: Dell and other PC manufacturers produced these platforms for general commercial use; the presence of wireless modules does not rest on them and is not implicated in any compliance failure. That obligation with the systems integrator — Dominion Voting Systems — ensures the assembled certified voting system accurately discloses all wireless-capable components to federal authorities and is not mispurposed.

Physical Evidence on the Modules Themselves: Each of the modules listed above carries its country-of-origin marking directly on its FCC regulatory label. The four photos below show the labels with red arrows highlighting the “Made in China” or “Product of China” text.

Reference photos sourced from manufacturer public product imagery (Intel, Realtek). Red-arrow annotations added by the author to highlight the country-of-origin markings visible on each module’s regulatory label.

II. The Declaration of Conformity Loophole

 A reasonable reader asks: how did China-manufactured wireless transmitters end up certified for use in U.S. critical-infrastructure equipment? The answer is a specific, identifiable regulatory pathway. Under FCC equipment-authorization rules, the system was designed for an era when supply-chain origin was not itself a National Security concern. It has recently been banned, however.

The consequence: a U.S. voting machine can be marketed and deployed as “FCC-compliant” while its actual transmitter component was manufactured in a country designated as a foreign adversary under U.S. law. Compliance with the FCC certification process had not addressed the underlying supply-chain and National Security risk. Recently, the FCC has banned routers not made in the U.S. for National Security concerns, as addressed herein. (See Section III.)

This is a known gap in a regulatory framework that was designed before foreign-adversary supply-chain risk became a National-Security category. The gap is not the result of malicious intent on the part of any individual agency or manufacturer. But the FCC’s March 2026 router determination that non-U.S.-made routers present critical gaps of exactly this kind — gaps that allow foreign-adversary components to reach

U.S. critical infrastructure and voting systems—and requires immediate closure. The same recent ban standard for routers applies to voting systems.

III. The FCC Has Already Established the Precedent for Action

Executive Branch interagency body. The reasoning the FCC adopted applies directly to the wireless modules documented in this briefing. The Commission found that foreign-produced routers/transmitters introduce:

“a supply chain vulnerability that could disrupt the U.S. economy, critical infrastructure, and National Security defense,” and “a severe cybersecurity risk that could be leveraged to immediately and severely disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure and directly harm U.S. persons.”FCC Fact Sheet, March 23, 2026. Full text: FCC Public Notice DA 26-278 (March 23, 2026) Covered List Update on Foreign-Produced Routers

 On March 23, 2026, the Federal Communications Commission updated its Covered List to include all consumer-grade routers produced in foreign countries, prohibiting new FCC authorization of such devices for U.S. import or sale. The National Security Council acted on a determination by a White House-convened Executive Branch interagency body. The reasoning the FCC adopted applies directly to the wireless modules documented in this briefing. The Commission found that foreign-produced routers/transmitters introduce:

The Same Logic Applies to Voting-System Wireless Routers / Modules: The wireless modules documented in Section I share every relevant characteristic the FCC cited as grounds for the router ban:

• They are radio-frequency transmitters manufactured in a foreign adversary country used in U.S. voting systems.
• They reside inside equipment that DHS-CISA has designated as U.S. critical infrastructure (the nation’s election systems).
• They present a supply-chain vulnerability of the exact kind that the Executive Branch determined to be addressed.
• They are FCC-authorized devices; the FCC, therefore, has direct regulatory standing.

The FCC has already exercised this authority. The regulatory pathway, the rationale, the legal framework, and the precedential language all exist. All that is required is the application of the same standard to voting systems containing these precertfied router/transmitters. This is not a request that the Commission do something new or has not been done. It is a request that the Commission or another agency (perhaps the DHS) reapply what the FCC has already done.

IV. Additional Supporting Concerns

The hardware findings in Section I are sufficient to establish the National Security case. Two additional concerns warrant separate review and reinforce the same conclusion.

Voting System Software Origin is Traceable to a Foreign Adversary Design: Independent reporting and a published account in the Book Stolen Elections by author Ralph Pezzullo, draws on the firsthand account of a former CIA officer Gary Berntsen. The book documents that the core software origin now known as Smartmatic, in Sequoia, Dominion, and related voting system platforms traces to software originally designed in Venezuela to alter election outcomes. A former developer of that original software — now a U.S.-based whistleblower — could provide testimony. The coalition raises this as a parallel matter warranting review of the evidence and testimony.

Potential Conflicts of Ownership Interest in the Voting Systems Companies: Appropriate authorities should examine potential ownership stakes in Voting System companies for conflicts of interest, and improper influence via foreign adversary indirect ownership of a leading voting machine company and voting software company. Evidence and testimony can be provided.

V. Federal Agencies with Independent Authority to Act

 Foreign-adversary involvement in Voting-System hardware provides grounds for action by each of the following:

1. 1. Federal Communications Commission (FCC): Direct authority over equipment authorization; established precedent under the Covered List process (March 2026 router (transmitter) action).
   2. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CISA: Primary authority over critical-infrastructure security; DHS-CISA has designated U.S. voting systems as critical infrastructure.
   3. Department of Commerce — Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS): Authority over export controls and foreign-adversary technology.
   4. Department of the Treasury — Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC): Authority over sanctions and financial ties to adversary nations.
   5. Department of War: National-Security authority where adversary-controlled systems are embedded in civilian critical infrastructure. (Like the recent banning of foreign drones)

1. 1. Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS): Authority to review and block foreign investment in critical technology.

VI. Proven Alternative to Computerized Voting Systems: Fast, Accurate, Auditable Hand Counting

Removing affected voting systems is half of our election remedy. The other half already exists and has been used in the U.S. for over 100 years. Grassroots organizations have developed and field-tested fast, effective, trustworthy, accurate, auditable, repeatable hand-counting protocols. They’ve been used successfully in multiple elections, in the size of an average precinct. One well-documented reference is the Hand Count Road Show; they are trainers of hand-counting elections.

The FCC hardware findings in this briefing can be independently verified by any official with internet access in approximately ten minutes. Where deeper context is useful — the build-to-materials work behind the FCC ID and Voting System Computer Build of Materials mapping.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.