Slack messages released by Sen. Rand Paul show scientists behind the influential “Proximal Origin” paper privately assigned meaningful odds to a laboratory origin, questioned their public certainty and discussed intelligence contacts, gain-of-function research and handling records subject to public disclosure.
By yourNEWS Media Newsroom
Scientists who helped author the influential “Proximal Origin” paper privately expressed substantially more uncertainty about the origin of COVID-19 than they conveyed publicly, according to internal Slack messages released by Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky.
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The communications show that Kristian Andersen and Eddie Holmes considered a possible laboratory origin for SARS-CoV-2 while the published paper was used by federal health officials and others to dismiss public debate over whether the virus could have emerged from research in China.
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Andersen privately estimated a 30% possibility of a Chinese laboratory leak, while Holmes placed the probability at 20% before later lowering his estimate to 10%, according to the messages included in Paul’s new COVID origins database.
Those private assessments contrasted with the paper’s public conclusion that there was “no evidence” the virus had been engineered.
The messages also show Andersen acknowledging that the paper, published in Nature Medicine, had presented its conclusion more forcefully than he was prepared to defend privately.
The paper “was pretty strong in saying ‘there’s no way,’ but I have less confidence in that statement at this stage,” Andersen said.
Andersen also expressed concern about the virus’s furin cleavage site, a feature associated with its ability to infect human cells and spread efficiently.
He identified the site as one of several “smoking(ish) guns” that “I’m not comfortable with,” according to messages published from Paul’s investigation.
The furin cleavage site became one of the most heavily debated features of SARS-CoV-2 because similar research proposals had contemplated inserting such sites into bat coronaviruses.
According to a Just the News report on the private communications, the scientists also discussed avoiding email and controlling which communications would become available through Freedom of Information Act requests.
Those conversations followed the public disclosure of the DEFUSE proposal, which had been submitted to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
The proposal involved plans to insert furin cleavage sites into bat coronaviruses, a detail that intensified scrutiny of whether research activity could have contributed to the emergence of SARS-CoV-2.
The authors discussed plans to “stay off email” and “carefully curate some emails for the FOI [Freedom of Information] records,” according to the messages.
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Such remarks are likely to increase questions about whether the scientists were attempting to limit the documentary record available to journalists, lawmakers and the public.
The communications also describe extensive contact with members of the U.S. intelligence community during the government’s investigation of the pandemic’s origin.
Holmes referred to one source in China as “my spy,” describing the individual as a contact who provided sensitive information.
Andersen wrote that he had been assigned “a handler” on the same day then-National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Director Anthony Fauci briefed intelligence officials during a 90-day origins review.
Andersen also predicted that “the spooks will spend quite a bit of time in Sunny San Diego,” referring to the location of his laboratory at Scripps Research.
The messages indicate that the scientists were not operating only within academic channels as they evaluated evidence concerning the virus.
They discussed “chatting to the intelligence folk” and preparing information to send “back to Tony[’s] team at NIH” regarding the leaked DEFUSE proposal.
Those exchanges raise further questions about how closely the paper’s authors coordinated with federal health officials and intelligence agencies while publicly presenting their conclusions as an independent scientific assessment.
The “Proximal Origin” paper became one of the most frequently cited publications used to argue against the possibility that COVID-19 resulted from laboratory research.
NIH leaders helped shape the paper and later relied on it to discourage discussion of a lab leak, according to the information released through Paul’s investigation.
The private messages suggest the authors had not reached the same level of certainty they presented publicly.
An estimate of a 20% or 30% likelihood would not have made a laboratory origin the leading explanation, but it would have represented a meaningful possibility rather than a theory unsupported by evidence.
The difference between privately assigning substantial odds to a lab leak and publicly saying there was “no evidence” of engineering lies at the center of the new disclosures.
The messages also contradict previous public representations from Fauci and then-NIH Director Francis Collins concerning the extent of gain-of-function research involving bat coronaviruses.
The scientists privately acknowledged that the Wuhan Institute of Virology was conducting “a lot” of gain-of-function work involving SARS-related coronaviruses.
They added that “there are also other labs that have been doing that.”
One of those laboratories was operated by Ralph Baric at the University of North Carolina, a participant in the DEFUSE proposal, according to the messages.
Baric has since announced his retirement from the university and was removed from NIH grants over what was described as an apparent “pattern of deception” concerning the nature of his research.
The additional Slack records released through Paul’s database document the authors’ discussions of gain-of-function work, government contacts and their evolving confidence in the paper’s conclusions.
Gain-of-function research generally involves experiments that alter an organism’s characteristics, potentially including its transmissibility, host range or ability to cause disease.
The term has been disputed throughout the COVID origins debate, with federal officials and researchers sometimes using narrower definitions when describing funded work.
The private admission that the Wuhan Institute of Virology conducted “a lot” of such research is likely to deepen scrutiny of earlier testimony and public statements denying that NIH-funded work met the relevant definition.
The messages do not by themselves establish that SARS-CoV-2 was created in a laboratory or that the Wuhan Institute of Virology caused the pandemic.
They do show that scientists who publicly presented a natural origin as effectively conclusive privately entertained a laboratory accident as a serious possibility.
They also show that the scientists were concerned about specific genomic features of the virus, aware of relevant coronavirus research and communicating with both NIH officials and intelligence contacts.
The disclosures are especially significant because the “Proximal Origin” paper influenced public policy, media coverage and decisions by social media companies concerning permissible discussion of the lab-leak theory.
Officials and commentators repeatedly cited the paper as evidence that laboratory engineering had been scientifically ruled out.
Those who questioned a natural origin were often characterized as spreading misinformation or conspiracy theories.
The private messages indicate that some of the paper’s own authors had not eliminated the same possibility.
Andersen’s statement that he had “less confidence” in the paper’s categorical conclusion demonstrates a gap between the certainty of the publication and the uncertainty expressed within the group.
Holmes’ changing estimate, from a 20% chance of a lab leak to 10%, similarly shows that the scientists were assigning probabilities rather than treating the theory as impossible.
The communications surrounding the DEFUSE proposal are also likely to remain a major focus of congressional inquiry.
The proposal contemplated coronavirus experiments involving furin cleavage sites before SARS-CoV-2 emerged with such a feature.
The fact that the scientists discussed preparing information for Fauci’s team and intelligence officials after the proposal leaked suggests they understood its potential importance to the origins debate.
Their discussion of staying off email and curating records adds a separate transparency concern.
Federal records laws are intended to preserve communications relevant to official business and allow public examination of government decision-making.
Scientists working outside the government are not necessarily subject to all the same requirements, but communications involving federally funded research and federal officials can become subject to disclosure.
Paul’s release provides a broader record of the conversations that shaped one of the pandemic’s most influential scientific narratives.
The database is expected to support continuing investigations into how federal health agencies evaluated the lab-leak possibility, whether officials attempted to suppress competing explanations and whether the public received an accurate account of the evidence.
Questions also remain about what intelligence officials learned from the scientists, what information was supplied by contacts in China and whether those exchanges affected government assessments.
The phrase “my spy” does not establish that Holmes’ contact was formally employed by an intelligence service.
It does indicate that the source was viewed as providing confidential or sensitive information from inside China.
Similarly, Andersen’s references to a “handler” and “the spooks” suggest structured contact with the intelligence community during the origins review.
The submitted information does not identify the officials involved or describe the intelligence exchanged.
The messages nevertheless demonstrate that the scientists’ work was connected to a wider government inquiry extending beyond ordinary academic collaboration.
The disclosures also renew scrutiny of the role played by Fauci and Collins.
Both men publicly defended the natural-origin assessment and rejected claims that NIH funded prohibited gain-of-function research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
The Slack conversations show the paper’s authors discussing how to respond to Fauci’s NIH team and privately acknowledging extensive gain-of-function work in Wuhan and elsewhere.
Whether those admissions directly contradict specific sworn testimony will depend on the definitions used, the timing of each statement and the complete documentary record.
They do, however, challenge the impression that the scientific and government officials involved held a uniform, confident view from the beginning.
The emerging record instead shows changing probabilities, internal disagreement, concern over viral features and active discussion of how information would be communicated to the public and preserved for disclosure.
For years, the central controversy surrounding “Proximal Origin” has been whether it represented an independent scientific conclusion or a government-influenced effort to contain public concern over a possible laboratory accident.
The new messages strengthen the argument that the published paper did not fully reflect the authors’ private uncertainty.
They also show that the possibility of a lab leak was not limited to outside critics.
It was being debated among the very scientists whose work was later cited to declare that possibility unsupported.
Paul’s database is likely to fuel further congressional demands for records from NIH, intelligence agencies, research institutions and the authors themselves.
The principal unresolved issue remains the actual origin of SARS-CoV-2.
The messages do not settle that question, but they provide new evidence about how influential scientists privately evaluated it and how sharply those discussions differed from the certainty presented to the public.
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