The expected agreement would bring U.S. companies into Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program and could authorize an enrichment facility after a joint study, raising concerns about future weapons capability.
By yourNEWS Media Newsroom
President Donald Trump has approved a long-term civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that could eventually allow the kingdom to enrich uranium domestically, according to two people familiar with the decision.
The agreement, which has not yet been formally announced, could be made public as early as Wednesday. The individuals who described the arrangement were not authorized to discuss it publicly.
The proposed framework is expected to remain in effect for 30 years and involve American companies in the development of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy program.
One of its most consequential provisions could permit construction of a uranium enrichment facility inside Saudi Arabia following a joint study conducted by the United States and the kingdom.
The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The Wall Street Journal first reported the decision.
The agreement would mark a significant advance in Saudi Arabia’s long-running effort to obtain U.S. nuclear technology and develop a domestic civilian atomic energy industry.
Both Trump and former President Joe Biden pursued nuclear cooperation with Riyadh, but negotiations repeatedly encountered concerns over enrichment, safeguards and the possibility that civilian infrastructure could later support a weapons program.
Uranium enrichment is not, by itself, proof that a country intends to build a nuclear bomb.
The process can produce fuel for civilian reactors when uranium is enriched to relatively low levels. The same centrifuge technology, however, can be used to produce much more highly enriched material suitable for nuclear weapons.
That dual-use capability has made domestic enrichment one of the most sensitive issues in nuclear diplomacy.
Nonproliferation specialists have warned that operating centrifuges in Saudi Arabia could give the kingdom a technical foundation from which it might pursue weapons-grade uranium if its political leadership decided to do so.
Those concerns have been heightened by previous remarks from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has suggested that the kingdom could seek a nuclear weapon if Iran obtains one.
The proposed agreement does not establish that Saudi Arabia will construct a bomb or that enrichment would begin immediately.
It would first require a joint U.S.-Saudi assessment before an enrichment facility could be developed, according to the people familiar with the arrangement.
The details of that study, including its safeguards, inspection requirements and technical limits, were not included in the information provided.
The agreement is also expected to create commercial opportunities for U.S. nuclear companies seeking contracts to help build reactors, supply technology and develop related infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia has sought to diversify its energy system, preserve more oil for export and expand advanced industrial capabilities as part of its broader economic development plans.
A civilian nuclear program could help meet growing domestic electricity demand while reducing the amount of crude oil burned for power generation.
The possibility of enrichment, however, distinguishes the proposed Saudi arrangement from a previous U.S. nuclear agreement with the United Arab Emirates.
The UAE signed a cooperation framework commonly known as a “123 agreement” before building its Barakah nuclear power plant with South Korean assistance.
Under that arrangement, the UAE agreed not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel domestically.
Nonproliferation experts have frequently described the Emirati commitment as the “gold standard” for countries seeking civilian nuclear power because it limits access to technologies that can also contribute to a weapons program.
Saudi Arabia has resisted accepting the same restrictions.
Allowing Riyadh to retain the possibility of enrichment would therefore represent a departure from the standard applied in the UAE agreement and could influence future negotiations with other countries.
Critics may argue that granting Saudi Arabia more flexible terms would weaken international efforts to discourage the spread of sensitive nuclear technology.
Supporters could contend that a U.S.-managed arrangement with inspections and safeguards would provide Washington greater oversight than allowing the kingdom to seek assistance from another nuclear supplier.
Saudi Arabia’s regional security relationships have added another dimension to the debate.
The kingdom and nuclear-armed Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact after Israel carried out an attack in Qatar targeting Hamas officials.
Pakistan’s defense minister later said his country’s nuclear program “will be made available” to Saudi Arabia if necessary.
The statement was widely viewed as a warning directed toward Israel, which has long been believed to possess the Middle East’s only nuclear weapons arsenal.
Pakistan’s comments did not establish that it had transferred nuclear weapons, technology or material to Saudi Arabia.
They nevertheless reinforced concerns that Riyadh could have access to nuclear support outside a formal civilian program if the regional security environment deteriorated.
The prospect of a Saudi enrichment facility must also be considered within the broader dispute over Iran’s nuclear activities.
Western governments have focused heavily on Iran’s enrichment program because the same infrastructure used for civilian purposes can shorten the technical path to weapons-grade uranium.
Enrichment alone would not provide Saudi Arabia with a complete nuclear weapon.
A country seeking to build a usable bomb would also need to master additional steps, including weapon design, the synchronized use of high explosives and a delivery system capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
Possession of enriched uranium and functioning centrifuges would nevertheless remove one of the most difficult technical barriers.
The Trump administration’s agreement is expected to rely on safeguards intended to keep the Saudi program peaceful, though the exact verification and enforcement provisions have not been disclosed.
Key unresolved questions include whether international inspectors would receive continuous access, what enrichment level would be permitted and what penalties would apply if Saudi Arabia violated the terms.
It also remains unclear whether Congress would have an opportunity to review or block the arrangement before it takes effect.
U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements generally establish the legal framework under which American companies may transfer nuclear materials, equipment or technical knowledge to another country.
Such agreements can include restrictions on enrichment, reprocessing, security, inspections and the use of transferred technology.
The Saudi deal’s anticipated 30-year duration would bind the two countries to a lengthy framework spanning multiple administrations.
That longevity could provide stability for commercial projects but also make the safeguards attached to the agreement especially important.
A decision to permit potential enrichment would likely face close scrutiny from lawmakers concerned about nuclear proliferation, Saudi human rights practices and regional competition with Iran and Israel.
The agreement may also be viewed as part of a wider U.S. effort to strengthen relations with Riyadh and prevent the kingdom from turning to China, Russia or another supplier for nuclear technology.
Saudi officials have previously indicated that they are considering multiple international partners for their nuclear ambitions.
American participation would give U.S. companies access to major contracts while allowing Washington to shape the program’s security and oversight standards.
The central policy question is whether regulated access to enrichment under U.S. supervision would reduce proliferation risks or normalize a capability that other countries may then demand.
The UAE model demonstrated that a Middle Eastern country could build and operate nuclear power reactors without enriching its own uranium.
Saudi Arabia’s insistence on retaining that option reflects its desire for greater control over the nuclear fuel cycle and its concern about Iran’s capabilities.
Trump’s approval signals that the administration is prepared to consider a more permissive arrangement than the UAE accepted.
The agreement’s ultimate significance will depend on its final language, the results of the joint study and whether Saudi Arabia proceeds with an enrichment facility.
Until those details are released, it remains uncertain how the administration intends to prevent civilian nuclear cooperation from becoming a pathway toward weapons capability.
The expected announcement would nevertheless represent a major development in U.S.-Saudi relations and in the continuing debate over how nuclear technology should be shared with strategically important but proliferation-sensitive partners.
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