Me and the Ayatollah

“Me and the Ayatollah.”

That was the answer given by President Trump when asked who would control the Strait of Hormuz — one of the most critical energy chokepoints on the planet. A statement that perfectly captures just how surreal this moment really is.

On Monday, March 23, Donald Trump announced that talks had taken place between the United States and Iran, even suggesting there were “major points of agreement.” This came just days after he threatened to strike Iranian energy infrastructure if the Strait of Hormuz was not reopened within 48 hours — a deadline that has now quietly stretched into days.

Iran’s response was anything but conciliatory. Tehran escalated immediately, threatening to target oil refineries, gas facilities, and strategic infrastructure across the Gulf states and Israel. At the same time, it imposed a new toll on the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow passage through which roughly 20% of the world’s energy supply flows.

So what does this actually mean? Are we watching the early stages of a deal, or just another round of political theater designed to calm — or manipulate — global markets?

Israel, for its part, has been crystal clear. There is no appetite for ending this conflict prematurely. Israeli leadership sees this war as an opportunity — not just to confront Iran, but to fundamentally reshape it. Whether through direct regime change or by pushing the system into chaos, the objective remains the same: weaken the Islamic Republic beyond recovery.

At the same time, Israel’s priorities on its northern front remain unchanged. Hezbollah is at the top of the list, and there are growing signals that operations could expand deeper into Lebanon. Statements from senior officials, including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, about extending Israel’s borders to the Litani River are no longer fringe rhetoric. They are increasingly part of mainstream political discourse — openly aligning with what many describe as the Greater Israel project, a vision that is becoming more visible day by day.

Meanwhile, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries find themselves in an increasingly dangerous position. They warned against this war from the beginning, yet now they are among its biggest victims. And paradoxically, they may not even welcome a quick end to it.

Why? Because if this war ends in the next few weeks without breaking Iran, it produces the opposite result: a more militarized Iran, a stronger Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and potentially the consolidation of power under Mojtaba Khamenei.

That is a nightmare scenario for the Gulf states — a more aggressive Iran sitting on their doorstep, influencing or even controlling the very routes through which their economies survive.

And the cost is already visible.

Cities like Dubai, Doha, and Riyadh — long marketed as untouchable hubs of stability, wealth, and neutrality — are now being hit by drones and missiles. These are cities that built their global reputation over decades on the promise of safety and predictability. That image is now cracking in real time.

For Donald Trump, this war is becoming politically inconvenient. He campaigned on ending “endless wars” and promised he could negotiate with anyone. Now, with midterms approaching and polling trends turning against his party, a prolonged conflict is the last thing he needs.

The assumption that the opening strike would collapse Iran “like a house of cards” has proven to be fantasy. Whether that miscalculation came from flawed intelligence, overconfidence, or external pressure, the reality is now unavoidable: the regime did not fall.

So now, the tone shifts — from escalation to negotiation.

Iran, however, is not coming to the table weak. Quite the opposite. From Tehran’s perspective, this is an existential war. The leadership is fighting not just to survive politically, but to preserve the state itself. And after its initial wave of retaliation — which surprised both allies and adversaries — Iran enters any negotiation with significantly higher demands than those floated in Geneva before the war.

This is no longer the same negotiation.

What we are looking at now is a high-stakes standoff where every actor wants a different outcome:

• The United States wants a deal — quickly.
• Israel wants decisive strategic victory — not compromise.
• The GCC wants security — but not a stronger Iran.
• Iran wants survival — on its own terms.

And sitting at the center of all of this is the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow strip of water turned into a geopolitical weapon.

The consequences are global. The risks are escalating. And the gap between these positions remains as wide as ever.

So the real question isn’t whether a deal is possible.

It’s whether anyone in this equation is actually interested in statesmanship — or if “Me and the Ayatollah” is the closest thing the world gets to diplomacy in 2026.