BY EMMANUEL OGBONNA
Japan is pressing ahead with an ambitious plan to dramatically strengthen its military capabilities, moving to double annual defense spending as it confronts what it describes as growing security threats from China. The push comes amid sustained pressure from its key ally, the United States, for greater burden-sharing in Asia, and under the leadership of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, a staunch conservative known for her hard-line views on national security.
Tokyo insists the buildup does not signal a departure from its long-standing commitment to peace, arguing instead that it is seeking a more self-reliant defense posture capable of deterring aggression and protecting the country in an increasingly unstable region. China and other critics, however, see the changes as a steady erosion of Japan’s postwar pacifism, pointing to Takaichi’s comments shortly after taking office that a Chinese military move against Taiwan could justify a Japanese response.
Japan’s emergence as one of the world’s largest defense spenders has been decades in the making, shaped by shifting regional dynamics and evolving interpretations of its constitution. The pace and scope of the current buildup, however, have revived questions about whether Tokyo is effectively abandoning the pacifist principles enshrined in its postwar legal framework.
After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the country adopted a constitution drafted during the U.S. occupation that was intended to prevent any return to militarism. Article 9 famously renounced war as a sovereign right and rejected the maintenance of land, sea and air forces for settling international disputes. In principle, Japan was not supposed to possess a military at all.
That position began to change with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, when Washington reassessed Japan’s role in regional security. Viewing Tokyo as a vital ally rather than a former adversary, the United States supported the creation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in 1954. Over time, Article 9 came to be interpreted as permitting a strictly defensive military necessary for national survival.
Since then, successive governments have gradually stretched the meaning of self-defense. Japan dispatched troops overseas for international peacekeeping missions and logistical support, carefully avoiding direct combat. A major shift came in 2014 under then–Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who sought to give Japan what he called a “normal” military. Abe reinterpreted the constitution to allow for collective self-defense, enabling Japan to use force to aid allies under attack even if Japan itself was not directly targeted. Security legislation passed the following year codified that change without formally amending the constitution.
Prime Minister Takaichi has gone further, openly discussing scenarios that previous leaders avoided. Her explicit reference to Taiwan as a potential trigger for Japanese military action marked a departure from decades of strategic ambiguity and drew sharp criticism from Beijing.
Tensions between Japan and China have intensified in recent months. In December, Tokyo accused Chinese aircraft of locking radar systems on Japanese planes during drills involving a Chinese aircraft carrier near southwestern Japan, a move widely seen as a potential prelude to missile targeting. Earlier in the year, two Chinese aircraft carriers were spotted operating near the southern Japanese island of Iwo Jima for the first time, alarming officials in Tokyo and reinforcing concerns about China’s expanding military reach.
Against this backdrop, Takaichi’s Cabinet approved a record defense budget exceeding 9 trillion yen, or about $58 billion, for the coming year. The plan focuses on strengthening counterstrike capabilities, expanding coastal defenses and investing in cruise missiles and unmanned systems. The spending surge is intended to push Japan’s defense budget to about 2% of gross domestic product by March, two years earlier than previously planned.
China reacted swiftly. A spokesperson for its Foreign Ministry accused Japan of accelerating military expansion and abandoning its professed commitment to peaceful development, warning that Tokyo was heading in a dangerous direction. Beijing, which itself maintains one of the world’s largest defense budgets, has also expressed unease over Takaichi’s nationalist reputation and her past visits to Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, including convicted war criminals. Such visits are deeply offensive to China and the Koreas, which suffered under Japanese occupation. Takaichi has refrained from visiting the shrine this year, opting instead to send a religious offering on the anniversary of Japan’s wartime defeat.
A more profound shift in policy began in December 2022, when the government adopted a new national security strategy explicitly calling for Japan to acquire long-range strike-back capabilities. The document identified China as Japan’s most significant strategic challenge and envisioned a more assertive role for Japanese forces within the U.S.-Japan alliance. The move represented a clear break from the country’s long-standing self-defense-only stance.
Masahiro Sakata, a former head of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, described the policy shift as effectively spelling “the death of Article 9,” reflecting concerns among constitutional scholars and pacifist groups that the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitution is being discarded.
For much of the postwar era, Japan prioritized economic growth while relying heavily on the U.S. security umbrella, hosting around 50,000 American troops. Defense spending was informally capped at 1% of GDP until recent years, when budgets began to rise steadily under Abe. Under Takaichi, Japan is now set not only to meet the 2% benchmark favored by Washington but potentially to face pressure for even higher spending as allies debate new targets.
The government is also seeking to revitalize Japan’s defense industry. Long-standing restrictions on arms exports are expected to be further loosened, enabling greater cooperation with partner countries. Japan is already working with the United Kingdom and Italy on a next-generation fighter jet and is close to finalizing a deal to supply frigates to Australia. Tokyo also plans to support the construction and maintenance of U.S. warships, deepening industrial and military integration.
Some proposals have pushed into especially sensitive territory. A government-commissioned panel has suggested exploring the development of a nuclear-powered submarine to enhance long-range deterrence, an idea that has sparked controversy in a country shaped by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While Japan maintains its three non-nuclear principles—no possession, no production and no hosting of nuclear weapons—officials have acknowledged that all options are being studied in light of regional threats.
Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to those principles, even as some politicians have voiced support for reconsidering nuclear capabilities, drawing criticism from atomic bomb survivors and pacifist organizations.
As Japan accelerates its military transformation, the country finds itself at a crossroads, balancing its postwar identity as a pacifist nation against mounting security concerns in an increasingly volatile region. The choices made now are likely to shape not only Japan’s role in Asia but also the future interpretation of the constitution that has defined it for nearly eight decades.
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