Iraq’s Post-Election Scramble Begins as Parties Jockey for Power and Outside Pressures Mount

BY EMMANUEL OGBONNA

Political forces across Iraq have been maneuvering intensively since parliamentary elections held more than a month ago, seeking to assemble alliances that will determine the shape of the country’s next government and the direction of its policies at a critical moment.

The vote, held in November, failed to produce a bloc with a decisive majority, setting the stage for protracted negotiations among rival parties and coalitions. The outcome reflects Iraq’s deeply fragmented political landscape, where power is dispersed among competing Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish factions, many of them tied to armed groups or backed by regional powers.

The government that ultimately emerges will inherit a security environment that has stabilized compared with the years of widespread violence following the rise of the Islamic State group. However, it will also confront a divided parliament, the expanding political influence of armed factions, a fragile economy heavily dependent on oil revenues, and persistent regional and international pressures, particularly over the future role of Iran-backed militias.

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s coalition emerged with the largest number of seats, bolstering his standing after a first term in which he cultivated an image as a pragmatic leader focused on restoring public services and keeping Iraq largely insulated from escalating regional conflicts. His bloc performed especially well in Baghdad and several other provinces, winning 46 seats and demonstrating significant popular support.

Despite that showing, al-Sudani’s position remains precarious. His party is nominally aligned with the Coordination Framework, an umbrella alliance of Shiite parties with close ties to Iran that secured the largest share of seats overall. Yet political analysts widely doubt that the Framework will back al-Sudani for a second term.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes it can control and who does not have his own independent political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation. Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said the coalition now views him as a rival rather than a partner.

“He has become a powerful competitor,” Jiyad said, adding that influential parties within the Framework are reluctant to empower a prime minister who could consolidate authority at their expense.

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, only one Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, has served a second term. Maliki’s attempt to secure a third term ultimately collapsed amid accusations that he monopolized power and alienated Sunni and Kurdish communities. According to Jiyad, that experience left a lasting impression on Iraq’s dominant political forces, reinforcing their suspicion of ambitious leaders.

Any candidate for prime minister, analysts say, must be broadly acceptable to Iran and the United States, both of which wield enormous influence in Iraq, as well as to the country’s highest Shiite religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

The election results underscore the complexity of the task ahead. Shiite alliances and lists, dominated by Coordination Framework parties, won 187 seats. Sunni groups secured 77 seats, while Kurdish parties took 56, alongside nine seats reserved for minority communities. Although al-Sudani’s coalition performed strongly, it lacks the numbers to form a government on its own, making an accommodation with the Framework almost unavoidable if he hopes to retain office.

Signs of that pressure emerged earlier this month, when al-Sudani’s government reversed a decision to designate Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi movement as terrorist organizations. The designation had been imposed only weeks earlier before being withdrawn, with officials describing it as an error. Both groups are aligned with Iran and closely linked to Iraqi factions that wield armed power and political influence.

The Coordination Framework’s leverage has been further strengthened by the absence of the Sadrist movement, led by influential Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr. The movement boycotted the election, continuing its withdrawal from formal politics after failing to form a government despite winning the largest number of seats in the 2021 vote.

Hamed al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that also boycotted the election, said Sadr’s absence had a decisive impact on turnout and results. Participation fell sharply in areas traditionally loyal to Sadr, including Baghdad and several southern provinces, creating what he described as an electoral vacuum.

“That vacuum was exploited by rival militia groups,” al-Sayed said, referring to parties within the Coordination Framework that maintain armed wings. Groups linked to militias won more than 100 seats, marking their strongest parliamentary presence since 2003.

Beyond the Shiite arena, Sunni parties have sought to regroup under a new alliance known as the National Political Council, aiming to recover influence lost in previous elections. Kurdish politics, meanwhile, remain dominated by rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, with negotiations ongoing over the presidency, a post traditionally held by a Kurd.

Under Iraq’s power-sharing system, the presidency goes to a Kurd, the prime ministership to a Shiite, and the parliamentary speakership to a Sunni. Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election results, which occurred on Dec. 14. Lawmakers must then choose a president within 30 days of the first parliamentary session, followed by the appointment of a prime minister, who has 30 days to form a government.

Whoever leads the next cabinet will face daunting economic challenges. Public debt exceeds 90 trillion Iraqi dinars, or about $69 billion, and the state budget remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil, which accounts for roughly 90% of government revenue despite repeated pledges to diversify. Corruption remains deeply entrenched, eroding public trust and straining state institutions.

Perhaps the most sensitive issue will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a network of militias formed during the fight against the Islamic State group and formally placed under state authority in 2016. In practice, many of its factions continue to operate with considerable autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack on Israel in October 2023 triggered the war in Gaza, some PMF factions launched attacks on U.S. forces in the region, citing Washington’s support for Israel.

The United States has pressed Iraqi leaders to rein in and disarm Iran-backed groups, a goal that faces fierce resistance from militias with deep political roots and from Tehran itself. Two senior Iraqi political officials, speaking anonymously, said Washington has warned against appointing a prime minister who commands an armed faction and has cautioned against allowing militia-linked figures to control key ministries or security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with pro-Iran parties that have armed wings, especially those designated by the United States as terrorist organizations,” Jiyad said.

Kataib Hezbollah, one of Iraq’s most powerful militias and a group designated by Washington as a terrorist organization, rejected the prospect of disarmament in a statement issued Saturday. The group said its weapons would remain in the hands of its fighters and declared that no discussions with the government could take place until all foreign forces, including U.S., NATO and Turkish troops, had left Iraq.

As negotiations continue, Iraq stands at a crossroads, with the balance between political compromise, militia power and foreign influence likely to define not only the next government, but the country’s stability in the years ahead.