You Won’t Believe What the Bond Market Just Did

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The bond market just gave back a chunk of its recent rally. Through last Thursday, Treasury yields had been falling and the curve had been bull-steepening. It was an honest to goodness bond rally dating back to early October.
Then payrolls came in stronger than expected. Consumer prices followed with another upside surprise. And Federal Reserve officials immediately began talking about not only a December rate hike, but potentially a larger one.
The evidence for what's coming is in the curve’s rare shape: unusually steep at the very front and unusually flat farther out.
Eurodollar University's Money & Macro Analysis
AI Generated·May contain errors
The bond market just gave back a chunk of its recent rally.
Through last Thursday,
Treasury yields had been falling
and the curve had been bull steepening.
It was an honest to goodness bond rally
dating back to early October.
Then payrolls came in stronger than expected.
Consumer prices followed with another upside surprise
and Federal Reserve officials began immediately talking
about not only a December rate hike,
but potentially a larger one.
The two-year treasury yield shot back up and the 10s moved too.
Because the policy-sensitive two-year moved more,
the two-year to 10-year spread flattened to just 24 basis points.
That doesn't scream inflation.
It has instead brought re-inversion back into the conversation.
The evidence is in the curve's rare shape,
unusually steep at the very front and unusually flat farther out.
The market is pricing higher Federal Reserve rates over the short run
without pricing the stronger growth, income,
or lasting inflation that would justify them.
That's Fed risk.
Not economic strength, nor inflation potential.
And American consumers are delivering almost exactly the same message.
Their short-term inflation expectations increased only slightly,
largely because of energy.
Those expectations fade farther out into the future.
Meanwhile, consumers now believe the chance
of unemployment rising is the highest it has
been since April 2020.
That is an extraordinary contrast.
Fed sees a month of payroll gains and a hotter than expected CPI
and starts talking about
multiple rate hikes and maybe even a 50.
Meanwhile, consumers see higher costs of essentials,
the fact that nobody is hiring, and threats
to the labor market.
And all in between that, the bond market,
steep in the front, flat in the back, is siding
with consumers who just overwhelmingly voted
their feelings on this resilient inflationary
economy.
The bond market retracement began
with the October payroll report last Friday.
Non-farm payrolls increased by 165,000, far above expectations,
and more than three times the average
monthly gain over the previous year.
And revisions added another 84,000 jobs to August and September.
The household survey also improved for a third consecutive month,
while the unemployment rate...
Sticking around 4.1%.
Then came the CPI earlier today.
Overall consumer prices rose four-tenths of a percent in October,
excluding food and energy.
The core rate increased three-tenths of a percent,
slightly more than expected,
and exactly at the threshold Federal
Reserve Governor Christopher Waller
had identified as potentially requiring a stronger Fed response.
This is also the last CPI report policymakers
are going to get before their December 8 and 9
meeting. So the combination appears decisive.
Stronger payrolls, upward revisions, core
inflation that failed to cool as much as economists had hoped.
Markets responded immediately.
Treasury yields rose across the curve,
stocks fell at the open, and traders added to expectations
for more aggressive Federal Reserve action. The two-year Treasury.
The yield there increased 19 basis points in a single session,
its largest daily move since the tariff turmoil in April 2025.
So on the surface, the story seems straightforward.
The labor market is strengthening, inflation is way too hot,
and the Federal Reserve has to raise rates
to prevent another inflationary outbreak.
But that interpretation depends
on treating every payroll positive as durable, every
upside CPI surprise as a sustained acceleration.
Neither assumption is supported by either the broader data
or market positioning.
It really is this simple.
If the CPI report was confirmation that inflation
was broadening out and starting to really
accelerate in sustained fashion,
we would already have seen it in the marketplace.
We'd see it at the very least in tips break-evens,
if not inflation swaps, and we would definitely
see it on the yield curve.
The point is, we don't, emphatically don't.
Tips remain remarkably calm.
Breakeven inflation rates haven't surged.
They barely responded even during the energy shock,
the beginning of the energy shock,
the middle part of the energy shock,
the entire energy shock.
And the latest CPI report hasn't produced
a sustained inflation breakout in market pricing.
Nominal treasury yields contain more than expectations
for the federal funds rate.
They also reflect expected inflation
as well as longer-term economic conditions.
If investors expected inflation
to remain persistently higher,
They would demand substantially more inflation
compensation to own long-term bonds.
Long-term yields should rise more forcefully,
forcefully, and the curve should be steepening.
Instead, the volatility is all driven by the front.
The two-year yield rose from 4.46,
which was the low last Thursday, to 4.75 as of this recording,
while the 10-year moved from 4.84 to 4.99.
The flattened two-year 10-year spread down to 24 basis points.
The front of the curve says
the Fed may hike more, which is very likely.
The back says those hikes aren't going to produce a stronger economy,
ignoring all the hardships
which came rushing to the forefront in last Tuesday's midterm vote.
Interest rate swaps and interest rate swap spreads
are also behaving more like the cautionary environment
of late 2023 than an economy entering a genuine inflationary expansion.
Reinversion on the yield curve is again plausible
because the market is being forced to price additional policy risk.
Without adding equivalent long-term growth or inflation,
this is the same rare combination
that we've already examined.
Steep at the front, flat at the back.
That shape does not describe inflation or reflation.
It describes a central bank over-interpreting another CPI,
more worried about the ghosts
of 2022 criticism than actual small-e economics.
There's a big mistake that a lot of gold investors
are making right now. It has nothing to do with
the price of gold. You might have bought gold five,
ten years ago, watched the price go up,
and thought, I've done pretty well.
But here's the question almost nobody asked. How many more
ounces of gold could you own today if your gold had
been earning you more gold this entire time?
Think about it.
Most people buy gold, pay to store it and insure it,
and then just sit there waiting for the price to go higher.
Your gold isn't producing anything.
That's what makes monetary metals interesting.
They've created a way for eligible investors
to earn up to 4% annually on their gold
through their gold yield marketplace.
But here's the important distinction.
That yield is paid in additional physical gold, not dollars.
So instead of only watching the dollar price of your gold change,
you have the opportunity to increase the amount of gold that you own.
And those additional ounces can potentially appreciate
alongside your original holdings if gold prices rise.
Now, Monetary Metals has been doing this for nearly a decade,
and they've paid out thousands of ounces
of precious metals to their clients.
So here's the question.
If you're already holding gold for the long term,
Why wouldn't you at least investigate
whether it could be earning you more gold?
The real opportunity cost may
not be the price that you paid for your gold.
It could instead be all the ounces that you're not accumulating.
Go to monetary-metals.com slash Snyder
and learn how their gold yield marketplace works.
Even before today's CPI report for October was released,
Federal Reserve Governor Christopher
Waller had already committed himself
to a December rate increase
and then started talking about maybe we'd need a 50
If the core rate came in.
At three tenths of a percent.
Well, the core rate just came in at three tenths of a percent.
He said even if the rates improved from September,
he'd still favor raising the policy rate by 25 basis points.
He's turned into a hawk.
But Waller went even farther.
If core consumer prices rose
three-tenths of a percent or more, he said,
a stronger policy move might be required,
including consideration of a half-point increase in December.
Now, he doesn't necessarily see inflation breaking,
so rate hikes are like the Fed buying rate insurance.
Dallas Fed President Lori Logan followed with support
for at least two more additional quarter-point increases
Potentially delivered more quickly than
policymakers had previously suggested.
And this is where treachery risk returned.
Back in July of 2008, if you're not aware,
European Central Bank President Jean-Claude
Trichet raised rates in response
to an energy-driven increase in headline inflation.
The central bank, the ECB,
focused on current prices and really current energy prices and
its own supposedly credibility,
while the underlying financial and economic system was
already deteriorating.
The problem wasn't merely that the rate
increase came at the wrong time.
It was the analytical error behind it,
treating a supply-driven price shock as though it were
some self-sustaining demand inflation.
Waller's emphasis on credibility creates the same risk.
If the Fed believes it must raise rates simply
because core CPI failed to decelerate enough,
policy becomes detached
from the mechanism required to sustain inflation.
Officials act against what they fear could happen instead
of what income, credit,
Employment quality and market pricing show is happening.
That is, insurance policy masquerading as monetary certainty.
And insurance becomes very expensive
when purchased by weakening households.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Survey
of Consumer Expectations makes that contrast impossible to ignore.
What consumers continue to say is that, yes, they see near-term price
increases due mostly to energy prices that haven't calmed down,
that aren't de-escalating, that aren't decelerating
in the way that everybody had hoped.
However, they don't expect that to turn into sustained
accelerating inflation across the intermediate and longer term.
And the reason why is because they're afraid of jobs
and incomes and they know on a deep
Fundamental intuitive level, without jobs and incomes,
inflation is impossible to sustain.
So you can have energy prices in the short run,
but it doesn't last because eventually
the economy runs out of room.
And that room is what everybody calls affordability, which is really
jobs and incomes. And consumers had a lot
to say about those to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. Not that policymakers
in Washington will pay any attention to any of it.
Short-term inflation expectations increased only slightly.
Much of that change explained by energy
and other immediately visible household expenses.
But the increase fades at the intermediate horizon.
Consumers are simply not extrapolating
the current energy shock into an endless inflationary future.
They expect some near-term pain,
but they don't see the conditions necessary for prices
to accelerate indefinitely or even beyond the short run.
What they do see is employment risk.
The perceived probability that unemployment will rise
has reached its highest level in the survey since April 2020.
Not since the first catastrophic month of the pandemic
has the public been this concerned about rising unemployment.
That's not how households respond to an economy
producing excess income or overheated demand,
which would be needed for inflation to break out.
It's how they respond when jobs become harder to find,
hours are uncertain, wage gains are wholly inadequate,
And the cost of essentials.
Consumes a growing share of paychecks.
The payroll report contained the same warning beneath its headline.
The number of people working part-time for economic reasons in October
jumped by 339,000 to 4.8 million.
Those are people who want full-time work but can't find it,
or they have had their hours reduced.
Long-term unemployment remained elevated at 2 million.
Average weekly hours were unchanged at 34.4.
And wage growth was only 3.1% higher from a year earlier,
at least according to the payroll data.
So employers may have added some workers in October,
but they didn't broadly extend hours
or demonstrate confidence in lasting expansion.
Consumers understand that distinction
because they are forced to live with it.
And even October's CPI, it was higher than expected,
but higher than expected is not
accelerating, broadening out inflation.
You'll hear the term in the media
because central bankers say, well, they see signs
of it.
They see that it may be happening.
They're worried it could possibly happen.
But the evidence so far doesn't actually show it.
Core prices increased exactly 0.3% for the month.
That was more than economists hoped to see,
but it doesn't establish a new accelerating trend.
It means inflation failed to decelerate
as quickly as forecasters anticipated.
The details also point toward household
pressure rather than excess demand.
Grocery prices recorded their largest monthly increase since April.
Housing costs rose three-tenths of a percent,
which is more questionable than not.
Electricity, energy again, increased nine-tenths of a percent.
Motor vehicle insurance posted its largest gain in more than a year.
These are not primarily signs
of consumers enthusiastically bidding against each other
with surplus income.
These are necessities or costs households have little ability to avoid.
Now because data collection was interrupted during
the previous October's government shutdown,
the BLS didn't publish standard year-over-year comparisons,
but the available year-to-date figures
still show the basic problem.
Consumer prices increased 3.3% while wages rose only 2.3%.
Inflation is outpacing pay.
That's not an inflationary wage price spiral.
It's a reduction in real purchasing power.
Households pay more for groceries, utilities, housing, insurance.
It all leaves them less income for discretionary purchases.
Businesses may initially raise prices to cover their higher costs,
but consumers eventually respond by reducing quantity,
something we continue to point out.
Trading down, which we always see, and abandoning purchases altogether.
Lower volumes.
The higher price level becomes restrictive.
And that's exactly why higher consumer prices can coexist
with weak inflation expectations
and rising unemployment fears.
For inflation to become legitimately entrenched,
forgetting the monetary aspect of it for a
second, that would mean that prices have
to transit through the labor market in income.
Quite simply, if you raise oil prices
and there's not enough income to pay for the
oil price increases, households
and businesses have to take from somewhere else.
Households take away from discretionary spending,
and businesses take away by cutting other
costs, primarily labor.
That's what consumers continue
to tell us they're afraid of because that's the small
economics that we see.
There is not anywhere close
to enough income flowing through the economy to sustain.
Price increases, let alone broaden them out
and accelerate them in 1970 style fashion.
Workers, at the very least, need enough bargaining power
to obtain larger wage increases.
And those wages must support additional spending.
Businesses then possess enough pricing power to raise prices
again without destroying more demand than the prices increase.
The process isn't visible.
For example, labor's share of income recently fell to just 52.8%,
which is the lowest level
in records extending back to 1947.
Workers are receiving a historically small share
of economic output as compensation.
Nominal income growth, which includes transfer receipts,
by the way, is nowhere near the
levels required to sustain an inflationary spiral.
And the available CPI data indicate prices
are already rising faster than wages again
this year, as we just went over.
Households are losing ground, and by the way,
they know it, which is why they voted the way
they did. The employment numbers don't solve the problem.
Payroll growth averaged only around
$48,000 per month over the previous year before October.
In an economy with a growing population
and labor force, such small gains
are effectively contractionary relative to the number of jobs
required to maintain the prior trend.
One month at 165, or even a couple of months at 165,
doesn't erase that accumulated deficiency.
It may instead reflect another temporary
burst of front-loading activity
related to the energy shock itself.
Manufacturers, transportation companies, and professional services,
they added some workers as production and inventories,
and some deliveries were moved forward.
We've seen this pattern before, as Steve and I went over this weekend.
You have a shock, you've got front-loading of activity,
You've got the appearance.
of resilience, you've got revisions, and then finally payback.
The risk is that October payrolls
represent the high of another artificial mini cycle,
not the beginning of recovery. That's what
consumers continue to tell us.
That's what the market continues to price, a temporary front-loaded
artificial high that gets followed with more payback, not inflation.
And Fed officials, their interference in the front end
by ratcheting themselves is essentially
they're confirming their own biases.
They see a couple of months of stronger than expected
payrolls and ignoring the weak months.
They see a couple of months where the CPI doesn't
decelerate like they wanted to,
ignoring the times that it does and say, well, the risk is too high
for us to sit here doing nothing
because we're more worried about what happened in 2022 and
being criticized than we are the actual small economics
of the current situation.
Payrolls occasionally beat expectations,
so labor demand must be resilient.
The core CPI beat expectations, so inflation must be broadening.
Therefore, officials conclude,
rates need to rise in December, possibly again in January,
possibly by 50 basis points.
But this skips the most important question.
Why are prices rising?
Can households afford them?
Are wages accelerating?
Are hours increasing?
Is hiring broadening?
Is the bond market pricing stronger nominal growth over the long run?
The answer to each of those is either no or nowhere near convincingly.
Even the Fed's own behavior reveals the uncertainty.
The October FOMC statement said policymakers needed a, quote,
accumulation of more information to determine their appropriate stance.
September's rate hike was insurance against
an inflation outcome officials couldn't confidently forecast.
They still can't. They still don't know.
If you hear what they're saying, including Christopher Waller,
they want a hike because they don't know.
Now, one CPI report that failed to slow
as much as expected is being used to justify
potentially accelerating that same insurance campaign.
That isn't evidence-based precision.
It's policymakers attempting to protect
their reputations against the criticism they received
during the post-pandemic episode.
Waller said doing less could damage
the Fed's inflation-fighting credibility.
The markets and consumers say, who cares about the Fed's credibility?
It's still talking about a resilient economy
that voters just overwhelmingly rejected and voted out.
That's the level of credibility Waller, Logan, Warsh,
and all the rest of them have over there in D.C.
No wonder the market isn't pricing
anything more than more Fed interference.
That's all it really is.
And the treasury market's message becomes
very clear once you separate out that policy
interference from the small e basic economics.
On the one side, you've got Waller worried about credibility.
On the other, you've got households worried
about whether or not they're going to have
enough income to pay for prolonged heightened energy prices.
The steep front of the curve says short
term rates could possibly rise even more.
That's Waller, Logan, December, possibly January, maybe 50.
The flat back, however, says those increases won't
be sustained by stronger longer-term fundamentals.
If the market believed payrolls represented a genuine acceleration,
the 10-year yield should rise a hell
of a lot more relative to the 2-year.
Stronger future growth would reduce demand for safe long-term bonds
and push the back of the curve higher.
If the market believed inflation was becoming entrenched,
Tips break evens should surge as investors demand more compensation
for the potential of lost purchasing power.
Neither of those is happening.
And we can go on and on with swap markets and beyond.
Instead, policy-sensitive yields are rising the fastest.
The two-year to 10-year spread is flattening to the point
that re-inversion is again a realistic possibility.
And we know what inversion really means.
That's the market pricing a policy mistake.
It's saying the Fed may raise rates
because officials are reacting or really overreacting
to recent data, but the economy lacks the income
and employment foundation to absorb
those increases, and consumers are saying
the exact same thing in different language.
Their inflation expectations move slightly with gasoline
and electricity, then fade over
time.
Their unemployment fears, however,
have climbed to levels not seen since April of 2020.
Markets see policy risk.
Consumers see job risk.
Central bankers see credit
credibility risk. Only one of those groups appears
to believe the economy should be focused on
accelerating prices.
And in truth, this week's bond market sell-off is as much a function of
just retracing after a pretty substantial rally
from the beginning of October as anything else.
Yes, the market reacted to the Fed likely overreacting
to the CPI after not really
reacting to the payroll report,
but yields have been down pretty substantially up until this
point. So they were bound to turn around
and bounce here in the short run anyway.
It's the reversal of part of a substantial rally
because two headline reports and several
hawkish speeches put the Federal Reserve back
into focus where it should never be.
Payrolls increased by 165,000, the CPI rose by four-tenths,
the core price rate rose three-tenths,
and Waller raised the possibility of a half-point move,
while Logan endorsed at least two more
quarter-point increases. So the two-year yield jumped.
Of course the two-year yield's going to
jump. But the curve flattened again
because the 10-year didn't keep pace.
Tips break evens, remain contained.
Swap markets retain the cautionary characteristics of 2023.
Consumers expect only a limited increase in short-term inflation,
while their fears of rising unemployment, the highest since April 2020.
The rare curve shape remains steep in the front.
That isn't growth. It isn't entrenched inflation.
It is the bond market pricing more Federal Reserve action against
an economy that lacks the income, labor quality,
and consumer demand that's necessary to validate it.
The Fed is looking at consumer prices
that didn't decelerate as much as it had hoped
and contemplating a more aggressive tightening campaign in response.
Consumers are looking at wages that didn't keep up with prices
and increasingly worry that jobs are going to start disappearing.
And the bond market is looking past central bankers
and siding with consumers,
having long since warned about them as voters.
And speaking of that election,
we're planning Euro Dollar University Live in February 2027.
The topic is going to be the rise of socialism.
And after last week's election
and the results of last week's election, I think people are
starting to finally get it,
that this is a very real problem that needs some, that requires
some serious examination and some serious discussion.
That's what we're going to do.
So what I need is some help from you.
Tell me in the comments section, who should we invite as speakers?
What are the things that we need to do?
What are the critical pieces that we can provide to help explain
and connect these dots,
to get people to finally see where this is all coming from?
Because the socialist message is resonating
in a way that the counter message really isn't.
In fact, most people don't realize
they're falling right into that trap.
They're actually making the socialist argument stronger.
In the comments section, let me know your suggestions,
some people we can invite.
Let's start planning for February 2027
so that we can take a serious look at what's taking place.
Again, the election last week should have been a wake-up call.
If you didn't think this was serious before,
you have to take it seriously now.
So I hope you can help me with getting together February 2027.
And I hope I get to see a lot of you there.
But let me know in the comments section.
