In this documentary, I dive into the real story of the Genoese crossbowmen at the Battle of Crécy (1346), before the famous English longbowmen began firing. This is Part 1 of our Crossbow vs Longbow series, focusing on the composition, deployment, and fatal disadvantages that doomed the French vanguard. We explore how crossbowmen and longbowmen shaped one of medieval warfare's most decisive battles.
Many sources claim 6,000 Genoese crossbowmen faced off against English longbowmen at Crécy—but how accurate is that number? Who were these soldiers, what weapons did they carry, and why were they left so vulnerable on the battlefield?
Using historical records, including those of Jean Froissart, David Nicolle, and Schnerb, we analyze the strategic missteps, logistical failures, and political factors that doomed the crossbow corps before the first volley flew.
Topics covered:
Genoese crossbow teams and tactics
Weapon differences
French army organization and the arrière-ban
March discipline and missing pavises
Language barriers and battlefield confusion
Stay tuned for Part 2, where we cover the devastating engagement itself—and whether the longbow's legendary reputation was truly earned.
Your name is Tommaso di Camogli, born and raised in the seaport of Camogli, east of the great city
of Genoa. But today, you're a long ways from home, standing on a muddy field in northern France,
your hands squeezing your crossbow in a death grip. Ahead of you, on top of a gentle hill a
few hundred meters away, you can see the red, gold, and blue banners of your enemy, the King
of England. You swallow hard, and as you steady your feet in the charmed up mud, you wonder,
how did a man from the Republic of Genoa end up in a war between two foreign kings?
Today, on the Warfighter Archives, we'll examine one of the most talked about matchups in military
history, the longbow versus the crossbow, focusing on what happened at the Battle of Crecy.
This battle is often cited as proof of the longbow's dominance, but that's only part of the
story, and in this video, I'll break down the weapons and the soldiers that carried them,
while the next video will discuss the battle itself and what tactical conditions led to its
outcome. And I'll do this in part through the eyes of Tommaso, our fictional Genoese crossbowman
whose fate, like many others, was decided long before the arrows started flying. As Tommaso,
you know something that people often overlook, that not all the crossbowmen standing with you
are Genoese, and not all the Genoese are crossbowmen. Genoese crossbowmen fought in teams,
typically one pavisserie, a pavisse bearer and spearman, for each three crossbowmen,
as noted by David Nicole. Thus, the off-cited 6,000 Genoese crossbowmen would actually mean
either 4,500 crossbowmen and 1,500 pavisserie, or 6,000 crossbowmen and 2,000 pavisserie.
Moreover, Genoa had also provided the French with a fleet of 32 galleys. Nicole cites a typical
galley as having a crew of around 200 men. How many of these were fighting men is open to debate,
since by 1346, the Genoese used a combination of freemen, slaves, and convicts as oarsmen,
according to the historian William Rogers. In addition, the French had hired 1,400 Genoese
crossbowmen to assist with their Gascony campaign, and we'll talk about that a little
bit more in a minute. In addition, Genoa itself was at war with the Mongols. In 1346, the Genoese
colony of Caffa on the Crimean peninsula was still under siege, with a garrison of several
thousand soldiers. In addition, Genoese galleys were working with the Venetians to blockade Mongol
ports in the Black Sea, and in total these operations probably included at least 5,000 men.
It's highly unlikely that Genoa could afford to send an additional 9,000 to 14,000 men, depending
on the status of the galley crews, to fight in France. The historian Schnurb agrees, as he believes
there's no way Genoa could have raised a force of 6,000 crossbowmen, let alone 9,000 to 14,000.
Add to that the fact that this was a hastily raised French army. Earlier that summer,
the main French army of 20,000 men, including the best knights and all the officers of the
royal household had invaded Gascony. They had expected the English army to sail south to
protect their valuable Gascon territories, so the English decision to land in the north
caught King Philip flat-footed. As a result, the Arrière Ban, which was an emergency call to arms,
was issued on July 29th, just under a month before the Battle of Crecy was fought on August 26th.
Tommaso, as a foot soldier, would be the first one to tell you. 9,000 Genoese can't march from the
Ligurian coast to Rouen in under a month, let alone with the full supply train, which thousands of
pounds of salted meat, bread, crossbow bolts, pavises, spare parts, and handlers that such a
deployment would have required. Moreover, the Arrière Ban likely raised large numbers of crossbowmen as well.
We know that crossbows, at least the lighter kind, were ubiquitous across France, and that many major
towns and cities had their own crossbowmaker. We know that a few thousand crossbows were made for
the French fleet in 1340, and so it's pretty clear that France produced great quantities of the weapon
when needed. David Nicole also states that crossbowmen were in short supply in France,
but I think he's referring to professional crossbowmen, and the Arrière Ban didn't just
call professionals, it summoned all able-bodied men, and the commoners with crossbows were likely
to be the first taken into service, especially since the king had just sent 1,400 expert Genoese
mercenaries to Gascony. My personal belief, and feel free to debate me in the comments below,
is that there were probably around 6,000 crossbowmen, but only a few of them, maybe 2,000
were Genoese, the rest were likely French levies. This is critical for two reasons. First, the
levies especially would have had a variety of crossbows with different draw blades and reload
mechanisms, and second, this would mean two different languages, French and Italian, trying
to operate as one cohesive unit. In contrast, the English would have had a more unified command
structure, and while there was variation with longbows, it was nowhere near as dramatic.
But why would King Philip create this type of linguistic problem? Well, I think David
de Col's statement about France lacking its own professional crossbowmen makes sense. Simply put,
the Genoese captains may have been the only leaders with experience commanding crossbowmen
on the battlefield. As Tommaso, such high-level decisions were over your head, but you would
certainly feel uneasy about serving alongside so many foreigners whose strange language you can't
understand. You'd also feel uneasy serving under Doria, who in 1339 had caused a mutiny by
pocketing the wages of his men. Language differences and dishonest commanders are hardly recipes for
battlefield cohesion. Moreover, you'd be further unsettled by the absence of the Pavese shield
which you rely upon for protection. Your pavisarii, Enrico, would probably be even more nervous.
Without the Pavese, he's just an armored spearman, the medieval equivalent of bringing a knife to a
gunfight. Historians have pondered the lack of Pavese a great deal, but there are two simple
explanations. Nicole notes that it was not uncommon for Genoese mercenaries to store the
cumbersome Pavese in wagons for the march. This makes sense. Genoese mercenaries were generally
very well armored, and the weight of armor and crossbow could add up fast when you're marching
10 to 20 miles a day. If this was the case, then they likely kept their baggage train close at
It's also important to remember that the French had set off at speed because King Edward had given
them the slip, crossing the Somme and heading north. The French had considered this impossible
and so had not bothered to remove crops or valuables from the lands north of the Somme,
so when they set out, their primary goal was to move quickly enough to prevent the English from
causing more damage to some of the richest lands in France. This is probably why the crossbowmen
were in the vanguard. The French would have been concerned with overcoming English rearguard
detachments and isolated bands of looters. In this context, a combined arms force of knights and
crossbowmen would provide an overwhelming amount of combat power. In addition, if a major battle
was joined, the crossbowmen would be expected to form a skirmishing line, meaning that they would
need to be on the field first anyway. However, the baggage train fell further and further behind the
and a key factor here is the poor march discipline of the French. Foissart states that
These kings, earls, barons, and lords of France did not advance in any regular order,
but one after the other, or any way most pleasing to themselves. This was probably because the
constable of France, the officer responsible for maintaining march discipline, had been captured
at Cannes and therefore was not present. Also, the Genoese were tired, having marched for over
half the day in full armor with their weapons, and by contrast the English longbowmen were well
rested and prepared. How much of this you'd know as a common soldier like Tommaso is debatable,
as even in modern times soldiers often don't know all the details of their mission or why
supplies aren't there when they're needed. But certainly you'd feel the cramps and soreness in
your legs as well as the unease over the missing pevis, much like a modern soldier forced into
combat without his body armor. You'd feel even more uneasy as you'd look up and down the line
and see the variety of crossbows that your French allies are sporting. Genoese mercenaries like
Tommaso benefited from being equipped by the wealthy city of Genoa, which had its own extensive
guild of crossbow makers. Most were probably equipped with windlass crossbows. These weapons
were expertly crafted, devastatingly powerful pieces. Each had a metal bow and a draw of 800
pounds or more in a range of around 200 to 250 meters. The downside was that the windlass took
time to reload. Even an experienced man like Tommaso would only fire around two bolts per
minute. This is why the pevis was so important as a reloading crossbowman was a stationary,
vulnerable target. On the other hand, French levies might bring any variant of crossbow to
the battlefield and many French crossbows might have been lighter variants, some possibly still
made mostly of wood. These would have a notably lower draw weight of around 250 to 300 pounds
in a range of 100 to 150 meters. On the plus side, most would use a lever or belt hook to
reload, allowing them to shoot faster, maybe at around six shots per minute. Honestly, there are
other types of crossbows that might have appeared as well, but going over them all would take far
too long. Suffice to say that there was significant deviation in the range, speed, and penetrating
power of the various types. From this, we see a confused force that lacks cohesion. The crossbow
line has a wide variation in draw weight and reload mechanisms, which means that their shooting
pace and range can vary pretty dramatically. In addition, there are language issues. If an order
is given in Italian, it needs to be translated to French, and vice versa. If this doesn't happen,
then confusion and misunderstanding can take hold. Combined, these two factors create a lot of
inconsistencies, and in battle, inconsistencies aren't just problematic, they can be lethal.
This is the most likely scenario, in my opinion. However, the other option is that the crossbowmen
were all Genoese and were probably only around 2,000 or so in number, meaning they'd be badly
outnumbered by the 6,000 to 7,000 English longbowmen. Either way, we know that the Genoese
were certainly concerned about the situation. Fossard states that the Genoese told the Count
of Alençon, commander of the vanguard, that, quote, they were not in a fit condition to do
any great things that day in battle. But Alençon dismissed them coldly as being scoundrels. Some
people have pointed to this and said that it makes no sense, since the Genoese were highly regarded
across Europe, and this is true to some degree. However, it fails to account for the 1339 mutiny
where the Genoese had seized control of their galleys and gone home. This act had played a
significant role in the deterioration of France's naval fortunes, which culminated in the disastrous
defeat at Sloyce in 1340. So it's likely that there was substantial bad blood between the two
sides, and Alençon's remarks make a lot more sense in that context. But in this video, we've
gone ahead and set the stage for the showdown between longbows and crossbows at Crecy, and maybe
we've painted the crossbow line in a different light. They were likely a mixed force, professionals
and levies, under-equipped and commanded by a man whose claim to fame was stealing pay and sparking
a mutiny. Either that, or they were badly outnumbered by more than three to one and still
had the same issue with a commander who had a reputation for stealing the men's pay. And they're
about to face one of the most lethal volleys of missiles in medieval history. In Tommaso's shoes,
you tighten your grip on your crossbow and try to swallow down your fear as the order to advance
sounds. You know that your next few minutes could be your last. And in the next episode, we'll look
what happens when the shooting starts. But will Tommaso survive, and if so, is the reputation of
his unit and his weapon truly going to be shattered for good? But let me know what you think in the
comments section below, and also let me know what you think about this video format with a bit of
immersive storytelling. Ultimately, I want my videos to be accessible, debate-provoking, and
interesting, and the best ones to help me attain that standard are you, my viewers. With that said,
thank you for watching, and I hope to see you in the next one.