Russia Stalls as Putin’s War Economy Starts to Crack

Global Finance News
11 followers
Nov 16, 2026 #finance #financement
#finance
#financement
Russia’s industrial engine is barely growing, regional budgets are under mounting pressure, and Moscow’s own forecasts point to falling industrial production and investment.
In this video, I explain how weak growth, expensive borrowing and the cost of the war in Ukraine are squeezing Russia’s economy. With regional governments facing financial shortfalls, the Kremlin faces increasingly difficult choices over military spending, public services and support for struggling businesses.
Can Putin keep financing his military ambitions without further weakening the economy underneath them?
AI Generated·May contain errors
Hi, welcome back to the channel.
In today's episode I want to talk to you about what's going on in the
Russian economy and particularly the growing financial pressure
because beneath all of the
Kremlin's claims about economic resilience,
a much more dangerous problem is now emerging.
Industry is barely growing,
regional finances are under severe strain and Moscow's own
economic ministry is forecasting a fall
in industrial production across the year.
After years of pouring resources into the war Russia
is struggling to turn that spending
into a stronger economy
and the danger for Vladimir Putin is that these problems can
feed into one another.
A struggling factory generates less tax, a regional government
The government collects less money,
Moscow faces more demands for support,
And the business is expected to finance the system, face
expensive borrowing and pressure on their customers.
The war machine still needs feeding, but the economic foundations
underneath it are becoming harder to maintain.
Now, before we get into all of the details today,
if you're enjoying my videos,
could you please give this video a thumbs up?
Please subscribe to the channel if you haven't done so already.
Hit the hype symbol if you're interested in doing that.
And have a look at my membership scheme.
And I just wanted to mention that I'm now offering the opportunity
Have lunch with me. You may have seen that I do a lot of food videos
and I go out to lunch a lot
and I thought why not open up the invite to you guys
and have lunch with me. So I will fly to you
wherever you are in the world.
Doesn't matter where you are in Australia, America, Canada,
South America. Doesn't make any difference.
I'll come to you and we can book the best possible
place. Now I'd like to go to afternoon tea
if you're interested in that but if you really don't
If you don't want to go to afternoon tea,
Then we can go to whatever sort of lunch you would like.
And you can bring a friend along as well.
I'll cover all of the costs.
So you can go to the best place in town,
the most expensive, doesn't matter, whatever you want.
We'll go there and we can just shoot the breeze
and talk about whatever it is that you fancy.
Maybe it's Russia.
Maybe it's what's going on in the US,
Iran, or just talk about the weather.
Doesn't really matter, or sport, or whatever you like.
It doesn't make any difference.
This is another way of helping to fund the channel.
So if you'd like to get involved.
Have a look at the QR code on the screen now
or click the link in the description below.
It will take you through to the independent company
that's hosting this competition on my behalf
and you can have a look at some deals and things there
and good luck and hopefully I will see you for lunch
at some point soon.
So let's start with the admission from Russia itself.
The Ministry of Economic Development
has cut its forecast for industrial production in 2026
from growth of 0.6% to a contraction of 0.2%.
That downgrade was reported recently.
If the forecast proves correct,
it would be the first annual decline that Russia has reported
since 2020, which was the year of the COVID pandemic.
Now, a fall of 0.2% might sound
relatively small, and in isolation, it is.
But consider what this forecast represents.
The government is expecting industry
to go backwards across an entire year while continuing
to prioritize the military.
That raises an uncomfortable question. How much support does
Does the wider industrial economy...
Still need just to stand still.
Now there's an important distinction here.
Some of the headlines circulating now make this sound
like a newly confirmed annual collapse, which it isn't yet.
The year is still underway and this is a forecast.
The latest figures actually show that industrial production
rose by 1.8% in September compared with last year.
And across the first nine months,
the increase is 0.2%, so barely growing.
So a stronger month has left the overall picture closer to stagnation.
And that matters because I want to understand the real weakness here.
We don't need to exaggerate the figures.
An industrial economy
that barely expands over nine months, 0.2% growth,
already represents a serious challenge
for a government with enormous military ambitions.
And one improving month doesn't tell us whether
the challenge has been resolved.
The next issue is what is growing?
September's Russian figures showed strong increases in
categories associated
with defense production including electronics and other transport
equipment, a category covering aircrafts and ships.
Those categories also include civilian
products so it's not 100% the production of weapons
and war machinery but nevertheless the
composition does matter.
Rising output in selected industries can sit alongside weaknesses
In the commercial part of Russia's economy.
So think about the difference between
a business buying machinery to expand production
and a government buying equipment to replace
the equipment that's been lost in the war.
Both purchases generate activity, both pay workers and suppliers,
but their economic consequences over the long term are very different.
Productive investment may generate additional income for years.
Military equipment consumed in fighting,
like a missile or a tank or an aircraft or whatever,
requires another round of spending to replace it.
And that's the trap here.
The government can sustain demand through military orders,
but those orders require financing.
Keeping factories busy is only one part of the equation.
The state also needs a durable tax base, viable businesses,
and enough productive capacity to meet civilian needs.
Otherwise, maintaining activity
becomes an increasingly expensive exercise.
A new assessment from Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service puts
the regional problem at the centre of this story.
It says 65 regions depend on financial assistance from Moscow,
while 24 remain donor regions.
They're actually giving money to the state.
And receiving federal support doesn't automatically mean
a region is completely bankrupt.
Transfers between richer
and poorer areas are a normal feature of government finances in Russia.
The important questions are whether dependence is increasing.
Whether local revenues can cover up their obligations
and whether the central government can comfortably meet
the demand for assistance.
The headline number alone doesn't answer those questions.
But we have a much more direct warning about the underlying pressure.
Russia's own finance minister, Anton Siluanov,
warned earlier this year that regional budgets
face the combined deficit of 1.9 trillion rubles in 2026,
an increase of 27% year on year.
He linked the problem to weaker corporate profit tax receipts
and higher social spending.
His ministry was seeking measures to bring that deficit down.
So the strain is acknowledged inside the Russian government
and the mechanism is straightforward.
Companies make less profit,
regional governments receive less profit tax
and spending commitments become harder to finance.
Siluanov also warned that some of the biggest deficits
were appearing in regions that had traditionally enjoyed surpluses.
And that's particularly uncomfortable because stronger regions
Normally provide a financial cushion.
Imagine a manufacturing town where one large employer supports
a network of smaller businesses.
If that employer cuts investments or reduces orders,
the impact travels beyond its gates.
Contractors lose work.
Shops face more cautious customers.
Local tax receipts weaken.
The regional authorities may then postpone a project
which removes another source of demand from the local economy.
That's how an industrial slowdown becomes a broader financial problem.
The initial fall in activity does not have to be spectacular.
What matters is how exposed everyone else is to the income being lost.
A community with diverse employers and healthy reserves has options.
A community dependent on a few businesses
and government spending has much less room to manoeuvre.
Expensive credit makes that adjustment harder.
The Bank of Russia kept its key interest rate
at 14% at its last meeting.
That's the central bank's policy rate rather than
the rate every business pays.
Commercial borrowing depends on the borrower
and the terms of the loan, but it will be higher than
14%. It gives you a sense
of the financial conditions facing companies that need money
in Russia right now. Consider a business deciding whether
to replace an aging production line.
It has to estimate future sales, labor costs,
maintenance, and financing. If borrowing is
expensive and demand is uncertain, waiting becomes more attractive.
Yet waiting can mean using less
equipment for longer. The company saves cash today.
potentially weakening its competitive position tomorrow.
That's why investment deserves so much
attention. September's government forecast projected
a 5.4% fall in capital investment
this year, a substantial deterioration from its previous forecast.
Now that's a projection rather
than the actual full year result because obviously 2026 is ongoing,
but it signals concern about the
The spending that builds future productive
capacity, even while the state.
Continues to prioritise defence and security.
If investment weakens, the consequences will arrive gradually.
A cancelled project means fewer orders now.
It may also mean less capacity,
older machinery and lower productivity later.
For a government trying to sustain a prolonged war,
that creates a difficult trade-off between meeting immediate demands
and maintaining the economy that will have to pay future bills.
And cutting interest rates is not a simple escape route.
According to the Bank of Russia's latest statement,
Annual inflation.
So that's 6.8% in October, with inflation expected
to finish the year somewhere between 7.1% and 7.6%.
And those figures are significantly above its 4% target.
The bank also described inflation expectations as elevated.
Policymakers, therefore, are facing problems with regards to prices.
Lower rates could ease financing costs and support demand,
but extra demand is less helpful
if businesses can't readily increase supply.
Why?
In that situation.
Some of the additional spending can push prices higher,
which results in inflation.
Keeping rates elevated restrains that risk
while making life harder for borrowers.
Neither choice can manufacture additional skilled workers
or instantly restore productive capacity.
To be clear, the central bank also reports moderate economic growth
and some improvement in business sentiment.
Russia has functioning businesses and sources of resilience.
But my concern is the tension within the system.
The authorities want more activity.
More military capability and lower inflation,
while companies and regional governments
have to operate within real financial constraints.
The Ukrainian intelligence report goes further,
alleging that reductions in state defense orders
are causing production cutbacks,
even at defense enterprises.
Now that needs careful attribution.
The public evidence I've checked
doesn't establish a uniform collapse in military production,
and the September industrial figures
show strong growth in several categories.
Individual cutbacks and growth elsewhere are existing though.
What would make that reported cutback significant
is the dependence created by military demand.
A company can expand staffing
and capacity around an expectation of continued orders.
If orders are delayed, reduced or redistributed,
it still has wages and other commitments to meet.
The more specialised its production,
the harder it will be to find replacement customers quickly.
That makes the allocation
of government spending increasingly important.
Money directed to one priority is unavailable
for another unless the state raises more revenue or
borrows more. Regional support, infrastructure,
civilian services and military requirements all
compete for resources.
The cost of the war therefore includes the useful activity that
cannot happen because those resources have been committed elsewhere
and a federal transfer does
not raise that cost. It changes who pays.
Supporting a struggling region can protect
essential services and prevent a deeper local downturn.
But the money still has to come from somewhere.
If the need for support grows
while the broader economy struggles to expand,
the burden shifts towards stronger taxpayers,
borrowing or reductions in other spending.
For ordinary households, that's where
an abstract industrial forecast becomes personal.
A delayed investment can mean a job opportunity that never appears.
A strained local budget can mean maintenance postponed.
High financing costs can make a major purchase unaffordable.
These effects don't arrive everywhere at once
and they will vary according
To what's happening in each region.
Nor does economic pressure give us a reliable date
when Putin must stop the war.
Governments can redirect resources and tolerate substantial damage.
A weaker civilian economy can coexist with continued military spending.
The risk is that maintaining
the war requires progressively harder choices,
with more of the adjustment falling on households,
businesses and future investment.
So the development I want to focus
on is the connection between these problems.
Industry barely expanding, regional budgets under pressure,
Expensive finance, a forecast decline in investment,
each issue makes the others harder to manage.
Moscow can intervene at individual pressure points, but intervention
itself has a cost and doesn't guarantee a lasting improvement.
Now, there are several things I'll be watching from here,
whether industrial growth broadens beyond the strongest categories,
whether the annual investment forecast improves,
whether regional tax receipts recover,
whether the finance ministry can reduce regional deficits
without simply pushing the pressure
into unpaid commitments or postponed projects.
Those developments will tell us much more than a single headline
about one month of production.
They'll help establish whether Russia is finding a sustainable balance
or merely moving financial strain.
From one part of the system to another,
while the unending demands of the war continue.
That's why this story matters.
Russia's own industrial forecast
and its finance minister's regional budget warning
expose the financial challenges beneath the claims of resilience.
The Kremlin can continue directing money towards its priorities.
What it can't assume is that the rest of the economy will generate
an ever-growing surplus to support them.
The longer the gap persists, the more difficult the choices become.
So hopefully you've enjoyed today's
video, found it useful, informative,
most importantly, thought provoking.
If you've liked what I've said, then please give me a thumbs up.
Please subscribe to the channel.
Have a look at my membership scheme and hit the hype symbol.
And as I said earlier, if you're interested in joining me for lunch,
then I'm offering that opportunity.
So have a look at the QR code on the screen now
or click the link in the description below.
That will take you through to the company organizing
that competition on my behalf.
So if you do do that, then good luck
and hopefully I will see you soon for lunch.
Thank you so much, everyone, for supporting me in other ways.
If you've already signed up as a member or a patron,
thank you for that long-term support.
And if you've bought me a coffee or sent me a YouTube super thanks,
thank you for that generosity.
And I'll see you again soon.
