China research ships mapped undersea cables off Guam, CSIS said on October 8, 2026. One ship, Xiang Yang Hong 06, ran a lawn-mower survey about 210 nautical miles from Guam over the Apricot and Asia-America Gateway routes. CSIS Futures Lab tracked 223 research vessels from 48 countries, using ship data from January 1, 2020, to December 9, 2025. Chinese ships ranked in the top 20 percent for time near critical infrastructure on the high seas in four of those years. Seven did so in 2024. The report says the data can help submarines and could support future damage to cables. Ke Xue mapped near cables off Japan, then appeared to survey Russia’s Polar Express cable in the Bering Sea. It also went dark for about three hours east of Shemya Island, home to Eareckson Air Station. About 99 percent of international data moves on these cables. CSIS estimates 22.4 trillion dollars in daily transactions. In March 2025, a Chinese state lab unveiled a cutter rated to 4,000 meters. In April 2026, Haiyang Dizhi 2 tested a cutter at 3,500 meters. Taiwan has blamed Chinese-linked ships for cable damage, and a Taiwan court sentenced the captain of Hong Tai 58 to three years. #China#UnderseaCables#CSIS Truth saves lives. Please support! 👇 🌺Donate： https://donorbox.org/support-inconvenient-truths-by-jennifer-zeng 🌺 Membership：https://bit.ly/3biCEk5 🌺 Bitcoin：bc1qlkkvwyvw96x3xx6jgzkhlnnv0nv3d9vm078vfd ㊙️ Website：https://www.jenniferzengblog.com/ ㊙️ Alternative English Channel: https://gjw.us/jenniferz ㊙️ Chinese Channel：https://www.ganjingworld.com/@ZengZheng_TrueWords 🍀 X/Twitter：https://twitter.com/jenniferzeng97 👉 Jennifer’s Bio：https://www.jenniferzengblog.com/about/
Are Chinese research ships secretly mapping
the underwater cables that connect U.S. military
bases to the rest of the world?
A new report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies
raises serious concerns.
And previous reports about the CCP's cable-cutting technology
suggest that potential threat goes beyond surveillance.
The CSIS study examined 223 research vessels
from 48 countries using tracking data from 2020
through December 2025.
It found that Chinese research ships spent unusually large amounts
of time near critical underwater infrastructure.
In 2024, seven Chinese vessels ranked among
the most active near these facilities.
One ship, Xiangyanghong-06, repeatedly mapped
waters near Guam, a major U.S. military hub.
Between February and May 2024, it made three
trips to waters about 210 nautical miles from Guam.
Its routes overlapped with important
submarine cable corridors connecting Asia
and the United States.
Another vessel, Ke Xue,
mapped waters near Japan and later traveled into the Bering Sea.
These activities appeared
to include areas near Russia's Polar Express cable.
The ship also stopped transmitting its tracking signals
for about three hours near Alaska's
Shemya Island,
home to a U.S. military installation.
Submarine cables carry about 99% of international data traffic.
They support global financial transactions,
civilian communications, and military operations.
Damage to these cables could disrupt communications during a conflict.
Repairs can take weeks or even months.
The CCP has also shown a cutter.
In March 2025, the China Ship Scientific Research Center unveiled
a device that can sever
armored cable at up to 4,000 meters. In April 2026,
Haiyang Dizhu tested a cutter at 3,500
meters. Suspected cuts are already on record.
In November 2024, the Chinese ship Yipeng-3
was near two Baltic cables when they were severed.
Investigators suspected a dragged anchor. Sweden
later found no proof of intent.
In January 2025, Taiwan blamed Shunxing 39 for damage to a Taiwan
US cable. A Taiwan court gave the Chinese captain
of Pengtai 58 three years for cutting a cable to
Penghu. A separate Reuters investigation identified
extensive Chinese seabed mapping across the
Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans.
The CCP's Transparent Ocean Program also uses underwater
sensors to collect oceanographic data.
Such information has scientific uses,
but it can also support submarine operations.
CSIC recommends three measures, stronger
international intelligence sharing,
coordinated maritime patrols, and expanded cable repair
capabilities. The critical question remains,
Are these vessels conducting ordinary scientific
research or gathering intelligence that could help
the CCP disrupt vital communications during
a future conflict.
