Chinese EVs Hit Europe’s Blacklist: Europeans Say “Never Buy China’s Electric Cars”

China Observer
822粉絲
At the Port of Bremerhaven in Germany, massive car carriers are unloading vehicles. Tens of thousands of futuristic-looking Chinese electric vehicles with luxurious interiors are lined up, waiting to enter the European market. However, across the port, the analysts at several major European leasing companies, including Ayvens, Arval, and Sixt, look at these new cars and shake their heads in hesitation.
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The 2025 Yanguang U8 is now selling for just 218,000 yuan, including the vehicle and all
the mud on it.
It's China's most luxurious large SUV, the domestic version of a Rolls-Royce Cullinan.
The rear seats have ventilation, heating and massage functions, plus entertainment screens.
This 3-ton vehicle is so heavy that even a forklift struggles to lift it.
The full price, mud and all, is 218,000 yuan.
Recently, a video went viral of a BYD Yanguang U8 owner smashing his vehicle.
The owner reportedly said the SUV was flooded and the repair costs were higher than buying
a brand new car.
In the video, the owner repeatedly strikes the body with an iron bar.
The sparks flying from the car represent the collapse of a once-promoted image of luxury
EVs.
The Yanguang U8 has an official starting price of over 1 million yuan, while the extended
wheelbase U8L starts at 1.23 million yuan.
However, on the used car market, the original owners typically lose more than 400,000 yuan
within a year.
After flood damage, the remaining value reportedly fell to just 218,000 yuan, less than a quarter
of the original price.
It's no wonder that the owner chose to smash the vehicle to express his frustration.
A single flood can turn a million-yuan luxury car into scrap metal.
This is far from an isolated case.
In China, the sharp decline in EV resale values has become a common problem.
Battery degradation, discontinued software support, unstable brand reputation, and weak
repair networks have together pushed these once-expensive smart cars into a difficult
second-hand market.
Many owners have realized that they did not buy an asset, but a product that continues
to lose value over time.
The same concerns are now appearing overseas.
European leasing companies have directly rejected large-scale purchases of Chinese EVs, citing
uncontrollable resale value risks and potentially unlimited after-sales costs.
For example, the BYD Yuan Plus, known as the BYD Auto 3 in Europe, sells for 150,000 yuan
in China.
After adding international shipping, compliance certification costs, European tariffs and
dealer margins, the vehicle sells for about 35,000 euros.
On the surface, the price nearly doubles, suggesting strong profit margins.
However, after factoring in the high costs of building after-sales service networks,
GDPR data privacy audits, ongoing cybersecurity compliance, and subsidies needed to maintain
resale values, each vehicle may still represent a significant financial loss on paper.
Leasing companies calculate every detail.
If a vehicle's resale value collapses after three years, insurers refuse coverage, and
used car dealers refuse to take it in, the entire financing chain could break down.
They would rather earn less than take on this risky business.
At the port of Bremerhaven in Germany, massive car carriers are unloading vehicles.
Tens of thousands of futuristic-looking Chinese EVs are lined up, waiting to enter the European
market.
However, across the port, analysts at several major European leasing companies look at these
new vehicles and shake their heads in hesitation.
What they see is risk, a black hole on the balance sheet.
The core of the European auto market is not individual consumers, but corporate leasing
companies.
More than 60% of new car sales come from bulk leasing purchases.
Many white-collar workers and executives receive company-provided vehicles.
For leasing firms, buying cars is not consumption, but asset management.
They don't look at marketing brochures or listen to sales pitches.
They focus on two cold hard numbers, total cost of ownership over the vehicle's entire
life cycle, and residual value.
A high residual value means strong value retention, lower depreciation, and cheaper monthly lease
payments.
A low residual value means faster depreciation and higher monthly costs.
As early as 1931, German expert Hans Schwache created the Schwache list, which remains a
key reference for banks, insurers, and leasing companies across Europe.
Let's do the math.
A BMW 3 Series has a new car price of €45,000.
Because of strong brand recognition and a staple used car market, analysts estimate
that after 3 years, it can still sell for €22,500, with a residual value of 50%.
That means the leasing company loses €22,500 in depreciation over 3 years.
Now consider a Chinese EV.
The new car price in Europe is €35,000.
It appears €10,000 cheaper than a BMW.
However, because Chinese automakers frequently launch new models and cut prices, while having
a limited used car ecosystem overseas, analysts estimate that the vehicle's residual value
after 3 years is at only 30%, meaning it can be sold for just €10,500.
The numbers are brutally clear.
A Chinese EV that is €10,000 cheaper at the sticker price ends up costing leasing
companies €2,000 more in depreciation losses than a BMW.
In the end, to avoid losses, leasing companies have to set higher monthly payments for Chinese
EVs, sometimes even higher than BMWs.
European customers are not foolish.
If the monthly lease price is the same, why give up a BMW for an unfamiliar brand that
could disappear from the market at any time?
This has created a highly unusual industrial paradox in Europe.
On one side, China's EV exports are surging, and sales figures look impressive.
On the other side, European leasing companies are increasingly placing Chinese EVs in their
do-not-purchase list.
The busy scenes at ports cannot hide the harsh reality.
Even more ironically, the rapid product cycles of Chinese automakers have almost turned consumers
into test subjects.
When a new model launches, older versions immediately lose value.
When prices are cut, the used car market collapses overnight.
In the eyes of European financial analysts, this amounts to a one-sided breach of contract.
If the collapse in residual value is a hidden attack, then Europe's after-sales logistics
network is the visible weapon that directly strikes at the survival of Chinese EVs overseas.
For example, in Germany, annual third-party liability insurance plus comprehensive coverage
for a BYD seal can cost more than €1,300, while a comparable EV, the Volkswagen ID.4,
costs only €865.
The difference is more than 50%.
In the UK, insurance premiums for some Chinese models have even surged above £2,000.
These figures are not random prices set by insurance companies.
They are risk premiums calculated by actuaries based on real claims data.
Europeans buying cars don't only look at the purchase price, they also care about whether
insurance is available, whether repairs are convenient, and whether an accident could
turn into an endless financial burden.
Chinese EVs are showing a critical weakness in exactly these areas.
Imagine you're driving a Volkswagen Golf in Germany and accidentally crack the rear
bumper while reversing.
The local dealership orders the replacement part from a nearby warehouse.
The bumper arrives the next day, and the repair costs €800.
The car is ready in three days, and the insurance company pays without issue.
But if you're driving a Chinese EV that has just entered Europe and has not yet built
up its local spare parts network, the situation can become far more complicated.
The dealership may tell you, sorry, this bumper is not available in Europe.
It has to be shipped by sea from Ningbo in China, which could take three months.
Under European auto insurance policies, insurers are often required to provide drivers with
With rental costs of about €100 per day, waiting for an €800 bumper could force an
insurer to pay around €9,000 just for a rental car.
Add labor costs of about €100 to €200 per hour, and insurers can quickly face a
major financial loss.
They may decide the vehicle is a technical total loss, pay the owner based on the used
car value, and send the vehicle for disposal.
After several cases where minor damage turns into a total loss, European insurers begin
to struggle with the costs.
Major Dutch insurer Unive and other institutions have reportedly suspended full coverage policies
for some Chinese car brands, while the Association of British Insurers has also raised risk assessments
for Chinese vehicles.
Being able to afford the car and the lease is no longer enough.
If buyers can't afford insurance, or if insurers are unwilling to provide coverage at all,
this is becoming a new barrier holding back Chinese automakers.
It's more subtle than tariffs and potentially more damaging than falling resale values because
it directly affects whether vehicles can legally operate on the road and whether consumers
feel secure owning them.
Looking back at history, when Korean automakers Hyundai and Kia entered the European market
30 years ago, they faced a similar crisis of consumer trust, but the Koreans did not
rely on a low-price strategy.
Instead, they focused on building infrastructure.
They invested heavily in factories in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, introduced seven-year
or 150,000-kilometer warranties, and built European spare parts networks capable of delivering
components within 24 hours.
The logistics and service network that Korean automakers spent nearly three decades building
cannot be bypassed by putting cars on ships and sending them overseas.
Meanwhile, Chinese automakers are also falling into a heavy asset trap with their overseas
sales channels.
Many companies still carry the mindset of China's domestic new carmakers.
They treat luxury flagship stores in city centers as standard requirement for overseas
expansion.
In areas like Amsterdam's Canal District, downtown Cologne, and prime locations in Oslo,
they spend millions of euros every year on rent for stylish direct-operated showrooms.
European consumers buy cars differently.
They usually drive to suburban auto centers and choose established dealerships that have
been passed down through generations and operated for decades.
What they value is not glass walls or photo-friendly display areas.
They care about the repair workshops behind the showroom, complete spare parts warehouses,
and the trust built within local communities over generations.
The daily crowds entering luxury flagship stores and city centers are mostly tourists
buying ice cream and taking photos.
The actual sales conversion rate there is extremely small.
The enormous rent and marketing expenses eventually become a heavy burden.
Alongside expensive distribution costs are high compliance costs, known as homologation
costs.
The European Union imposes a 10% basic tariff and countervailing duties of up to 35.3%,
pushing the combined tax burden to around 30-48%.
Even more challenging are the strict compliance requirements, including whole vehicle type
approval, GDPR data privacy audits, UN R155 and R156 cybersecurity standards, and the
latest EU battery passport requirements.
A complete compliance audit for a single vehicle model can quietly consume millions of euros.
These are not one-time expenses, but ongoing, rigid costs that are extremely difficult to
reduce.
As some Chinese automakers struggle and begin scaling back overseas operations, some have
shut down their European headquarters.
This immediately triggers panic in the used car market.
European used car dealers are highly reluctant to take in these Chinese brands.
They worry that if an automaker exits the market and cloud servers are shut down, the
vehicle's smart systems could become unusable.
Without after-sales support and with discontinued spare parts, the cars could eventually become
a liability sitting on their lots.
In the past, many Chinese automakers believed overseas expansion was simply an arbitrage
game.
They thought they could manufacture highly cost-effective products through China's powerful
supply chain, ship them overseas, and sell them at much higher exchange rate-adjusted
prices.
However, the European market has used a century of financial analysis, insurance risk management,
distribution barriers, and residual value protection systems to deliver a profound lesson
to Chinese automakers.
When a Chinese EV arrives at a port overseas, the manufacturing competition is already over.
The real challenge is only beginning.
The true test lies in building financial service systems, navigating local regulatory and legal
negotiations, integrating into used car assessment networks, and establishing after-sales support
systems that require decades of investment.
If the focus is only on the grand narrative of soaring export volumes, then this kind
of globalization built on losing money to grab market share will eventually become a
hollow cycle of assets drifting overseas without generating real returns.
Even more alarming is that China's EV industry has entered a brutal phase of market elimination
and severe domestic competition.
In the first eight months of 2026, cumulative retail sales of passenger vehicles reached
over 11 million units, down 20.8% year-over-year.
This represents a dramatic decline.
Profit margins in the auto manufacturing sector have fallen to 3.4%, while the complete vehicle
segment has dropped to just 1.5%, the lowest level in nearly a decade.
Profits have become so thin that companies can barely sustain research and development
or after-sales services.
China has 71 registered automakers and more than 130 vehicle brands currently on sale.
Among them, the number of EV brands had already reached 129 by the end of 2025.
However, the top 10 automakers now control 84% of the market, leaving more than 100 remaining
brands struggling for survival.
Since the beginning of this year, 23 EV companies have entered bankruptcy, restructuring or
suspended operations.
Neda Auto is the latest typical example.
In 2022, Neda delivered more than 150,000 vehicles, becoming the sales leader among
China's emerging EV startups.
But just two years later, in 2025, its monthly domestic retail sales plunged to only 11 vehicles.
Local governments competed to attract the company through measures such as direct equity
investment, factory construction support, 10 years of rent-free facilities, and per-vehicle
subsidies.
The result was 18.3 billion yuan burned through, 26 billion yuan in debt, and halted production
lines.
Neda's story is not just a corporate failure, but also a painful lesson about excessive
government intervention.
Associate Professor Hu Bo at the School of Finance at Renmin University of China pointed
out that the government's role has shifted from guidance and support toward excessive
financial backing, ultimately distorting market forces and exhausting public finances.
The reality of declining policy support has made the industry's challenges even worse.
In 2026, trade-in subsidies were reduced compared to the previous year, while the EV purchase
tax exemption was adjusted to a 50% reduction.
The actual level of support available for lower-priced models has clearly weakened.
At the national level, stricter controls on local government debt have made the old model
of continuously using public funds to support struggling automakers increasingly unsustainable.
In 2025, China's total auto production capacity was about 47.5 million vehicles, while actual
sales were only 34.4 million vehicles.
The official capacity utilization rate was around 73%, but the actual utilization rate
of many brands was only 20-30%.
Even these figures are based on officially released data and may not fully reflect the
severity of the situation.
A draft of Changchun's 15th five-year plan for the auto industry has openly predicted
that by 2030, the number of Chinese vehicle manufacturing groups will shrink from 71 to
around 15.
Ex-Bank Chairman He Xiaopeng has predicted that only around five brands with significant
sales volume will remain stable in China's future auto market.
Yang Dayong, executive vice president of Chang'an Automobile, has been even more direct, saying
that the Chinese market would eliminate 100 automobile brands in the coming years.
These views all point to the same harsh reality.
The industry is entering an irreversible large-scale shakeout, and most brands are unlikely to
survive.
The former boom of China's EV industry was, in essence, a massive expansion driven by
subsidies, government policies, and capital investment.
Local governments provided excessive support.
Companies burned cash to seize market share.
Production capacity expanded far beyond demand.
Residual value systems collapsed.
Overseas after-sales networks struggled, and international markets became more cautious.
Ultimately, Chinese consumers are left to pay the real cost of this industrial raise.
