Millions of China’s High-Rise Apartments Have Turned Into Dangerous Slums! Chickens,Ducks Everywhere

China Observer
822粉絲
An unusual scene is unfolding in some urban housing complexes in China. Modern apartment towers rise dozens of stories overhead, while the landscaped lawns below have turned into busy livestock yards. Chickens, ducks, and geese run everywhere. Even cattle and sheep have appeared.
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Yaks have actually gotten into this housing complex.
I have no idea how they got in.
They're all grazing here.
Around here, yaks roam free.
Nobody even needs to take them out to graze.
Oh, here's another one.
It's scared of me, and I'm scared of it too.
Good thing I'm not wearing red,
or it might come charging over and attack me.
This is in a residential community in Wuhu City.
This is a housing complex in Wuhu, Anhui province.
Maybe someone watching can guess where it is.
Look at these free-range chickens.
Real San Huang chickens.
There are actually dozens of them here.
See if you can guess the place.
This isn't the countryside.
This is an actual residential complex.
An unusual scene is unfolding in some urban housing complexes in China.
Modern apartment towers rise dozens of stories overhead,
while the landscaped lawns below have turned into busy livestock yards.
Chickens, ducks, and geese run everywhere.
Even cattle and sheep have appeared.
This is just bizarre.
People are keeping chickens, ducks, and geese in this complex,
along with cats and dogs.
We can put up with all of that.
But then, it turns out, someone is keeping sheep, too.
I honestly have no words.
Oh look, someone is on the main road in Xi'an.
Wow, look.
Someone is herding sheep along this main road in Xi'an,
letting them eat the landscaping.
There are quite a few of them.
Come grab one, take it home, and make lamb skewers.
It's 4.48 in the morning.
This starts at the same time every single day.
Today, I finally had enough.
Listen to that sound. It's a rooster crowing.
I used to think someone was out there
yelling every morning before dawn.
Today, I couldn't take it anymore,
so I came down to the complex's garden to find out,
and I finally found the culprit.
It's this rooster, crowing here every day.
Is this a pigeon?
Just listen, it does this every morning.
Nobody can put up with it. My god. Management,
I'm telling you, I finally found the cause.
This video is the proof. Get over here and deal with
it. If you don't get this rooster out of here,
I really will take matters into my own hands.
Surely, killing a chicken isn't against the law.
Along with animals running loose,
piles of firewood, a familiar sight in rural areas,
are scattered throughout the complexes.
Hallways are packed with all kinds of belongings.
What were designed as orderly modern residential developments
have effectively become large villages behind an urban facade.
It's not rural. There are groups in the city.
This isn't the countryside. Cities have heating.
Look, someone thinks the heating isn't warm enough,
so they're actually carrying firewood upstairs.
They're frying up a heated brick bed.
There's just nothing you could do when you get neighbors like this.
Look, they're still hauling it up.
They're really going to burn those huge logs.
This is the leak path we use to return to the front.
Look at this hallway in a resettlement apartment building.
Almost every floor is piled with all kinds of junk.
Good grief. If a fire ever breaks out, nobody's getting out alive.
We're all stuck sharing the consequences.
Oh, this floor actually has nothing piled up.
Nice. Very nice. Credit where it's due.
This is the ninth floor. Look at how clean it is.
But go down one more floor and there's another huge pile.
The problems go further. Some residents have
even put up signs and opened businesses.
This is
Look, there are trendy snack shops,
women's clothing stores, smart learning services,
after-school care programs,
and child development centers right inside the complex.
There aren't any ground floor commercial units,
but businesses just move higher up.
They can even operate on the 26th floor.
According to China's National Bureau of Statistics,
nearly 68% of the country's
permanent residents lived in urban areas by the end of 2025.
The urban population exceeded 950
million. For the Chinese Communist Party government,
that is undoubtedly an achievement
to showcase. But the reality behind
those impressive statistics tells a different story.
On one side is the grand vision for modern cities.
On the other are scattered garbage,
piles of clutter, and damaged public facilities.
That stark contrast raises a basic question about
what urbanization means.
Turning farmland into housing developments, moving farmers into high
rises, and counting them as urban residents does
not necessarily mean the job is done.
One complex stands out in China's urbanization story.
Xinglong Community in Xi'an
Which some people online jokingly call
the country's most chaotic housing complex.
The development was originally planned as a 5.5 billion yuan project.
Xi'an launched the Xinglong Community Resettlement Project in 2012
to support construction linked
to Samsung Electronics' industrial projects.
Plans called for a site of about 120 acres,
roughly 16.8 million square feet of total floor space,
and homes for about 10,000 households displaced by demolition.
Local authorities even promoted it as premium housing,
with planned schools, a hospital,
a cultural center, and more than 10,000 parking spaces.
But more than a decade later,
this supposedly premium community has faced one problem after another.
A local independent media account
in Xi'an published an article on June 20, 2024.
The article said residents were keeping sheep,
cattles, and chicken,
and even using heated brick beds
inside apartment buildings.
Some people describe the complex
as being in a league of its own.
But beyond the livestock,
Xinglong community's biggest headaches
are poor construction,
neglected public facilities,
and endless disputes between residents
and property managers.
A property management notice
from Xinglong Community's Zone 2 circulated online in June 2022.
Its contents were startling.
Of the complex's 80 elevators, 65 had safety risks because they had
either failed their annual inspections
or had not been inspected on time. They had to be taken out
of service. That meant only 15 of the 80 elevators might have
been operating normally. For residents
living more than 10 or 20 stories up, getting home became a climb.
A local Xi'an blogger revealed on June 22,
revealed that both elevators in Building 3 of
Xinglong Community's Zone 2 had stopped working.
Residents had to use the stairs every day.
Just the day before, an elderly woman had suffered an emergency
while climbing the stairs.
Emergency responders arrived,
but the hallway was too narrow for the stretcher to pass through
easily. The woman died. Afterward,
her grieving and angry relatives placed funeral wreaths outside
outside the property management office.
Mainland Chinese media reported after another startling incident
at the complex on August 11,
2023. A resident surnamed Zhang had originally lived
in Shiganhe Village. Her family left their
old home in 2012 when the land was acquired
and homes were demolished for projects linked to
Samsung. They finally moved
into Xinglong Community's Zone 2 in September 2015,
receiving four resettlement apartments.
They thought moving into the new apartments
would finally bring a better life.
Instead, renovations uncovered a major problem
in one unit measuring about 750 square feet.
Workers drilling into an overhead beam found
that the concrete inside was loose and crumbling.
Zhang later touched the beam with a plastic water pipe,
and sand came pouring down.
In some places, even the reinforcing steel was exposed.
This was a structural beam,
not peeling wall plaster that could be easily patched.
A forensic assessment later found that parts
of the beam's concrete contained far too much sand,
creating a serious safety hazard in the apartment.
Zhang was afraid to live there,
but the organization's responsible kept delaying a solution.
With no other option, she sued them in 2020.
The lawsuit dragged on for several more years.
A court finally ruled in May 2023 that the
organization's responsible had to provide
a replacement apartment within a specified time.
But when a reporter interviewed Zhang that August,
she said the replacement had still not
happened. Xinglong community's problems extend well beyond
these two cases. Residents had already
complained to the media in February 2022 that many issues
in the complex had been left unresolved.
Some residents had lived in their resettlement apartments
for years without receiving ownership
certificates. Some supporting commercial
units could still not be used normally.
Distribution of certain collectively owned
village assets had not been carried out.
Underground garages, surveillance systems,
and access controls were also inadequate.
Even compensation for delayed handovers was disputed.
Xinglong Community was back in court in December 2023,
this time over property management fees.
A ruling by the People's Court of Chang'an District
in Xi'an documented numerous management
disputes in Xinglong Community's Zone 2.
Elevators had long failed to operate normally. Broken fire
safety equipment and children's play facilities
were not repaired promptly. Roads and landscaping
were damaged, and garbage was not collected on time.
Haphazard parking of e-bikes and objects
thrown from upper floors were also not being effectively controlled.
The property management
had its own explanation.
It said some public facilities
were not under its direct responsibility.
Those issues had to be referred to the Residents Committee,
the Sub-District Office, and the
relevant government departments for coordination.
Even more frustrating, these problems persisted into 2026.
Residents complained to the media again on March 18,
2026, about long-running leaks affecting
19 buildings in the community.
Plaster was peeling off walls inside their homes, and mold was growing.
Years of complaints had brought no solution.
The Xinglong Sub-District Office replied on March 24th
that it had urged property managers to
coordinate repairs. Work was expected
to begin between late March and early April,
but there has still been no outcome.
Clearly, these conditions cannot simply be blamed on
residents' poor behavior.
Some complexes were built on the urban fringe or as resettlement
communities replacing demolished rural villages.
Residents moved into high-rises, but habits formed
over decades could not change overnight just
because they had a different home.
The issue is that the government led
this massive urbanization drive, yet failed to
establish community management and maintenance systems.
That points to a long-standing problem in China's urbanization.
Urban construction has advanced far faster than
the ability to govern those cities.
China's urbanization accelerated
dramatically over the past few decades.
To drive economic growth and expand cities,
many local governments eagerly acquired land,
demolished homes, developed real estate.
and built new urban districts.
Their view was that, as long as buildings went up,
homes sold, and GDP increased,
they had secured their political achievements.
Community management, public services,
resident self-governance, and the development of civic
behavior, by contrast,
required sustained investment and rarely produced quick results.
These are also the areas the CCP is least willing to invest in.
The result in some places is that homes
and roads are built and residents move in,
but ongoing management fails to keep up. Property services are missing,
shared spaces lack effective oversight,
and residents lack a system of following common rules.
When buildings are new,
the elevators and fire safety equipment are new too.
Management fees are also relatively easy to collect,
and everything looks good.
But after 10 or 20 years, elevators begin aging, pipes need replacing,
exterior walls develop leaks, and fire safety equipment needs repairs.
By then, the questions are who will pay,
who will manage it, and who will take responsibility.
These issues should have been carefully considered
and addressed before large-scale
urbanization began. Instead,
they've become deeply entrenched problems that are increasingly
difficult to fix.
Jiang Ming heads the owner's committee at a residential complex.
Not long ago, property
managers forwarded a notice to his phone.
It was a power shutoff notice bearing the state grid's
official red seal. The complex owed more than 37,000 yuan
in electricity bills and related
charges. Unless the debt
and late payment penalties were paid in a week, the power would
be cut off. The tallest buildings in Jiang's complex have 26 floors.
A power outage could affect elevators, water supplies,
and other shared facilities, disrupting
daily life for hundreds of households.
What was even more unexpected was that the seeds
of this management crisis had been planted
when the developer first sold the homes.
The developer and property management company belonged
to the same corporate group.
To attract buyers, the developer used extremely
low management fees as the selling point.
Monthly management fees per square foot were 0.08 yuan
for high-rise apartments, 0.16 yuan for low-rise apartments,
and 0.32 yuan for villas. Yet less than a year after handover,
all three rates were reduced to 0.08 yuan per square foot.
At first, owners were understandably pleased.
Lower management fees were an obvious attraction.
The problem was whether fees that low could actually cover the costs.
Take a low-rise apartment building,
where 10 households share one elevator.
Annual maintenance and inspection alone cost about 4,000 yuan,
or 400 yuan per household.
For an apartment of just over 1,000 square feet,
a monthly rate of 0.08 yuan per square foot
produces just over 1,000 yuan a year in fees.
The elevator alone uses up 400 yuan,
leaving 656 yuan for everything else.
The management must also pay for fire safety,
Safety.
Cleaning.
landscaping, garbage collection, and repairs to shared facilities.
Every one of those services
costs money. The financial shortfall becomes clear once
the figures are added up. According to the
report, normal operations
at the complex cost about 1.88 million yuan a year. Even if every
owner paid on time, annual revenue would still fall short
by more than 400,000 yuan. Worse,
the actual collection rate was just 42%.
That meant only 400,000 to 500,000 yuan came in annually.
While losses reached around 1.4 million yuan,
the less the company collected, the more it lost.
It clearly no longer wanted to keep covering the shortfall.
In September, it issued a withdrawal
notice, saying it would leave the complex once
the 90-day notice period ended. With management
really preparing to leave,
Zhang faced a crisis affecting hundreds of households. He negotiated
on behalf of the owners, proposing a reasonable fee increase
that would bring annual revenue to
to around 2 million yuan,
enough to at least keep basic operations running.
The company flatly refused.
It would not stay for an increase of a few tenths of a yuan,
or even if the fees doubled or tripled.
Its refusal went beyond whether there was money to be made.
The problem was more complicated than financial losses.
Okay.
According to the property manager,
the company had previously helped the developer delay
dealing with leaks and other construction defects until
the warranty period expired.
Now, those unresolved problems were surfacing all at once,
and owners were directing their
anger at management.
The company faced losses, a backlog of problems,
and daily complaints from residents.
Chang's complex is far from an isolated case.
Monitoring by the China Index Academy identified
212 residential projects nationwide,
where property managers withdrew between early 2025
and the end of March 2026.
Data from CRIC Property Management showed that companies
chose to leave voluntarily in about 64% of withdrawal cases in 2025.
Among the top 500 management companies monitored
by CRIC Property Management,
fee collection rates fell for four consecutive years,
from 89% in 2021 to 71%.
Many small and mid-sized companies
collected less than 65% of the fees owed.
According to Song Hongwei, an expert at TOSPER Research Institute,
large property management companies used
to consider leaving only after a project had lost
money for about two years and efforts to turn it around had failed.
Now some companies want
to withdraw shortly after homes are handed over.
That raises questions about why these companies
took on troubled complexes in the first place.
Fees were clearly too low to cover costs,
yet companies still competed for the contracts,
despite the developers' apparent strategy.
There are two main situations.
In the first, the developer and property management company
are part of the same corporate family.
Many developers have their own management companies.
The two businesses may be legally separate,
but belong to the same group.
To attract buyers, developers deliberately
set management fees very low,
sometimes below what normal operations require.
These management companies are there to help the group sell homes,
rather than simply earn fees.
A developer might make hundreds of thousands of yuan on one home.
If annual management losses
of hundreds of thousands, or even more than a million yuan,
help sell a few extra homes,
the group can still come out ahead.
In effect, the group shifts money between its own businesses.
Once losses grow too large, management leaves,
and owners are left to cover the costs.
In the second situation, the management company is independent
of the developer and voluntarily takes on the complex.
First, when evaluating a project,
management companies consider more than the current number
of residents. They also assess future occupancy,
fee revenue, and other lawful income from parking
management and additional services.
If a developer plans 2,000 homes, for example,
the company may calculate the occupancy
of 80-90% would eventually bring in enough fees
to cover operations and even turn a profit.
I love it.
But homes may remain unsold for a long time,
while basic expenses for security guards,
cleaners, elevators,
and fire safety do not fall simply because occupancy is low.
In principle, developers should pay management fees on unsold homes
under the applicable rules or contracts.
But if the developer is short of cash and falls behind,
the management company's revenue can be far below expectations.
What looked like a sound business becomes a losing operation.
One former property management project
manager described his own experience.
He took on a new development, whose builder had expected strong sales,
but the market weakened, and the actual occupancy reached only 20%.
With so few residents moving in, there was little fee revenue.
The entire complex collected just 1 million yuan a year,
while normal operations cost 4 million yuan.
That meant an annual loss of 3 million yuan,
a burden the company could not sustain.
Just one year after handover,
the company applied to the housing and urban development
authorities to withdraw. If even new complexes face this situation,
older ones with low fees and aging
facilities face an even harder struggle.
Sanhe Yuan, a residential complex in Harbin,
has more than 1,600 households. It went through
eight property management companies in just eight years,
nearly one a year. Second, some companies
accept low fees to gain market share.
Scale matters greatly in property management. The
more complexes and floor space a company manages,
the easier it becomes to expand.
Secure financing or win more projects.
Some companies, therefore, enter at a low price,
planning to find ways to make money later.
They may expect revenue to rise as occupancy increases.
If that fails, they may plan to negotiate higher fees with the owners.
In practice, it is rarely that simple.
Buyers were originally promised monthly fees
of just a few cents in yuan per square foot.
A sudden increase is unlikely to win their approval.
Owners demand better service, while management says it has no money.
The dispute escalates until it ends up in court.
Resettlement complexes have
an even more unusual management arrangement.
Under Xian's implementation plan
for transferring shantytown resettlement projects
to community management,
a property management company must be selected three months before
residents move back in.
For redevelopment projects on state-owned land, the district's
urban redevelopment office selects the initial management company.
For urban village redevelopment
on collectively owned land,
a newly established economic organization, or the community's
resident committee makes the selection.
For some property management companies in China,
access to government projects is itself highly
attractive. Some may also have complicated networks
of financial interests behind them.
An official's relative, for example,
might register a management company
and use personal connections to win contracts.
The opportunities for private gain may
be greater than most people imagine.
Beyond government subsidies available
to qualifying resettlement complexes,
income from shared community assets,
repair contracts, and even dedicated residential
maintenance funds can become targets for personal enrichment.
Money intended for routine upkeep can
end up in private pockets.
Another problem is shoddy construction. Developers finish
the buildings and walk away,
leaving property managers to deal with the mess.
People used to line up to buy homes here.
Now look at it.
It's deserted.
Look over here.
The weeds are almost taller than I am.
This is really bad.
It makes me so angry.
You even have to roll up your pant legs to walk around here.
Look at the paths.
All muddy water and garbage.
It's filthy.
Anyone who didn't know better would think
that this was the outskirts of town.
Some owners have already moved in.
Let's go take a look at one of their homes.
That pile of reinforcing steel is completely rusted through.
Look at Building 7 on the far edge.
That's actually the best building here.
It's infuriating that construction on these homes was abandoned.
I'm starting to speak now.
Look at this. These homes are only a few years old,
and they're already in this condition.
See if you can guess which complex this is.
Just a few years, and the buildings
already look like this. It's frightening.
Ultimately, construction is only the beginning of the expense.
Maintaining buildings for the
decades that follow is the real test
of government administration. Investment and
administrative orders can accelerate development,
but polished publicity cannot erase failures in
governance. Risks ignored today may become costs society has
to bear tomorrow, and problems left
behind in the pursuit of political achievements
will eventually have to be reckoned with.
