Strategy Insights E105:Xi’s Taiwan Attack:11 Red Flags? Prof.Ming: 3 Weaknesses Holding Beijing Back

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Professor Ming's Strategic Insights. Up to this point, the United States has been fighting Iran for quite some time, and it is said that the United States has used up to 30 to 40 percent of its ammunition, and it'll take the United States another two to three years to rebuild the stockpile. So, therefore, some people suggest, in the eyes of the Beijing leaders, especially Xi Jinping, this may be the best time for them to invade Taiwan. And Mr. Gregory Moore, a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Strategy, has published an article entitled How U.S. Ammunition Depletion Puts Taiwan at Risk. And in this article, he lists 13 indicators. He puts them in a so-called dashboard, saying that there are 13 indicators, and out of these 13 indicators, 11 of them has turned from green to red lights, meaning the probability of Beijing's invasion of Taiwan is approaching. I studied his indicators very carefully. Personally, as I see it, some are relevant, and some are less relevant, and some are even debatable. So let's study them one by one. Indicator number one, as he sees it, the Taiwanese people are less and less in favor of China, and more and more people consider themselves as Taiwanese instead of Chinese. So that means the Chinese identification in Taiwanese population is decreasing rapidly. And the second indicator goes like this. The Chinese population is aging fast, and the Chinese government can recruit fewer and fewer people to join the army to fight the war. But I don't think this is so relevant, because if the statistics are correct, China has a population of 1.4 billion people. So I don't think recruiting people to join the army would not be such a big challenge for them. And the next two indicators have to do with Taiwan's semiconductor industry. The first one has to do with TSMC, as we suggested before. TSMC is the biggest chip producer, high-end chip producer in the world. It is important not only to Taiwan, but to all the leading countries in the world. So the United States is putting much emphasis upon TSMC and Taiwan's semiconductor industry as a whole. And China considers it very important for them too. So if the United States is imposing a stricter and stricter sanction of high-end chips export to China, that means that if China can hold Taiwan, or if China can incorporate Taiwan as soon as possible, it's good for them. So that gives them a stronger motivation to invade Taiwan or to incorporate Taiwan. Well, that may be true. If China really thinks so and tries to decide to attack Taiwan, to invade Taiwan, to get the semiconductor industry, then the United States and all the leading countries in the world would rise against China. And that's for sure. But I don't think that will really motivate Beijing to invade Taiwan at this moment, at least not for today. And indicators five and six have to do with the relationship between Taiwan and the United States. The United States is helping Taiwan more and more diplomatically and even militarily. So if they extend or expand their relationship even bigger than now, then it will be much more difficult for Beijing to invade Taiwan in the future. But as I said, even if Beijing starts an invasion against Taiwan now, the United States will jump in and help Taiwan. So it doesn't really matter that much. And the next two indicators, indicators seven and eight, have to do with the so-called hypersonic weapons. He argues that China is now possessing hypersonic weapons and is much more advanced than the United States, although I think that's questionable. But he thinks that China or Beijing thinks that they have an advantage over the United States in terms of these hypersonic weapons. But yes, let me put it this way. Despite this so-called advantage over hypersonic weaponry, the United States has other weapons such as nuclear warheads or SLBMs and some nuclear submarines and things like that. So hypersonic weapons may be one important factor, but that's incomplete. In the arsenals of both countries, there are much more other weapons that can be used. So these are relevant factors, but they are not complete. That's how I see it. Indicator number nine is a strange one, as I see it. The argument goes like this. Logically speaking, the worse the relationship between the United States and communist China, then Xi Jinping will consider it will cost him less to start a conflict with the United States and vice versa. Well, personally, I don't think it's so relevant. It is relevant, but it's not that relevant. Once they consider whether they want to go to war or not, it has to do with the kind of benefit or kind of gain they can get out of the war instead of the relationship. So that's not that important. Number 10 has to do with the perception. He argues that in the eyes of Xi Jinping, the United States is holding a more and more negative perception about China. Well, that may be true, but as I argued before, the confrontation between Washington and Beijing has been solidified. It's a systemic confrontation. It's a confrontation between two ideologies and two ways of lives and two value systems. So it has nothing to do with some personal perception. The personal perception of the leaders of each country may be relevant, but that may not be determined. And the last one, he argues, that has to do with the DPP, the so-called ruling party in Taiwan. And he thinks that the DPP will be in power until 2028. Well, that'd be two years from now. But I think that's not the point that really worries Beijing. What Beijing worries is the possibility that the DPP may be holding power for another four years or even eight. That's something that makes them pessimistic about the relationship across the Taiwan Strait. But as I argued before, opposing or the opposition against Taiwan independence is not so real. It's just an excuse used by the Beijing leaders. But anyway, they use that as an excuse. So what can I say? Having said all that, Mr. Moore argues that there are some other factors or other indicators that there are still green lights. These may be something that prevent Xi Jinping from invading Taiwan in the next few years. The first one is the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese army. They need more time for preparation. That's true. But that's not the real reason. As I see, the real reason is the purge. The serial purge that Xi Jinping initiated against the PLA leaders or against the PLA generals leads him to having fewer and fewer generals to command the army or to fight a war. So that's something that really bothers him in terms of the fighting capability of the PLA. And of course, there's a prevailing distrust between the leadership and also the support in the army. And that's something, as I said, very important. And the next indicator, he says, is a green light is the poor economy or the poor performance of the Chinese economy. That's true. But the more important question or the more serious question is their fiscal capability. They are now in heavy debts, be that the central government or the local governments. They're in a very poor fiscal condition. So I think that fiscal capability is something that cannot support them for a longer period of war. And that's something that prevents them from fighting a war against Taiwan. So those are the 13 indicators or 13 factors affecting Xi Jinping's intention to launch an invasion against Taiwan. But as I see it, Xi Jinping may be worrying about other things, or there may be other factors affecting Xi Jinping's decision to start a war. The first one is the concern about the U.S. and Japan intervention into war should Beijing decide to start a war against Taiwan. And it will be a serious challenge for Beijing. Beijing may be worrying about the possibility of being defeated completely. And that's something that really worries them. The second one is the fiscal capability, as I mentioned before. The third one is concerned about international sanction, as we witnessed in the Russian-Ukraine war. And the last one, I think the most serious one, is about the internal problem. As I see it, the thing that really concerns him is the internal problem. Should he start a war against Taiwan and a mutiny, a coup d'etat, or even assassination against him would be conceivable, would be real danger for him. Although we don't see it yet, but in the mind of a dictator, that's something they can never rule out. But on the other hand, that doesn't mean that we can sit back and relax about the whole problem, because I see there are two recent factors that may change the whole thing. The first one is the possibility of an expansion or an extension of the Russo-Ukraine war. Should Putin of Russia decide to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, or should he want to start a new war against other NATO nations, such as the Baltic states, that would expand the war to a large extent. And that may affect the situation here in Taiwan Strait. And the second thing is the summit, the summit between Xi Jinping and Trump in this coming late September. And should Xi Jinping successfully lure Trump into a negotiation over Taiwan, he then may stop the arms sales to Taiwan, or sign a fourth communique, or anything else. And that would cause big problem in Taiwan Strait. And that will accelerate the pace of a war here in the Taiwan Strait area. So in conclusion, you don't have to agree with Mr. Moore or myself. The indicators he provides and the ones I supplement, they both serve as a very good checklist for us to keep an eye on the situation, at least across the Taiwan Strait. So that's a very good reminder. And what I'm saying is, no matter what, we have to be vigilant, and we have to stay on guard. Well, that's all I want to share with you today. I hope you liked today's program. And please share it with your friends and subscribe to it, if you haven't done so. And please do remember to click the icon bell. That's all for today. I'll see you next time.