Xi Jinping’s upcoming U.S. visit and expected meeting with President Trump are already drawing attention—but his unusually brief itinerary is raising an even bigger question: is Xi preparing to leave power? In this program, we examine the signs behind that possibility, including his decision to skip the UN, renewed talk of “voluntary” succession, the shifting Taiwan timeline, turmoil inside the PLA, and speculation over Li Qiang as a possible successor. None of these developments proves Xi is stepping down, but together they form a pattern that is becoming harder to ignore.
The video examines rumors and behavioral signals suggesting Xi Jinping may be planning a political exit. By analyzing his shortened US itinerary, avoidance of the UN, and shifts in the Taiwan reunification timeline, the speaker posits that health issues and military instability within the PLA may be driving a strategy for a graceful transition of power, potentially favoring Li Qiang as a successor.
Hello everyone, I'm back.
Two days ago, I said that I may need a vacation
for coming back from a vacation.
Tonight, I'm very happy to tell you that I don't need one.
The reason?
Well, my team produced actually two beautiful songs,
two beautiful vacation songs while I was gone,
while I was on vacation.
And they were so beautiful and energetic.
So I'm back 100% and I'll play the songs for you
at the end and they're great.
All right, you know, one of my biggest challenges
for doing the live stream is picking a topic.
Today's Top China Story is the live sentence
handed to Evergrande founder, Xu Jiayin,
or Xu Jiayin in English.
His two sons and more than 50 executives
connected to the company were also sentenced.
Yesterday, the biggest story was the claim
that hackers had obtained around 400 gigabytes
of medical records, allegedly including Xi Jinping's.
And before that, a big China-related story
was Xi Jinping's upcoming trip to the United States
and his unusually short itinerary.
But while mainstream media are focused on those stories,
overseas Chinese communities
are debating something more explosive,
a claim that Xi Jinping wants to quit.
If you're new to my channel,
this channel is dedicated to bringing you China analysis
and political insights that you normally do not get
from mainstream media.
CCP politics operates like a black box.
Every day, rumors, whispers, leaks, and speculations
come from all directions.
My job is to sort them out,
sort through that noise, connect the dots,
and figure out what actually matters.
So tonight, I want to take a close look
at that extraordinary claim
that Xi Jinping has had enough
and he may be preparing to step down.
Let's start with his upcoming US trip
because this is what got my attention in the first place.
Let me share a picture, which wasn't from this year
because it hasn't happened here.
This was from, I think, last year in South Korea.
But anyways, on September the 24th,
Xi Jinping is expected to arrive at the White House
for a highly anticipated summit with President Trump.
At a time of intense geopolitical tension,
tariff wars, technology restrictions,
growing confrontation with Washington,
and an intensifying power struggle inside the party,
you would expect Xi Jinping
to make the absolute most of this trip.
You would expect Beijing
to turn it into a major diplomatic event
that gives Xi Jinping
the biggest possible international stage.
But according to the latest reports,
Xi Jinping will spend only one full day in Washington.
His plane arrives on the evening of September 23rd.
Then on the 24th, he goes to the White House
and spends the day meeting Trump.
Then the following morning,
he heads straight back to Beijing.
Does that sound like a major visit by a CCP leader
who normally demands the highest level
of ceremonial treatment?
Not really.
And it gets even stranger.
That very week, the United Nations General Assembly
is holding its annual meeting in New York.
World leaders will be giving speeches,
holding bilateral meetings,
and having informal conversations in hallways,
meeting rooms, and private gatherings.
This is one of the biggest diplomatic stages
in the world for the year.
And New York is only, what,
a little more than 300 kilometers away from Washington.
Xi Jinping apparently is willing to fly
all the way across the Pacific,
but will skip the UN meeting altogether.
Actually, according to reports
circulating in Washington's diplomatic circles,
the Chinese side has made no arrangements
for Xi to attend the New York UN General Assembly meetings.
Diplomats based in New York have noticed that.
Beijing has not sent the kind of advanced team
that normally arrives before a visit by Xi Jinping.
And that is very strange,
because anyone familiar with Beijing's propaganda
over the last two years
knows that China has been emphasizing again and again
on several keywords.
Multilateralism, a new international order,
and a larger Chinese role in global governance.
If you may remember, last September,
Xi Jinping personally introduced a major new concept
in Tianjin called the Global Governance Initiative.
Beijing gave this initiative enormous political importance.
Its official documents emphasize the global system
centered on the UN,
and based on the purposes and principles of the UN.
China's foreign ministry has described the UN
as one of the main platforms for promoting this initiative.
And for the past year,
China's entire diplomatic system has been working hard
to promote Xi Jinping's idea.
So for example, China's UN ambassador, Fu Cong,
quickly circulated the concept paper
as an official UN document.
Chinese diplomats organized events
at UN headquarters in New York
to promote it.
By December, they had even created a group of friends
of global governance at the UN.
Then May 28th this year,
Beijing raised the level even higher.
Foreign minister Wang Yi flew to UN headquarters
in New York and chaired a high-level meeting of the group.
Representatives from more than 60 countries attended.
Wang Yi declared that in less than a year,
Xi Jinping's initiative had already received support
from nearly 160 countries and international organizations.
Everything seemed to be building toward one obvious moment.
You could tell.
That is the first anniversary
of the initiative this September.
You would expect Xi Jinping himself to arrive in New York,
walk onto the stage of the UN General Assembly,
and promote his vision in front of hundreds
of international media outlets.
Politically, the timing could hardly be better.
Trump is back in the White House
pushing his America First agenda.
Xi Jinping could use the UN as the perfect stage
to present himself as the defender of multilateralism
and another international order.
Beijing has spent an entire year
building that stage for him.
And yet the man behind the initiative goes to Washington
and then skips New York and the UN completely.
It's almost like spending a year building a theater,
selling tickets, filling the seats, and raising the curtain,
only for the star of the show to refuse to come on stage.
And you wonder why.
Well, just as people are trying to understand
Xi Jinping's unusually brief US itinerary,
another explosive piece of information appears.
It appeared two days ago on August the 18th.
A dramatic claim suddenly appeared.
It came from an overseas Chinese political commentator,
now living in Australia.
His name is Jiang Wangzhen.
In English, his English name is Edwin Jiang, Edwin Chan.
I think that's his, let me see his name.
Here we go, Edwin Chang, yeah, that's his name.
He lives in Australia.
He has connections with officials in Zhejiang.
He's from Zhejiang.
In the past, he's made several revelations,
or I should say leaks,
about high-level CCP politics, which were very accurate.
Of course, he also have posted information
that turned out to be false.
So it's a mixed bag.
Almost every Chinese commentator
who has dropped information like this in the past
has mixed bag.
No one is able to predict everything accurately.
And remember, Zhejiang is one of Xi Jinping's
most important political base.
Now, the central claim was extremely sensitive.
And according to Edwin's post,
Xi Jinping does not intend to serve a fourth term
and plans to step down in the 21st Party Congress.
He gave two reasons.
The first was very simple, health.
According to the claim, Xi Jinping's body
can no longer handle another five years in the job.
Now, many China watchers immediately dismissed the story.
They simply do not believe Xi Jinping
would willingly give up power and step down.
Some suspect it could even be smoke and mirrors
coming from Xi's own camp.
My view is that I do not believe
we should dismiss it that quickly.
Every piece of information, whether it's true or false,
comes with a purpose, and we need to understand that purpose.
In CCP politics, major signals really happen
in isolation, or really appear in isolation.
The more useful question is whether this claim
fits with other developments we're already seeing.
And when you look at it that way,
the August 18th bombshell from Edwin
does not look completely disconnected from reality.
It begins to fit a broader pattern.
So let me put together several pieces of the puzzle
that have emerged in Beijing, Washington, New York,
and inside the Chinese military establishment.
My goal isn't to convince you
that Xi Jinping will step down or not.
It is to obtain a broader perspective,
or it is to help you obtain a broader perspective
on CCP politics.
Because once we connect the dots,
we can at least understand why the idea
of Xi Jinping preparing to leave
should not simply be dismissed as another wild rumor.
Perhaps what we're watching
is not just a strange diplomatic schedule in Washington.
Perhaps Beijing is quietly beginning
to prepare the conditions for a more controlled
and more face-saving political exit.
Okay, so the first connection that I gave you
is the significantly reduced itinerary in Washington.
That's the diplomatic front.
Now let's turn our attention away from diplomatic strategy
to internal political struggles.
Xi's reported White House visit
will come only about a month
before the Communist Party's fifth plenum in October.
And anyone who follows elite CCP politics
knows how much speculation
has surrounded Xi Jinping this summer.
There have been rumors, I shouldn't say this summer,
it has been, the speculations have surrounded him
for an entire year.
There have been rumors about pressure
from retired party elders,
rumors about Xi Jinping losing control
over parts of the system,
rumors about him losing control
or not having control over the military,
rumors about military turmoil,
and rumors about him possibly facing pressure.
I shouldn't say possibly,
rumors about him facing pressure
to step down at the 21st Party Congress next year.
Many of these claims remain impossible to verify,
but they've never stopped.
So politically, that makes Xi Jinping's public image
even more important.
Normally, when a leader is surrounded by rumors
that his power is weakening,
what does he need?
He needs a major public demonstration of strength.
And the visit to the White House
and a speech at the UN right before the fifth plenum
would be almost perfect.
Think about it,
Xi Jinping addressing representatives
from more than 100 countries,
Xi Jinping meeting world leaders
from Xi Jinping's camp,
that would be an extraordinary opportunity
to sell his image as the supreme leader,
to tell the party, the military, and the Chinese public
that Xi Jinping is still firmly in charge.
The rumors are nonsense.
Nothing has changed.
But that's not what we're seeing on the ground.
And that's apparently not what's in the plan.
Instead, Xi Jinping is in and out of White House or DC
very quickly, and that's it.
So how do we explain that?
And that brings us back to Mr. Jiang's bombshell revelation,
Xi Jinping's pending resignation and his health problems.
If Xi Jinping is planning his exit,
he doesn't care about going to UN
and make a lasting impression there.
For his team, the hardest part of foreign travel
is not necessarily the meeting itself.
It's the public exposure.
It's security and health concerns.
A White House meeting is a controlled environment.
It's entirely sealed.
And he can sit during long discussions.
The number of journalists is restricted.
The schedule can be managed minute by minute.
His doctors, security team, and protocol staff
are always nearby.
But the UN is completely different.
You move from Washington to New York,
you enter a building filled with presidents,
prime ministers, diplomats, security teams, and journalists.
There are unscripted encounters in hallways.
Long periods of standing, waiting, walking,
moving from room to room.
If Xi Jinping is planning to step down,
he doesn't want to take the risk to go to New York.
And above all, there are hundreds of cameras
from media organizations around the world.
There's no Chinese propaganda department
controlling every image.
If a leader walks unusually slow or slowly, people see it.
If his expression looks strange, people see it.
If he appears exhausted, people see it.
If he has difficulty standing after sitting for a long time,
cameras may capture it.
In an environment that's almost transparent,
it becomes too hard to control what the world sees.
That is why the New York decision matters.
The issue is not the cost of travel.
The issue is exposure.
The exposure, security exposure,
and also exposure and his health,
exposure of his health concerns.
And this is why the August 18th rumor becomes interesting.
Xi Jinping may be in poor health
and his team doesn't want him to take any risk
of exposing it.
By itself, the claim that Xi Jinping's health
can no longer support another five years proves nothing.
By itself, an unusually short American visit proves nothing.
By itself, skipping New York UN General Assembly
proves nothing.
But when you put these things together,
the logic begins to form a pattern.
The reported diplomatic schedule
suddenly becomes much easier to understand.
And that is where the bigger question begins.
If Xi Jinping's health really has reached the point
where stepping down has to be considered,
then there's another problem.
How does a strong man who spent years
building a system around himself
explain his exit to the party?
How does he step down without looking like he lost?
Interestingly, at almost exactly the same time
that the strange US itinerary began attracting attention,
Beijing had just held a major political event
that offered Xi Jinping something very useful,
a ready-made script for a graceful exit.
You may remember me telling you
about a large gathering on August the 17th
when the party held a high-profile ceremony
at the Great Hall of the People
marking the 100th anniversary of Jiang Zemin's birth.
And Xi Jinping delivered a long speech.
And when he reviewed Jiang Zemin's political legacy,
he used some very interesting language.
He said that Jiang Zemin had voluntarily stepped down
from party leadership positions.
And later in the speech,
and then he also said that later,
Jiang Zemin again voluntarily proposed resigning
as chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Pay attention to that word, voluntarily.
At a moment when the entire party is extremely nervous
about the succession question at the 21st Party Congress,
Xi Jinping suddenly brought this chapter
of Jiang Zemin's history back into the spotlight.
Then just one day after that,
on the 18th, an overseas report claimed
that Xi Jinping would not seek a fourth term,
that he himself no longer wanted to continue,
and that he intended to personally choose his successor.
I'll talk about the successor later.
Yes, it is reviewed who he has chosen
according to this claim.
But before we talk about the successor,
let's talk about the timing.
The timing is very interesting
because if that rumor reflects
some kind of internal political thinking,
then for a leader who personally altered the constitution
to remove the presidential term limit
and concentrated more power in his own hands
than any Chinese leader in decades,
the biggest fear may not be stepping down itself,
but how he steps down.
If Xi Jinping is forced out by party elders
or pushed aside by military
or physically unable to continue governing,
then his departure would be a political collapse.
If that's the case,
then his danger begins the moment he steps down
because it would open the door
to a broader reckoning with his entire era.
But if the story is rewritten as a voluntary transition,
then everything changes, right?
I was not forced out.
I personally arranged an orderly transition
between generations.
That's the idea.
Okay, now even Xi Jinping has that plan,
there's still a problem for him, Taiwan,
because over the past decade,
Xi Jinping has tied his political legacy
very closely to the question of national unification.
He used Taiwan to justify his controversial third term.
And in Mr. Jiang's August 18th report,
there was a second major claim.
That is the second reason why Xi Jinping wants to quit,
and that is precisely Taiwan.
The source said that Xi Jinping has come to believe
that Taiwan can no longer be taken by military force
during his own tenure.
And if he cannot resolve Taiwan,
he cannot claim to have surpassed Deng Xiaoping
or reached the historical status of Mao Zedong.
So according to this theory,
rather than remain in power until the Taiwan question
turns into a disastrous political burden,
Xi Jinping prefers to leave while he is still at the top.
That sounds like a very bold claim, isn't it?
Or doesn't it?
But Xi Jinping himself might have dropped a hint
in his August 17th long speech commemorating Jiang Zemin.
Near the end of his speech,
he quoted Jiang Zemin's old vision for China
in the new century.
And one key line said that the Chinese nation
would achieve its great rejuvenation
on the basis of completing national reunification
and building a modern socialist country.
You may wonder, well, why does that matter?
It's completely, it's 100% CCP jargon.
Yes, it is.
But it does matter because the great rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation has long been tied
in CCP political language to one very important date.
That's 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding
of the People's Republic of China.
So if reunification is placed inside
that much broader historical framework,
it creates a very different timeline.
For the past couple of years,
one date has dominated almost all discussions
or outside discussions of a possible Taiwan conflict.
2027, a lot of people believe that Beijing
officially declared 2027 as the deadline
for invading Taiwan.
We've seen analysts, military planners,
and the media all treating it,
all treating 2027 as a possible Taiwan deadline.
And inside Xi Jinping's highly centralized political system
that creates a dangerous expectation.
If the entire party and military begin to believe
that something decisive must happen
in the Taiwan Strait around 2027,
then one man's name is written on that,
what we call final exam paper on that paper,
and that's Xi Jinping.
He owns it.
He owns 2027 because he used it to justify his third term.
Now, if he wins, if he wins the war,
it becomes his historic achievement.
He could place him next to Mao Zedong.
But if he refuses to fight or launches a war
that ends in disaster,
the political responsibility also falls directly on him
because he has used it to justify his rule.
But if he loses, if he refuses to fight
or loses the war, that's an extraordinary gamble.
It's something that he cannot afford to lose, basically.
So let's now look at the language he used
in his speech on August the 17th.
By quoting Jiang Zemin and placing national reunification
inside the much longer framework of national rejuvenation,
Xi Jinping effectively moves the political horizon
away from an immediate 2027 deadline
and back toward 2020, no, 2049.
And that is potentially very significant.
It does not mean Beijing has officially announced,
we will not attack Taiwan in 2027.
Nothing like that happened.
But politically, it creates a much more flexible narrative.
If unification belongs to the broader 2049 national project,
then it no longer has to be completed personally
by Xi Jinping during his own term.
By then, by 2049, Xi Jinping will be, what, 96 years old?
Most likely, the question will belong
to another generation of CCP leaders.
And that is the clever part.
The Taiwan issue quietly moves out
of Xi Jinping's personal briefcase
and back into the party's institutional file cabinet.
That changes everything.
Failure to unify Taiwan during Xi's tenure
would no longer have to be described
as Xi Jinping's personal strategic failure.
It would instead be presented as a long-term mission
inherited from previous leaders
and passed on to future ones.
But then we have to ask another question.
Why would Xi Jinping,
after years of talking so loudly about military readiness,
suddenly become less confident
that the military option can succeed?
The answer is he doesn't have confidence in his military.
And we can get a clue from another development
exposing the turmoil inside the PLA.
So on the same day of that bombshell, August the 18th,
oh, here's Xi Jinping arrived.
This is just to compare Xi Jinping's state visit in 2015.
When he arrived on September the 22nd in Seattle
and concluded his state visit on the 25th.
Four days later, he concluded his state visit.
Obama was the president.
And then after the 25th, he spent, he went to New York.
This is his New York UN speech in September, 2015.
He spent three days in New York.
So you just compare that itinerary with this itinerary,
you see the dramatic difference.
Okay, so let's, so this is Xi Jinping
giving that speech on August the 17th.
Okay, let's talk about this guy.
This is, I don't think Western media outlets
are talking about Zhao Xiaozhe because to us,
to me, he is important,
but most people in the West probably don't know him.
So on August the 18th, the official website
of the Chinese Academy of Engineering
quietly dropped his name from its list of top scientists.
Zhao was a member of the, or is,
I don't know if he still is or not.
He is or was a member of the 20th CCP Central Committee.
That means he is among the 200 plus top leaders
within the party.
He has the rank of vice admiral in the PLA Navy.
He was the former director
of the Central Military Commission's
Science and Technology Commission.
He is an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering.
And after his name disappeared
from the Academy's official list,
his biography there was also removed.
His alma mater, Dalian University of Technology,
quietly cleared his name from its website as well.
What does that mean?
This man is in big trouble,
but he was not an ordinary military officer.
He was one of the key technical brains
behind the PLA's modern naval command system.
He specializes in command and control information systems.
In other words, he worked on the software,
networks, and decision-making architecture
that make modern naval warfare possible.
Over the course of his career,
he helped establish engineering systems
for the PLA's independently developed combat software.
He also worked on new command structures
for surface warships.
Most importantly, he played a major role
in developing a three-level decision support system
for modern naval operations.
In modern warfare, the nerve system connecting the radar,
the missiles, the warships, and the commander is critical.
And at the center of that nerve system
is the software brain.
It's the software, which is the brain
that helps the PLA make decisions in battle.
Now, the man responsible for that brain is removed.
If Beijing ever wanted to fight
a truly modern multi-domain war over Taiwan,
the kind of systems Zhao Xiaozhe worked on
would be among its most important assets.
So his disappearance is not simply
in another personnel story.
It potentially reaches directly
into the technological foundation of the PLA's ability
to fight the kind of war Xi Jinping
has spent years preparing for.
So what does, I shouldn't say so, I should say,
but what does the reality look like?
The reality is Zhao is far from the only one.
This year, China's top engineering
and military research establishment
has gone through what can only be described
as a major collapse.
Let me tell you, okay,
so this is Zhao Xiangen, a nuclear weapons expert
and former vice president
of the Chinese Academy of Engineering,
had his official biography removed as well.
And then Wu Manqing, one of China's leading radar
and electronic information experts
and the former general manager
of China Electronics Technology Group
was removed from the academy.
And then this is Wei Yiying, a missile guidance expert
from China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation
was also removed.
And then you have Xiao Longxu, a missile expert
from the PLA Rocket Force Research System
was removed as well.
And then even this man, Yang Wei,
the chief designer of China's J-20 stealth fighter
has also quietly disappeared.
I made a video about his story
in my other channel, Lei's Looking Glass.
You can check it out.
The link is provided in the description below.
And there may be more.
These are just ones that people have noticed.
Then at what has happened over the past years
inside the military itself,
from the Navy to the Air Force,
from the Rocket Force to the theater commands,
a remarkable number of senior officers
have disappeared, purged, or even died.
So ask yourself, how does a military fight
one of the most difficult amphibious wars imaginable
while its joint command system,
weapons development chain, technical leadership
and senior command structure
are all going through political turmoil at the same time?
And if forcibly taking Taiwan
becomes militarily too dangerous
while politically remaining tied
to Xi Jinping's personal legacy,
then moving the timeline toward 2049
suddenly becomes very useful.
It gives Xi Jinping a way to remove the Taiwan deadline
from his own political calendar.
And if he really is considering leaving
before the 21st Party Congress,
that would also give him a possible way
to protect his own legacy,
which now bring us to the key question.
If Xi Jinping has decided to quit,
who takes over this mess?
According to Mr. Jiang, he has chosen one successor.
Okay, that's this man.
He's Premier Li Qiang.
In my July 30th program,
I told you that Li Qiang
is one of the three possible candidates to succeed Xi.
You can watch it to get more information on Li Qiang.
I did a complete analysis of him
against two other possible candidates.
Actually, three other, including Xi Jinping himself.
Xi Jinping may still succeed himself,
but Li Qiang is not known
as a powerful political operator.
He has no obvious independent base inside the military.
He's not linked to any particular faction,
except that his political career
is closely tied to Xi Jinping.
So to a departing Xi Jinping,
that kind of successor may look much safer.
And also in my July 30th program,
I said Li Qiang is not an overly ambitious man.
He is easy to work with.
So he may be the candidate
that other factions can tolerate.
So overall, Li Qiang may be the least threatening one
to Xi Jinping.
Someone who might preserve the outgoing leader's people,
policies, and political legacy.
Okay, with all that said,
again, a rumor is still a rumor.
And when we analyze Chinese politics,
we cannot rely only on whispers from overseas social media.
We still do not know whether the details are true.
We do not know whether Xi Jinping
has actually decided to step down.
We do not know whether Li Qiang has really been selected.
And we certainly do not know
whether any transition would happen smoothly.
But the deeper logic behind the rumor
touches several very real pressures
inside Xi Jinping's system.
A political order built around extreme centralization
of power, which could be very brittle,
fragile and brittle.
A personality cult that's crumbling
and increasingly ambitious.
I should say no.
I should say a military under deep internal stress,
a slowing economy and ever-growing ambitious.
I shouldn't say ambitious.
I should say ambiguous.
An increasingly ambiguous foreign policy
because Chinese foreign policies
have been in the past couple of months
a little bit all over the places.
So you wonder who's really driving what policy.
And eventually there is the biggest limit of all,
age and the human body.
So if the political system really is beginning
to prepare for Xi Jinping's departure,
then the most important signals
may not come from the official state media
or some dramatic announcement saying Xi Jinping is leaving.
You'll never hear that.
This is not how CCP actually works.
The signs will probably appear much earlier.
A carefully shortened foreign trip.
A sudden revival of the language of voluntary retirement.
A Taiwan timetable quietly stretched
into the distant future.
A possible successor gradually given more responsibility.
Either way, I do think that Li Qiang will come to UN
in place of Xi Jinping,
or maybe the foreign minister,
maybe foreign minister Wang Yi.
No, I don't think Li Qiang will come.
I think Wang Yi will go to New York
to attend the General Assembly.
Anyway, so one piece by itself proves very little,
but if these pieces continue moving in the same direction,
then something much larger may be happening
behind the walls of Zhongnanhai.
With all that said, there's another possibility.
Maybe this information was released
by Xi Jinping's own camp to test the waters,
to see how people react, who supports him,
and where everyone's loyalty really lies,
or simply to cause confusion.
There are always people who believe
that all that talk of Xi Jinping losing power,
Xi Jinping is about to stepping down,
it's just a camouflage to hide the real ambition
behind a Taiwan conflict.
There are always people who believe that,
and that's certainly possible.
My job here is not to tell you
that Xi Jinping is definitely stepping down,
it is to gather the signals,
sort through the rumors and facts,
and give you the information you need
to make your own assessment.
For now, we don't know whether he wants to quit,
but there are enough unusual developments
that I don't think we should simply dismiss,
or dismiss the possibility.
So that's what I have gathered for you.
It's a lot of information,
but what piqued my interest was the report
on Xi Jinping's shortened itinerary in Washington, D.C.
And then the next thing I saw was the rumor
that he wants to step down.
And when you look deeper,
there are other dots that need to be connected.
All right, what do you think?
Well, now let me do something
that will put a smile on your face.
While I was gone, my team, particularly Chris,
produced a song about vacation, about summer vacation.
And they came up with a couple of versions,
and we narrowed them down to two.
And they're very different.
I mean, the lyrics is the same.
The music and the style,
the music and the style is very different.
One rendition was sung by a man,
and the other was sung by a woman.
And our team, or I have a hard time choosing one,
so I just want to share the song with you,
because they're such happy songs.
We have produced some very heavy songs
to remember several historic moments,
like the June 4th anniversary,
and then the 250th birthday
of the founding of the United States of America.
And those are very, how to say,
big topics, music production or rendition.
And now we feel like we just want to produce something
about everyday life, about summer vacation, about happiness.
And Chris did exactly that.
I'm extremely touched by...
I didn't tell them much about my vacation.
I just told them that I'm going away.
I'll be on a cruise.
I'll be going with friends and family.
And here he is,
writing me these two beautiful songs.
And I'm very, very happy.
I'm very grateful.
So I want to share that with you.
Okay, the first one is this one.
Let me remove this.
Let's remove Li Qiang.
Let's add Chris's song.
Here we go.
Can you guys see?
I don't know.
Oh, it's...
Is it loading up?
Can you guys see?
Can someone tell me, can you actually see the video?
Why is my screen frozen?
Oh, here we go.
Okay, let's play this song.
It feels like somewhere new
Every road, every little moment
Feels a little brighter too
Windows down, summer sky
Laughing as the days go by
We don't need to know where we're going
Anywhere with you feels right
Oh yeah
Ice cream melting on our fingers
Taking pictures by the sea
Someone tells a silly story
And we laugh till we can't breathe
Late night talks and sleepy mornings
Sunset colors shining through
Years from now we'll still remember
All these days we shared with you
Anywhere with you feels like somewhere new
Every road, every little moment
Feels a little brighter too
Windows down, summer sky
Laughing as the days go by
We don't need to know where we're going
Anywhere with you feels right
Maybe we won't remember
Every place we passed along
But we'll remember all the laughter
All the nights we sang our songs
Life goes fast
The seasons change
So let's enjoy this time
The best part of the journey
Is having you by our side
Anywhere with you feels like somewhere new
We don't need a perfect destination
We've already found the view
Windows down, summer sky
Making memories as we drive
Wherever life may take us tomorrow
Anywhere with you feels right
Anywhere with you
Anywhere feels right
Anywhere with you
Anywhere feels right
Yeah, our friends and family
Under the summer sky
Anywhere with you
We'll make memories tonight
Oh yeah
All right, this is version one
And we have version two
Version one wants to make one dance
All right, here's version two
This one is sung by a woman
Anywhere with you
Okay, oh, this was already at the end
And tell me which one you like better, okay?
At the end
So you already heard version one
Here's version two
This is a woman's rendition of the song
Sunshine pouring through the windows
Music playing, voices loud
Bags are packed and hearts are open
We're just happy to be out
Left or right, we don't really care
There's adventure everywhere
Every road becomes a story
When we're all together there
Anywhere with you
Feels like somewhere new
Every road, every little moment
Feels a little brighter too
Windows down, summer sky
The days go by
We don't need to know where we're
Anywhere with you
Feels right
Ice cream melting on our fingers
Taking pictures by the sea
Someone tells a silly story
And we laugh till we can't breathe
Late night talks and sleepy mornings
Sunset colors shining through
Years from now we'll still remember
All these days we shared with you
Anywhere with you
Feels like somewhere new
Every little moment
Feels a little brighter too
Windows down, summer sky
The days go by
We don't need to know where we're
Anywhere with you
Feels right
Maybe we won't remember
Every place we passed along
But we'll remember as we sang our songs
Time goes fast, the seasons change
So let's enjoy this time
The best part of the journey
Is having you by our side
Anywhere with you
Feels like somewhere new
Need a perfect destination
We've already found
Windows down, summer sky
Memories as we drive
Wherever lies tomorrow
Anywhere with you
Feels right
Anywhere with you
Anywhere feels right
Friendly under the summer sky
Anywhere with you
We'll make peace tonight
All right, uh, I have been reading your comments and almost everyone voted version one.
Uh, I, I don't see any vote for version two.
Someone said version one, uh, let him imagine ice cream
and version two, uh, gives him the imagery of sitting in a bar.
Um, wow, everyone, Chris won because Chris likes version one.
I like version one too.
But as a woman, I think version two somehow expresses my, um, my feeling better
because it's a woman's voice.
But wow, everyone overwhelmingly, uh, vote, voted for a version one.
Someone said version two.
Her voice is okay.
All right.
Um, okay.
So version one wins, but I like version two.
What do I do now?
Uh, anyways, okay, let's, let's get back to politics.
Um, what a nice contrast.
We went from, uh, we went from serious CCP politics to a very girly song about vacation
ice cream.
Anyways, that's late.
That's very me.
That's very late.
Okay.
Uh, I asked that I asked all 10,000 people that they want version two.
I think guys like version one and, and girls like version two.
And I think I'm outnumbered here.
So, all right.
Uh, questions.
Okay.
Let's get back to business.
Serious questions.
All right.
Um, uh, someone said I can dance rumba to version two.
Someone likes version two.
Yeah.
Version two is a, is yeah.
A slow, a slow rumba.
Yeah, you, you can.
Yep.
You can do a Latin dance for version two.
All right.
Uh, questions.
Someone asked me Frank.
Nah, like ever considered doing a show on Qian Xuesheng, the Chinese American scientist
that we traded for 12 POW pilots in the 1950s.
Yeah.
Qian Xuesheng is the American educated nuclear scientist that the CCP, uh, that
who returned to China in the 1950s, who played a major role in helping China develop nuclear
weapons.
It's a loss for the U.S.
I can do a show on him, but I don't know how many people will be watching it because any
program on history, on, on Chinese history is not getting a lot of views or at least
not for my channel.
So I'm still trying to find out what topics people are generally interested in.
Okay.
Questions.
Um, that's, that's it.
There's no questions.
Okay.
All right.
Let's see a quick arrow through the heart and she resignation is accepted.
Easy.
John is good to work with.
Uh, okay.
That's not a question addressed to me.
Any questions?
Someone says I like the first version more.
Okay.
Uh, no questions, no comments, just people's vote on, on the song.
Good.
Okay.
Should we end it here?
How about we end it here and then I'll be back on Saturday.
Um, and I'll give you more time for questions.
How's that?
All right.
Thank you.
Bye.