In this video, you’ll discover: 🔹 Why Alasdair Macleod believes gold’s 4% surge may signal more than a bear squeeze 🔹 How Japan and U.S. Treasury risks expose deeper credit problems 🔹 Why energy and grain disruptions could trigger another inflation wave 🔹 How gold can rise even as interest rates climb 🔹 Why South Korea’s return to gold buying matters for global reserves 🔹 How currency weakness could become the real gold catalyst
AI Generated·May contain errors
Video Summary
AI Generated
The bullish outlook for gold and silver is driven by systemic credit risks and G7 debt instability rather than short-term geopolitics. Alastair MacLeod argues that gold serves as a critical hedge against currency collapse and energy shocks, reflecting a broader shift away from credit-based assets as fiat currencies lose credibility amidst mounting global debt traps.
I think gold is going to dip below 4,000 again.
Well, that tells me they're short, basically.
If you look at the open interest on COMEX yesterday,
it certainly jumped reasonably in silver.
To the highest levels, actually,
we've seen for months the relationship
between Japan and the U.S. Treasury.
You can see the risks mounting in credit.
And of course, gold is the escape from risks in credit.
Deal in the Hormuz and in the general area
in the Middle East can be made,
and that's good for gold.
How do you see that?
Is there a clear link that most commentators see?
Shortly, we're going to see diesel shortages.
I mean, there's going to be no diesel,
no aircraft fuel, no ship bunkers, no heating oil.
This funding is running into a brick wall.
I mean, you've got debt-to-GDPs throughout the G7,
which average something like 120, 125%.
They're in debt traps.
If the expectation is that interest rates or bond yields
are likely to rise in the short term,
then that disadvantages holders of gold.
The current level of the Fed funds rate
is actually broadly sufficient
to contain the effects of expected inflation.
And we're going to talk, of course,
about gold and silver, about bond markets,
credits, fiat money, Japan.
A lot of interesting things are going on.
Yesterday, we had a great day
in terms of price action for gold and silver.
We are recording this on Thursday, the 6th of August.
And also today, I see gold continuing its rise.
But yesterday was quite an explosive day
with more than 4% for gold and silver.
What do you think?
Is this a bull trap, a fake breakout,
or are we firmly back in bullish territory again?
Well, we're certainly not in bullish territory.
I mean, basically, the market is so oversold.
I think what we saw yesterday is a bear squeeze.
I mean, you know, when you get sentiment so low,
you will have people who have shorted it.
I mean, and I've seen various commentators saying that,
oh, I think gold is going to dip below 4,000 again.
Well, that tells me they're short, basically.
And silver, of course, is the other one.
I mean, I've seen various people come up with estimates,
you know, it's going to go and challenge 50 or,
but I mean, these are flim-flam artists, really.
And I think they're being squeezed.
And of course, as well as that,
there has been a bit of demand.
I mean, if you look at the open interest on Comex yesterday,
it certainly jumped reasonably in silver.
To the highest levels, actually, we've seen for months.
And that rather tells me
that there is some genuine buying in there.
So it's a mixture, I think,
of bear closing and genuine buying.
A 4% surge can look bullish
while revealing how crowded the bearish trade had become.
As Alastair MacLeod notes here,
to its highest level in months,
suggesting buying alongside forced short covering.
That distinction matters
because a squeeze can reverse quickly
while credit deterioration can persist underneath.
Investors should judge this move
by positioning and credit risk, not headlines.
Next, Alastair MacLeod exposes why the bigger signal
may sit outside metals.
But, you know, all this is pretty irrelevant.
All you need do is look at the mounting risks,
if you like, in credit,
which was really shoved in our face
by the relationship between Japan and the U.S. Treasury
just earlier this week.
Look at that relationship
and you can see the risks mounting in credit.
And of course, gold is the escape from risks in credit.
So whether this is the bottom or whatever,
whatever I think is irrelevant,
I think you've just got to look at the risk factors
and think, how do I protect myself?
And the answer basically is don't tizzy snatch,
don't worry about whether gold's gonna dip again
or whether you're gonna get a better buying opportunity.
I mean, if you take that attitude,
you're not actually hedging risk at all.
You are just trying to trade it.
And as we know, most traders lose money.
So, you know, if you want to do that, good luck to you.
Yeah.
I also read a report, another report by Deutsche Bank.
I must say Deutsche Bank is,
when it comes to gold, they're spot on usually.
Maybe it's still the German mindset
and understanding of gold,
because this week they said that gold remains
in an ongoing explosive phase of price behavior
that began in August 24.
And with the recent correction looking muted,
they maintain a constructive year-end outlook
of at least a $4,700 an ounce.
But a lot of commentators, they link the price increase
to a potential Hormuz deal.
And if a deal in the Hormuz and in the general
or broader area in the Middle East can be made,
then that's good for gold.
Gold does not need a geopolitical story
when the credit system becomes the story.
According to Alasdair MacLeod,
the real issue is mounting credit risk,
making gold protection rather than a short-term trade.
Deutsche Bank's $4,700 outlook reinforces
that the correction has not broken the trend.
For savers, waiting for cheaper entry
can leave the hedge missing when risk reprices.
Next, Alasdair MacLeod unravels why the Hormuz narrative
may distract investors from the monetary signal.
How do you see that?
Is there this clear link that most commentators
Well, it's interesting because up until now,
every time there's a threat of war or something like that,
gold seems to get hit.
I mean, the market is so confused over this
and it doesn't help
because of all the propaganda going around.
I mean, President Trump has tackled that 20 times on this.
One day he says,
we're gonna bomb the bastards into the Stone Age.
And the next day he says, there's peace negotiations.
Then the following day, we're gonna bomb them again.
And then following day, basically, I mean, you know,
it's just, I mean, the fact of the matter is
that the Americans have got themselves cornered
at the behest of the Israelis
and it's not working out well for them at all.
The other thing to bear in mind is that the 60-day pause,
which, you know, if you remember
under the Memorandum of Understanding
is meant to be in place,
that ends on the 16th of August.
Whether that really matters or not, we'll see.
But so far, Iran has restricted itself
to the sort of tit for tat.
In other words, you know, if the Americans attack them,
then they attack their American bases around,
but otherwise they haven't attacked anyone.
They certainly haven't attacked Israel.
So they've actually respected this 60-day ceasefire
sort of.
And so I just wonder whether on the 16th of August,
whether this is going to change.
It could well do.
I mean, the fact of the matter is that the consequences
of the mistake of trying to attack Iran
leading to the closure of Hormuz
and now also leading to the closure of the Red Sea,
effectively bottling up a further 7 million barrels a day
of Saudi oil, this is a real crisis.
A temporary ceasefire can look like stability
while quietly setting a countdown clock
for the next energy shock.
What Alasdair Macleod is highlighting
is the August 16th deadline
and its potential impact on already constrained oil flows.
The market may focus on battlefield headlines,
but investors should watch energy availability
and inflation transmission instead.
Next, Alasdair Macleod reveals why the real gold catalyst
could arrive through energy markets, not war headlines.
Shortly, we're going to see diesel shortages.
I mean, there's going to be no diesel, no aircraft fuel,
no ship bunkers, no heating oil.
All this comes out of refining sour crude,
which is basically what we get out of the Middle East.
This is going to hit prices, consumer prices,
very, very hard later this year.
And in Europe, we can couple that with the drought,
which means that crop yields have fallen
to less than half of where they would be expected to be.
And just to make things worse,
Russia has managed, if you like, to stop all shipping
going into Odessa and the other Black Sea ports under,
well, which were under the control of Ukraine.
So Ukraine can't export its grain anymore.
So global grain prices are going to be rising quite sharply.
I mean, this is everything.
It's a perfect storm coming together for governments,
for G7 governments to deal with.
So, you know, what happens?
Well, we know what happens.
They will have to print, print, print, print
in their effort to stop their economies tanking.
I mean, put aside the inflation sort of argument,
what that really does mean
is that the purchasing power of these currencies
is effectively going to be running into a collapse.
I mean, the fact of the matter is
that when it comes to funding the expansion of credit
in the form of currency and bank receipts,
this funding is running into a brick wall.
I mean, you've got debt to GDPs throughout the G7,
which average something like 120, 125%.
I mean, there are outliers like Japan on the one hand
being 200 or 240%, however you measure it,
and Germany, which I understand is around about,
what, 75% now.
But its economy is really, really scrabbly.
They're in debt traps.
So how do you get out of this risk?
The danger is not just higher prices,
it is the currency response required to contain them.
This is where Alastair MacLeod's thesis
shifts toward G7 debt,
with debt to GDP averaging roughly 120 to 125%
across major economies.
If governments respond to supply shocks
with more credit creation,
savers face purchasing power erosion,
even without a formal crisis.
Next, Alastair MacLeod exposes why the supposed solution
to economic weakness can become the threat to cash itself.
Well, the answer is you get into gold.
And I think it's, we're at the point
where the markets should be waking up to this.
I mean, they should have woken up to it a lot earlier.
I mean, markets are effectively broken.
And as to the point as to whether this move up in gold,
if you like, is the start of a new trend,
the facts, the fundamental facts suggest,
yes, it is the start of a new trend.
Basically, not because of the merits of gold or silver,
but because of what's happening to credit.
It is entering a stage of, you know, a period of collapse.
There is no other conclusion you can come to.
A bit more about gold.
What I find so confusing and fascinating at the same time
is that the argument goes from,
okay, so if there's a Hormuz deal,
then oil prices will go down.
Inflation expectations will go down.
Rate expectations will go down.
And that is traditionally good for gold.
But over the past few years, we saw rates go up.
I like the 10-year yield has gone up
from half a percent to almost 5%.
So at the same time, gold was rising.
So in this correlation or this link
between lower rates and higher gold
or higher rates and lower gold,
over the past few years, it was the other way around.
Gold was going up anyway, despite rates going up.
So there's this recent narrative
that it's really good for gold if rates go down.
But in the end, rates have to go up
because of everything that's going on, right?
Because of the sheer amount of debt
that's issued over time.
So could you enlighten me a little bit?
Like, what's the link between rates and gold?
Gold can rise with higher yields
when investors fear the currency
more than they value the yield.
Alastair MacLeod notes
that the traditional rate-gold relationship breaks
when credit risk dominates,
explaining why gold advanced
despite the 10-year yield approaching 5%.
The overlooked issue is what those yields say
about debt sustainability, not merely opportunity costs.
Next, Alastair MacLeod unravels
why rising rates can actually strengthen gold's case
during a debt-driven monetary regime.
Okay, well, in times of relative stability,
what traders will look at is the relationship
between interest rates and the yield on gold,
the yield being basically the lease rate.
If the expectation is that interest rates or bond yields
are likely to rise in the short term,
then that disadvantages holders of gold
because they're losing interest, as it were, on currency.
So that, if you like, in times of,
let's call it normal market volatility,
is the basic relationship that has evolved.
However, if there is an increased risk
in the value of credit,
and by this I mean specifically currencies,
then the relationship changes.
And this is why, when we came off
the Bretton Woods system,
we saw gold run from $35 to $850 at one stage
between 71 and 81.
And at the same time,
the Fed funds rate rose from something like 5%,
in fact, it dipped down to about 3.5%,
up to around about 19.5%.
So there was a sort of general correlation
between rising interest rates,
rising bond yields, and a rising gold price.
But that was a time when there was, if you like,
a growing and perceived risk
to the purchasing power of currencies.
And remember that we had inflation rates
which were running far higher during the 70s too.
I mean, we saw, I mean, believe it or not,
the Japanese inflation rate in the mid-70s
hit, at the consumer price level, hit 30%.
You know, so this is, that, if you like,
is where the real difference is.
Now, so what are people expecting today?
Well, if you look at the surveys in America,
and you know, what America does, we all follow,
let's face it.
If you look at the investor surveys in America,
I think the two main surveys,
you know, one of which is,
I think University of Michigan is one,
the other one is the New York Fed.
They say that consumers expect inflation
to run to something between 3.7 and 4% by the year end,
but in the longer term, they expect it to decline.
Rising yields do not automatically make gold
less attractive when the currency itself
is losing credibility.
According to Alastair Macleod,
gold climbed from $35 to $850,
while US rates surged toward 19.5% during the 1970s.
That historical pattern matters
because today's investors may be overfitting
a normal cycle relationship to an abnormal debt cycle.
Next, Alastair Macleod reveals why inflation expectations
could matter more than nominal interest rates.
From those levels to around about 3%.
They think that's gonna be the long run rate of inflation.
So in other words, the suggestion is
that the current level of the Fed funds rate
is actually broadly sufficient
to contain the effects of expected inflation.
What we need, if you like,
is the representative of all the commodities
which are gonna be going up in value, and that's gold.
I mean, if you look long term,
the value of a basket of commodities valued in gold
is pretty constant.
You know, you get commodity bull markets,
which actually are bear markets in the currencies.
All the people who talk about congratulative cycles
and all the rest of it,
I mean, they miss this fundamental point.
Yeah, you know, I mean,
the world basically works on credit, not on gold.
Even when credit is tied to gold as a gold substitute.
But, you know, if you literally,
I mean, there will be some variation
in the value of a basket of commodities,
but mostly that comes from the interrelationship
between currencies and gold, not from gold itself.
So, you know, you could buy,
instead of gold, you could buy any sort of commodity,
but I mean, it would have to be, you know,
a basket of them to get rid
of the individual characteristics.
I mean, what happens if, let's say,
suddenly nobody wants magnesium?
I mean, you know, the price would collapse.
They find a substitute for silver,
complete substitute for silver.
And let's just dismiss the monetary argument
I mean, it would collapse.
I mean, what happened to silver in the 1870s
was when Europe went off silver standards
following the Franco-Prussian War onto gold standards,
the silver ratio rose.
The hidden benchmark may not be inflation itself,
but what an entire commodity basket costs
when measured against gold.
What Alasdair MacLeod is highlighting
is the commodity bull markets
can actually represent bear markets in currencies,
while gold remains relatively stable against the basket.
That reframes gold rising
as currency purchasing power falling.
Next, Alasdair MacLeod exposes
why silver carries a different risk profile
despite its monetary history.
I mean, it shot up from, what, sort of 15-ish
to, you know, sort of 20, 25.
Why?
Because, you know, the monetary value went out of silver.
I mean, it wasn't demanded
for its monetary qualities anymore.
So, you know, I mean, the point I'm making
is that gold is representative
of all commodities put together.
And, you know, gold is the most convenient way
of buying that basket.
That's what it amounts to.
You can buy silver and get a more volatile version of it,
but then again, you are getting specific silver risks.
So, anyway, that's where we are.
Yeah, and it seems like South Korea
is also getting that message now
because after 13 years,
they will be back on the market
and they intend to buy domestically produced gold.
And they cite its geopolitical uncertainty
and the desire to de-dollarize
and diversify their reserves as reason.
How do you look at that?
Well, yeah, I mean, I think you have to bear in mind
that Korea is not all that far away from China.
Now, they talk trade a lot between, you know,
Korea, China, and also Japan, China.
And, you know, at the time of Trump's liberation day,
you remember when he held up all the, you know,
these tariff boards and all the rest of it,
that was April the 2nd last year.
One of the things that China did
was it moved very, very quickly
to try and develop the existing talks,
trade agreements between China, Korea, and Japan.
South Korea returning to gold after 13 years
is more revealing than another day of price movement.
Alastair McLeod's argument suggests
that reserve diversification is increasingly being driven
by geopolitical uncertainty,
not simply inflation hedging.
That matters because official buyers
can change marginal demand
without making dramatic public statements.
Investors should watch reserve behavior
rather than headlines about sentiment.