Jamie Dimon Just Made A Shocking Interest Rate Prediction (Not What You Think)

Financial Freedom
10 followers
AI Generated·May contain errors
Old Jamie Dimon just issued another warning about interest rates.
According to Bloomberg, the JP Morgan CEO says there's a risk inflation remains sticky
and that interest rates, they go up from here.
That sounds like caution about staying away from Treasury bonds.
If inflation remains elevated and the Federal Reserve has to raise rates
or feels it has to raise rates, bond prices could fall as yields go up.
But Jamie Dimon's prediction isn't necessarily what you think
because we've heard this warning from him before, more than once.
And when Dimon has warned that inflation and interest rates could be much higher
than markets expect, something very different has happened.
Treasury yields eventually fell and not by a little.
Even more interesting, JP Morgan itself has repeatedly increased its holding
of Treasuries and agency securities at the same time its CEO was publicly warning
about higher inflation and rates, about doing just what his bank ended up doing.
And right now, the bond market may be approaching another one of those turning points.
The three September effects I talked about last week, September Q,
they helped push yields higher but now are beginning to fade.
TGIO, thank God it's October.
Buyers are returning to the market.
Major investors are becoming less hostile toward bonds.
And there is still, there is still no market signature of the sustained inflation breakout
required to produce the rate path Dimon is warning about.
None. Zero.
So is Dimon correctly predicting the direction of interest rates from here?
Or has he inadvertently given bond investors a reason, several reasons,
to begin investigating the exact opposite?
I think there's a risk that inflation is sticky, that rates continue to go up.
Now to be fair to Jamie Dimon, he isn't claiming higher rates are guaranteed.
His warning is about risk and probability.
Inflation could remain sticky.
Tariffs, fiscal deficits, military spending.
We've got supply chain restructuring.
Other forces, a combination of all those.
They could keep consumer prices elevated.
And if that happens, Trichet is going to remain all over the FOMC.
They'll hike as much as they can get away with.
That scenario is possible.
But the important part isn't whether it's technically possible.
Almost anything is.
The important question is whether this is a new warning based on new information.
Or the latest version of the same warning Dimon has repeatedly delivered
near important turns in the bond market.
In 2023, Dimon said he wasn't sure the world was prepared for interest rates reaching 7%.
In 2024, he warned that, get this, large deficits, the green energy transition,
trade restructuring, re-militarization, they could all produce stickier inflation
and therefore higher interest rates than what the markets were expecting.
And now he is warning again that inflation may remain sticky
and rates, they might have to rise.
The wording changes, but the framework remains the same.
Stronger nominal growth, persistent inflation, and insufficient preparation
for the higher rates that are necessarily going to come with them.
The problem is what the bond market itself is actually showing us.
Everyone spent September searching for some grand macroeconomic explanation
for why long-term treasury rates in particular were rising.
It was inflation. It was tariffs.
It was bond vigilantes finally coming for Uncle Sam and his out-of-control spending ways.
But no one stopped to consider something so simple as the calendar.
September has frequently been a difficult month for treasury bonds.
And this year, the market had to absorb the three overlapping effects that I talked about.
The first was the broad seasonal tendency for treasuries to sell off
from late August through September and sometimes into early October.
The second of those was the mid-September funding bottleneck.
You've got a whole bunch of stuff happening around the 15th.
Dealer balance sheets are constrained,
and repo market pressures can temporarily make treasury financing more difficult.
And then the hedge fund basis traders may be being the mechanism for it.
The third was a recurring post-bottleneck acceleration in those long-term yields.
Since September 2021, long-term yields have often jumped
during the second half of September, immediately following the bottleneck.
That's why I call it September cubed.
It's a combination of the first two that creates an acceleration that we see as the third.
That doesn't mean every increase in yields was technical,
but it does mean the market, or at least commentary about the market,
may have been misdiagnosing the size and the meaning of the move.
And almost immediately after September ended, the behavior has begun to shift.
The two-year treasury yield fell from roughly 4.95% to about 4.75% in a week,
and since then has been stabilizing, at least in the short run, around 4.8%.
Ten-year treasuries began attracting buyers.
The curve started to very modestly bull steep it,
meaning yields were falling across the curve with shorter maturities,
leading the nascent possible rally.
Now, one day, one week doesn't prove yields have reached their final peak,
but the timing, the timing is definitely noteworthy.
It is suggestive.
When buyers return as soon as the seasonal and funding pressures begin fading,
it suggests September's sell-off may have at least been exaggerating the underlying economic signal.
Before we go on with our video today, let me ask you a question.
What if your gold could actually pay you every single month in more gold?
That's what today's video sponsor, Monetary Metals, lets you do.
And here's how it works.
You still own the gold, it's still in your name, it's fully insured,
but instead of just sitting there doing nothing, it actually starts working for you.
Monetary Metals has built a system that turns idle gold into productive gold,
earning real yield, paid in physical gold, not dollars.
No selling, no trading, no converting.
You keep your gold, and every month, you get more of it.
It's a simple idea, but it solves a big problem.
If gold is money, it should act like money.
And now it finally can.
If you're a long-term gold holder looking for a smarter way to store value,
check them out at monetary-metals.com slash Snyder.
Again, that's monetary-metals.com slash Snyder.
I highly recommend booking a call with them today
to see if they're the right fit for you.
We thank Monetary Metals for their sponsorship,
but now let's get back to the rest of our video.
Now go back to 2018.
2018, very similar circumstances to those that we find ourselves in today.
What was Jamie Dimon doing?
In the summer of 2018, he was saying,
hey, we need to prepare for the 10-year to hit 4%, maybe even 5%,
which today may not sound like a whole lot,
but back then, the 10-year treasury was a hell of a lot lower,
and everybody was talking about the same thing,
inflation, rising, accelerating, rising, accelerating economy.
But that's not what happened.
By August of 2018, Dimon's warning had become even more aggressive.
Quote, I think rates should be 4% today.
You better be prepared to deal with rates 5% or higher.
In interest rates, they did rise for a little while.
The 10-year yield reached roughly 3.25% by October of 2018,
and that initially looked like confirmation.
But then the global system ran directly into what we call
Eurodollar number four and the landmine.
Markets fell, growth expectations collapsed,
funding conditions tightened, and treasury yields, they reversed.
By May 2019, Dimon was still describing a 10-year yield
down around 2.45% as extraordinarily low.
There was widespread concern the Federal Reserve
and its quantitative tightening plus weaker foreign demand
would leave the treasury market without enough buyers.
Instead, yields kept falling.
By August and September of 2019,
the 10-year yield was approaching historic lows,
matching its 2016 rates.
The Federal Reserve had abandoned its rate hiking plans
and started cutting them.
Dimon's higher rates scenario wasn't impossible.
It simply wasn't the scenario the global economy delivered,
and there were warning signs all over the place at the time,
including the September effect.
And J.P. Morgan, the bank, its own behavior
made this episode even more interesting.
From March 2018 to June 2019,
the bank's reported treasury and agency holdings
across trading and available-for-sale categories
increased from approximately $68 billion
to more than $172 billion, a rise of about 153%,
meaning the final total was roughly 253% of the starting level.
So while Dimon was warning the public
to prepare for much higher yields,
J.P. Morgan, the bank, was substantially increasing
its own securities exposure.
Which, of course, brings us right back
to the inflation story that we see today.
Like I said, very similar to 2018,
especially in the respect that the treasury market,
not just the yield curve, but the TIPS market,
inflation swaps, all these inflation indications
in the marketplace, they were not seeing
what Dimon was seeing about inflation,
nor what the Federal Reserve was talking about
under Jay Powell.
Just like today, the TIPS market said
the inflation idea, it's not being priced.
There is still no convincing market signature
of any kind of risk for an inflationary breakout.
Now that does not mean reported inflation
is around 2% or that every inflation measure is falling.
What it means is that the market isn't pricing
the kind of sustained acceleration
that would support a whole new rate hiking cycle
or market interest rates just skyrocketing on their own.
And the front of the treasury curve
is especially important.
If investors expected a bunch of rate hikes
from the Fed, the two-year yield should rise decisively,
especially relative to other measures
like the three-month treasury bill.
Instead, the front-end slope remains restrained
compared with other policy episodes
such as 2017 and 2018, or especially 2022.
The market may be allowing for the possibility
of another triche hike, maybe two more triche hikes,
but it is not endorsing a massive sequence,
and that distinction matters.
To get to something like a complete hiking cycle
such as the middle 2000s, for example,
or even 2016, 2017, 2018,
it would require an economy that's absolutely capable
of absorbing higher costs and higher prices
when we don't see anything like that.
The treasury curve isn't pricing it.
Credit conditions, they're not saying it either.
Stress has been building among leveraged and smaller borrowers.
The credit cycle itself seems to be shifting.
Banks have become more cautious.
Consumer demand, as we keep talking about, is fragile.
And those are forms of financial restraint
that can slow the price rates in the economy,
as well as economic activity,
even if the Federal Reserve does nothing from here.
The marketplace isn't predicting
that inflation disappears tomorrow.
It's saying that the economy just isn't strong enough
to produce the inflationary track
the diamond is warning about that would lead
to higher policy rates and higher market rates,
much higher than what we see today.
And that same, call it gap,
between Jamie Dimon's public rhetoric and warnings
and what J.P. Morgan, the bank, was doing
was also seen again here in the 2020s,
just a couple of years ago.
Dimon said inflation is sticky,
and then J.P. Morgan did not take his advice.
During 2024, Dimon repeatedly emphasized
the inflationary consequences, as he saw them,
of government deficits, sound familiar,
infrastructure spending, sound familiar,
military expenditure, sound familiar,
trade restructuring, and, of course,
what was in vogue back then, the green transition.
Meanwhile, J.P. Morgan increased
its reported treasury and agency security holdings
by roughly 121 billion,
or approximately 39% across the relevant categories.
Now, that doesn't automatically mean
the bank's traders were deliberately betting
against the CEO, or the CEO was deliberately
setting up the bank's traders
for better prices to do their trading,
because a large bank holds government securities
for many different reasons,
including liquidity management, collateral, as we know,
their regulatory requirements, market making,
client activity, balance sheet optimization,
a whole bunch of complex factors.
And J.P. Morgan's portfolio
isn't a personal brokerage account
controlled by Jamie Dimon.
Still, the contrast is meaningful.
The CEO was publicly emphasizing the possibility
of sticky inflation at higher rates,
which would be bad for those holdings,
yet the institution he leads
was dramatically increasing its exposure
to the various securities that would benefit from,
or at least become more valuable
under a lower growth, lower rate environment
that he was saying wasn't happening.
And J.P. Morgan wasn't alone.
The broader banking system
accumulated substantial amounts of securities,
including treasuries and agency debt.
Banks do that when those securities
offer attractive yields,
but also when institutions become more defensive
and less enthusiastic about expanding risky lending.
The public narrative said inflation.
The institutional behavior said caution,
liquidity preferences, and duration.
That is the real dichotomy.
Not only have we seen these warnings out of Dimon before,
we've seen this type of behavior
out of the bond market before.
Everybody's making the 10-year treasury yield
rise into this huge, meaningful,
we've never seen something like this before,
25-year high and nearly 25-year high in rates.
Well, the last time we saw the 10-year treasury yield
yielding about as much as it does today
was early 2002 under very similar circumstances.
At the end of 2001's dot-com recession,
in November 2001,
the 10-year U.S. treasury yield was around 4.22%.
Then economic data appeared to improve.
The recession was supposedly ending.
Inventory rebuilding created the appearance
of stronger momentum.
Sound familiar?
Commentators began predicting
that growth would accelerate
and the Fed would soon need to raise its rates.
And Alan Greenspan's Fed,
just like Kevin Warsh today,
sure as hell didn't do anything to dissuade that argument.
The 10-year yield surged by more than 120 basis points,
reaching approximately 5.44% by April of 2002.
And that move looked like the beginning of a new expansion
and what they call tightening cycles,
just a Fed raising rates.
But it wasn't.
The apparent recovery depended too heavily
on temporary inventory effects.
Sound familiar?
While final demand and business investment
remained weak,
once the expected acceleration failed to materialize,
the entire interest rate move completely reversed.
By October 2002,
just six months later,
the 10-year yield had fallen to approximately 3.61%.
That's a huge decline in rates,
decline in rates.
In November 2002,
the Federal Reserve,
for its own part,
it cut its policy rate by 50 basis points,
going from,
we're hiking a lot,
to cutting by 50 in a matter of six months.
120 basis point rise in the 10-year yield
hadn't predicted durable growth or inflation,
it had reflected a temporary fluctuation of the economic cycle
and how markets and market participants aren't perfect.
Then consider 2006 and 2007.
The 10-year yield reached roughly 5.25% in June 2006
before falling to approximately 4.43% by December 1st.
But then yield reversed again.
By the middle of June 2007,
the 10-year was back near 5.25% again.
And that rise occurred
while concerns about subprime mortgages
and the credit system
were already appearing
and becoming more and more evident.
If higher yields automatically meant
stronger growth and inflation,
June 2007 should have been an economic green light.
Instead,
it was the final bond market head fake
before the credit crisis became impossible to ignore.
Yields subsequently collapsed.
And the Fed,
rather than holding steady forever
or even raising rates as oil prices were rising,
they began cutting rates in September 2007
and got down to zero a year later.
The lesson isn't that every increase in yields is wrong.
We have to pay attention to these as potential fluctuation.
The lesson here is that rates can rise sharply,
yes, sharply,
during the early stages of a slowdown
because markets temporarily misinterpret
inflation probabilities,
inventory management,
fiscal activity,
funding pressure,
or even just a narrative of resilient growth.
It happens.
Sometimes the biggest rise in rates occurs
just before the reason for lower rates becomes undeniable.
And this is a big reason why
Diamond's Warning isn't what it appears to be.
On the surface,
as he says,
it's inflation,
it's higher rates,
interest rates have nowhere to go but up.
But he said that same thing
for many of the same reasons
many times before.
Meanwhile,
the market,
if you know how to read the signals,
market is pricing something else entirely.
So it's not necessarily a forecast
that investors should just accept at face value.
Maybe another example of a highly influential bank CEO
focusing on visible inflation risks
or what he thinks are visible inflation risks
while the bond market and the banking system
focus on less visible factors
including risks to growth.
Diamond could still be right in the short run.
Oil prices could continue to rise.
In fact,
we'd expect them to,
especially gasoline and diesel.
Tariffs,
yeah,
they could still have an effect.
Leveraged positions could still produce
another leg down in the bond sell-off.
But Diamond made these same arguments
in 2018 and 2019.
Very similar arguments.
Rates ultimately fell.
He revived the higher for longer argument
in 23 and 24.
JP Morgan increased its treasury and agency holding.
Now he's warning about sticky inflation
all over again.
Just as the seasonal pressures
that helped lift yields in September
are beginning to fade.
At some point,
repetition becomes part of the signal.
Not because Diamond's always wrong,
you do have to wonder
why he's saying what he's saying,
but because risks that he emphasized
are already highly visible.
They're the low hanging fruit of the narrative.
The risks that banks appearing to be preparing for,
slower lending,
weaker demand,
greater liquidity needs,
they receive much less attention
because everybody wants to focus on a headline
that says the 10 years at its highest rate
since 2002.
Well,
what happened in early 2002?
And another thing to keep in mind too
is that Diamond is on the other side
of what is a changing institutional conversation.
Again,
some of that might be on purpose though,
we'll never be able to say for sure,
but he's saying inflation rates have to go up
and more and more we hear from institutions
that, okay,
we're kind of looking for the treasury market
to turn around here.
I mean,
Jim Bianco,
veteran trader,
veteran bond guy,
well-known all over social media,
the regular media,
everywhere.
He recently joined us
on our Eurodollar talk channel
and he explained
why he believes
that we're closer to the top in rates.
Now that doesn't mean
he's calling the exact peak
to the basis point.
It means that,
according to Jim,
the balance of risk
is changing
after the enormous repricing
that bonds have already endured.
PIMCO,
same thing,
changing its posture,
big,
gigantic,
fixed income name.
With long-term treasury yields
above 5%,
CIO Daniel Avasin
said the firm was trimming
its underweight position
in long-dated government debt.
PIMCO isn't dismissing
America's fiscal challenges.
They're not saying that.
They wouldn't dare
swim against the tide
on something like that.
What they're arguing
is that
more of these challenges
are now reflected
in the yields
and the evaluations
offer better value
moving forward.
Man Group
has challenged
another common assumption
that gets thrown around
everywhere reflexively,
that any period
of elevated inflation
must be bad for treasury.
Its research found
that when inflation
was between 2% and 4%,
10-year treasuries
historically generated
average annualized
nominal returns
of approximately
4 percentage points
above inflation.
The real danger
wasn't simply
inflation remaining
somewhat elevated,
it was inflation
accelerating rapidly
above 4%.
And when inflation
increased by more
than 50 basis points
over three months
in that environment,
10-year treasuries
produced a deeply
negative annualized return.
But again,
the TIPS market says
there's almost no risk
of that taking place.
In other words,
according to their research,
the direction
and rate of change
matter more
than the headline level.
At the more aggressive
end of all this,
there's a company
called Azimut
that's buying
deeply discounted
long-duration bonds
that were issued
during the zero-rate era.
Some of those
that are trading
at 50 cents on the dollar,
which is an extremely
volatile strategy,
not necessarily
evidence to rush in
and buy these
50-year zero-coupon bonds.
But what it demonstrates
is how much
the conversation
has shifted.
Investors are no longer
asking how much
further bonds
have to fall.
Some are beginning
to ask how much bad news
has already been priced in
and whether or not,
now that we're in October,
it's time to start
thinking fundamentally
all over again.
Not narrative,
actual market fundamentals.
So what does
Jamie Dimon's latest
interest rate and inflation
warning really tell us?
Well,
on the surface,
it's certainly a possibility,
but given the history here,
this should be raising
a whole bunch
of more red flags
and provoke you
to ask more
and more questions
than to simply say
interest rates have
nowhere to go but up.
I think there's a risk
that inflation is sticky,
that rates continue
to go up.
It tells us
one of the most familiar
late-cycle narratives
is back at exactly
the moment
Treasury market pressure
may be stabilizing.
The September
seasonal effect
is indeed fading.
The mid-month funding
bottleneck has passed.
The post-bottleneck rise
in long-term yields
may also be losing
its momentum
at the very least.
Treasury buyers
are returning
or at least talking
about returning
to the marketplace.
The curve over the last week?
A little bit
of bull steepening.
PIMCO
sees better value.
Man Group says
higher for longer inflation
doesn't automatically
mean in doomed bonds.
Jim Bianco
believes he may be
closer to the top
in rates.
And underneath
all of it?
The market still
is not pricing
a sustained
inflationary cycle.
Now that doesn't guarantee
yields fall from here.
In fact,
in the short run
wouldn't be surprised
if they still go up
a little bit.
Markets never move
in straight lines
and long-duration bonds
remain highly sensitive
to all of this stuff.
But history gives us
a reason to be skeptical.
Whenever a temporary
rise in rates,
even a big one,
is treated as
proof of
permanent inflation
or the
coming
economic boom.
That happened
in 2002.
It happened again
in 2007.
And Diamond himself
delivered a similar
warning in 2018
shortly before
Treasury yields
reversed course
and the Federal
Reserve had to
abandon its
rate hiking campaign
and start cutting
rates all over again.
Jamie Diamond
may be warning
that rates are
going higher,
but history
and the repeated
behavior of his
own bank
strongly suggests
we should pay
very close attention
to the possibility,
the strong possibility,
that eventually
the next move
in bonds
is the opposite
of what he says.
