China’s top generals are disappearing, key military posts remain vacant, and Xi Jinping has kept an unusual distance from the PLA. Retired commanders are reportedly angry, military orders may be going unsigned, and even the general believed to guard Beijing has vanished from public view. Did Xi’s purge strengthen his control—or leave China’s military paralyzed by fear?
Hi everyone, welcome, welcome to today's real talk.
All right, it's been a while since I last discussed China's military, the PLA.
Let's stay on that topic for tonight. China has one of the largest militaries in the world.
It has nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers, hypersonic missiles, millions of soldiers.
But right now, the most important question is not how powerful the PLA looks from the outside.
It's whether anyone is still willing to command it from within.
In the past several months, China's most senior generals have disappeared one after another.
Critical positions remain vacant. Military orders are reportedly going
unassigned. Retired commanders may be boycotting official events.
And the general believed to be responsible for guarding Beijing has vanished from public view.
And Xi Jinping, chairman of the Central Military Commission,
has not publicly entered a major military facility for more than six months.
Is Xi Jinping avoiding the PLA because he no longer trusts its commanders? Or has the crisis
gone even further? Can the commanders themselves no longer guarantee his safety?
Tonight, we're going inside the growing power vacuum at the top of China's military and take
a closer look. August 1st was the 99th anniversary of the founding of the PLA. The Ministry of
Defense held its annual reception. It was held the day before on July 31st. But this year,
the reception revealed something about the state of the PLA. Let me show you the picture first.
Once again, China's top military leadership appeared to be disappearing. Let's compare
the guest list from the past several years. In 2023, four members of the Central Military
Commission attended. Then in 2024, despite the political fallout from the removal of
former Defense Minister Li Shangfu, three commission members were still present,
Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shenming. In 2025, that number fell to two,
Liu Zhenli and Zhang Shenming. But this year, not a single CMC member attended.
The official announcement named only one senior military figure, and that's this man,
Defense Minister Dong Jun. And Dong Jun is not even a member of the CMC.
The upper ranks of the PLA appeared to be growing increasingly hollow. And there was
another striking absence. This man was also absent. Liu Yuan, the son of former Chinese
President Liu Shaoqi and one of the most politically influential princelings connected
to the military. Last year, Liu Yuan attended the August 1st reception wearing his military uniform.
Now, he had already retired from a long time ago. So his decision to wear the uniform was
therefore widely interpreted as a political signal. A reminder that despite his retirement,
he was still playing a role inside the military establishment. But this year,
Liu Yuan was nowhere to be seen in the footage released by CCTV. And that change may be extremely
significant. Now, the biggest event that ever happened to the PLA this year was the removal
of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. And Zhang Youxia was not simply another vice chairman
of the Central Military Commission. He was one of the leading figures among the PLA's princeling
officers. Within that political community, Zhang Youxia represented far more than himself.
He was seen as a guardian of the military inheritance created by the
first generation of communist leaders. So by moving against Zhang Youxia, Xi Jinping may
have effectively declared war on an entire political class. And so Xi Jinping might have
succeeded in removing Zhang Youxia, but he has not succeeded in neutralizing Liu Yuan.
And Liu Yuan is believed to now play an important role connecting two powerful groups,
military commanders and the CCP's red families. Today, former legal professor Yuan Hongbin
dropped a bombshell, claiming that the second generation red families connected to Liu Yuan,
Hu Deping, and Deng Pufang, and others, reached a common understanding about the end of Xi Jinping's
And you know, the three names that I gave you, Liu Yuan is the son of Liu Shaoqi,
Hu Deping is the son of Hu Yaobang, former party secretary under Deng Xiaoping,
and then Deng Pufang is the son of Deng Xiaoping. So these three princeling heavyweights
and others reached a common understanding. And they have a plan. Their plan is to spread a
different message through private conversations across the government, universities, business
circles, the military, and among ordinary people. The goal is to create a powerful public narrative
outside Xi Jinping's official propaganda system, and eventually turn it into a nationwide
chorus of criticism against him. And by doing so, they estimate that Xi's rule would end in 2028.
Therefore, with that background information, Liu Yuan's absence this year at the PLA's reception
might have been a security precaution rather than a sign that he has lost influence.
And at the same time that Liu Yuan disappeared from the reception, unverified reports began
circulating outside China about a possible boycott by retired PLA commanders. According to those
reports, dozens of retired officers at the deputy theater command level or above declined invitations
to the reception. And the reports even went further. They claimed that at several military
retirement compounds in Beijing, not a single official car departed for the PLA building
where the reception was held. And allegedly, among those refusing to attend were more than
30 retired officers. And this included a Princeton general whose name is Zhang Haiyang,
who is a retired PLA full general who once served as political commissar of the 2nd Artillery Corps,
which was the predecessor of today's rocket force. And according to circulating accounts,
these retired officers were protesting the treatment of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.
The two men have been detained for more than six months, yet the Chinese authorities or Xi Jinping
has offered no detailed public explanation of the accusations against them, the status of their
cases and their current whereabouts. Some retired commanders believe the two cases are unjust,
and they used the reception or allegedly used the reception to boycott. They boycotted the event to
express their anger. Now the same sources made an even more serious allegation. They claim that
after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were removed, the PLA's command structure descended into confusion.
And training, logistics and operational planning were reportedly disrupted.
Some military orders allegedly circulated without anyone willing to sign them or formally accept
responsibility. In other words, the problem may not be that the PLA has run out of officers.
The problem may be that nobody wants to make a decision. And that distinction is extremely
important. An authoritarian military does not necessarily become paralyzed because it lacks
personnel. It can become paralyzed when every officer is afraid that signing the wrong document,
approving the wrong deployment, or following the wrong commander could cost him his career
or his freedom. Now, concurrently, the Epoch Times Chinese edition published an article
revealing that several of its anonymous sources offered similar accounts. One source,
identified as Mr. B, claimed that after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were investigated,
Beijing failed to announce permanent replacements for two of the most important positions
in the Chinese military system, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and chief
of the Joint Staff Department. And according to Mr. B, major posts remain vacant in both the
commission's top decision-making structure and the PLA's joint operations command system.
And another source, using the name Mr. Tang, claimed that the investigations into the two
generals were completed approximately two months ago, but the findings generated so much anger
among senior officers that Beijing has hesitated to release them publicly. A retired PLA officer
quoted by the Epoch Times Chinese edition, under the name General Ji, said that in previous major
military cases, the CMC would normally brief retired senior commanders. The authorities
would explain what had happened and attempt to secure the support of influential veterans.
But in the cases of these two generals, he said, retired commanders were told almost nothing.
Their questions received no answers. Even major promotions were carried out without
consulting the retired military establishment, breaking with practices that had existed for
decades. Now, these anonymous claims, of course, remain difficult to verify,
but the broader pattern they describe are consistent and they can also be seen in public.
The leadership vacancies are real, the disappearing commanders are real,
and Xi Jinping's awkward relationship with the military is also real. Even his physical
distance from the PLA is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.
Start counting from January 20th, the day Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhengli were arrested,
more than six months have passed. Now, during that entire period,
public reports do not show Xi Jinping entering a military facility, boarding a naval vessel,
or visiting the headquarters of a theater command. And before the Lunar New Year,
on February the 10th, Xi Jinping did not travel to a frontline unit, which he used to do often.
Instead, he remained inside the PLA building in Beijing, while representatives from nine military
units appeared on large screens and spoke with him through video. And during the annual two sessions,
Xi Jinping met military delegates, but inside the Great Hall of the People. On July 30th,
he chaired a Politburo study session on national defense and military modernization,
but inside Zhongnanhai. On July 31st, he signed an order awarding merit to an individual officer.
Once again, it was an administrative act carried out from his office.
And now, around the PLA's 99th birthday, there was no widely publicized visit to a military base.
No photograph of Xi Jinping standing beside frontline commanders, no image of him inside
a theater command headquarters. And the pattern becomes even more unusual when we look at Xi
Jinping's two visits to Shanghai this year. It has been widely reported that Xi Jinping has not
made many visits domestically since November of last year. And the two most important visits
were to Shanghai. On April 30th, he attended a symposium on basic scientific research.
Then from July 15th to 17th, he returned to Shanghai for another inspection and attended
events connected to the World AI Conference. Now, Shanghai lies within the jurisdiction of
the Eastern Theater Command. Yet during both visits, I mean, the Eastern Theater Command is
the most important to Xi Jinping because it's responsible for any Taiwan operation.
But during those two visits, Xi Jinping met local officials, researchers, and residents
without publicly visiting any military unit in Shanghai.
Nor did he make the relatively short trip to Nanjing, where the Eastern Theater Command
is headquartered. That marks a sharp break from his previous routine. In the past,
when Xi Jinping toured a region, he would very often include a military inspection.
Now, think about that. The chairman of China's Central Military Commission entered the territory
of one of the country's most important theater commands twice, but did not publicly meet his
commanders. That was not Xi Jinping's normal pattern before January 20th, the day when
Zhang Yuxia was taken down. Let me give you his pattern before that. On February 2nd, 2024,
before the Lunar New Year, Xi Jinping personally visited troops stationed in Tianjin. On April 23rd,
2024, he visited the Army Medical University in Chongqing. That same year, he inspected a
rocket force brigade and later visited the PLA garrison in Macau. On January 24th, 2025,
he traveled to Shen Yun and entered the headquarters of the Northern Theater Command.
He met officers and soldiers in person before speaking by video with personnel stationed
elsewhere. And on November 7th, 2025, which was not that long ago, when the aircraft
carrier Fujian entered the service, Xi Jinping boarded the ship and personally conducted an
inspection. You see, the pattern was unmistakable. Every few months, he physically entered a military
facility. Visits around the Lunar New Year and Army Day or the PLA Day were especially predictable.
Before, Xi Jinping walked into the military and issued orders. Now, the military appears
on a screen in front of him. The screen still lights up, the officers still salute,
but Xi Jinping has not publicly stepped inside the barrel of the gun for a very long time.
And that raises the most important question here. Is Xi Jinping avoiding the PLA because he no
longer trusts his commanders? Or are the commanders refusing to guarantee his safety?
And that question may help explain another extraordinary event.
Last week, Xi Jinping was widely expected to attend ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary
of the Tangshan earthquake. And according to the Tangshan government's own announcements,
the city had imposed strict, very strict airspace controls. One of the clearest signs that Xi Jinping
was preparing to arrive. But he never appeared. And that shocked not only the Chinese but also
foreign media outlets. Instead, Premier Li Qiang attended his place.
Why did Xi Jinping cancel at the last moment? Well, according to one unverified account,
he had received a warning or a tip about a possible assassination plot in Tangshan.
So, Xi Jinping sent Li Qiang in his place. Of course, we can't verify that. After more than
six months of avoiding military bases, the allegation raises a deeply troubling possibility
though. Xi Jinping may not simply be keeping his distance from the PLA. He may no longer trust the
military to protect him. And if Xi truly feared that the military could not guarantee his safety
in Tangshan, then we need to ask a more basic question. Who is responsible for protecting him
in Beijing? And that question leads us to one of the strangest disappearances in the PLA today.
It concerns the man believed to be responsible for guarding China's capital.
When I say believed to be responsible, that's because, oh, here's the invitation to the
PLA reception, as people were saying that they were boycotting the event.
Okay, this man. Now let's talk about this man. When I say he was believed to be responsible
for guarding China's capital, that's because his former position, he was the commander of the
Shanghai garrison. He was later transferred to be the head of Beijing garrison. But that
announcement, that transfer was never formally announced. People only learned it through media
reports afterwards. So that's why I say he was believed to be responsible for guarding
Beijing's capital, only because the formal appointment was missing. Now, his name is Cheng
Yuan. He is believed to command the Beijing garrison, right? Whoever controls the forces
defending Beijing possesses enormous influence over the fate of the regime. Yet this major general,
Cheng Yuan, appears to have vanished from public view. His last known public appearance was on
January the 14th, when media said that he attended an expanded meeting of the Beijing
garrison party committee. And that was when the media report came out, I believe in February.
The media report came out much later, after Zhang Youxia was already arrested. But it talked about
this January 14th meeting, where Cheng Yuan attended as the head of Beijing garrison.
And that's the moment when people realized that, because the commander of Beijing garrison,
the position had been vacant for a while. So from that media report, people concluded that
the head of Shanghai garrison was moved to be in charge of Beijing. However, after that, nothing.
No new appointment has been publicly announced. He was not seen in the public, no media reports,
no investigation has been disclosed, no official explanation has been given for his absence.
More than six months later, the status of the man believed to command the forces defending
Beijing remains unknown. Now, we should be very clear, there's currently no public evidence
proving that Cheng Yuan has been detained, removed, or harmed. And there were sensational
online claims saying that he was killed. But that cannot be treated as fact. But his unexplained
disappearance is politically significant because of the position he's believed to hold.
And because of the moment that he disappeared, because he disappeared
right after Zhang Youxia was arrested. Okay, so who is he? Well, he's 54 years old,
and he spent much of his career in the People's Armed Police. Around 2018, he served as deputy
commander of the Jiangsu Armed Police Corps. And then in 2019, or around 2019, he became the head
of an armed police school for non-commissioned officers. In 2021, he was promoted to commander
of the Guangxi Armed Police Corps and received the rank of Major General. In January 2023,
he was commanding the Shanghai Armed Police Corps in charge of the security of Shanghai.
Most recently, he was transferred into a senior leadership position in the Beijing garrison.
But we don't know when. But as of January 14th, he was already fulfilling that role. Now,
he also has political connections that have attracted attention. He comes from Jiangsu
province, or Dongtai, particularly comes from Dongtai in Jiangsu, the same hometown as
former CMC vice chairman He Weidong, if you still remember him, who was one of Xi Jinping's
military loyalists, and who has himself fallen from power, who was also rumored to have died.
I mean, who disappeared from the two sessions in 2025 has never been seen. His downfall was
announced right before the fourth plenum last fall. Anyway, so they're from the same place,
and their careers have overlapped within the former Nanjing military region.
So one military commentator has argued that Chen Yuan became commander of the Beijing garrison
shortly before Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhiming were taken down, even though his appointment was
reported publicly only afterward. And under this interpretation, Xi Jinping placed someone he
considered politically reliable in control of Beijing's security before moving against General
Zhang. There have also been unverified allegations linking Chen Yuan, the man you're looking on the
screen, to the sudden death of former Premier Li Keqiang in Shanghai in October 2023. Because
Chen was not punished, and was later transferred to a far more sensitive position in Beijing.
Some people believe that Xi Jinping regarded him as highly trustworthy, or he would not be
moved to Beijing. Again, speculations are not proof, but they help explain why Chen's disappearance
has generated so much attention. Several explanations are possible. The first is
that Beijing has deliberately removed him from public view at a time of intense concern about
a possible coup. I mean, given the ugly political infighting that's happening
inside Zhongnanhai, the leadership may not want outsiders to know who actually
controlled the forces defending the capital. And the second possibility is that Chen became
a scapegoat for the June 26 aircraft incident in Beijing. Remember, there was a small aircraft
struck the landmark skyscraper, the Sidiq Tower, on June 26, after military and civilian authorities
failed for more than 20 minutes to authorize an interception. As a senior officer responsible
for the capital's defense, Chen could have been blamed for that failure. The third possibility
is that Chen participated in the operations against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. He
knew too much, and was later removed. And the fourth possibility is far less dramatic. Illness
or a routine personnel transition. At this stage, we simply do not know. But the deeper issue is
not which theory is correct. The deeper issue is the extraordinary secrecy surrounding the
command of Beijing's garrison. The CCP repeatedly tells the public that it exercises absolute
control over the military. If you follow the PLA daily or military media outlets, this line is
repeated obsessively. The party controls the gun. The military must follow the order of the party.
It's been said over and over again in the past couple of months. But can the regime truly be
confident in that control when outsiders cannot even determine who currently commands the troops
defending the capital? And this is not a reassuring picture of stability. It's a picture
of a system consumed by secrecy, suspicion, and fear. And the louder Xi Jinping repeats that the
must always obey the party, the more we must ask, is the gun still listening? And there's one more
detail we need to examine. Now, despite the scale of the purges, Xi Jinping has promoted
remarkably few generals to fill the vacancies. Two were promoted in December 2025. Two more
were promoted on July 3rd, 2026. And we didn't see any promotions around the August 1st PLA day,
because that's really the holiday where the PLA traditionally does its promotions. But we didn't
see any this year. And according to interpretations circulating among Chinese political analysts,
none of the four that were promoted is regarded as personally loyal to Xi. Not the two promoted
in December 2025, and not the two this July. That alone does not prove Xi Jinping has lost
control of the military. But when we combine the purges, the vacancies, the unexplained
disappearances, and Xi Jinping's prolonged absence from military bases or facilities,
a much more troubling picture begins to emerge. Xi Jinping might have achieved a tactical victory
by removing Zhang Youxia, but strategically the operation may have backfired. Xi Jinping appears
to have believed that once General Zhang was gone, military authority would flow back to his
own hands. Instead, by removing such a powerful and respected commander, he may have destroyed
the very mechanism that allowed the PLA to function. Zhang Youxia had real combat experience,
and he had commanded troops. According to anonymous sources, commanders across the
theater commands trust Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli because both men had fought in wars
and understood the daily realities of the PLA. With both men gone, there may no longer be anyone
at the top whom subordinate commanders both respect and trust. And that may explain why
military orders are allegedly going unsigned. Nobody knows which political faction will
ultimately prevail. Nobody knows which command will later be declared disloyal. And nobody wants
to become the next general taken away. A military can possess enormous firepower and still become
politically paralyzed. And all of this brings us back to one word—fear. Fear among officers who
no longer know which orders are safe to follow. Fear inside Xi Jinping's security apparatus over
who can still be trusted. And perhaps fear that the crisis inside the military could eventually
spill beyond the wars of the PLA. And let me give you one striking detail that I know most
Western analysts have overlooked. So this was an announcement, a very interesting announcement,
that was made on July 28th, the very same day as the 50th anniversary of the Tangshan earthquake,
or the very same day that Xi Jinping, how to say, feared an assassination attempt.
Anyways, on that day, seven Chinese government and military agencies issued a very unusual
joint notice. Listen to this. Central Military Commission's Logistic Support Department,
Equipment Development Department, and Political and Legal Affairs Commission,
together with the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration of Science, Technology
and Industry for National Defense, and the State Administration for Market Regulation.
Sorry, I just recounted the number of agencies. It's not seven, it's six.
Okay, so these six agencies, some civilians, some military, they issued a joint notice to prohibit
the sale of retired and scrapped military equipment. The issue must be serious enough
that it required six agencies to issue such a joint statement. What's the matter?
This is according to the announcement. Okay, I'm back on. I got too excited.
I'm too excited about my upcoming vacation, I guess.
So, according to the announcement, some businesses have been openly selling retired
PLA equipment, both online and in physical stores. The authorities said these sales had created
negative effects and potential security risks. The new rules prohibit individuals and organizations
from selling retired or scrapped military equipment, including machinery, ammunition,
components, and other materials removed from service and designated for disposal.
They also prohibit the use of parts taken from retired military equipment to manufacture,
modify, assemble, or market replicas that could be mistaken for genuine PLA equipment.
Even the commercial promotion of these products has been restricted.
So why is Beijing suddenly so concerned about old military supplies circulating? Because that's very
interesting. The very issues that I just told you about, that were spelled out in this announcement,
are happening in China. So, the CCP's concerns are, one, is counterintelligence. Military
surplus items can obtain serial numbers, model numbers, manufacturing marks, repair records,
and visible signs of use. Foreign intelligence services could study those details to learn
about production or production batches, maintenance standards, equipment quality,
and the condition of China's defense industry. And that's explanation number one. Explanation
number two is corruption. China's military procurement and disposal systems operate with
very little outside oversight. If equipment officially marked for destruction is appearing
on commercial markets, military personnel may be diverting state property and selling it for a
private profit. And some of these equipment may not be obsolete. They're not like retired
equipment or scrapped equipment. They could be good, legitimate,
in-use type of equipment and weaponry that are being sold for profit. But there may be another
fear, one that goes directly to the political insecurity we have been discussing throughout
this program. Beijing may also be worried that weapons, components, protective gears,
communication devices, and other military materials could flow into civilian hands
to help people become armed. The CCP does not merely fear foreign intelligence agencies
examining old equipment. I think that's lesser of their concern because how good is CCP's military
equipment, right? But it fears losing control of the chain of command. And above all, it fears
people inside China obtaining the tools, the weapons to resist the state. And with the
corruption going on inside the PLA, they could be selling these equipment or weaponry
to private hands. And that would be detrimental to those in Zhongnanhai.
So that is what ties these developments together. The missing commanders, the unfilled positions,
Xi Jinping's distance from military bases, the secrecy surrounding the Beijing garrison,
and now the effort to control even retired military equipment,
or I should say the effort to control an underground arms industry.
Each development may have its own explanation, but taken together, they review a regime
increasingly preoccupied with one question, not how powerful its military appears from the inside,
but whether the party can still control the gun from within.
All right, so I just gave you some updates related to the status quo of the PLA,
and I hope that's helpful to you. All right, I will be going on vacation later this week,
and I'll be gone for about 10 days, so I will not do any live streams for the next
week and a half. Unless there are major events, breaking news, then I will jump in
to do a program. Otherwise, I would enjoy my vacation. All right, so that's what I have for
you tonight. Let's see. Oh, I see some super stickers flying. You know, I saw that some of the
Chinese YouTubers who cover China, cover CCP, are also saying that their views and subscriptions
are strangely low, and they did investigations and research into that, and they suspect that
the CCP has been using AI to alter or manipulate YouTube's algorithm, targeting certain channels
like mine, so that we don't get a lot of views or a lot of subscriptions, because the traffic lately
has been really strange for the past, I would say, a couple of months. Yeah, it's not normal,
and someone was suspecting that they deployed AI as a weapon to target us, and I think that's a
huge possibility. I don't have any solution, because I am just one woman with Chris and Nicole
trying to do these programs. I don't know how to counter a country, a communist state with its
unlimited resource to target people like myself, but it's very, very sad. I hope YouTube can do
something to change that, to correct that. Anyways, I want to thank people,
not Mike Stewart from Canada. Hi, my daughter is still on the Major General Mao Xinyu.
He will be the last man standing. Mao Xinyu, who is the grandson of Mao Zedong. Okay,
let's hope that he will be the last man standing. Thank you very much, Mike, for your support. I
appreciate it. Okay, here's a question. Lei, what prevents a military coup against Xi? This
is a common practice in many similar situations in other countries. But what do they want to
accomplish? If the military staged a coup against Xi Jinping, what's their alternative? Who do they
put in? I don't think the military leaders are interested in replacing Xi. They're not interested
in running the country. So what's the solution? They have to partner with someone, and that
someone has to be ready for this coup. So it appears to me that no one is ready to do that
yet. So the military can do anything. The military alone cannot stage a coup. They have to team up
with a political leader. And then who is that person at this point? If you watch my program
from last week about a three-way deadlock. Everyone has their own calculation, has their
own agenda. And Xi Jinping has taken advantage of that division in the anti-Xi camp. And that's why
they're stuck in a deadlock. So anyways, okay, here's a question from Fishing Fave.
Lei, what prevents a military coup against Xi? I already answered that. Great question, though.
Okay, now Mike Stewart. The CCP needs to control public opinion to survive. How strong can a
regime be when its biggest threat is information, food for thought? You brought up a very good
point. That's why I think the United States government should seriously think about using
its technological advantage to tear down that infamous Chinese firewall. Because if they could
provide the Chinese people uncensored information, the regime will not last for more than two weeks.
And that's the most cost-effective way to deal with all the crises in the world. I mean,
China is obviously behind Iran. It's also behind Russia. Rather than spending all the money
devoting so much resources trying to deal with Iran, why don't we deal with the root cause?
And the solution to the root cause doesn't have to be war. It doesn't have to be trade war.
It's information. I think publishing the top officials' personal assets is one
great geopolitical weapon. And then providing Chinese people with uncensored information,
taking down that firewall, is a bigger lethal weapon. It's deadlier. So good point. Thank you.
Thank you for the support. Can you do a video on September 15 date when China imposed exit
ban on Chinese citizens deemed risk to national? They're already practicing that on August 1st.
There have been reports of ethnic Chinese holding foreign passports,
returning to China for vacation, but detained and forced to renounce their foreign citizenship
and regain their Chinese nationality. I think there was news all over the internet about a
Japanese family of five who had lived in Japan for 13 years. They have a business that employs
40 employees in Japan, and they returned to China for vacation during summer,
and they were detained, locked up in dark rooms for a week. They were forced to give up their
Japanese citizenship, and they were not allowed to leave China until what, 2036?
And so the word is out. I think Chinese Americans or ethnic Chinese holding
foreign passports, if you're born in China, if you still have families or business ties in China,
even though you hold a foreign passport, you should not go to China.
You may ask, why do they want to do this? For money. They wouldn't arrest someone who has no
money. They target those who are relatively affluent because they could squeeze money out of
you. All right. Thank you. Lei's short patterns are flickering for me. What? Short pattern?
Coffee and Paul. Well, thank you, Paul. Okay. Someone said, Lei is going to Beidaihe Beach
Resort for vacation with Xi Jinping and party elders. You will never see me again if I go.
You want me to go? You guys have come to China to rescue me?
Thank you. Enjoy your vacation. Okay. Someone said, Lei, don't click on YouTube links in
messages in email about account changes. That's how CCP fishes to get passwords.
All right. Okay. Well, thank you for the tip. I'm very careful not to click anything.
Someone said, Lei, I trust your vacation would be brilliant. Oh, yes. I have not taken a real
vacation ever since I've become a YouTuber. I mean, the few times that I traveled, it was
not a real vacation. There were business, sometimes business, sometimes personal travel.
I was very busy. But this time is a real vacation. So I'm looking forward to it.
Why are factories in China catching fire lately? Is it the normal trend or is this something out
of the ordinary? They're not normal. I know there are a lot of them. The factories have become
infernal, right? There was some in Shandong. There were two in Shandong. And there was one truck
explosion on highway. And then there was another factory that were on fire. All happened on the
same day. The factory fire was said to be a revenge. It was a disgruntled employee,
allegedly a disgruntled employee taking revenge on his employer. So I don't know what happened
to the truck. All right. George Washington, 1776. Thank you, George, for the super sticker.
I appreciate that. Oh, here's another one. Not Mike again. Set up a high power
Wi-Fi spot, beam in Taiwan and point it at the shabby. I'm sure there are people who do that.
Someone said, do you think the CCP might be behind the issues with water in certain states?
You mean what, in the US? What water? Flooding? I'm not sure what you mean by water. But I know
that in Sichuan and Qinghai, there were a massive amount of earthquakes that happened in the past
couple of days. People say that the tremors weren't stopping and people got scared. But
apparently the tremors were shallow. So I don't know if they were natural earthquakes or like we
suspected before, underground nuclear testing. But there were a lot of tremors in Sichuan and Qinghai
in that area. Someone said, there has been an exodus of middle and high income influx of PRC
migration to Southeast Asia. Why is it that we seldom hear from them or media sharing the fact
that China's economy is bad? CCP's influence in Southeast Asia is tremendous. Seriously.
And so these people, even though they moved away from China, they're still careful
with what they have to say. Even people who live in Western countries like Canada and the US,
some Chinese are very careful with not criticizing the CCP. Because they feel like
the big brother is watching over them, over their shoulder. So I wouldn't be surprised at all.
The ones who are brave enough to give you real information about what's happening in China are
courageous ones, are the ones who have already decided to cut the ties with mainland China.
Otherwise they'll be very cautious. They'll be very careful with what they say, especially with
the law that they just passed inside China. So they're not going to say what you want to hear.
They're very careful. Someone asked me, Norbert Claus, who will be in charge if she is assassinated?
What would happen to the CCP or the PLA? It's a very interesting question. What if he got ill?
What if he got another stroke and is incapacitated? What would happen?
That's an interesting question. Maybe I should do a program on that.
Lei always calls me someone. What do you want me to call you? Good? Good?
I don't know what to call you. Pronouncing people's names is a challenge for me.
Okay. Seek the truth. Yuan Hongbin claims the CCP has given Iran military plans to lure US
ground forces into a protracted war, providing Iran with military hardware and promises to send
troops if needed. Yes, I heard that today. It was in the same bombshell that he released today
about the Red Princetons getting together, trying to come up with a plan to end Xi Jinping's rule.
In the same interview, he also said that the CCP has given Iran a military plan to lure US,
exactly what you said. But he also said that the CCP, or Xi Jinping, even plans to send
PLA soldiers to fight the war in Iran for the Iranian regime.
Because of that, I don't think the PLA would do that because it's too risky.
As much as Xi Jinping wants to do it, because it's one thing that you send Chinese soldiers
to fight in North Korea because they all look Asian. But if you send Chinese soldiers to fight
in Iran, and what if they're captured on the battlefield? What if they're killed?
I mean, it will be immediately exposed. And then some US relations will be off completely.
And also, there's a logistic question. China and Iran, they don't share a border.
So how do China send soldiers to Iran? They have to go through Pakistan. Will Pakistan allow
Chinese soldiers to pass its land to go to Iran? I mean, Pakistan would have to think about it
carefully. I would believe that the CCP supplies Iran with weapons and missiles and a strategy.
That I absolutely believe. But when it comes to supplying Iran with soldiers, I find it hard to
believe because it's suicidal. It's not going to sit well with the Trump administration.
Yeah. But you're right. He did make that claim. Okay. I already answered that question.
Okay. I reached the bottom of all the questions. That seems to be all. And
I thank you for all the questions. Good. If you don't object, that's what I'm going to call you.
Good. Good. Okay. All right. That's all for tonight. And I thank you very much.
I'll see you back in 10 days, unless there will be major breaking news. Who knows what will happen
in Beidaihe. If something dramatic happens, then I'll jump on and do a live stream.
All right. Thank you. I'll see you. Bye.