STAX Talk—which hosts events that focus on science, technology, acquisition, and exploration—hosts a discussion on China in space at 12 p.m. ET on July 31.
Speakers:
Malcolm Davis, senior strategic analyst for the Defense Strategy Program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Brendan Mulvaney, director of the China Aerospace Studies Institute at Air University
Host: Laura Winter
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Video Summary
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Experts Malcolm Davis and Brendan Mulvaney analyze China's strategic advancements in space technology, focusing on reusable rockets, autonomous deep-space missions, and the integration of commercial sectors under state control. The discussion highlights the geopolitical implications of China's space cooperation with Iran and the long-term rivalry with the U.S. regarding lunar militarization and space control.
This is The Downlink and I'm Laura Wintour.
And in this episode, we're talking about China, space, technology, and
defense since the beginning of the year.
And there have been a number of major space related developments, and I'm
lucky to have with me two internationally recognized China experts.
Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst with the Defense Strategy Program at the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and Brendan Mulvaney, director of the
China Aerospace Studies Institute at Air University.
Hello, gents.
Hi, Laura.
How are you?
It's great to see you.
And I love that shirt, Brendan.
Thanks.
It's actually an official Cassie shirt that we get to wear around the office.
And Brendan, you told me that you are in Newport, Rhode Island.
That would make me think that you are visiting the Naval War College.
Am I right?
Yep.
That is correct.
We're actually up here teaching our three-day People's Liberation Army
Fundamentals course in conjunction with our, we like to call them our big
brother institute, the China Maritime Studies Institute, CMSI, up here in Newport.
That's really cute.
Big brother and all.
And Malcolm, you are coming to us from Canberra, Australia.
When are you coming to visit us?
Look, I would love to have teleportation and just beam straight over there now.
But unfortunately, we're about 200 years too soon for that technology.
So I think probably, hopefully next year, I will get over there.
I missed out this year, but unfortunately it'll have to be next year before I can
get over there to visit with DC.
Thank you both for coming on the line for this discussion.
Now, if you're watching this on the live stream, come and find the downlink on
your YouTube or Apple podcasts, you know, channel network.
And hit subscribe so you don't miss next week's episode.
It only takes a second and it really helps others find the show.
Now, I've organized this discussion on the first half of this year in parts.
And the first topic that I think we should tackle are the technological
feats, which we know have been supported by, if not outright managed
by, China's People's Liberation Army.
So right off the bat, I want to tackle China's reusable rocket.
It's called the Long March 10B.
It's shorter, it's fatter, and it's liftoff mass is heavier than the SpaceX
Falcon 9, but the metric that really counts is payload mass.
It can carry 16,000 kilograms to low earth orbit.
But that's roughly two and a half metric tons less than the Falcon 9.
It is reusable and is successfully launched and landed a few weeks ago on July 10th.
So Malcolm, just how big of a deal is this?
Look, it's a big advance for the Chinese space program in the sense that they are
making progress on reusable rockets.
And basically it brings China up to the level of where SpaceX was some
years back with Falcon 9.
I have to say, the recovery method is a little bit more cruder than SpaceX
with Falcon 9, all those cables.
Do you want to explain what that is?
Yeah, because it's a funky picture.
It's, for those who've seen it on social media, the booster comes back and
lands in a net, basically, of cables that are suspended over the landing
ship by a structure of pylons, and the net catches the booster.
Where if you look at the SpaceX model, yes, they've had a few botched landing
attempts, but there you have the booster just landing on the ship without anything
else. And so the actual approach to recovering that booster is probably a
little bit cruder in that sense, but I'm not sure that's a significant thing if
what they're trying to achieve is to effectively match Falcon 9.
I think the big step forward is not necessarily this.
The big step forward is if the Chinese can develop some sort of means to match
Starship. That's some way off.
But I think that this at least is a step forward for them.
It gives them an ability probably to be competitive with SpaceX if they can get
their launch costs down.
And I think that that's what they're aiming for.
This is about the commercial market more so than anything else.
It's about China probably being the lead launch partner for the global South and
having some degree of reusability is probably an important step forward for
them.
Brenda, what do you think?
So I would take a slightly different view.
I don't know that it's sure getting the most payload to launch is absolutely
an important commercial asset, but it's really how quickly can you reuse it?
How many times can you reuse it?
How much fuel do you have to retain to come back down?
So it's really this is a great demonstration of the technology, but
they're nowhere near where SpaceX is today.
Certainly several years ago.
Sure, you can make that comparison, but it's not how much can you get there?
It's how quickly can you get multiple times there?
How many times can you use that rocket?
What do you have to discard and how long can you get it back into the cadence?
And that's, that's, you know, this is the one off, uh, you know, you can't
really criticize it for yet, but they've, they've got a ways to go.
And Brendan, there have been more developments.
There's the Tianwen-2 asteroid mission, which reached its target
destination in early July, and the Chinese Academy of Science and a group
of other Chinese academic institutions has made significant progress
with laser communications.
Perhaps those two are the really big things, or maybe
there's something else, Brendan.
You know, what do you think has been another significant technological
advancement that we need to pay attention to?
Yeah, I think this is a, this is a really big legitimate science
mission that they accomplished.
Right.
And it was something.
You're talking about the Tianwen though, right?
Yes, the Tianwen, yeah.
Um, and that was, that demonstrated their ability to, uh, find something in space.
Right.
You can't use GPS, uh, there's no maps, so they've got to, uh, they've
got to be able to track it.
They've got to be able to get to it.
Uh, do a remote proximity operation close to it, close enough to get the samples.
Uh, and so I think all of those things, including, like you said, the laser
comms, including the, this, uh, a semi-autonomous or completely autonomous
because it was so far away, the lag, uh, it had to do a lot of these things on its own.
So this is a, a pretty big scientific, uh, you know, uh, I'll call it robotic
or autonomous or semi-autonomous, uh, scientific project that they actually did.
And of course, it's going to come back, drop those things
off and then go back out.
So I think that is, uh, that just shows that it's not all, uh, sometimes
it is just about science, uh, and, and proving the technologies
and, and driving things forward.
And what about you, Malcolm?
Is there another technological development that you think that
we should be paying attention to?
Look, I think, uh, the fact that, um, what Brendan's talking about there
with that, uh, uh, mission to the asteroid and the laser comms, I think
we need to see it in the bigger astro strategic picture in terms of China's
perception of how they use space as a nation.
Uh, it's, it's about how they establish an ecosystem or the infrastructure
to enable them to operate expansively across space to do complex operations.
It's very different from the, the approach that the U S took at the
beginning of the space age, which was a sequential step-by-step process.
With the Chinese, what they're trying to do is establish the foundations
for a space based, um, society or a space-based economy, um, that enables
them to do a lot of things simultaneously.
So go to the moon, have, uh, low earth orbit, uh, space stations,
rendezvous of asteroids, all the things that you need to be able to
do that on an ongoing basis.
It's a much more, uh, ambitious approach, uh, to space than what, how the
U S started, but of course it was a different age back then for the U S.
But it's interesting when you look at the U S now, and you look
at what China's doing now, the U S with, um, Artemis is still
very much a sequential process.
It's understandable because that's how they've gotten used to doing things.
The Chinese are taking a fundamentally different path in that regard.
And that's an interesting, um, uh, observation in itself in the sense
that, uh, the technological, technological developments, the key
systems they're developing in terms of launch, in terms of on orbit
operations, deep space, communications, data links, and so forth, all
contribute to a broader goal of China as a space-faring civilization
that can fully utilize resources, uh, and positioning, uh, within
space to its advantage.
Systems of systems type of, uh, concept.
Yeah.
As opposed to start, stop, go, uh, that we do here, um, I, not just here
in the United States, but I would say, you know, East is probably guilty
of the same thing to be honest.
I hate to say it, but really, uh, but Hey, so now that China, you know,
really is a major space-faring nation and therefore has the technology, it
can export the fruits of their labor, right, for profit in Guangxi,
which is pull or influence.
Uh, there's nothing new in that though, right?
Other space-faring nations do the same, including the United States, but
China has been helping Iran with space assets quite a bit.
That and help from Russia has likely ended in the death of US service
members in the Middle East.
Could you guys explain what's the state of play here?
Um, Brendan, do you want to kick this one off?
Sure.
Well, I mean, uh, the, the Chinese have definitely built a
huge space architecture here.
Uh, you know, one of their, their driving goals was to get away from GPS
reliance, uh, because at the end of the day it was, you know, uncle Sam had
the, had the finger on the trigger on that one, uh, and although we've been,
uh, benevolent enough, if you want to think about it that way to let the
rest of the world use it, we could turn it on and off, we can change the
encoding so that the signal that most people get, uh, wasn't going to be as
accurate, right?
And so the Chinese like, no, that is not, not acceptable to us.
And so they created the Beidou constellation, took them a long time to
get it, uh, but it is up and running.
It is, I would say comparable, uh, in almost every metric to the GPS, right?
And so part of the belt and road initiative, part of their going out,
part of the diplomatic, uh, was to spread Beidou, Beidou receivers across
the world, uh, wherever they went that includes Iran.
Uh, so they have Beidou receivers there.
They have incorporated them into military hardware and that's
both platforms and weapons.
Uh, and so certainly they are able to use it just like anyone around the
world that has a UAV that has a GPS receiver can use it, right?
Um, uh, and so that's not necessarily nefarious or China actively.
It's that following step that, uh, has been reported on and off.
Uh, you know, are they getting better Beidou signals?
Uh, and really it's not even the signals.
It's how are they processing them in order to make an
active military target, right?
It's that closing that loop with the find, fix, target, engage, right.
All of the things that you have to do in a military sense.
Uh, and that's where we simply don't know in the publicly available sphere, how
much, if at all, China is assisting actively assisting the Iranians, uh, as
opposed to them just using advanced Chinese technology that isn't GPS in
order to drive their own weapons.
That's kind of the, the gray area, if you will, at the moment.
To me, if I'm wrong, guys, I have read reports that Chinese companies have
sold, and I mean, sold, uh, satellites to Iran, um, that the Chinese, uh, you
know, have had, have helped them, um, operate them, uh, for earth observation
and possibly for communication.
So I'm not very sure about that.
And that's a big deal because that means the Chinese government would sign off
on saying, great, well, we're going to let Iran use this technology and Iran
would use this technology to target our, our folks that are in the region.
Right.
I mean, that's, that's kind of a big deal, isn't it?
Absolutely.
I mean, essentially what you have is the Chinese providing advanced
positioning, navigation, and timing support to the Iranian military to
enable them not only to do, you know, uh, precision navigation and targeting,
but also the timing signals that are coming out of Beirut in the same way
that GPS timing signals are critical for advanced command and control.
Uh, so it elevates Iran's military capabilities indirectly by allowing
the Iranians to access Beirut, uh, potentially at a higher level than
the typical, um, commercial use of Beirut, uh, to, uh, deliver a military
effects against the U S that can lead to ultimately U S casualties.
So I do think that this is a significant step on the part of China.
I do think it indicates that China is definitely involved in supporting
Iran in undertaking military operations against the U S in the same way that
And I think that, uh, you know, we need to take that very seriously.
Uh, and, uh, it's, it's, it's a, it's a significant, um, escalatory step
or provocative step on the part of Beijing, uh, to do this, to support
Iran, uh, actively in this regard.
We actually profiled one of the companies that you, you know,
you were talking about Changuang.
Uh, we put a profile up on the website, the Cassie website.
I think it was April of, uh, 24 ish.
Uh, so this is a known, uh, you know, bad actor.
It's been sanctioned, uh, and continues to, to do things around the world that
are counter, uh, to, uh, you know, American interests and obviously putting
U S servicemen and assets at risk.
And it's also not just Changuang, uh, there's EarthEye company, right?
Uh, they have both of them, uh, recently probably sanctioned again, but they were
recently in May sanctioned for their role in Iran's military satellite
acquisitions and that, I mean, acquisitions, not just pictures, but
acquisitions of hardware, uh, that is in orbit.
But the question I have for you guys is will sanctions really work?
No, is the short answer.
Uh, you know, uh, uh, it's sanctions are something that you do when you want to
feel like you're doing something, but you're not actually doing anything really.
Uh, yes, we've looked at, I mean, look at Russia, Ukraine, we've sanctioned
Russia and has achieved absolutely nothing in, in stopping that war or
convincing Putin to back down and seek a negotiated settlement.
I think the same can be said here, you know, putting sanctions on Iranian
companies or, or, or putting sanctions on Chinese companies ultimately is
going to achieve nothing, uh, in this regard.
Yeah.
Uh, I think there's a little bit of utility to sanctions, but they have to
be broad and they have to be, uh, actually enforced, right?
So I think the sanctions we put on the Russians at the very beginning of the
Ukraine war, when NATO and the U came together, uh, actually had some, some
serious impact, the problem was, uh, they didn't hold, they found some loopholes,
obviously the Chinese, uh, being one of the big contributors there, uh, and
they've, uh, they've gradually, uh, started to leak after that.
So the sanctions that we're trying to put on these companies, I totally
agree with Malcolm, these are not doing anything other than making us feel good.
All right.
Well, uh, speaking about feels, uh, because that's about as, uh, as good as
it gets when we start thinking about Chinese politics and what's happening
on the inside of China, but it is kind of interesting, right?
So let's turn to Chinese politics in space.
Ma Xingri was just expelled from the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo and
the Chinese Communist Party, right?
That was about two weeks ago on July 14th.
Ma is 66 years old.
He is the former head of the China National Space Administration, and he
has more than two decades of space experience and a lot of accomplishments.
He should be remembered for being the chief commander of the Chang'e 3 mission,
which is China's first lunar soft landing and rover mission, right?
This is not a small thing.
He is essentially like a space hero, really, when you think about the narrative
of China and space, you know, major space accomplishments, but he's out because
he's been accused of bribery, family corruption, and essentially
sex trafficking for money or power.
Now, Ma's departure follows that of General Zhang Youxia in January.
Now, General Zhang was the first ranked vice chairman of
the Central Military Commission.
That's China's top military body.
That is also chaired by President Xi Jinping himself.
Now, before Zhang was elevated to that position, he served in
two roles at the same time.
He was the commander in chief of China's manned space program, and he was the
director of the PLA General Armaments Department, so he oversaw human space
flight and the buying of military satellites and missiles.
General Zhang is being investigated for serious violations of discipline
and law, whatever that means, but neither of them have actually been formally
charged, but they are number 18 and number 19 in the list of space leaders
who have been unceremoniously removed, and this purge started a little more
than three years ago in March, 2023.
So Xi Jinping's been kind of busy removing space people.
Men who have brought the nation a number of important successes.
So what do you guys actually make of this?
Well, so Cassie actually just put out a report a couple of weeks
ago on corruption in the PLA.
So the space guys, maybe they were the first ones that came in a couple
of years ago, but Xi Jinping has been after this since he took office.
He came in, he believes in his heart of hearts that the Communist
Party is the way, the truth, and the light.
It is the way that they get the great rejuvenation of the, of the Chinese
nation and returns them to the center of the world stage, anything that
threatens the party, including corruption from within, and he is going after it.
Uh, I, I don't think, uh, yes, these two had a, had a nexus to space, but
they also had a nexus to a lot of other things, one of which is money.
Um, you know, the PLA has had huge corruption issues for a long time.
Uh, and I was just, uh, you know, I said earlier, you know, they asked
Bonnie and Clyde, why do you rob banks?
And the answer was, well, cause that's where the money is.
Well, the money in a modern military is in logistics and corruption
and equipment development, right?
And so anybody that has that, that's where the, a lot of the
part generals actually had.
It wasn't really necessarily a party thing.
It was all back to these contracts and this money.
Um, and I, I don't think it doesn't appear, you know, you can go and read
the report and see the statistics.
It doesn't appear to me that he is singling out people in the space industry.
Uh, Moshe was, was definitely a high flyer and obviously, you know, maybe
those allegations are true, uh, but did something, uh, you know, untoward
as far as the party was concerned.
John Yosha was really a big shock to the system.
Uh, but at the end of the day, I don't think it's necessarily targeting,
uh, the space infrastructure, you know, per se, as opposed to just
general hate corruption and, and doing things that Xi Jinping doesn't like.
But here's the thing, they haven't been charged.
But, but if you get kicked out, so here's the weird thing, right?
If you're a party member, uh, in, in, in China, uh, and I'm not talking about
parking tickets or stuff like that, but if you get accused of a crime, the party
gets to decide what happens to you first.
So if the party says, nope, we don't care about that.
Nothing is going to happen to you.
So the fact that he got kicked out of the party now makes him vulnerable
to the state and state prosecution.
Uh, so that, that absolutely means there was something there that was
enough to kick him out of the party.
The state is going to, uh, you know, find that evidence.
They're going to prosecute them.
They have a 90 something percent conviction rate.
He is absolutely, uh, uh, going to go down or whatever that is.
Once you're getting kicked out of the party, especially from a
center, a center of power like that.
It is bad news.
You better have your bags back.
It's your wife because you're not coming home for the long time.
I would add into that, uh, that seeing this.
It's not just about individual, um, generals or officials
being accused of corruption.
There's also, uh, a top, an element of top-down control on the part
of Xi Jinping, uh, to assert absolute domination and control
across the entire Chinese system.
Uh, and so corruption is a useful, uh, justification, uh, for getting
rid of people that he sees as being either disloyal or potentially
questioning his, his judgments, his personal judgments, or potentially
emerging as a challenger to his authority.
So, uh, Brendan's right.
There's, there's aspects of corruption there right through the system, but
that's a convenient opportunity for Xi to essentially remove anyone that
see that he sees as a challenge to his authority and put in place people
that are completely loyal, uh, in that regard, and so it's, it's also
about Xi's personal authority.
Xi wants to be the most paramount leader, even more so than Mao
Okay.
That's what he wants.
When he finishes his term in office, he wants to be
recognized as greater than Mao.
Uh, and I think that he's in part, he's doing this, these crackdowns on
an ongoing basis to make sure that when he leaves, the people who are around
him are completely loyal in every respect whatsoever and that they'll
be teaching Xi Jinping thought for the next two decades or for him.
I bet he'd hope for the next two, you know, uh, centuries.
But I do have to say, I find the thing with Mao really funky because it's
kind of like their own Epstein-Biles kind of situation, right?
I mean, sex trafficking in China is also really no bueno.
Well, so is having your ambassador have, uh, you know, a kid, uh, that is an
American citizen and having them recalled.
So there you go.
Things happen, right?
Things happen to people or people.
Uh, and just cause you're a leading member of the communist party doesn't mean
you're necessarily cleaner than the next one.
And you know, Epstein's a, you know, a perfect example of how many people would
have been respectable outside of that.
And that's swept up into that.
So really good point.
Excellent point.
Okay.
So, uh, what do you guys make of this?
China's state administration of science, technology, and industry for national
defense, and it's got this acronym SASTEND, uh, but it sits above the China
National Space Administration, but under the Ministry of Information and Technology.
So on July 1st, which is again, just, you know, within the past 30 days or so, this
powerful organization published a membership list and it's a roster of
national commercial space companies.
There are 271 of them across nine sectors like satellite development,
data applications, rockets launch.
Um, I hate to be so untrusting, but I just kind of feel that as I said, this was
going to be kind of Ivy cause it's a feel that way.
And you know, am I wrong?
What does this really signify?
Well, I'm happy to take it, but if Malcolm wants to jump in there first, but.
Yeah.
So I would say this is, this is, um, it is a way for the, the CCP and the PRC to
align all the elements of the space industry, right?
So.
Is that a diplomatic way of saying thing?
No.
So I don't want to, we don't want to, we don't want to be, uh, overly, uh, you
know, concerned about this, but we do need to pay attention, right?
So, um, China is just organized differently, right?
There's state owned enterprises.
There's the communist party.
There's party cells within commercial entities, right?
So it's just, it's just a different system.
So I don't think this is the, you know, the malevolent Borg coming
and sucking up everything, but it absolutely is a way for the communist
party and the leadership there.
And remember that a lot of these, uh, you know, commercial companies and
certainly the state owned enterprises, but even on commercial side, they want
the party to succeed because they feel in general that China is generally on
the right course and that Xi Jinping for whatever faults he has is generally
leading China to a better place.
Uh, you know, a stronger place, certainly in the world.
And so this is a way for them to align private capital and commercial, uh, and
academia in a way that is driving them toward scientific prowess.
Uh, because that's part of a great nation, but also being able to bring all of that
back to national security, right.
And drive things at the PLA aerospace, uh, aerospace force in the space.
Uh, you know, the space programs as well as the rest of the PLA, you know, need
and want for winning and fighting modern war.
So, um, it's not only a bad thing, right.
It can be multiple things can be true at once, right.
It is actually, it is trying to align it, but it does have the impacts of impacting
national security, uh, throughout the entire realm of space.
So, yeah, I think Brendan's nailed that quite effectively.
Uh, I don't have anything to add to that per se, but it's an interesting development.
Speaking of, well, maybe it's not really a development, but it's more of a developing
discussion that's happening here in the United States.
I kind of wonder about what China feels about guardians and military human space
flight, right?
That's title 10 authorities, which relate to the use of hard power to deter aggression
and defense, defend U S interests.
And in fact, I dedicated last week's episode to it.
Now, how would China likely respond to armed U S military
personnel stationed on the moon?
Is this a wise thing to do?
I read the Mitchell Institute report on this.
It was fascinating reading.
I have to say it was very well written.
The whole idea of, I don't know, would you call them space Marines or you wouldn't call
them storm troopers?
That would be a very bad.
No, that's me.
They're going to be guardians.
That's the idea.
Guardians, guardians on the moon, armed guardians.
Yes.
Title 10 means declared military capability or military operations.
And so we are talking armed U S guardians on the moon or operating in space, undertaking
missions in support of U S interests.
I think it's something that will happen at some point.
I think invariably that the momentum is leading in that direction.
I think that probably the challenge is what do they do?
Because there has to be something for them to do up there.
And I think that that's a longer term challenge because there has to be a threat that they
have to defend against.
And so that implies a Chinese presence on the moon.
And that's going to take shape over the coming decade into the 2040s.
Same with the U.S.
So I think we are probably talking the 2040s here.
We're not talking in the next few years.
But once you get to that point, you then decide, well, what is it they're going to do?
How are they going to get around?
Because, you know, Orion is not going to cut it.
You know, they need something more substantive in terms of getting to it from the moon or
getting from low earth orbit up to cislunar space, moving around space in an effective
way. So it begins to sound a bit more like the Expanse in that sense, you know, sort of
with more complex ships out there and more effective space transportation systems.
But then, of course, it's the whole implications of of how would the Chinese, as you
say, how would they respond?
The obvious response from the Chinese perspective is that they would have their own
taikonauts on the lunar surface.
And so at that point, they would have their own taikonauts on the surface anyway.
Yeah, right.
And their taikonauts really are our PLA.
Yeah, they can hide behind non-declaration, the fact that these are military
astronauts. Supposedly, I mean, if you look at the Antarctic treaty system, you've got
probably PLA officers down in Antarctica doing scientific research.
So therefore, technically, they're not violating the Antarctic treaty system.
Same thing, same gray zone could be exploited on the moon in that sense.
But once you have armed personnel on the moon, that gray zone completely goes away and
you then basically confront the reality that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is null and void
at that point. It's probably going to be null and void well before then because the
Russians are developing nuclear weapons based ASAT capabilities.
But let's save our argument.
By the time we get to the 2040s, we've got armed U.S.
Guardians on the moon.
We've got armed taikonauts on the moon.
There's no 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
You've got armed ships operating in cislunar space.
That's a completely new ballgame from where we are now.
And I would imagine that you will see a real significant pickup in both U.S.
and Chinese military space capability development in the lead up to that.
In the same way, for example, that U.S.
airpower evolved very quickly after the end of the Second World War.
You'll see something similar happen in that regard in space.
Yeah, I hate to be the Debbie Downer on this one, but it's and I love a good sci-fi.
This one just seems a little bit far-fetched to me.
So I actually know the very first Guardian in space.
Mike Hopkins and I were in the same class, so he went to Parma, Italy when I went to
Shanghai back in 2003.
Right. And so he literally had more fun.
Well, I had a great time, so, you know, I could argue that one.
But he literally became a Guardian in space.
He went up as an Air Force officer and then transferred to the space.
I got to watch it online.
It was awesome and became the very first Guardian in space.
Right. But of course, all the first astronauts were military members for the U.S.
Still, a huge chunk of them still are today.
But that doesn't mean that they're up there necessarily doing military things.
And again, you know, it's not going to be the Guardians that are armed, you know, until
we get the Star Trek lasers, you know, the pew pew, you know, it's going to be it's
going to be other platforms, right?
It's going to be platforms, it's going to be machines.
And all of that is going to take place in Leo and Geo way before it takes place on the
moon. So I think Malcolm's right.
The outer space treaty is going to go the way of the wind way, way before we have to
worry about armed Guardians on the moon, because at that point, man, we better have
robots that are going to go and run over stuff, you know, because I'm not really sure
how well bows and arrows, much less gunpowder is going to work on the moon.
Yeah, I mean, no one's ever really explained what it is they do if you have armed
astronauts. And frankly, you know, I wouldn't want to be an astronaut on the lunar
surface where my suit gets punctured by a round and I die horribly.
You know, I'd much rather let the robot do the kill, do the fighting.
And when you look at what the Chinese are investing in, in terms of humanoid robots,
that's something that, you know, would potentially have application in terms of military
operations on the moon.
I think it's one of the justifications I've seen for it is, well, we need to protect space
lanes of communication and trade.
If we get to that point in the 2040s where we're bringing resources back from the moon or
resources back from near-Earth asteroids to gain profit from them, then yes, maybe there's
some sort of space equivalent to the East India Trade Company that we could have, you
know, privateers.
But I think space guardians armed on the moon and taikonauts armed on the moon is
something that is mid-century at the earliest.
And it's something that is very nebulous and uncertain at this point in time.
I love the Mitchell Institute report.
It was fascinating reading.
It's sort of over my lunch, but I thought, this is something that I may see in my
lifetime. I may not.
I don't know.
Well, if anyone who's watching this wants to know more, you can listen to last week's
Downlink podcast, where I have folks on to actually talk about it.
So now I have to wonder, you know, in your crystal balls, what's coming in the next half of
the year? What is there?
That you think that the United States really needs to pay attention to?
And who in the United States really needs to pay attention to?
Because I think that also matters as well.
We've got the Department of Defense and the Space Force.
We've got the White House and the administration in general.
And we've also got Congress that is trying to decide how much to actually hand over to
the Space Force to spend.
And also other parts of the DOD, such as, you know, the Naval Research Laboratory, which
does a lot of work in space as well.
Right. What do we need to be thinking about here for the next six months and paying
attention to?
If I kick off in terms of from an Australian perspective, Australia is having to think
now about space control as a step forward from where it's at in terms of its own space
activities. Obviously, it's going to be doing that with the United States.
But I think there's an opportunity there for the US, for Australia, for Japan and others
to work together on a more coherent approach to space control.
There was an interesting discussion by the Geostrategy Group in London about orbital
warfare that I took part in a few weeks back.
What do we mean by it?
What does that involve in terms of capabilities?
I think that when we talk about space control, there's a vagueness there in terms of that
concept of what it is we're actually thinking about.
And Golden Dome potentially drives that forward if it happens.
But I think that one of the things I would be looking for, given Chinese and Russian
collaboration in space, is the US sitting down with the likes of Japan, with the likes
of Australia, maybe some NATO states as well, although NATO seems to be on the nose a
bit with the current administration, to how we do space control.
What's the practical aspects?
If we're going to defend our critical interests in space that are so vital to our
military advantage, how do we do it and what do we need to do as a group of countries
working together?
So that's something that I would like to see the Trump administration actually take a
lead on and actually sit down with its allies and say, we need to think about this
rather than just having a vague concept of space control and what that might mean.
Brendan, what about you?
Yeah, I think that's very well said and totally in line with it.
I would say that I was at the Global Air and Space Chiefs Conference here in London,
more launch facilities.
We didn't talk about them doing launch from naval vessels.
Building, like you mentioned, the laser communication backbone that they're going to
do, proliferated LEO, they've got two multi, both over 10,000 planned LEO constellations
in Guangdong and Tiananmen, right?
So this is a whole lot of stuff that I tell people I wouldn't trade our system for
theirs, but when one guy is in charge and that guy says, go do this, you know, you've
got long-term programs, plans, policies, and most importantly, funding.
And so when Xi Jinping, you know, he's up for reappointment next year, almost
certainly going to stay for at least that five, that's another six years, you know,
in the United States and Australia and, and in, you know, the UK and in free
democratic societies, budgets go up and down depending on who's in charge and
what the priorities are.
China doesn't have that problem.
So it is a slow, steady, pardon the pun, long march, uh, that they have a plan for
and they are executing against.
And so they may have some bumps along that way, but five and 10 years from now,
we should not at all be surprised that they've built through civil military
commercial integration, as well as academia, as well as foreign academics,
right, that are helping them build some of these things.
Um, you know, and they are going to achieve this goal because they have a
long-term plan, uh, and until something exterior to that throws them off that
plan, that's what they're working on.
And I think that's really the heart and soul of what we need to pay attention
to, uh, as opposed to, you know, our, our, our battles in Washington, DC,
where the budget, you know, may be great this year, space force hopefully
gets a whole big, big chunk of that.
Uh, you know, commercial space flourished under the first Trump administration.
Uh, but no telling who, you know, how the next election is going to go.
The, the, you know, the end of the end of the year, much less how the next
presidential administration is going to go much less the one after that.
And Xi Jinping is going to be the man all the way through all of that, just
marching toward that beating drum of how do you build China as the greatest
spacefaring nation on the face of the earth.
He wants to do to space what they did to ship building and the nation.
Hmm.
I would add to that.
I mean, uh, I know, uh, Jared Isaacsman is saying we'll get to the moon by 2028.
Chinese are saying by 2030, I can't help, but believe that if there was a
significant delay to Artemis, the push that 2028 date back, the Chinese wouldn't
be thinking, you know, we should push forward and get there ahead because,
you know, that would, if the Chinese got back to the moon before the Americans,
that would be a huge boost to their global prestige and they can't ignore that.
So yes, they're saying, oh, we don't have any plans to raise the Americans.
But I think if the Americans were significantly delayed in getting back
to the moon, I bet you the Chinese would say, right, let's get there first.
I don't know.
What do you think, Brendan?
No, I think you're right.
Um, and I think, you know, we've seen those dates on the American side, uh,
you know, move a couple of times just to make sure that we're trying
to stay ahead, uh, of the Chinese.
But you know, at the end of the day, it's great and it's prestige.
And absolutely, regardless of if they're, if they beat the Americans or not, it's
going to show that they are, you know, the big kid on the block and park on par
with, if not, you know, exceeding the Americans, but you know, I come back to
the point, it's not who plants that first flag on the moon or the next flag on the
moon because we did it first.
Right.
But it's not who does the next one is who does all the hard work of laying,
you know, building the transportation, building the communication, the
sensing, the navigational logistics, building the, you know, the entire
supply chain, uh, which we know we haven't even touched on it.
I know, you know, people pay a lot of attention to that.
Um, because that allows you to continue and reuse and drive that commercial
things forward, not just a one-off, but to go back and do it over and over again.
And that's really where you're going to start to drive both national prestige
and more importantly, national strength.
And that's really what we need to pay attention.
Brendan.