How U.S Forces are Cutting Iran in Half

Army Analysis
8 followers
1 Video View·Jul 23, 2026
AI Generated·May contain errors
Video Summary
AI GeneratedThe U.S. is employing a strategic campaign to isolate Iran's Hormozgan province and the Strait of Hormuz. By targeting critical infrastructure, supply lines, and military assets, the U.S. aims to degrade Iran's coastal defenses and use strategic deception to force Tehran back to negotiations while mitigating the risk of a total maritime blockade.
American fighter jets have escalated to a brand new war strategy. They're trying to cut off Iran
from the Strait of Hormuz by bombing the roads, bridges, ports, and the power networks connecting
Iran's interior leading to its southern coast. We're officially in an on-again, off-again
relationship with the Iran war. But what is the goal of this new war strategy? Is it to
strong arm Iran back to the negotiating table? Is it a shaping operation to prepare for an
amphibious invasion? Or has CENTCOM already reached a point in the war where every road
looks like a valid target? To understand, look at the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas.
U.S. fighters launch precision-guided JDAMs onto the bridges leading into the city,
with bombs striking one after another until sections of the crossings totally collapse.
At least five bridges in the wider region were hit, because nothing says return to the negotiating
table like removing every bridge leading to it. This is where America's new campaign becomes
visible on the map for any fellow geographic autists out there. Bandar Abbas sits inside
Hormozgan province, which is the center of Iran's military operations against the Strait of Hormuz.
We can see the three major highways that feed into the region. Highway 71 runs north towards
the central Iran and capital of Tehran. Highway 96 approaches from the west, connecting the
region toward Iraq. Last and possibly least, Highway 94 runs east toward Pakistan and Iran's
southeastern military bases. CENTCOM's plan becomes pretty clear at this point, even a lower
enlisted grunt like myself can understand, and I normally need the plot of movies explained to me
by my wife. These three highways are the fastest routes for moving any Iranian troops, fuel,
ammunition, and armored vehicles toward the coast. But like my old squad leader used to always say,
terrain dictates. The terrain here forces Iranian resupply across several key rivers,
pictured here, here, and here. There are valleys and narrow gaps here, and those crossings create
natural choke points. So by destroying key bridges along these approaches, U.S. forces
are partially sealing off Bandar Abbas to any resupply or heavy equipment. They force Iranian
convoys onto slower secondary roads and funnel them through predictable bottlenecks, and place
the surviving routes under constant aerial surveillance. One man's war crime is another
man's strategic bridge target. It makes sending mechanized forces through here incredibly difficult.
You might think of your side roads in your town as like, ah, I could drive a tank through there.
But in the Middle East, side roads are a lot more of a roll of the dice as to whether or
not you're going to get stuck. From my time riding around in armored striker vehicles in Iraq,
if you're not on a major highway in the Middle East, then there's a good chance that your
vehicle's going to get stuck in the mud. These three major approaches into the city are being
downgraded with airstrikes now, and the strategy is to cut off Iran's supply lines. And it goes
even further than that, because more U.S. aircraft drop bombs onto Iranian rail stations for the
first time. So we're hitting new series of targets here, further slowing down resupply to the south
of Iran. Here we see the main rail networks in Iran. These routes that lead out of the country
are the lifeline for their forces that have now been knocked out. Infantrymen have two
natural predators out in the wild. You got paperwork and vehicles getting stuck trying
to avoid highway routes. The developing strategy appears to be an attempt to cut off large sections
of the Hormozgan province from resupply, similar to the tactics of other mid-range strike campaigns
that we've recently seen somewhere in Eastern Europe. Further north, the rail bridges in
Golestan province was blown up in an American strike on July 9th. And this is the route that
links China to Iran by rail. And it suggests that the American counter logistics campaign
is reaching out to touch and stop supply routes to international corridors where the IRGC gets
much of its support. So zooming back in, we see Iranian water facilities were recently destroyed,
forcing water to be transported into the region, creating heavier burden on resupplying logistics.
Reports on the ground state that food silos have also been targeted by Allied strikes,
all attempts to cut off Iran's supply lines here. The U.S. new strategy has developed into
four layers. One, prevent the IRGC from reinforcing and resupplying the coast.
Two, blind the IRGC coastal forces by hitting radar assets. And three, attempt to destroy
the weapons threatening the strait. And four, blockading the area from the sea.
Then the next step in cutting off Iran's supply line was knocking out low level power infrastructure,
which they just started doing, causing rolling blackouts all along the route from Tehran
to the southern coast of Iran. And now we reach the electrical engineering part of the episode
where I start nodding confidently and hope that nobody asks any follow up questions in the comments
section. But this low level power infrastructure is being systematically destroyed. It's not yet
the power plants at the moment, but it is a level of escalation not seen during the first
high intensity phase of the war. Iran's energy ministry told people to reduce their use of
electricity and air conditioning after the bombings to the power grid caused strain.
The ministry stated areas in the south were experiencing extreme heat because temperatures
in Iran are soaring right now in July. Southern Iran regularly sees highs exceeding 110 degrees
Fahrenheit and whatever that is in Celsius. Because of the intense humidity, the heat index,
or how hot it feels to the body, frequently soars between 130 degrees Fahrenheit and 150 degrees
Fahrenheit. That's what it feels like. Just talking about that is giving me flashbacks,
triggering my days in Iraq when you, oh, that sweaty helmet and you can just like wring out
the helmet pads. The point is, though, that I think I'm trying to make is that these are
sensitive targets being hit, and we're going to see a similar retaliation from Iran against
civilian infrastructure across the Gulf. But what deepens the mystery here is that the IRGC
doesn't need any of these interior supply lines to shut down the Strait of Hormuz.
So why destroy bridges when Iran can still threaten Hormuz from their pre-positioned
coastal positions? They have enough cheap drones, missiles, and supplies already pre-positioned in
the South, already located in hardened underground bases along the coastline, to keep the Strait of
Hormuz shut down for the foreseeable future. They've prepared for this scenario for decades,
and they can accomplish shutting down the Strait with just a few dudes launching munitions here
and there. So why is the US focusing fire on shutting down these transit routes leading to
the South if it likely won't open up the Strait? America cannot guarantee control of Hormuz by
hunting down individual missile launchers. That's an endless game of terrorist-themed whack-a-mole.
So CENTCOM is turning southern Iran into an isolated battle space, where coastal units
are harder to resupply, and inland reinforcements are slower to arrive, as we'll see. And Tehran
has to prepare for any possible US Marine landing that may actually never come. Whether CENTCOM is
actually planning a ground invasion of the islands near the Strait of Hormuz or not,
they want Iranian leadership to believe that they're planning it. These strikes, the targets
chosen, as we'll see, are designed to make the IRGC believe that there is a credible threat
of an amphibious attack coming from the South. This could all be strategic deception on the part
of the Americans, which is reassuring because the alternative is another ground operation in the
Middle East, and historically those have been extremely quick and affordable. More evidence of
comes from the US airstrikes slamming into the control tower at Iran's Chabahar port on the Gulf
of Oman. The control tower completely collapsed. Up until then, the tower was responsible for
overseeing commercial maritime traffic here. The paramilitary Iranian Revolutionary Guard
used it to maintain operations at ports around the country, and it was a critical trade route
to Afghanistan through here. Then US aircraft and warships struck the Iran Shahar airport
with long-range missiles, the facility that sits inland from the Gulf of Oman.
This was another step in isolating the Bandar Abbas region and shutting off supplies because
it supports movement of Iranian personnel and equipment toward Iran's southern coastal bases.
Iran Shahar airport serves as the air logistics node for Iran's southeastern military reserve
area. It's not really all that important as a frontline fighter base. Its value comes from
helping the IRGC move equipment around damaged roads because once the ground network is disrupted
by those bombing campaigns, Iran's commanders, the first thing they would naturally rely on
is on the airfields in an attempt to leapfrog the damaged infrastructure from the north to the south.
In this line of logic, striking Iran Shahar removes one of those workarounds. You know
mission creep is starting when the briefing starts with detailed discussions of municipal
transportation networks. The reported location of the damage at the airport is also revealing,
I think. Iranian state television said that the strike hit the airport's electrical facilities
and a fuel tank causing a power outage. That suggests that the immediate objective of the
United States may have been to reduce the airport's operating tempo without needing to
destroy every meter of the runway because a 2000 meter long runway by itself is just a very
expensive parking lot. Evidence that the true strategy is to make Iran think that an amphibious
invasion is coming comes from what a senior U.S. official just told the Wall Street Journal.
They said that this was done to disrupt supply lines and routes that are used to transport
military equipment to the key port city and Iran's naval base near the Strait of Hormuz.
Anonymous U.S. officials speaking to the press said that the U.S. is leaning toward escalating
the war even further with possible ground troops seizing islands near the Strait of Hormuz and
Karg Island. Just so you guys know, as a former army infantryman, I'm legally required to describe
any marine amphibious assault as an unnecessarily complicated way to avoid using a road. A U.S.
official told Reuters on July 15th that recent U.S. strikes could be seen as quote-unquote
shaping operations to degrade Iranian defenses in case the U.S. military was ordered to conduct
more intensive operations, which of course has everyone asking why the guy is vague posting.
What does the official mean when he says shaping operations? What counts as more intensive
operations? Why are you blue balling the marines with the whiff of an amphibious operation there?
Reinforcing this strategy, American fighters roar inland over southwestern Iran near the border
with Pakistan, where they release precision-guided bombs and they disappear before Iranian air
defense can react. It appears like U.S. forces continue to have air superiority. But seconds
later, buildings erupt across the Iranian military brigade's compound as vehicles burn and Iranian
soldiers scramble for cover. The war is pushing again beyond the coastline and American aircraft
are now hunting the forces positioned up to 200 kilometers behind it. The United States is
striking new targets that we haven't seen them hit before further inland in southeastern and
southwestern Iran in the Balochistan province. They destroyed an IRGC base near Rask. This base
was critical for reinforcing the southern coastline. So according to the report from the Institute for
Study of War, U.S. fighters and warships fired munitions at three different targets here recently.
And we get a hint at what those shaping operations might be for when we look at the IRGC's 388th
Mechanized Assault Brigade that operates main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
Iranian media reported that American forces struck the barracks of the 388th Iranian Mechanized
Assault Brigade, killing seven personnel and wounding several dozen more. The brigade belongs
to Iran's conventional military, as far as I know. The Artesh, it operates under the 88th Armored
Division. We're talking about tanks and IFVs. The mission is traditionally a territorial defense one,
but the location of the strike is revealing, I think, because the 388th Iran's brigade
is positioned inland in southeastern Iran, making it a logical reserve force for reinforcing coastal
bases around the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz. Its armored vehicles, artillery,
and mechanized infantry could be used to replace near Bandar Abbas to secure damaged installations
or move south to counter any American landing. The reported strike on an IRGC base near Saravan
points in the same logical direction. American aircraft appear to be targeting the units that
could regenerate Iran's coastal defenses, not only the missile launchers and the drone sites
that are already operating near the water. What makes the earlier attacks on bridges, roads,
airports, and rail infrastructure easier to understand now is those routes are the pathways
that the 388th and similar formations would use to reach the coast. Before any credible amphibious
operation near the Strait could happen, U.S. forces would need to slow Iran's ability to rush
mechanized units south and counterattack Marines after they come ashore. Destroying barracks reduces
the available force. Damaging those bridges and airfields delays whatever would survive.
There are also reports that elements in this region supported drone operations and resupply
toward Bandar Abbas. Taken together, the strikes suggest the United States is trying to isolate
southern Iran from the reinforcements that could keep the coastal campaign alive.
Or maybe tomorrow we'll just go back into negotiations and this war will be over again.
So, this doesn't mean that a well-funded U.S. Marine beach party in Hormuz is imminent.
What it means is that the U.S. military frequently creates options even if they never plan to follow
through on them. By striking potential reinforcements that are inland, Washington forces
Tehran to consider that the air campaign may be a shaping operation on the battlefield for something
larger. Iran may then have to disperse its ground units to defend against this type of scenario.
They have to move air defense systems, which exposes other locations. It costs ammunition
to protect those roads. It requires holding forces back from other missions to defend
against an amphibious assault that may never come. As we've seen, Iran has recently deployed
to the border with Iraq and is fighting the Kurds there in low-level fighting.
So, in war planning, it's called creating multiple dilemmas or being a big pain in the ass. Just a
credible threat can shape the battlefield as we've seen here. However, any ground action would be
very unpopular. So, why would the U.S. be preparing for this? Because of the limits of air
power. Because despite legitimately hitting over something around 20,000 combined strikes between
U.S. and Israeli forces in the war so far, the threshold for shutting down the Strait of Hormuz
continues to be extremely low. In an attempt to blind the Hormuz abusers, the United States
hit the Iranian naval and coastal installations that had been used to threaten maritime traffic
through the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM, stated that the U.S. forces
hit Iranian command centers, their air defense sites, and missiles and drone capabilities,
as well as coastal surveillance facilities. But these are the kind of strikes that have been
ongoing now for months with little to no impact on Iran's ability to shut down traffic in the
Strait, which is why we're seeing the target list begin to expand now. And to further cut
off Iran's supply lines going into and out of the country, forces in Syria have begun to crack down
on Iranian weapon shipments. The IRGC was trying to supply Lebanese Hezbollah fighters with first
person FPV drones and fiber optic drones. They've long used a route through Iraq into Syria as a way
to get supplies to Hezbollah. But the Syrian Interior Ministry forces stopped these attempted
smuggling operations of advanced weapons. Syrian forces seized the shipment of a vehicle near
Al-Tanah. There were hundreds of FPV drones and anti-tank guided missiles from Iran and
cruise missile components in it. And the materials may have originally come from China and Russia.
So Al-Assad, being gone in Syria, has now shut down this supply line for Iran into Lebanon.
Iran's logistics problem is now expanding beyond Iran internationally, which is impressive because
I can barely keep track of where my phone charger is. But this all comes after U.S. reimposed a
blockade on all Iranian southern ports along the Persian Gulf. U.S. Marines have been yoinking up
oil tankers left and right. The U.S. military has been shooting ships almost as much as the IRGC
has been shooting ships over here. They opened fire on ships sailing toward Kargayan. They had
aircraft knockout merchant vessels with missiles straight into the smokestacks, which sounds like
a weird kind of sex move. So the target pattern now makes sense. American forces are cutting the
coast and attacking the naval infrastructure, sustaining Iran's forces at sea. In response,
Iran has in turn retaliated with striking water treatment facilities in Kuwait and civilian
infrastructure throughout the Gulf. But what is the next logical step of escalation? Iran has
threatened to use their allies, the Houthis, to shut down the Bab el-Mandab strait so all of this
escalation could lead to two straits closed down, which carries like 10% of seaborne trade by volume
and eight million barrels of oil through here daily. And if we all think getting gas is expensive
now, we don't know how good we have it. We don't even appreciate how cheap it was until that $20
a gallon comes. The newest reports indicate the Houthis have already moved anti-ship missiles
and attack drones into position on the coast. Whether they would join Iran in solidarity isn't
clear yet, but the next escalation for the U.S. is to pound Iran's actual power plants,
which Iran says would lead to the Mandab strait being closed. Currently, they're hitting the low
level distribution networks instead of the power generation that is very difficult to replace.
The largest power plant in Iran sends out enough capacity to power two and a half million U.S.
homes or approximately nine crypto mining operations in one data center. The point is,
it would be a devastating escalation of the war. This would be the next step for the U.S. forces
attempting to cut off Iran's supply lines, shape operations for a potential amphibious landing,
and mitigate Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz and force them back to that negotiating table.
If you liked this video, check out this playlist on the Iran War or this episode
on the Pentagon's new UFO file drop. I'm your average infantryman, Chris Cappie, ending
transmission.
