Retired generals break down Iran war strategy after week 3

Army Analysis
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As the US-Israel war against Iran nears the end of its third week, US President Donald Trump has downplayed prospects of a ceasefire contending the US has the upper hand and would like a decisive end to the war. Thousands more US Marines and sailors are heading towards the Middle East. Brent crude, the global oil benchmark, rose early Friday to more than $110 a barrel.
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He has been talking about Carg Island by name, Donald Trump, since 1988.
So when he says now he could take Carg Island anytime we want, what would it look like to
take it?
It's small, but that is not everything.
No, it's not.
It's offshore, as you can see right here.
Let me get this thing to cooperate with me.
Carg Island is really very, very close to the shoreline, but it is the main terminal
for all oil exports coming out of Iran.
About 20% for the world comes through the Straits.
The challenge with this mission is that coming ashore here, even though it's probably not
contested right now because the military capacity has been reduced, but we don't know.
And as an intel guy, I would want to know what has Iran done in the interim between
the reduction of that military capability a number of days ago and where we are today.
So there's always challenges associated with coming ashore.
And you've got this terminal that is going to be used.
I think primarily that's all about leverage, more than it is bringing in a capacity to
get that thing up and running.
Right.
And so you would require, obviously, significant boots on the ground to take that and hold
it in the sense of you don't know what could be coming, incoming, especially because it's
so close to shore.
So there's that.
Then you and I talked about securing the Strait of Hormuz quite a bit because you were talking
about the very mountainous terrain, which would give Iran, it's also on the other side,
but that's not the side where the fire would be coming from, on the Iranian side, the benefit
of height.
So how would ground troops be used in the Strait?
Yeah, so what you have en route is an amphibious ready group marine expeditionary unit.
It's a mouthful.
What that means is this is an incredibly capable force that can get itself, can force itself
on shore.
And it's comprised of elements like this.
This is a CH-53 heavy lift helicopter grabbing this artillery piece, which is an M777.
This is what we call the beginning of an artillery raid.
You take this thing off a ship, you land it where you want it to go.
So then you have artillery capability.
Then you've got counter fire capability within minutes.
Also within that capability, these things called Amtraks, incredibly capable.
They swim, as you can see, and inside this is about 20 plus marines.
They will disembark to begin their missions.
What also they have, obviously, is vertical lift gunships.
The Cobra is incredibly dependable.
And also the Osprey, again, vertical lift.
You don't need a runway.
You can come off the deck of a ship.
You can land anywhere.
And then you disembark about 30 to 40 marines.
Okay, so that's what they, so they would be able to move quickly.
Although obviously when you meet with resistance, there is a risk of real loss of life.
And also how do you get offshore once you get on?
As you mentioned a moment ago in our conversation.
Now today, Netanyahu says Iran no longer has the ability to enrich uranium.
Which is obviously significant.
Obviously Trump has said the program was eliminated last summer, was obliterated last summer actually.
So it's unclear what those terms at this point really mean.
However, there are three main nuclear sites.
And I say main for a reason.
Because we only know what we know in terms of where, say, enriched uranium could be stored.
We know those.
But if we understand it's in those canisters, it could be a lot of different places.
And that would change the whole calculus for boots on the ground, wouldn't it?
Absolutely.
First of all, look at the distance that we're talking of.
If we had forces here, or if the U.S. came ashore here, and you were going to try to
put forces there, now you certainly wouldn't have to drive up there.
I mean, you could have some aviation, airborne operation to drop them in.
But the challenge is, these are monstrous facilities.
And to your very point, the enriched uranium isn't necessarily here.
It could be dispersed into military compounds, into somebody's backyard, into a garage, underground
facilities, which are all along the mountains here.
So if you get there, and let me show you the significance of this.
This is Natanz.
This is a monster facility.
This would eat up ground forces.
Marines would have to guard intersections, they'd have to be here, they'd have to go
into each one of these buildings, is anything there.
And then once they get in a building, they don't know what they're looking at.
You have to clear it, then there's what's underneath it, and then there's the other
one.
And then who's going to come in and say, yep, that's radioactive, or no, that's inert.
And that takes other experts that have to be a part of this endeavor.
We did this in Iraq.
The sensitive site exploitation mission, we did this in the early stages of Iraq.
We found all those sites, it became very, very difficult, and every time we got one,
we put experts in there to determine, this equals something, this equals something.
Painstaking and excruciatingly time consuming.
And detailed, yes ma'am.
When we talk about this mission to keep the straits open, or to reopen them, they're not
open right now, one of the things that Dan Cain, the chair of the Joint Chiefs, the general
told us the other day, was that they are introducing now two new weapons here.
The A-10 Warthog, this close infantry, you know, close support fighter jet is now flying
missions over the strait, as well as Apache helicopters.
What is the introduction of these two aircraft, what does that do to the conflict?
Well thank you John.
John, well this significantly increases our ability to attack small targets, you know,
so they're probably going after the thousands of small speedboats that the Iranians have
on the coastline.
I mean, you're talking about a thousand mile coastline, that's the entire west coast of
the United States, you know, from California to Washington State.
And so the A-10 is an incredibly capable air-to-ground weapon, as is of course the Apache helicopter.
And so this means that they've got the capability now to go after the smaller targets.
Probably can also go after some of the launching sites, for perhaps cruise missiles and other
missile sites.
And they can also go after small boats that are trying to lay mines and whatnot.
So it greatly increases the capability of the United States to interdict small targets.
So we have the A-10 and we have the Apache flying over the straits now in some capacity.
Alex, what does that mean?
If there is now this new mission to open the straits, what does that tell you about the
state of play?
I mean, it speaks to mission creep.
There's really no other way to describe it at this point.
You know, the White House and the Department of War laid out very clear, you know, goals
that had to be rectified a little bit.
But essentially it's, you know, going after the missiles, the drones, the associated industrial
base, the Navy, potentially the nuclear program, and obviously we saw the decapitation strikes,
who were largely the security leaders responsible for the deaths of the protesters.
That was a three to five week mission, very clear set of targets that were defined by
U.S. Central Command that they're working through right now, what we call an air tasking
order.
But this is a new military mission with new objectives here.
So the president has tried a few things.
There were strikes on Karg Island that resulted in counter-strikes and infrastructure in the
region.
The Israelis struck the, you know, the Pars gas field, which is right here, that led to
retaliatory strikes.
Seventeen percent of Qatar's liquid natural gas is gone.
Twenty billion dollar plant could take three to five years.
So that didn't work.
At this point, it looks like additional military forces are going to be needed to free this
up.
Okay.
You brought up Karg Island here.
I want to show people again where this is.
This is the island.
It's toward the north of the Persian Gulf here.
This is where there were airstrikes the other day.
Barak Ravid and Axios is reporting there are serious discussions now about a ground operation,
right?
Because landing there, landing troops there would be ground troops, despite what some
people say.
A ground operation on Karg, either occupied or otherwise, what would be needed for something
like that?
Well, so what we're seeing now is several thousand Marines have been activated from
Marine Expeditionary Units.
Just for context, there are no infantry divisions or armor divisions, either from the U.S. Army
or U.S. Marine Corps, that have been activated or mobilized.
And Iran itself is a country of 90 million people that's extremely mountainous.
We're not going to see a major ground invasion based on the force posture we see right now,
but it is possible that those Marines could be used in amphibious landings here or to
hold territory as Karg is 90 percent of Iran's oil basically flows there for loading.
General, right now, as Alex was saying there, we do think there is this Marine Expeditionary
Unit headed to the region.
We don't know exactly how close they are.
They haven't arrived just yet, is our understanding.
Would that be enough to take and hold Karg Island?
I think that that probably would be a suitable mission for them.
You know, you're talking about 2,500 Marines with an air component.
The problem, of course, is once they get on the ground, it's a small island.
It's only about 7.7 square miles.
You know, and it's probably lightly defended.
But as Alex very rightly points out, this would be mission creep.
And once you're on the ground, you're on the ground and you are a target.
And I think of the political impact of losing soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines on the
ground at a place like Karg Island, you know, that would be a tremendous blow.
But you know, the president's stuck because he's got to do something to relieve the strait
of Hormuz.
He just can't allow this to go on.
And right now, with 1,500 ships out there waiting to get through the strait, it's going
to take three months to get through that, to work off that backlog.
And remember, they were restored.
They had at the time about 100 ships a day, and no one's going through there.
And of course, the Saudis now can't even produce oil now because there's nowhere to store it.
So you know, they've got to do something to relieve the strait.
CENTCOM has announced that they've dropped these, the military dropped these 5,000-pound
guided bombs that are designed to penetrate targets deep underground on Iranian missile
sites along the strait on Tuesday, and used to be deputy commander of the Air Force's
entire bomber force.
So you know, what can you tell us about those strikes and these bombs, what this can achieve,
what it can't achieve?
Well, certainly the United States watches what our potential adversaries around the
world are doing.
And we've seen a trend in recent years of hardening and burying some critical infrastructure,
some critical targets.
And so the United States has developed over time, whether that's the GBU-57, which we
saw in Midnight Hammer, going after very deep, buried nuclear targets, or something like
this 5,000-pound penetrator, the GBU-72.
We've developed capabilities to exploit those targets, to go after and hit them.
And they're very capable, and this was the first use in combat, and I suspect very effective.
So where do the capabilities kind of end here, right?
Can the U.S. bomb the strait open, or does something else need to be done here?
Well, I think CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command, will have a very well-developed plan and a
set of objectives that they're trying to accomplish.
Like in any conflict, we have a very determined adversary, a thinking adversary, who's going
to try to react, adapt to what we might be doing.
I think it would be very difficult to say we can execute a bombing campaign and open
the straits.
But you do see a very successful effort so far to reduce Iran's ability to affect its
neighbors, to reduce the drone and ballistic missile strikes by about 90 percent or more
over the course of the campaign, to reduce the naval capabilities.
And so their ability to affect operations in the straits has been greatly diminished.
But I wouldn't expect that to be completely eliminated or go to zero.
Is there any way to do this without having some kind of, maybe even just limited, but
nonetheless boots on the ground when it comes to maybe being close to the shore?
This is what we were talking yesterday about with our military experts, because I think
the public really makes quite a distinction here when it comes to boots on the ground.
Even if this isn't, you know, very far inland in Iran, that is still, I think, something
that really sticks with people.
The idea of American boots on the ground.
Do you expect that to happen?
Brennan, I think that all comes down to the objectives that the administration is trying
to achieve.
And I think we've heard a range of possible objectives.
I would say if we're looking to do some type of regime change, if we're anticipating that
the leadership in Iran is going to turn over and a new regime come into place, that would
be incredibly difficult given the current restraints against having boots on the ground.
But I would again emphasize that we've seen a dramatic decrease in the amount of Iranian
attacks and their ability to influence the region.
They still can get a drone through.
They still can get a missile through on occasion.
But CENTCOM is continually going after that and trying to bring that level down to a great
amount.
Can the strait be secured without boots on the ground?
I think you'll see a large effort to do that.
I think you'll see us continue to push back Iranian capabilities.
Whether that can be fully subdued without boots on the ground is an outstanding question.
I think that we may see some capabilities that will dramatically influence that.
But to say that we could eliminate Iran's ability to shut the strait down without boots
on the ground is an open question.
There are 5,000-pound deep penetrator munitions on hardened Iranian missile straits near the
Strait of Hormuz.
We don't know the exact locations.
How significant would that be in neutralizing part of the threat to ships in the strait?
I think that's the right answer.
Part of it.
But I think we've still got to remember there are hundreds, if not thousands, of speedboats
that are hidden along that coastline in coves, camouflaged in open sight as commercial vehicles.
Literally speedboats, the kind you would see out recreationally?
Yes, what you'd see, cigarette boats that basically can shoot missiles at big ships,
our ships, tankers.
So until we can eliminate that threat, I still think we're not going to be considered militarily
successful through the strait, and the commercial success won't be for a while.
I mean, with the USS Cole, we saw what one speedboat like that can do to a vessel.
And our tankers are much, much larger.
During the tanker war, it took three or four different hits on a tanker to sink it.
But nonetheless, when you've got a couple of hundred, if not thousands, speedboats,
they can put a lot of pain on those tankers.
Do you also agree that this is likely to go on for weeks?
Yeah, especially if we do try to form a coalition.
It's important to understand that we don't have nearly the capability to bring up the
mines to escort the tankers, to escort all the equipment that we did in the first tanker
war.
We've got about 50 helicopters that can spot them, but we only have four boats, four entire
boats in the Navy that can actually do mine countermeasure.
Huge numbers, probably 10 times that amount in other countries, especially among the Europeans.
We can't open the strait.
Is that because we just haven't put much emphasis on mine clearing?
I had a Navy guy tell me the other day that the last thing a surface warfare would ever
want to do is work in a wooden-hulled boat.
And those are wooden-hulled boats to avoid the magnetic signatures.
In general, what are you watching right now?
What should people be watching?
To me, we've got to understand that the Iranian government is not fighting war, they're fighting
resistance.
And in a resistance operation, you win by not losing.
And they think we're losing by not winning.
So what I'm watching more than anything else is what's going to happen with the government.
Are they going to fight or are they going to resist to the last man?
I think that's why Brett says this is going to take at least three weeks, but the enemy
has a boat and they may want to drag this out as long as they can.
In a sense, is the U.S. fighting an insurgent?
They are fighting, in very many ways, the standard insurgency tactics, which is, you've
got the watches, we've got the time.
We're not going to put long-duration boots-on-the-ground presence in Iran, I don't think that's ever
been an objective in terms of the strategy going from the outset of this campaign.
So I do believe that the Marines coming in are going to provide Commander Semcom some
great agility in terms of potentially going after some of those shore-based or onshore
or nearshore-based locations that can threaten into the Strait of Hormuz and also into the
Gulf of Oman as you're entering from the east.
But I don't believe we'll put them on the ground for a long duration of time.
OK, so explain to us what that would look like.
Getting onshore, how far onshore, staying onshore, the dangers of being onshore, because
I think those are questions that a lot of people will have looking at this.
Yes, so the capability that's coming in with the Marine Amphibious Ready Group, they have
the Osprey, which is a tilt-rotor aircraft that I think most are familiar with now, so
they have that means to get onshore.
They also have landing craft as part of the element coming in in terms of for infiltration
and exfiltration onshore, over-the-beach type operations.
So there's a lot of capability there.
So the options of getting on to land, that would typically be for a short-duration operation.
The Marines historically, you set aside Iraq and Afghanistan or long, multi-decade wars,
the Marines typically go in to establish a lodgement or a beachhead to support for follow-on forces.
So absent of that, because we don't have any indication that there are follow-on forces
coming in, I could see them supporting, going after potentially weapon storage sites that
maybe have not been able to get completely eliminated, pardon me, from the air.
Or also, as we discussed previously, one of the missions that the Marines have, the Marine
Expeditionary Unit, is to support a special operation.
So if there is one, they could serve as that outer cordon of security.
All of those are high-risk, Brianna, because even though we've done a great job of eliminating
a ballistic missile threat, there's still a lot of artillery that exists within the
Iranian conventional forces, and a lot of short-range rockets, other capabilities that
we haven't specifically targeted yet.
So that's definitely a concern going forward.
So and I hear what you're saying, that this might be limited, they might not be that far
on shore, but that would be troops on the ground.
Would that fundamentally change the nature of this war?
Because certainly in the eyes of the American public, it very likely will.
I don't think it would change the nature of the desired outcome in terms of the objectives
that the administration has set forth.
But putting a sustained presence, which I don't think the Marines would be used for
in this instance, that would certainly change the view of the war to date.
But I don't believe that that's going to be the intent of how the Marines will be used.
If in fact, decisions made to even put them on shore, it could be, I think they have five
to six more days before they're actually in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman, if that's
where they end up deploying to, that it could be a situation where the operational environment
has changed to the point where they don't need to be used on shore.
So that's the agility and flexibility that I believe Commander CENTCOM on behalf of the
National Command Authority wants.
Can the U.S. secure the Strait of Hormuz, get oil flowing through that region, besides
just Iranian oil, without what you're describing?
Well, they can. We have air superiority right now.
We have the ability to continue to engage locations where we believe Iran can deploy,
whether it's drones or short range ballistic missiles, long range artillery.
And even, you know, the fast boats that we talked about.
So we have the capability is moving in.
The littoral combat ships that replaced the mine counter mine frigates that we had there
prior to the new year, as we discussed, they are, CENTCOM does not have the number that
they would optimally like to have, certainly.
So it's going to be far more challenging.
And that's why allies and partners coming in to support freedom of navigation is so
important. And it sounds like right now, I'm sure there's still work going on behind
the scenes. But right now, there's not a lot of nations signing up to support, absent
of the Gulf states that are already committed just by virtue of it's their commerce
that needs to flow both in and out, you know, to the Gulf of Oman and then, of course,
into the upper Persian Gulf.
We have built a system of alliances over the last 80 years that has worked brilliantly
for the United States of America.
And as Winston Churchill once said, the only thing worse than having allies is having no
allies. And we went into this war without consulting our allies.
So the Trump doctrine in a way is move fast and break things.
And that doesn't allow us to work with our allies.
So what are our allies feeling right now?
Well, if you're Europe, you're worried about Russia.
You're worried about them and that but the hybrid attacks they're making into Europe
right now and the fact that now we've listed the oil embargo.
So that's providing money to them.
Also, our THAAD and Patriot missiles are now being used up that Ukraine can't use.
They're not being consulted.
And the Asia feels the same way.
70 percent of their oil comes to the Straits.
The Japanese weren't consulted.
The South Koreans weren't consulted.
And now we're sending forces, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit from Okinawa to the
Mediterranean, correction, to the Gulf, which means that all those forces that we had to
protect them against China are being are not being used there, but being used in the Gulf.
So our allies now and then we're going to ask them to participate in this.
And no wonder they are worried about that, because we have not put the work in previously
to bring our allies into this.
So it worries me that we're going to go into this with just our Israeli allies and not
as part of a large coalition, which, again, will be difficulty going forward.
Remember, the enemy gets a vote and their vote is that they that we have a clock, but
they have the time.
And I think it's going to be very difficult to end this thing quickly.
Secretary Hegseth, actually, he spoke at the beginning of the war and he was complimenting
Israel and really kind of putting down past allies, particularly European allies who had
worked with America.
He was talking about the importance of capable partners compared to, quote, our traditional
allies who wring their hands and clutch their pearls, hemming and hawing about the use of
force.
I wonder what your read is on that for maybe what the administration was expecting to need
in terms of help from Europe and also how that kind of talk affects the dynamics here.
Well, remember, it's a great question.
We're a geopolitical power.
We're a world power.
Israel's a regional power, and they may be close to being a regional hegemon.
But if we need help against China or need help against Russia, we're not going to get
it from Israel.
We're going to get it from our Asian partners and from our European partners.
So the idea that we would somehow denigrate them seems to me short-sighted and it goes
against the historical foundation of these great, of our great alliances.
Remember, how many allies does China have?
One or two.
How many does Russia have?
One or two.
How many does Iran have?
One or two.
We have dozens and dozens if we use them properly, but we have to respect what they want.
So it worries me when Secretary Hegseth makes these pronouncements that denigrate these
great allies who, by the way, who have died for America in Afghanistan.
And he was there when we did that.
So I think that is incredibly short-sighted to go after them.
Israel is very capable, but they're capable in the Middle East, not in the world.
Are you looking at sort of the alliances, the order post-World War II differently in
light of how you see America relating to its allies in this conflict?
I think so, because I think we look at what they put in after 1945.
We went into World War I and won that war and then left Europe.
And look what happened with that vacuum of power.
Another World War came.
After World War II, we created these series of alliances that served the United States
incredibly well, served us best of all, not just militarily, but also economically.
And so if we're going to break these alliances and break the post-war era, post-war alliance
system, we're going to get into something that we don't want in the United States of America,
which is ruled by the strongest.
But remember, that's not just us.
That is China and Russia.
And if we're looking at this at a world level, it's China and Russia that are the major powers
that are a problem.
And if we're stuck in the Middle East, which it looks like we are, to create, by the way,
opening the Straits of Hormuz, which we had before the war started.
So I worry that we're going to put all of our effort there, leaving Russia and China
openings to start something even worse.
And that's what our alliance system prevented, which is the ability for us to work around
the world with our friends to create a global order.
Because if there is stability, the United States wins.
