Fmr. Trump NSA on The Murder of Khashoggi

The meeting that took place last November, where MBS is welcomed into the White House, you commented on that meeting, in any event, in just absolute cold-blooded national interest terms, we've got a lot at stake in Saudi Arabia. Trump defended the kingdom and MBS. I think that's the right thing to do. What is cold-blooded national interest when talking about Saudi Arabia? Well, national interest means fundamentally protecting the security of the United States and its people and its vital interest around the world. There are a lot of things that we prize because of our value system, but in international affairs, it's not the same as personal relations. Sometimes you have to make unpleasant choices, and the right choice to make in difficult areas is often to do what your interests dictate and maybe not what moral scruples dictate. Why is Saudi Arabia important to the United States? Well, the Saudis, their role in the international oil business, their position in the Islamic world make it a country that has been critical to the U.S. in one way or another since Franklin Roosevelt met the Saudi king on an American destroyer in World War II. There have been changes, obviously, since then, but the importance of the kingdom really has been a fixed point in American foreign policy now for getting on to 80 years. You talk about, back in April of 2018 when you came in, that one thing that was underway was a pressure campaign against Iran, and you had said that MBS was pivotal to the administration's pressure campaign against Iran. How so? Well, the Saudis have, for almost the entire history of the production of oil, been the leader of the Gulf Arab countries, often in opposition to Iran from the very earliest days, but the leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the biggest producer, the most important, and stability in the region really depends on some kind of ability of the Gulf Arab states to counter Iran and to hold together, since the Islamic revolution of 1979, and provide an alternative source of oil and political stability. In the beginning of the administration, even before they took office, the Saudis reached out to several of the top officials in the incoming administration, and especially to Jared Kushner. Jared Kushner becomes an important person in the administration, a kind of point person, and people have looked at this and criticized it because they said that the administration was skirting traditional protocol, sidelining people like the Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, for example. Was that ever something that raised your eyebrows? Well, Jared could perform whatever function he wanted to because his father-in-law was the president, and he had different interests at different times. He flitted in and flitted out of issues. It was not a problem for me because the National Security Council process rolls along without regard to people who flit in and out of it. He was much more a problem, I think, for Mike Pompeo at the State Department. And before that, Rex Tillerson. Right. But he admitted in an interview that I've seen that when he was first approached by the Saudis, he said, I don't really know much about Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had filed a report back to the Deputy Crown Prince at that time saying, this is a guy who really is fairly naive about what's going on here. Did you ever have any concerns about his ability? Was that an issue? Well, it depended on what he was doing. And since a lot of it looked to be more Dilettante's interest in this issue or that issue or the other issue, as I say, it didn't really distract my attention. He did get into some things in terms of immigration policy, for example, to try and help Trump out. But it was really very hard to define what he was there to do until he began to work on his Middle East peace plan, which during my tenure was a work without end. And we finally saw the light of day really after I left when it looked to be a business plan for investment in the Middle East, which conveniently was what he went into after he left government. That was the Abraham Fund. Through a variety of different permutations, the whole idea was to attract investment into the region and to use that investment in the West Bank and Gaza for the Palestinians. But the criticism is that this guy comes in, he has no foreign policy experience, and that he is essentially the point person in the administration. Why would that not raise concerns at the National Security Council? Because I don't think he did anything substantive. That was a quick answer. I don't know what he was doing for himself, but he didn't do anything substantive. But he had a very close relationship, did he not, with Mohammed bin Salman, the closest of any official? He did. I'm sure they had many conversations. That's why what interference was caused was more with the State Department, because a lot of those conversations, I think, never made it back to the State Department. There was a debate over that first trip that was made. And again, I apologize, we're back in 2017. Before your time, but there was a healthy debate in the administration over whether or not that should be the first visit of President Trump to a foreign country. Were you aware of that debate? I was not. I thought it was unusual. There are a number of options for presidents. You can go to Canada first. You can go to Mexico first. Whichever one of those you go to first, you go to the other one within a few days. And then your first trip outside the hemisphere can be to Europe, it can be to Japan. This was the first time it was someplace other than those destinations. And by this time, Jared Kushner has a WhatsApp texting relationship with MBS. You come on to the job at the National Security Council. And as you said, that this was more of a concern for Pompeo at State or Tillerson at State. But it's clearly a factor in shaping U.S.-Saudi relations, right? Right. There's also nothing much you can do about it. John Kelly, the chief of staff, had tried to do things like make sure Jared has a legitimate security clearance that he's gone through a background check. They didn't give Jared a clearance initially. Trump decided to give him one anyway. So my attitude was there's nobody who's going to discipline that. And I'm just not going to take ownership of it. I could have shortened my tenure in the Trump administration considerably if I had really focused on it. But I didn't see what it was doing to real issues of national security. Right after that initial trip that Trump takes, the blockade of Qatar takes place. There's a lot of speculation, people trying to connect dots that somehow Kushner would have been briefed on that beforehand, the intentions of the Crown Prince. Same with the Ritz-Carlton affair. I mean, so in that way, he had played perhaps a pivotal role, at least in understanding and maybe approving certain of these moves of the Crown Prince. Well, those predated my arrival, I don't know. It's certainly a way to cut out the President's chief advisors on matters that could be important. And to the extent you're cut out and don't know about it, you don't really know what the effect has been. But to have any specific lasting effect, somebody has to communicate to the rest of the U.S. government that something has happened. And I found very few things came out of whatever Jared was doing that indicated that something was actually happening. It's kind of amazing to sit here and listen to you say that this was just something you had to accept. I mean, it's like visiting somebody's home and their child is running around and making a nuisance, perhaps, or perhaps not. But you just have to accept that. Well, let me give you an example. Toward the end of my tenure, Trump visited Moon Jae-in, the President of South Korea in Seoul. That's when he later went up to the DMZ to meet with Kim Jong-un. And so we were having the formal bilateral meeting between Trump and Moon. I was there, Pompeo was there, a few other advisors, and in came Jared and Ivanka to sit in the meeting. I'd never seen anything like it. Nobody said anything. What were you going to say? Tell them to get out? Have the President then overrule you? So you just had to accept it. Well, or you could resign at some point. I mean, I didn't resign over Jared Kushner, but eventually that's what happens. Right. So we get up into 2018, and you have this huge test of the United States relationship with Saudi Arabia when Jamal Khashoggi is murdered. You're there at the time. You are in a meeting in the White House. You've written about it, as to how to deal with it. Can you take us there? Put us in the room? The reaction, obviously, was blowing up around the world to what had happened to Khashoggi, and we had to decide what our posture would be to decide what we thought the cause of the murder had been. And I was surprised to find almost immediately without discussion that Trump had decided that we were going to stick with the Saudis on it, not berate them in public, but that we were going to support the Saudis. We talked about a number of things, like a suggestion Mike Pompeo and I had talked about, that he go to the kingdom to express our concern and do a little fact-finding, as it were. Which he did. And that was accepted. But the President was determined to put out a statement very quickly. He had Pompeo draft it. Pompeo sent me a draft. I thought it was not what it should be. And I said, look, we've got to try and hold this back a little bit. Pompeo said, no. He said he wants a statement. I'm going to give him the statement. And indeed, it was issued pretty much as drafted. That was a statement, I think, called Standing with Saudi Arabia. I don't remember the title, but if I wrote it in the book, I'm sure that's what it was called. I'm not sure. When we saw it, it had a title. Right. So, you thought we should do what instead? I thought the statement was inappropriate. I'm not sure how I would have drafted it. I don't remember at this divide. But when you come down to it, the choice is, do you ostracize the Saudis for what was likely behavior committed at their behest? Or do you try and move past it and keep the critical interest of the regime for the United States in mind? And I thought, ultimately, it was important to keep them close. And in my mind, I had verified some months later, when I met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, and the subject of Khashoggi's murder came up. And we had a brief discussion. And he said to me, well, if the United States doesn't want to sell arms to Saudi Arabia, we'll sell them arms. That's it right there. Yeah, that underscores what you mean when you say that there are interests besides human rights. Right. But you say that you wouldn't have done it that way. I mean, the President was quite, I guess I would say, casual or flippant about it. He said, well, maybe he did, maybe he didn't. But we're going to stand with Saudi Arabia. What would you have suggested they do instead? Well, I thought we should have waited and maybe found out a few more facts. This was at a time when Ivanka was coming under criticism for using her private cell phone for perhaps for government communications. And it was pretty clear that putting this statement out about Saudi Arabia would overwhelm news coverage of that issue. You think that was behind it? Wouldn't surprise me. Wouldn't surprise you. I mean, did you have any doubt as to who ordered that murder? Well, I think it was somebody in the Saudi government. Now, whether it was an official with the authority to do it, or whether it was somebody who said, as in the murder of Thomas and Beckett, will someone rid me of this meddlesome cleric? I don't know the answer to that. You spoke with MBS. Can you recount that conversation? Is this the one where Jared comes in and puts him on the phone? Here's what you wrote. Kushner asked how we should respond to the growing Khashoggi storm. My advice to the Saudis was to get the facts out immediately, whatever they were, and get it over with. Kushner agreed. And the next day, we spoke with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, emphasizing how seriously the issue was already viewed. Yeah, Jared had him on his cell phone. And recount that conversation, what you said to the Crown Prince, and what he said in response. Well, I said my advice would be to find out what the facts were and get it all out as quickly as possible and get it behind us. How did he respond to that? I think he sounded affirmative. I mean, he was, at the beginning of this, after this murder, coming up with alibis. Jamal Khashoggi walked out of the embassy alive, or the consulate, excuse me. Other such things. And then they settled on a rogue operation theory. Well, Trump talked to the king himself, which was a rare conversation. And the king said quite emphatically, I'm appalled at the murder of any of my subjects, and we're going to get to the bottom of this. And I listened into the conversation. I don't speak Arabic, but I heard the translator. And Trump came away convinced of the king's seriousness. But yet they had determined, even before there was an investigation, that the Crown Prince was not involved, which doesn't make much sense. Well, you can decide to get into the specifics of it, or you can do basically what Trump did, which is to say we're going to stick with the kingdom, and the commentators can commentate. And that's the, I mean, you would say the bottom line, that was correct, that we had to consider our interests over the death of the murder of this one guy. Assuming everything turned out to be contrary to what the official line was, it was still an American interest to keep the relationship with the Saudis. I think when Biden came into office, he damaged the relationship seriously. And I think that harmed American security interests. How so? How did he damage it? Because he gave the Gulf Arabs, and not just Saudi Arabia, but all of them, the impression, as had Barack Obama, that reaching an agreement with Iran on their nuclear program was more important than the concerns of the Gulf Arab states, more important than the concerns of Israel, more important than the concerns of friends and allies of ours right in the same region. And it took a while to get that back. There were other things that Biden did, basically coming out against petroleum as a source of energy, that also pushed the kingdom away. And I think those were mistakes. It's one of the cliches of American history is when Franklin Roosevelt, speaking of the then ruler of Guatemala, I think it was, said, well, he may be an SOB, but he's our SOB. And I'm with Roosevelt on that. At the end of the day, Project 2030 succeeds. Will Saudi Arabia be vital? Well, I think it's going to be vital for a long time, given its geographic position, given the continued importance of oil and gas in the global economy. We'll see what happens in Iran, but even if it returned to pre-1979 friendship to the United States, the position of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arabs as a whole will still be critical to our foreign policy. But what I meant is if he achieves his goal, which is to wean Saudi Arabia off of oil, then what will be his leverage and his importance to the U.S.? Well, I don't think they're going to wean themselves off the importance of oil. And I think that's already been recognized. I look at Project 30 as a way to modernize Saudi society and a daring gamble, given the Shah of Iran once tried to modernize Iranian society, and we got the Ayatollah Khomeini. You had said, you wrote in your book, that Trump wanted to call Ben Salman to tell him the statement was coming out, the statement of standing with Saudi Arabia, and stating that whether or not he did it or not, we're standing with Saudi Arabia. You wrote, in hard-nosed geopolitical terms, Trump's was the only sensible approach. No one excused Khashoggi's murder, and few doubted it was a serious mistake. But whether you liked it or not, we had significant interests at stake. Sounds good to me. Yeah, go by that. Okay. You also wrote, which we highlighted here, Trump wasn't necessarily deciding on the basis of geostrategic reality, but on the U.S. jobs generated by the arms sales, and he ended up in more or less the right place. Well, Trump's view of international affairs is that it's based on personal relationships between heads of state, and it has manifested itself in individual economic transactions. That's how he sees the world. The arms sales to Saudi Arabia are an important component of our defense, aerospace and defense industry business, and a secure Saudi Arabia is important to us in the geography, the political geography of the Middle East. But there are larger strategic questions as well that go beyond rolling up arms sales of a couple hundred million dollars, however important that may be. You took a lot of pushback when you commented to the press corps. It got quoted, perhaps. Well, why should I listen to the tape? You seemed equally, or you were seen as equally flippant as the president when he said, maybe he did, maybe he didn't. What was the tape going to tell you? Well, it was going to, I mean— He was dead at the time. He was dead at the time, but we know that the guys that carried out the murder at the time were reporting back to the royal court. I don't speak Arabic. Yeah, but you work with translators. I know what was on the tape. I just didn't feel I had to listen to it. I know, but there are optics. There are considerations. I mean, the president, I just think that's violence porn. If you want to listen to the tape, listen to the tape. I understand what was on the tape. But did the president ever, in your presence, bring up to the crown prince the murder? I don't think Trump spoke to the crown prince. He spoke to the king. This is at the time, shortly after the murder. I don't think he spoke to the crown prince. Did human rights come up when Trump spoke with MBS? Not at the meeting I was at, no. Not at all? I don't think so. I mean, this is the criticism that, yes, there are American interests at stake here, but there are also American values, and that President Trump, yourself, didn't do enough to stress that side of the equation. Well, it's a fair criticism if you think that you have to mention everything in a relationship when you sit down with a foreign head of state. It was clear Trump wasn't going to raise it, and I don't think he did. Well, right, but the critics... It wasn't just on Saudi Arabia. In other words, he wasn't talking about human rights to everybody else, but not to MBS. He didn't talk to anybody about human rights. What does that tell us? Well, it tells you a lot about Donald Trump. He wanted to talk about transactions. Can you say a little more about that? His idea of international affairs is the personal relationships of the heads of state and being able to say, I made deals on economic transactions. That really is the bulk of his approach to things, and it meant that a lot of other issues, including critical geostrategic issues, didn't get talked about. And including human rights. I don't recall him speaking about human rights in any of the meetings he had. Would you have advocated that that come up, that pressure be put on the Crown Prince to clean up his act? I think when Pompeo went out to the Kingdom, that he made those points. I think others made those points. I mean, that was after the Shoji murder, but I mean, there's more than just that murder that took place. Many people who had tweeted something that was seen as critical of the Crown Prince got put in jail, academics, writers, others. There was a bad record before the Shoji murder that perhaps got more attention than anything else. But to paraphrase some of the human rights advocates that I've spoken to, we essentially enabled him to feel like he could get away with whatever he needed to do. And in fact, he got away with murder. Well, people can say that, but the question is, what effect do you think you're going to have? There are certainly some situations where talking about human rights is important. I think in this case, it wouldn't have made any difference. And indeed, if the Biden experiences any indication, it would have impaired our ability to achieve other interests that we were after. It wouldn't have made any difference. I'm open to the suggestion of what the difference would be. I don't know. You would know better. No, I can tell you how this goes in meetings, not on human rights, but on a lot of subjects. You can sit down and you can say, here are our talking points. And the other side says, here are our talking points. Then you can turn to the next page in the briefing book. I consider that a waste of time. If I had had another meeting with the Chinese official, a counterpart, where I listened to the 5, 10 or 15 minute version of how Taiwan belonged to them, I would have been happy never to have had to meet another Chinese official. It's pointless for them to raise it, but they do it anyway. And I just don't believe in doing pointless things. Do you think that there should have been more emphasis on balancing American interest in values, civil, human rights, that there should have been more emphasis on that with the Crown Prince? Well, I think the United States, including in the Trump administration, argued for a lot of things that MBS was doing and has done that have opened the kingdom up very considerably. And indeed, I think there's a substantial argument that only somebody like MBS, young, unconstrained by many of the traditions, could have cut through a lot of the existing social structures in Saudi to get done what he's done. And I think the proof for everybody is the extent of his popularity with young people, young men and young women in Saudi Arabia for what he's done. Is his record perfect? No, but he has accomplished more to change Saudi Arabia than any of his predecessors. How do we know about his popularity? There are no polls. Well, I think there are polls. And I think the impression and reporting of our diplomats in Saudi Arabia and my own experience is, indeed, he is very popular. And so, on balance, he is a good thing, in your view? Look, on balance, he's an important part of the political geography of the Middle East. He's been, by and large, a very loyal ally of the United States over the years. Just to come to today's news, you've expressed concern over how Trump has gone about his move on Iran. What's your criticism? Well, I think the case for overthrowing the regime in Tehran is very clear and very compelling. We are legitimately worried about their pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. We're very concerned, and rightly so, about their support for international terrorism, their own state terrorism around the world, and the way they treat their own people. We don't need to wait for that threat to be imminent to protect American interest. And we have learned painfully over nearly 30 years of negotiation that the regime can't be trusted either to give up terrorism, which it refuses to acknowledge that it's doing, or to give up its nuclear weapons program. So faced with those threats, faced with the reality that the regime's behavior is not going to change, the alternative is change the regime. And I think that's what we should be doing. I'm not sure whether that's what Trump is doing. His communication of his purposes has been unclear. He failed to generate public support. He didn't roll the pitch, as the British say, to get the public ready for it. He didn't do the preparatory diplomacy. He has not coordinated sufficiently, in my view, with the opposition itself inside Iran, which will bear the brunt of the repression and a brutal repression, as we know from recent events, if things go wrong. So there are a lot of ways this mission can fail. And I think that ultimately will be to our detriment. I hope it succeeds. I believe the fact that the Israelis are very much involved is helpful, because I believe that the Prime Minister's number one priority is the overthrow of the regime, and that that will keep us moving in that direction. What role does the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia play in this? I think across the Gulf, in all the Gulf Arab states, the view is they would be better off and the Middle East would be better off with the change of regime in Tehran. But like all people, they hoped that would happen without any pain and strain. I understand why they think that, but that was never going to be possible. And we've seen in the early days of the U.S.-Israeli effort that the Iranian regime has responded by attacking civilian targets, and I believe every one of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. That brings them into the war, whether they wanted to be in it or not. I think it was entirely foreseeable that that would happen, although I think it's a catastrophic mistake that the Iranians have actually gone so far as to attack their near neighbors across the Gulf. I think it will hasten the fall of the regime. This seems to me a matter of mathematics, that if they run out of weapons and launchers, missiles and launchers, or we run out of interceptors, or the Gulf states run out of interceptors, whatever happens first determines who wins, who loses. Well, I don't think we're going to run out. I think they're wasting their assets by attacking the Gulf Arab states, but we're not going to wait to see how many they have. We are in the process now of determining where their stockpiles are, where their arsenals are, destroying them on the ground, destroying the launchers, destroying the production facilities. That's what we should do. If they never fire the missiles, we don't have to worry about interceptors. Our record, I was listening to Prince Turki al-Faisal talking. He was very critical of the approach that the United States is taking. He says he doesn't know quite what the goal is here, and he worries that there'll be disintegration of the state, civil war, and that we will somehow walk away. Well, that's a potential criticism of Trump that I don't disagree with. But the regime's been in power for 47 years. It's not going to go easily, and that's why coordination with the opposition in Iran is so important, because they're the ones working to pry apart the regime at the top, to fragment the leadership, to convince people in the regular army, not the Revolutionary Guard Corps, but the regular army to come over to the side of the opposition and hopefully minimize the violence. Ultimately, it will depend on how much the opposition really wants to be living in a free country. We're not going to deliver it to them on a silver platter, and they're not going to get it without bloodshed. There's no Nelson Mandela here. There's no figure that leads this opposition. It's an amorphous protest movement with many currents in it. How do you negotiate or how do you reach out to that opposition? Well, I think the administration has already done that by public reporting. They delivered 6,000 Starlink terminals during the demonstrations in January. They must have delivered it to somebody. There are plenty of groups in the Iranian diaspora around Europe and the United States with their own ideas. I don't think it's a situation where you can pick somebody in advance who's going to be the leader. It may well be chaotic. It was certainly not clear when we started the American Revolution what our government was going to look like, but we did it and we won. That was a clear point in Ken Burns' series. I don't know if you watched it. I haven't watched it. They didn't have any idea who was going to win that, and it was very chaotic. So this is going to be a long haul. Well, I think it could be a long haul until the regime collapses, but no one should underestimate how unpopular it is. It's at the weakest point, I think, since it took power in 1979. It's unpopular for manifold reasons. The economy is a disaster. The country is running out of water. The economic pain is felt in all 31 provinces. The young people, two-thirds of the population are under 30. They know they could have a different life when the internet is turned on. They can see it across the Gulf. The women, for now nearly three years since the murder of Masi Amini, the young Kurdish woman, are alienated from the regime. Their protest is not simply about a dress code. Their protest goes to the very foundational legitimacy of the regime itself, because the regime says it speaks the word of God, and the women are saying, no, you do not, on the dress code. Once you say they're wrong on the word of God on one issue, they can be wrong on every issue. On top of that is the ethnic discontent. Persians amount, depending on whose census you believe, between 50 and 60 percent of the population. Kurds, Azeris, Balukis, Arabs, all have separatist critiques. That's not necessarily good for the country, but it shows how fragmented this regime already is. I can't make any predictions as to how quickly it will fall, but everybody said before this action started that when the Supreme Leader died, and he was 86 and ailing, that there would be a succession crisis. He's only the second Supreme Leader. They've had one transition before this. We have now accelerated the succession process, not only by killing the Ayatollah Khamenei, but by killing a lot of the people who would have been decision makers and killing them down through successive levels of government. What I think could happen inside is that ideology becomes much less of a factor than good old-fashioned personal ambition, animosity, family connections, money, and a whole range of things that can further fragment the regime. Can you name a successful regime change in the Middle East? Well, I think it's been hard over a long period of time because the regimes are not stable. These are countries that were not formed in the nation-state building process. Some have been more successful than others. Certainly, regime change that we have not agreed with, like the fall of the Shah, didn't turn out very well. It doesn't require American involvement for the change not to go well. But given the strategic interest we have at stake, I think it's worth trying what we're doing here, trying to overthrow the regime, trying to get another one in place, because the alternative can hardly be worse than the ayatollahs in the Revolutionary Guard. But one has to be sobered by the fact that we have not engineered a successful regime change in the Middle East, have we? Well, we did engineer successful regime changes. In the case of Afghanistan, if you want to call that the Middle East, I think our mistake was leaving. You were there for 20 years. Well, we've been in Germany for 80 years. By the way, speaking of regime changes, that was a successful regime change. I said in the Middle East. Yeah, well, you don't want to limit your geographical focus on this question. So you're thinking that it's possible that this... Well, anyway, this isn't a program about that. I just was curious and appreciate being able to go into that. I mean, look at Egypt. So they overthrow Mubarak and they get the Muslim Brotherhood in. Morsi. And that lasts until they realize, my God, he's Muslim Brotherhood. And then you have el-Sisi come in. So there were two failed regime changes that we had absolutely nothing to do with. Right. Regime changes are hard. Regime changes result in chaos, disintegration, and civil war. Egypt didn't disintegrate. They didn't have much of a civil war. Okay. So if that's what bothers you, then you say the more autocratic and theologically extremist you are, the better you're off, the greater your duration in power. Saudi is seen as critical to U.S. interests. But during your time, can you provide an example of what they did that benefited America? Well, I think as we tried to turn the pressure up on Iran after withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal, we withdrew in May of 2018. And the Saudis and the Gulf Arabs as a whole, for their own reasons, but were very supportive of putting maximum pressure on Iran right through the entire time I was there and thereafter. So they stood with us on that initiative. But what kind of critical support on any front did they give? Well, we have bases and facilities of different kinds in all the Gulf Arab countries, and that's critical to our ability to project force in that part of the world. And Peter Baker of the New York Times said to us that there's been no president in history that has monetized the office like Donald Trump. You were out of office. You came to part ways with him. But you've seen the monetization, the payments into Jared Kushner's private equity fund and hotels and licensing deals and crypto that the Trump organization has been involved in. As a person who has conducted policy for the United States, how do you feel about this? Well, I think in the second term in particular, it's just gone completely over the top. And I think it has diminished the office of the presidency and the United States in the eyes of the world. There are those who can make advances on their own interest off of it, but I think it's really set a new low in the conduct of the office. And we'll see after the 2026 elections, if Democrats can get control of one or the other houses of Congress, there's no doubt among all the other hearings they're going to hold, they're going to hold a lot of hearings on the corruption issue. We'll see how good they are at it, which is always an open question. But if they are, then that may well be very damaging to the Trump family. I mean, tell me what is so detrimental about these deals? Well, Trump doesn't have any sense of the separateness of his personal interests and his government interests. And I think it's of a piece with him saying that everything deals with the personal relationship between him and foreign leaders. And so if you have that relationship, whether you're dealing with a governmental issue or an issue of personal finance, it really doesn't make that much difference. He raised this issue about business interests, and he said he was not held to these strictures, these traditions of separating his own personal business from his performance of the presidency. Well, technically, the Ethics in Government Act does not apply to the president. And other presidents tried to behave in an ethical fashion. I think many of the strictures in the Ethics in Government Act are ridiculous and overdone. I can tell you about how people have struggled to fill out the financial disclosure forms that are nearly incomprehensible, at least they're incomprehensible to me, for purposes of disclosure that didn't affect anybody. But in general terms, other presidents have tried to separate their professional responsibilities as president from their own personal fortunes. And I think that's the right thing to try and do as a general proposition, and I think Trump couldn't care less about that.