China Forced Moscow To CAPITULATE! Putin Did Not Expect Such A Betrayal!

Shock! China is waiting for Putin's death, the betrayal of the century by Xi Jinping. Beijing is preparing for, or perhaps even orchestrating, a change of power in the Kremlin. Bets on the dictator have been called off. Moreover, a humiliation for the whole world, China has halted negotiations on power of Siberia II and has forbidden the Russian delegation from even mentioning this project. So what is the reason? And Russia is becoming the new Pakistan. Why do Chinese spies recruit Russian officials with impunity? And how is Beijing taking advantage of a weakening empire? All the inside information right now. Welcome! This is the channel Ukraine Today, Victoria Perepelitsa, and the latest events. China has finally written Putin off and is already secretly preparing for his physical or political departure. The reputable publication The Wall Street Journal is releasing sensational information. Beijing no longer trusts the Kremlin dictator and is launching a backup plan in case of a change of power in Russia. If back in 2013 Xi called Putin his political role model, then over the years of the war against Ukraine, the balance of power has changed forever. Russia has completely lost its agency and turned into an obedient junior partner, whom Beijing cold-bloodedly manipulates for its own interests. Beijing has started to act proactively and is building strategic relationships not only with the current Kremlin leadership, but also with Russian officials and members of the elite who may determine the course of the Russian Federation after Putin's rule ends. This humiliation was most vividly demonstrated in the story of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. For the Kremlin, this project was a matter of survival and the main hope for replacing the lost European market. But during the visit to Beijing, the Russian delegation received a harsh slap in the face. China has effectively put the negotiations on hold. Xi is only willing to buy gas at domestic Russian prices, which is five times cheaper. And when Moscow tried to bargain, the Chinese directly showed the Russians the door, advising them never to bring up this issue again. As one European diplomat aptly noted, Xi received Putin as an emperor receives a guest, and then simply showed him out. China is demanding that the Kremlin radically lower the price of gas. He is ready to sign a supply contract only if the price is at the domestic Russian level, which is about $50 per thousand cubic meters. Even now, China is buying gas from Gazprom at significant discounts compared to global prices. This year, it is paying $258.8 per thousand cubic meters. The Russian delegation that traveled to Beijing with Putin in May hit a wall, according to WSJ sources. China is effectively demanding that Moscow subsidize the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. They want a price five times lower than the current one, and eight times lower than what Gazprom's other overseas clients pay. While Putin is being met with refusals, Beijing is acting behind his back. Chinese intelligence agencies have set up an unprecedented spy network in Russia. Beijing is actively recruiting mid-level officials and regional elites, specifically those people who will be dividing power after Putin's death or overthrow. The most astonishing thing is that the FSP regularly uncovers these facts. But the Kremlin, gripped by animal fear, orders silence so as not to anger its Chinese master. As a result, the main conclusion of the article goes far beyond the story of a single gas pipeline. The war against Ukraine has not only made Russia more dependent on China, it has changed the very nature of their relationship. Beijing increasingly sees Moscow less as an equal partner and more as a source of cheap resources, a large sales market, and a geopolitical asset whose future it is already time to start shaping. At the same time, Xi has begun to sharply distance himself from toxic Moscow. There is no longer any limitless partnership. China flatly refuses to supply weapons to Russia, and Chinese banks are in a panic over secondary sanctions and are blocking transfers. Moreover, it has reached the point where Xi personally forbade Putin from flying to North Korea immediately after visiting China, forcing the dictator to humiliatingly change his route through Vietnam so as not to damage Beijing's image in the eyes of the West. A telling episode from 2024. Beijing asked Putin not to fly to North Korea immediately after his visit to China, so as not to create the impression of forming a new anti-Western bloc. The Kremlin had to change the route and make a stop in Vietnam. Similarly, China abandoned the idea of a trilateral summit between Russia, China, and North Korea. And Xi Jinping himself went to Pyongyang, once again demonstrating who is the main patron of Kim Jong-un's regime. Taking advantage of the weakness of a dictator cornered, China is methodically squeezing Russia out even from those regions that Moscow has always considered its own. For a whole 10 years, the Kremlin resisted China's financial expansion in Central Asia, but now Putin has capitulated here as well. Moscow meekly agreed to make the Chinese yuan the main currency of the S.E.O. Development Bank. The economic takeover of Putin's empire is in full swing, and the Kremlin no longer has any levers to resist it. According to informed Chinese sources, over the past year, Beijing has used its virtually unrivaled influence to extract a major concession from Moscow. Russia agreed to make the Chinese yuan the main currency of the future Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development Bank, which is intended to finance projects in Central Asia. For more than 10 years, Moscow resisted such a decision, fearing an increase in Chinese influence in the region. Now, however, it has been forced to reconsider its position. The political verdict of this new reality is perfectly clear. As analysts note, Xi is deliberately turning Russia into a giant Pakistan. For China, the ideal Russian Federation is a politically dependent, impoverished, economically weak and perpetually warring state that nevertheless possesses a nuclear arsenal to intimidate the West. Beijing gains unlimited access to dirt-cheap resources and a vast sales market. Meanwhile, the Putin regime is bleeding out in a senseless war, paying for this Chinese triumph with the lives of its own citizens. Moreover, Xi is already actively preparing to divide up Russian territories. All this so-called friendship without limits has turned out to be nothing more than a takeover, where Russia is simply being plundered for cheap resources and total economic dependence. The most frightening thing for Putin is that in the Chinese media space, the future of Russian lands after the collapse of the Kremlin regime is already being openly and unashamedly discussed. In Moscow, people are even afraid to comment on these signals out loud. What is Beijing actually calculating? Which regions of the Russian Federation will be the first to come under Chinese control? Watch right now in our report. China is quietly devouring Russia, without unnecessary words. Xi Jinping is taking territories, while Putin gladly hands them over and bows at his feet. Beijing is turning the Far East and Siberia into a raw materials appendage with a long-term Chinese contract. A vivid example is the Zashulanskoye coal deposit in Zabaykalsky Krai, which is being developed jointly by Russian and Chinese companies. The project is designed for centuries of extraction, and the Russian side is also generously granting tax breaks. In fact, it looks like a long-term lease of the region in exchange for investment with Beijing becoming the main beneficiary. Starting from 2027, they plan to send about 5 million tons of coal to China from here every year. That's hundreds of trucks every day. New routes are being laid literally through forests, near mineral water sources and protected natural areas. Ecology, it seems, is a secondary detail in this scheme, simply left out of the business plan. Alongside resources, China is actively entering the regions through people and business. In the Baikal region, tourist infrastructure catering to Chinese visitors is growing. Investors are buying up land and building hotels, pushing out local entrepreneurs. According to various estimates, there may already be up to 2 million Chinese citizens in the Far East. Against this backdrop, it looks less and less like a partnership and more like a gradual economic reprogramming of the region to suit Beijing's interests. And while Russia is gradually turning into a resource periphery for China, even harsher scenarios are emerging in the Chinese information space. These are no longer about cooperation, but about the actual division of Russian territories in the event of a crisis. And strangely enough, this is presented not as a fantasy but as a geopolitical calculation. A piece appeared in the Chinese media that openly discusses the potential control over 7 million square kilometers of the Russian Far East in the event of an internal collapse of the Russian Federation. The authors refer to the fact that due to the war against Ukraine, Russian forces have been redeployed to the West, leaving the eastern regions virtually empty, with minimal military presence and weak territorial control. The economic conclusion is even harsher. According to the authors, Russia is rapidly deteriorating, and its economy is allegedly smaller than that of a single Chinese province. And here, cold logic comes into play. If the center of the Russian Federation weakens, the Far East with its resources should not go to waste. At the same time, the authors cautiously warn Beijing against direct military expansion, hinting at a scenario of international isolation similar to the situation surrounding Crimea. Instead, another approach is proposed, a soft absorption through investments, long-term contracts, and support for friendly forces in the region, which formally retain their independence, but in reality become dependent on China. In fact, the main idea expressed in the text is that Russia no longer appears capable of fully controlling its own eastern territories, and China, taking advantage of the moment, can gradually fill this power vacuum. And even if all this is presented as analysis, the very appearance of such scenarios in the public sphere looks like a signal. Beijing is already thinking in terms of the post-Russia era. The collapse of Russia is no joke. Only through careful preparation can one move forward calmly. And perhaps the Celestial Empire will not wait for the collapse of the Russian Federation, but will start speaking the language of force. China is building a gigantic military megacomplex in the desert, so massive that Western analysts are already openly saying they've never seen anything like it before. We are talking about a new strategic zone near the intercontinental nuclear missile silos, where, according to Reuters, more than 80 launch pads, a bunker, a railway junction, airfields, and command centers are being built. Essentially a fully-fledged military fortress of the future. Particular concern is caused by three gigantic octagonal complexes, surrounded by fortifications and protected infrastructure. Experts suggest that these may house electronic warfare systems, command centers, or elements of nuclear infrastructure, including the preparation and deployment of mobile missile systems. But the key detail is that no one knows for sure what exactly is inside. And it is precisely this uncertainty that frightens analysts the most. In fact, this is an unprecedented expansion of China's nuclear architecture amid escalating tensions with the United States, especially around Taiwan. What is emerging in the desert is not just a military base, but a new level of strategic reality, where Beijing is demonstrating its readiness to play the long game. And while the world tries to comprehend the scale of what it has seen, experts admit they have never before recorded this level of military construction in the era of nuclear states. For Putin, this is a real geopolitical cold shower. Russia is looking less and less like an independent center of power and more and more like a resource periphery in China's orbit. China is not acting abruptly for now, but it seems that Putin may live to see the day when Xi Jinping takes what he wants quickly and without warning. And against the backdrop of this total Chinese takeover, even Putin's last allies are fleeing from him. Lukashenko has abandoned the Kremlin and sided with Xi. After a difficult conversation with the bunker dictator, the Belarusian leader suddenly rushed off to seek protection in Beijing. For Moscow, this was a humiliating slap in the face. The Chinese are now openly taking Russia's most loyal vassals away from it. What exactly happened behind closed doors? And why did Lukashenko leave Putin to sink in complete isolation? All the details of this grand betrayal are coming up next. He abandoned Putin and went to negotiate with China. What happened during the talks between these old friends? Putin and Lukashenko spent two days behind closed doors, but something very strange happened after their meeting. There were no traditional embraces in front of the cameras, no joint statements about brotherly nations. There wasn't even the usual parade of staged photographs that for years were meant to show the world the unbreakable friendship between Moscow and Minsk. Instead, there was almost complete silence, and for authoritarian regimes, silence after negotiations often says much more than dozens of official communiques. The fact is, right now Putin doesn't need compliments or diplomatic courtesies from Lukashenko. The Kremlin needs Belarus as a military resource, as territory, as a staging ground, as yet another tool to continue the war. After Russia lost a huge amount of equipment, people, and time, Moscow is increasingly returning to the old idea of using the Belarusian direction to put new pressure on Ukraine, while simultaneously keeping NATO's eastern flank on edge. But it seems that this time Lukashenko did not want to be the person who would personally open the door to a new major escalation. According to analysts, the issue of using Belarusian territory may have been the main topic of the negotiations. Judging by the outcome, Minsk's response turned out to be extremely unpleasant for the Kremlin. It is especially interesting that this whole story is unfolding just a few days after another very telling episode. Lukashenko effectively confirmed that he had shut down the relay stations that the Russian side was using to coordinate drone attacks. Moreover, he openly stated that Belarus should not be drawn into the war. For a person who for years had demonstrated almost unconditional loyalty to the Kremlin, such statements are more than eloquent. And then things got even more interesting. Hardly had the difficult negotiations with Putin ended when Lukashenko almost instantly appeared in Beijing. The fact that a meeting with Xi Jinping was arranged so quickly has already been called a separate signal by many experts. When after a difficult conversation in the Kremlin, a person's first move is to fly to the Chinese leader, it looks like an attempt to find a very influential interlocutor and at the same time a very serious insurance policy. In Beijing, Lukashenko heard exactly what he wanted to hear. China officially declared its support for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Belarus. For diplomats, this is a standard formula, but for the Kremlin, it is very unpleasant news, since China has, in fact, drawn a line. Belarus must remain a separate state and not turn into yet another military testing ground for the implementation of someone else's plans. And here, Putin found himself in a rather awkward situation. Just a few years ago, Moscow could almost unilaterally dictate the rules of the game to Minsk. Today, however, Lukashenko has gained a powerful external resource for maneuvering. While the Kremlin is demanding greater involvement in the war, China is reminding everyone about the stability of trade through transit corridors and economic interests. And for Minsk, money and logistics have recently sounded much more convincing than yet another military adventure. Beijing has the very simple reason not to allow Belarus to be drawn into a new round of war. For decades, China has been building transport routes to Europe, investing in the Belarusian economy and viewing Minsk as an important hub for its presence on the continent. The opening of any new front would mean the risk of border closures, new sanctions, and the destruction of part of these plans. And for the sake of the Kremlin's fantasies about another march on Kiev, the Chinese leadership clearly does not intend to sacrifice its own interests. Another aspect is no less painful for Moscow. Lukashenko has long since learned how to survive among bigger players. For years, he balanced between the West and Russia, and now he is increasingly adding China into this equation. In fact, the Belarusian leader is demonstrating that even under current circumstances, It's no coincidence that political analysts call Lukashenko a political weathervane. He rarely takes risks unless absolutely necessary, and he almost never sides with the party he believes might lose. If Lukashenko is now increasingly showing caution toward the Kremlin's plans, this may indicate something very important. Even among Russia's closest circle, fewer and fewer people are willing to tie their future to Putin's policies. And this story may go far beyond the Belarusian issue. If China is indeed beginning to play a more active role in the processes surrounding the war, if Beijing is increasingly openly demonstrating its own red lines, and the Kremlin's allies are more and more often seeking support there, then Moscow is gradually losing its monopoly on influence even in those countries it considered its own backyard just yesterday. And while Russian propaganda continues to talk about the unity of its allies, reality itself is presenting completely different scenarios. One dictator spends two days in the Kremlin, refuses the most important requests, and then flies to Xi Jinping for political protection. For Moscow, this does not look like a show of strength. For Moscow, this looks like a very alarming sign that even its closest partners are increasingly considering a future without Putin. On top of all this, a true era of wild fear has begun in the Kremlin. The bunker dictator, in a panic, is urgently strengthening his personal security, while his generals mysteriously die one after another, and the security services are at odds with the army. Putin understands perfectly well. He has finally been cornered, and the consequences of the lost war can no longer be hidden, even from ordinary Russians. What is it that the Kremlin's master is so desperately afraid of, and why has his paranoia reached a historic high? We explain in our report. Putin no longer even trusts his own shadow. The dictator is urgently increasing his personal security for the fourth time since the start of the full-scale war. Interestingly, the more Moscow talks about stability, the more bodyguards are posted around the Kremlin's master. According to European intelligence services, the Kremlin is increasingly preparing not only for attacks by long-range drones, but also for possible internal upheavals, assassination attempts, or even a coup. And it seems that the main problem is no longer outside, but within the system itself. Bodyguards are forbidden to use phones and devices with internet access. Their lives are surrounded by new restrictions, and inspections are becoming increasingly strict. It seems that now not only Putin is being guarded, but also those who guard Putin are being guarded. The story about wristwatches was especially surprising. According to Russian sources, officials have been advised to remove them during meetings with the president. When the authorities start suspecting even ordinary watches, it's no longer just about security. It's about an atmosphere of total distrust, where a potential threat is seen everywhere. And the more strange bans like this appear, the harder it becomes to hide the obvious. Fear has become one of the main factors driving decision-making in the Kremlin. The most interesting thing is that before the invasion, the central security apparatus had hardly changed for more than 10 years, but since the war began, it has been expanded for the fourth time already. And this may be the best indicator of the real mood inside the Kremlin. After all, when the head of state keeps increasing the number of people who are supposed to protect him from danger, a logical question arises. If everything is really going according to plan, then why has the level of anxiety there reached its peak? And these are not the only troubling signs. A conflict is escalating between the army and the security services, and it can no longer be concealed. The most glaring symptom of this crisis is a series of mysterious deaths and eliminations of Russian generals. According to European intelligence, the military is increasingly outraged that the FSB is in no hurry to ensure the protection of the top command staff. A paradoxical situation arises. The Kremlin needs generals to continue the war, but the system, it seems, does not particularly care about their safety. And while some wear expensive epaulettes, obituaries are already being prepared for others. This situation affects not only military capabilities, but also the morale of the entire army. Generals are dying as a result of strikes, explosions, sabotage and other emergencies. And with them, the sense of inviolability of the Russian elite is disappearing. What just a few years ago seemed impossible is now becoming almost routine news. Russian opposition figures are also drawing attention to another curious detail. In Putin's system, a popular general is almost always a problem. For decades, the Kremlin has regarded the army as a potential threat to its power. The security services received more influence, more money and more opportunities, while the military were constantly reminded of their place. Because in the Kremlin, they remember well. The army is one of the few structures that, in theory, can ask uncomfortable questions of the people in the Kremlin offices. And now the situation looks almost comical. Putin is increasing his personal security, tightening the security regime around himself, hiding behind ever more layers of protection. Yet at the same time, the generals who are supposed to lead his war keep finding themselves at the center of high-profile incidents. Obviously, the main priority of the system is to save one person, even if that means turning a blind eye to the problems of everyone else. Each such incident gives rise to new suspicions and rumors within the Russian elite itself. The generals no longer feel protected, distrust is growing between the security agencies, and fear for one's own life is becoming the norm. Has that very purge of the inner circle begun? The one so feared in authoritarian systems? And if this process has already started, it will not be easy to stop it. Meanwhile, in the Kremlin, people are beginning to say out loud what was until recently considered a forbidden topic. Putin has effectively admitted Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory are causing serious concern and the war has long since ceased to be a distant television image for ordinary Russians. Moreover, the Russian president is increasingly calling what is happening by its real name, a war, rather than using the usual Kremlin abbreviation that for years was meant to create the illusion of a controlled operation. The consequences of the war are beginning to reach places they never did before. Strikes on oil infrastructure are hitting the main source of income for the Russian state, and as a result, prices are rising, fuel shortages are occurring, and economic anxiety is intensifying. For years, Russians were told that the war was somewhere far away and hardly affected their lives. But when problems reach gas stations and the family budget, propaganda slogans start to work much less effectively. The situation at the front looks even more alarming for Putin. According to Western sources, losses in the Russian army remain extremely high. This means that the Kremlin is getting closer to the point where it will have to make politically dangerous decisions. If a new wave of mobilization affects not only the provinces but also the more affluent segments of society, the level of discontent could sharply increase even among those who have supported the system until now. In military theory, there is the concept of a culminating point, a moment when an offensive can no longer maintain its own momentum and begins to lose effectiveness. It seems that this is precisely the scenario the Kremlin fears most right now. After all, if resources are being depleted faster than they are replenished and economic pressure is increasing, the question is no longer about launching new offensives, but about how to avoid a strategic defeat. And now Putin faces a choice. On the one hand, escalation and an attempt to raise the stakes again with strikes and new threats. On the other, negotiations which may turn out to be the only chance to preserve the regime and his own safety. The only problem is that time is no longer on the Kremlin's side. If earlier Putin expected to dictate the terms, today it is clear that he is looking for a way out of the situation without admitting defeat. The man who promised a swift victory and a new world order finds himself caught between two equally dangerous options. Escalation could accelerate the crisis, while negotiations could demonstrate weakness. And it seems that this is precisely why there are more and more nervous statements coming from the Kremlin, and the confidence that the Russian authorities had displayed for so long is gradually being replaced by fear for their own future. And what do you think about these events? Share your opinion in the comments, leave a like, and stay up to date with the most important news. There's more to come.