This week John Eastman, Founding Director at Claremont’s Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, joins the show to discuss recent landmark Supreme Court rulings. In Trump v. Slaughter, the Court ruled to hold executive agency heads accountable to the president. Meanwhile, delivering the Court’s opinion in Trump v. Barbara, Chief Justice Roberts upheld a broad conception of birthright citizenship. Where do the conservative and progressive movements go from here?
This podcast episode features a legal analysis of the \"unitary executive\" theory and the limits of birthright citizenship. The speakers argue for increasing presidential control over independent agencies to ensure democratic accountability and challenge the current judicial interpretation of the 14th Amendment to restrict citizenship for those not legally domiciled in the U.S.
Welcome everyone once again to the round table of the editors and publishers
podcast here at the American mind at the Claremont Institute.
I'm your host Ryan Williams,
president of the Claremont Institute and publisher of the American mind and the
Claremont review books. I am joined by Spencer Clavin,
associate editor of the Claremont review books and our special guest,
John Eastman. Uh, many of you know, I think most of you know,
I should hope that all of our listeners and watchers know Dr. John Eastman,
the founding director of our center for constitutional jurisprudence among many
other, uh, services to his country. Uh,
he was a one time attorney general candidate in California.
He's now like many of us in exile from the great state of California, uh,
has a PhD from Claremont graduate university and a law degree from Chicago has
been practicing constitutional law for, um,
at least a decade more than, uh, many of our listeners or watchers have been
alive. So we're, we're happy to have John.
We wanted to do a recap of the recent Supreme court term,
but not only this current, uh, the last week of announcements, uh,
but other decisions as well. But first a very,
very special guest who will remain off screen. Wanted to say hi.
Hi, I'm Albert Williams, Ryan Williams, son and welcome.
Thank you, Albert. Now get out of here.
Our listenership just rocketed by 10 X, I think,
thanks to this guest appearance for our deep, deep cut listeners.
They will recognize Albert from the first, uh,
maybe the seventh or eighth month of the podcast.
We had, uh, some cameo clips for him, uh, saying podcast over.
And that was back when he was three and a half, maybe four.
So some color commentary, it's a family think tank and, uh, uh,
Albert really wanted to say hi. So take you all for tuning in. Well,
we're going to confine ourselves in this podcast.
We're going to do two with John because it's an embarrassment of riches. Uh,
and a couple of travesties at the Supreme court's closing weeks or closing a
couple of months. Um,
we wanted to start with a case that Spencer and I discussed on the paid podcast
and we've actually discussed on the main podcast too. Uh,
and that is Trump v. Slaughter.
For those of you who've been living under a rock or are not normally interested
in this jurisprudential weedery,
that is a fake word about being in the weeds. Uh,
Trump v. Slaughter is a case about the administrative state, uh,
for the better part of almost a hundred years,
growing out of a precedent called Humphrey's executor in 1935,
our modern administrative state was insulated from presidential control,
or a good portion of it was with the so-called so-called independent regulatory
agencies. Uh, think the sec, uh, the FTC,
which is the agency in question in this case there when they were controlled by
board members, a portion of the board would be,
would be picked in one presidential term and a portion in the other, uh,
their terms were scattered so that more than one president would have a say in
who filled them. They usually serve for fixed terms of seven years,
although there are a few departures that doesn't really matter.
What's germane for us is that Congress a long time ago had conditioned their
removal on a pretty narrow category of faults by the,
the commissioners that is, as it's known in the legal Academy for cause,
that is, they had to commit a felony, be convicted of bribery. Uh,
they couldn't just be removed by the chief executive who was putatively the head
of the executive department, including the regulatory agencies. Uh,
this insulated a good portion of the bureaucracy,
which set all sorts of rules affecting our wallets and our interactions are how
we conducted business, uh,
how we were regulated depending on what industry we were in.
The sec would regulate your lives and activities. If you traded,
traded on the equity markets, et cetera. Uh, the FTC, uh,
if you're engaged in some sort of commerce, which is, uh, uh,
under a very expansive understanding of the Supreme court, uh,
basically gave it purview over most of the commerce of the United States.
Anyway, that was the system that had been in place for, you know,
80 years or so, 85 years or so.
And it had grown substantially in these 1960s and 1970s and has been off to the
races ever since.
So Trump v. Slaughter is a case that finally put, uh,
the nail in the coffin or the final nail in the coffin of this doctrine that the
president could not control through removal.
And thus the people could not control through their elected president,
this portion of the administrative state.
So I will turn it over to John to talk about the significance of Trump v.
Slaughter and what it portends for the future of constitutional government in
the coming years and decades.
Thanks for the setup, Brian. I think you did a very good job summarizing.
I want to just add a few things to the summary and that is, you know,
the Claremont Institute has spent a long time challenging the
anti-constitutional movement that we call the progressive movement and,
and Humphrey's executor was really a capstone,
both a capstone and a cornerstone of that movement.
It really brought to fruition things that the early progressives have been
pushing for, which is ruled by the experts, uh,
unencumbered by popular opinion,
which means unencumbered by voters and, uh, and the popular,
the sovereignty of the people directing it, uh,
direction of the country, uh, and of the government. And so that's the,
the capstone,
but also the cornerstone because the administrative state or the deep state or
the, the dark state, whatever you want to call it, can't exist,
uh, in large measure. If,
if the people that run these independent so-called independent agencies can be
terminated by the president, the chief executive. Um,
the second piece that I think is very interesting about this case is it like
Humphrey's executor in 1935, it involved the federal trade commission.
And so, you know,
the fact that they've overruled Humphrey's executor with another case coming out
of the federal trade commission is a big deal. Now, uh,
the court had a more modest off-ramp, uh,
that they could have taken Humphrey's executor is based on the claim that
at the time in 1935,
the federal trade commission was a quasi legislative or quasi judicial
body, really not exercising pure quintessential executive
power.
And so Congress could constrain the executive's ability to remove the
commissioners because they weren't really executive officials. Now,
uh, that was always phony.
There were a lot of executive powers that had exercised at the time.
And of course that, that completely ducked the question.
If they're exercising some executive and some legislative and some judicial
powers, doesn't that pose a different kind of problem, which is, you know,
the consolidation of all three kinds of power in one agency.
Montesquieu described that and James Madison picked up on this as the very
definition of tyranny. Court never addressed that back in Humphrey's executor.
But in the intervening 70 or 80 years, since that case was decided,
Congress has given more clearly executive powers to the federal trade
commission. Um, and, uh,
and one could have seen potentially the court saying,
this is now an executive agency. We're not overruling that original decision.
Uh,
we are distinguishing it because the current FTC is dramatically different than
the former FTC could have done that.
And with the incrementalist approach that some of the justices on the court seem
to prefer,
there was some concern that that might be the off ramp they take happily.
They did not. They did a full overrule of Humphrey's executor with, uh,
with the federal trade commission. Uh,
and the second thing I want to point out here is another case that happened along
the way. And we'll, the significance of this, uh,
will become evident when we talk about the birthright citizenship case in a
moment, but along the way in the 1980s,
we had a case come up called Morrison versus Olson. Um,
Ted Olson was, uh,
worked for the Reagan administration and Congress was pushing hard
interfering or intruding on executive powers.
And Ted Olson was the point person pushing back against that.
He was subsequently prosecuted by an independent prosecutor. Um,
and the issue comes up on whether the independent prosecutor, uh,
who exercised clearly, uh,
executive powers could be removed by the president and under Humphrey's
executor,
somebody that exercised purely executive powers should be removed by the
president. And the court held with a single dissent by justice Scalia,
the court held upheld the independent prosecutor law and the restrictions on the
president's ability to remove this guy,
exercising the quintessential executive power,
which is the prosecutorial power. Um,
Antonin Scalia wrote separately in dissent to challenge
that on core fundamental separation of powers principles, um,
and executive authority principles. Uh, it was a lone dissent,
but it has carried the day, uh, in, in, in,
in the scholarship.
And most people recognized eventually that justice Scalia was right.
And I bring that up because, um, it, it,
it demonstrates that when a court speaks and it's ought not to end the inquiry,
it ought to be the beginning of an inquiry about constitutional interpretation.
So we get to slaughter and Trump, you know,
basically sent a message to the commissioner slaughter, uh,
just, just very similar to the message that, uh,
I think it was Herbert Hoover sent to, uh, uh, uh, uh,
a postmaster first class that back in a case before Humphrey's executor called
my Myers. And he said, you know, I, I, I don't have anything against you,
but, uh, I think, uh, I should have somebody who,
with whom I have a full confidence and you're not it. And so I'm removing you.
Um, and the court in that case,
Myers versus the United States upheld the president's authority,
remove executive officers. And then of course,
that's changed in Humphrey's executor.
So fast forward to slaughter and president Trump says, you know,
I think I need somebody who who's on board with my agenda and in whom I have a
full confidence and you're not it. So you're gone. She sued. And, uh,
the court, uh, uh,
just last week upheld the president's authority to remove independent
agency heads,
even though Congress had put in fairly stringent for cause removal
restrictions on the president's power. That's a huge win. It's a,
it's a huge win because it fundamentally restores article two of the
constitution to its, to its place that the constitution assigns it.
The constitution doesn't say the executive powers except whatever Congress
decides to give to independent agencies, uh, are vested.
It says the, the executive power, all of it,
all of it is vested in the president of the United States.
Everybody else that exercises executive power does so derivatively from the
president, which means derivatively from we, the people,
because we're the only, uh,
the president is the only office that we, the people elect, uh,
to run the executive branch, not, not the head of the federal trade commission,
not the head of the securities exchange commission or any of the other alphabet
soup agencies that have, uh, uh, you know,
blown out of proportion over the last century. I've often joked,
I want to get one of those power ball things with letters in it and pull out any
three letters and see how many agencies you can make. Uh,
I dare say most people in Washington can't even keep track of them.
There are so many of them. So this was a major win, a restoration,
not only a separation of powers,
but have the unitary authority that the constitution assigns in the executive
and authority that the founders deliberately put into a single person so
that we knew who to praise when things went well and knew who to blame when
things went badly. Uh,
when you create all these agencies that are not accountable, uh,
you kind of lose the ability to, uh, have political accountability at all.
And one of the most bizarre aspects of the old Humphreys executor decision was
the con the court said,
Congress wanted to create an agency that was directly accountable to the American
people, not filtered through political elected officials.
And one has to wonder how it was that if they couldn't be removed by the one
guy, we had an opportunity to elect,
they were accountable to be the American people. They weren't,
but you can see the progressive notion coming out in it.
Their accountability to the American people is because they're the experts and
they know better than we do how the federal trade commission should be run or
securities and exchange commission or the economy or global warming or the
COVID controversy. Uh, you know, the,
the experts didn't seem to get any of those things. Right. Not surprisingly,
the American people have much more common sense about it than that.
So that's slaughter and the significance of it.
It is probably the most significant structural constitutional
case of the term.
The one that will go down in all of the constitutional law textbooks now is a
landmark decision,
but I do want to provide a caveat because chief justice Roberts split the baby
here a little bit.
Also before the court was a case called Trump versus cook. Uh,
and the president tried to do the same thing, uh, with Lisa cook, uh,
chairman of one of the members of the federal reserve board. Now, uh, when,
when that kind of got some pushback,
the president changed gears a little bit and said, no,
we're just not removing her at will because I have the authority to do so,
but we're removing her for cause because we've now discovered that she, uh,
committed mortgage fraud by claiming a primary residence on a mortgage
application.
That wasn't her primary residence and therefore getting a better, uh, uh,
a better interest rate that she was not, uh, entitled to. Um,
so he fired her for cause and the court on a preliminary phase of this
case,
the trial court had said you can't fire her and ordered her reinstated to
continue to serve on the fed, even though the president had removed her. Uh,
and so this went up on an,
on a stay application to block that lower court order.
And chief justice Roberts writing for the majority of the court rejected the
president's request for a stay of that order.
So the case is now back before the trial court to go to the merits.
But chief justice Roberts seemed to be pretty clear on what he thought the
merits were, despite having just moments before issued the decision in slaughter.
He, he, he doesn't talk about any of that history,
any of that constitutional line drawing, uh,
that he had so eloquently, uh, uh, discussed in, in slaughter.
And he just says somehow the fed is different.
It's more like the first national bank of the United States.
And we've always recognized those banks should be, uh,
free from political influence. Now, uh,
the historians and the legal scholars are already lambasting that decision as
very soft, more simplistic historically,
because vast differences between the fed,
which is a government agency,
exercising executive power and the first and second national banks of the United
States, which has no executive power were in fact, private entities. Um,
but all of that gets glossed over. Uh, and so at the moment,
it looks like a huge win in slaughter for pushing back against the
administrative state with a, with a minor carve out,
at least for now of the fed. Uh, apparently the wall street, uh,
crowd was expressing jitters that they didn't want the fed, uh,
being accountable to the American people. Um, but again,
this is part of the progressive problem.
They think that experts can come in and manage things for us. Uh, uh,
and, and that's just not the way the constitution is designed. Um, anyway,
so we made, we made major progress with slaughter, uh, step back on fed,
but it's a narrow carve out. I think slaughter is going to carry the day,
certainly for every other agency in town and maybe eventually for the fed as
well, but we'll have to see how that plays out.
I have a perhaps pedestrian political question since this does seem like a
hugely significant ruling. Um,
and judicially as you've described it kind of cuts to the heart of this matter
that has been a major conservative, uh,
grievance for, for a long time. This, this administrative,
the power of the administrative state and restores, as you said,
if I'm hearing you rightly, it restores a measure of power to the president,
the unitary executive that had been taken wrongly and placed in these agencies.
Um,
it seems to me like the progressives have had a bunch of different views over
the years about how strong they want the presidency to be.
If you look at kind of the FDR era and the,
some of the love that emanates out of the histories and biographies of FDR,
you get the impression, and even Woodrow Wilson,
that like the progressive model includes a kind of really forceful,
decisive leading man, uh, at the top.
And then the conservative reaction to that as well, there's,
there's an element of just arbitrary kind of progressive tyranny in this. Um,
now, of course,
with Trump in power and with the executive state starting to be dismantled,
or at least it's some of its, uh, uh,
some of its independence being taken, taken away,
you're starting to see all of these concerns about, Oh, no kings.
We're worried about the imperial presidency. We'll worry about the tyranny.
Um, and so I can see kind of two ways that the progressive movement might go
from here. One would be, yes,
we are now the defenders of the people against this overreach of,
well, you know, one unitary executive in, in the person of the president.
On the other hand, if, if a Democrat president gets elected,
I imagine that that won't be a concern at all.
And they'll be very happy for the Democrat president to have as much power as
he can, as he can grasp. Um, at which point, you know,
I guess I'm asking what,
what do you think the progressive reaction to this decision is going to be?
And what kind of, uh, tactics will they adopt in, in response?
Yeah. So, uh, you know, immediately and for the next two years,
it'll be a orange man, bad. Trump is bad.
He's an authoritarian and he's destroying our country.
Look at the way he's ignoring congressional statutes that created these
protections for these independent agencies.
And then beginning on January 20th, 2029,
if they retake the white house, all of that will go by the wayside. And, uh,
all they have to do is say, yeah,
the president has the ability to remove these people, uh,
and we'll remove all the terrible folks that Trump brought in. Um,
but beyond that,
the agency can continue to be independent because behind the scenes,
progressive presidents will talk to the progressive heads of these agencies.
And, you know,
the agencies will do the president's bidding without it being done publicly.
And without it being done with any measure of accountability,
the American people, if it goes badly, the president say, well,
I didn't have any control over the people of the FTC, uh,
shame on them for doing that, but I can't do anything about it. Uh,
but behind the scenes, it'll be the president's policy.
So what's really at play here is a double standard,
depending on who the American people have chosen to relieve the country. And,
and unfortunately, most people in government, uh,
tend to be left of center progressive or much worse,
radical leftists increasingly. Um, because think about it.
Conservatives don't think, you know, having a,
an extra office inside the bureaus is a height,
the heightened goal of your careers. Uh, whereas many,
many on the left side of the political spectrum do.
And so the agencies are almost always, uh,
manned and staffed by these leftists or radical leftists. And, uh,
uh, and, and, and if we don't have something like Trump versus slaughter,
fixing that problem,
making the agency heads accountable to the president and therefore through him
to the American people, then this unelected bureaucracy,
this deep state, uh,
unaccountable just operates on its own,
no matter who we elect. And that's been the case for 50,
60, 70 years. Um,
it's probably led to the Nixon downfall,
although he did some things to try and appease them that, you know,
we should not praise. Um, but, but, uh, you know, and, uh,
the deep state of the state department trying to scuttle, uh,
Ronald Reagan's initiatives that, you know, that brought,
eventually brought down the Soviet union.
That would have never happened if the deep state had had its way,
the deep state at the department of state. Uh, uh, you know, so, uh,
uh, this is a bigger problem that the progressive unleashed on us than,
than simply whether the president could remove an FTC commissioner.
It really goes to the fundamental question on when we give
consent to the operation of government through free and fair elections,
does that really matter if the deep state's going to operate on autopilot
without any change, depending on how the head of the office runs it. Uh,
and that's, what's at stake.
And that's why I think slaughter is so vitally important is it's finally,
finally set the ship back a right on that it'll take a long time before
the, the, uh, the, uh,
rank and file and all these agencies get the message. Um, and you know, if,
if, uh, if the radicals come back in power in, in two years, um,
uh, then this,
this might end up being a blip and they'll just get rid of all the Trump people
and they'll staff these things with bureaucrats that don't think they need to be
accountable to anybody anymore. And,
and we'll see the demise of a great civilization in relatively short order.
Um, but to stop that slide,
this was an absolutely critical step and why I think it's so important.
Yeah. I think John, I can just a comment on that last point.
And then I have a question for you follow up. Uh, I mean,
in many ways,
because of the trajectory of national government since the new deal era and
post-war war two, which we've been describing really the rise,
the, the ascent and dominance of this new way of doing government,
a substantial portion of policy being run through these independent agencies.
I think the progressive argument is of course, it's, um, uh,
it's popular and accountable to the people,
but we get back to this theme of quote unquote,
our democracy that the left likes to use. So in the progressive view,
it is accountable to the people,
but it's accountable to the people that are on the right side of history.
That is us and the university educated public administration,
PhDs who serve in government and the portion of the American people that agree
with us on how we ought to do modern government. And so in that sense, uh,
it's very representative.
I think they think for maybe a majority or super majority of the country as they
understand it. Uh, and this leads to my question, which is, um,
Spencer and I went through the oral arguments for Trump v. slaughter,
and you could hear it, especially in Sotomayor's questioning,
although it was echoed in Kagan and in Jackson. Uh,
and it was this incredulity that, uh, you surely solicit Mr.
Shirley, uh, general sour that is solicitor general sour.
It's not the government's position that the way we've done government now for
eight decades or even longer, uh, in some embryonic form,
surely you're not saying that that all has to go away. Uh,
we've been doing government this way for so long. What are we to do now? Uh,
and it gets to this question of conservatism versus constitutionalism.
Uh, so some of our more moderate friends on the right would argue, look,
this has been settled for now almost a century.
And this is not a conservative ruling. It's really radical.
You can't just throw out modern government and how it's practiced in the West
or a good portion of it. What are you all doing? You're crazy. Uh,
a final question. Uh, uh, you could do with, with all of that, which you will,
but what is John Eastman's ideal, um,
process for sorting all this out?
And I ask it because I think we are not unapologetic,
um, maximalist defenders of the scope of the modern executive power at all at the
Claremont Institute. What we really would like,
I think is actually some serious, um,
curbing of executive power and the return a lot of,
of a lot of these powers to Congress. But in the interim,
you're going to have a much more powerful executive if he's allowed to exercise
more control over these independent agencies.
So all of these sort of topics were swirling around the court's deliberations.
So I was wondering if you could help us parse that a little bit.
Yeah, look, uh, uh,
it won't be an expansion of executive power that flows from this.
It'll be a more accountable executive power. We're not,
we're not expanding the kind of things that are being exercised by the
executive. We are simply, uh,
determining who it is that has where the buck stops that has the ultimate say on
the exercise of that power.
We're shifting it from an unaccountable bureaucracy suit to an accountable
elected president of the United States.
We're shifting it back to where the founders placed that executive power.
And if the president exceeds the constitutional authorities that the constitution
gives him, we know who to hold account. I mean, how many people knew, uh,
uh, Lisa Cook or Slaughter's name before this case came up,
right? And yet they had a massive impact on regulations that affected your lives
every day.
And if you thought that their regulations and their enforcements were
causing harm, who did you hold accountable for that?
Right. And was it somebody that really was accountable and could you do anything
about it? And because the answers to those were, no,
you couldn't do anything about it. This thing was on autopilot.
No matter who you elected, they were going to run our country into the ground.
They were going to run our debt up to 40 trillion.
They were going to stifle entrepreneurial ship and innovation from one end of
the country to the other. And there's, you know what,
they look at you and they say, there's not a dang thing you can do about it.
Well, now there is something we can do about it.
We can elect a president whom we hold accountable.
If somebody is telling me what size my chair at my home office has to be
coming out of some Bureau in Washington, DC,
we now know that it's not the head of the FTC I should blame.
It's the president I should blame.
And we can throw him out of office at the next election.
So it's not altering executive power.
It's just making the exercise of that power accountable to the ultimate
sovereign in this country. And see,
and that's ultimately the question that the progressives go ballistic over.
And as you pointed out,
they think that they are furthering democracy by having the elites and their
little cocktail party circuit be the runs that control everything because they
don't trust the American people.
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson and George Washington and the rest of that
crew from our founding era, the drafters of the constitution,
the first Congresses,
they had a much greater inherent trust in the American people and the common
sense of the American people than any of these crazy elites right now have.
And the fact of the matter is they get it wrong more often than right.
And the collective wisdom of the American people gets it right much more often
than wrong. And, you know, just,
you just look at the COVID nonsense and how many people died and how many
generations of kids have we destroyed their educational trajectories because of
the idiocy of Anthony Fauci, you know,
and yet he's supposed to be the expert that we all bow and need to, you know,
so this gets back to accountability more than anything else.
We're not, the president will have more power,
but the executive branch itself will not have any more executive power.
What exercising power they have will be more accountable in its exercise.
Yeah. Just one followup, John, I guess what I was trying to get at it,
and I know you agree with me, so it's, it's another softball,
but just to put a point on it for folks,
to the extent that these agencies now much more controlled by the accountable
executive, which is good to the extent that they exercise a decent amount of
judicial and legislative power,
there's still a lot of work left for Congress to do to kind of bring a lot of
that back in house, as it were, uh, while leaving the president with, uh,
his newly, uh, uh, I guess,
newly re-enlivened ability to control the use of executive power in these
agencies.
Well, and, and, uh, uh, if,
if I'm recalling correctly and one of the concurring opinions in the case,
there was a suggestion that this notion that they get to exercise quasi
legislative and quasi judicial powers is itself a huge separation of powers
problem. And maybe we ought to look at that next. Um, and so, uh, uh,
you know, we're, we're,
we haven't restored the constitution in full measure yet,
but we're certainly heading in the right direction for the first time.
Look, I was, you know,
we founded the center for constitutional jurisprudence a quarter century ago,
a little over a quarter century ago.
And I was looking back at one of the original strategy memos that we,
I did way back at the beginning. And, um, you know,
I listed off about a dozen or a dozen and a half Supreme bad Supreme court
decisions I'd like to see overturned. Uh, and, uh,
Humphrey's executor was one of them. And, uh,
it was just a very big day when that case came down.
And the fact that it was named slaughter, I just thought was priceless,
you know, to say we slaughtered Humphrey.
It's like when we took out Chevron deference, which is another case,
case we'd been trying to get overturned for a long time. And, uh,
there were two cases up there at the Supreme court. Um, uh, unfortunately the one,
the one of them that, you know,
got there a little bit after the first one was called relentless.
And I thought that would have been a good name for overturning Chevron deference
because we'd been relentless and arguing for that. Uh,
but slaughter is a good name for this. And, uh,
I'm glad it'll go down as a landmark decision, but it was such a name.
It deserves it.
Definitely. Uh, well,
let's turn to the other elephant in the room of the last week of the courts.
Uh, we want to try to talk about Trump v. Barbara, um,
this birthright citizenship case. Um, I wonder, John, I know a lot of, um,
our listeners and audience were a bit dispirited by that decision. Uh,
we predicted that it would not come out fully in our favor. Uh, we'd be, uh,
but I wanted you to maybe set a little bit of the,
the history or background for this and illustrate for us,
even the fact that it was five, four slash six, three, depending on how you count,
but really five, four in the holding, uh, is, is amazing in a way,
given what's,
what our arguments and the effects of them have been over the last 20 or 30
years and their reception,
especially in Washington versus where we are today.
Yeah. So, you know,
let's go back in the 1990s or the brief that Ed Meese and I filed in,
uh, in the early two thousands and one of the war on terror cases,
Yasser Esam Hamdi, uh,
he'd been born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana to Saudi parents while his dad was
working here on a temporary work visa and went back to Saudi Arabia,
ended up joining up with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. And,
and we captured him there and took him to Guantanamo Bay. Uh,
when they found out he'd been born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, uh,
they treated him as if he was a citizen and sent him up to Norfolk. And, um,
you know, his case then goes, uh,
in dealing with whether the president had authority to declare somebody an enemy
combatant without full trials and all of that. Um,
but we raised the issue about whether he was in fact a citizen. Um, uh,
so that was 20, almost 25 years ago, uh,
at earlier and Tom West and Mike Anton and I have been doing a lot of research
on this subject. The original,
the original understanding of the citizenship clause of the 14th amendment.
Of course,
everybody acknowledges that it was designed to overturn the egregiously wrong
Supreme court decision in Dred Scott that denies citizenship to any
black American free or slave, uh,
and prohibited Congress from, from prohibiting slavery in the territories.
So the citizenship clause was designed to overturn that all persons born in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens.
Now, uh, subject to the jurisdiction had two meanings.
And this is where the historical research that we have done that justice Thomas
in his dissent, primarily in a 91 page dissent,
just laid out line by line, crossing the T's and dotting the I's.
Some get the jurisdiction did not mean mere partial or territorial jurisdiction.
It meant complete jurisdiction. Uh,
and the drafters of the language were asked that question point blank.
What do you mean by that?
Because the Indians are clearly subject to our jurisdiction,
both civil and military was one of the questions asked of Senator Howard who
authored the language. He said,
what I mean by that is subject to a complete jurisdiction.
And because they owe their allegiance to their tribes are not subject to the
complete jurisdiction of the United States and they are not granted automatic
citizenship under this clause.
Now if Indians who were domestic dependent sovereigns within our jurisdiction
and old full allegiance to the United States that by treaty or conquest,
if they're not covered by the citizenship clause and clearly somebody who's just
passing through temporary visitors or who's here illegally and who continues to
owe allegiance to their home country,
whether it be China or Mexico or Venezuela or Iran or,
or wherever the notion that they get automatic citizenship under this clause is
very his a historical. Um,
and president Trump to his credit said so when he came down the escalator in
2015 and made this one of this planks and his campaign platform and people
roundly criticize them and said, Oh, that was settled a hundred years ago.
You can't change this. Um,
and he was waving a law review article saying not true, not settled.
And I think it was my law review article on this subject. Uh, but,
but, um, the point is, uh,
most legal scholars until Trump came down the escalator acknowledged that an old
Supreme court case called one Kim arc had broad language,
but the actual holding did not settle the question of the citizenship of temporary
visitors or illegal immigrants. But when Trump came down the escalator,
they all started acting as if it had been settled a hundred years ago and that
he was flouting the constitutional law and the Ken's and longstanding precedent.
So it's just not true. There was dicta broad language in the case,
but what was involved in the one Kim arc case in 1898 was Chinese parents who
had moved here and had become permanently domiciled in this country.
And the court goes out of its way 28 different times referencing that fact in
its opinion. Now we get to people who are not permanently domiciled here,
domiciled, meaning legally present with our consent in the United States.
They weren't temporarily passing through and they weren't here illegally.
And Trump's executive order hits those two categories,
which are not covered by the holding in one Kim arc. Um, unfortunately, uh,
the court five to four, and you're right about this five to four, uh,
whether the constitution compels mandatory citizenship for everybody,
virtually everybody born here, except for the children, the diplomats. Um,
and, uh, the six, three language,
you'll see the press touting is because justice Cavanaugh, uh,
disagreed with the constitutional row ruling sided with the dissenters on that.
But he said a federal statute, uh, compels birthright citizenship.
And he did that so that Congress could change it if they want it. Now he owes,
his view only got one vote. So I don't think Congress could change it, uh,
because of the constitutional ruling,
but that creates another very important issue for us and why I referenced Ted
Olson's solo dissent in the Morrison versus Olson case on the independent
prosecutor law and the administrative agencies case a minute ago,
the strength of that dissent. Yeah.
The strength of that dissent carried the day because it was correct.
And I think the strength of the dissents here by Thomas and Alito will carry the
day because they're correct.
And you already see just a groundswell of people talking about birthright
citizenship when 10 years ago or five years ago, everybody thought it was settled.
If you were born here, you were a citizen. We know they, you know,
some people thought that was great. Some people thought it was foolish,
but they thought the constitution compelled it.
And our scholarship drove the issue to the Supreme court to a five,
four ruling when,
when most legal scholars were laughing at it saying it was so frivolous,
it would get nine zero slapped down.
Some of the lower courts even threatened one of the judges in Seattle
threatened the department of justice lawyers for even daring to defend the
president's executive order. The argument was so frivolous. He said, well,
you know, they're not saying it was frivolous anymore when it comes five,
four,
and you look at the strength of the arguments and the reasoning in those
dissents and set it up, uh, next to the, uh, uh,
the reasoning of the majority opinion. And they just went at hands down for any,
anybody that's honestly looking at it. Um,
I published a piece at American mind, um, uh, uh,
challenging chief justice Roberts.
He begins his analysis in the case with old English common law beginning
in 1608. And I say, you know,
we would have been better served if we began not at Westminster in 1608,
but in Philadelphia in 1776,
because at the heart of the chief justice's opinion is that America adopted the
English feudal rule of the law of the soil.
You solely that if you're born on the King's soil,
you are the King's subject and you owe a perpetual allegiance to the King,
which you can never renounce. Now look at our declaration of independence.
I hope everybody in your audience read it this past weekend as part of the
celebration of 250th anniversary. Uh,
it concludes with a brilliant repudiation of you solely probably the most
eloquent repudiation ever written.
It says we declare that these United colonies are and of right ought to be free
and independent States.
And we hereby renounce all allegiance to the British crown.
Now, if that doesn't say we've rejected the old English feudal rule of perpetual
allegiance and you solely, I don't know what could be more clear. Uh,
we fought the revolutionary war over that issue and we won and we fought the war
of 1812 over that same issue and we won again. Uh, and yet justice,
chief justice,
Robert says that the English feudal rule of you solely cross the Atlantic and
remain and came and came into the United States unchanged. Uh, and you know,
just historically, it's just demonstrably not correct. Um,
so what I think is we're going to see now is push back against the decision by
a lot of Americans who have been awakened to the issue that it wasn't settled
law. The constitution didn't codify this crazy rule into place.
By the way, a rule that the English themselves no longer follow, um,
that we did something aggressive, different. And you know,
if you just ask anybody on that court,
so do you think in 1868 the people that drafted or the people that ratified the
14th amendment, if you ask them,
would it cover Chinese birth tourists or people who had come across our border
and we're here illegally? Uh, uh, they would say, no, that's crazy talk.
Nobody, nobody thought that that's what it was doing.
So where is the consent of our governed to have accepted this rule that's now
been imposed on us as a matter of constitutional law? It doesn't exist.
And therefore cornerstone of the, uh,
of our declaration that governments are legitimate based on consent of the
government is gone. Um, now we,
we've had this, uh, in our, uh, history before. And oddly,
it's the same case that led to the 14th amendment in the first place,
which is the Dred Scott decision. Remember,
Dred Scott said that Mr. Dred Scott,
when he was taken to a free state and territory, uh,
had gained his freedom. The Supreme court said, no,
he can't even sue in the courts because he's not a citizen.
And not only he and no other slave,
but no other black free or slave can be treated as citizens forever in this
country now. And,
and Congress has no authority to prohibit slavery in the territories.
Chief justice Taney held for the Supreme court in Dred Scott.
But within a few years,
Abraham Lincoln's elected president challenging that order.
And he gives in his first inaugural address,
a great challenge to judicial supremacy. He said,
the court's ruling is binding on the parties to the case.
But if we're to treat its pronouncements on a hotly contested issue like this
as controlling forevermore,
we will have ceased to that extent to be our own rulers.
And Lincoln directed people not to comply with the Dred Scott ruling in other
cases to keep challenging it.
Congress in 1862 passed a law prohibiting slavery in the territories directly
contrary to the Dred Scott ruling. Uh,
signed that into law. And,
and so I've suggested that Congress ought to do something similar to push back
against this and what you'll likely go. Let's suppose, I mean, I know this,
this Congress,
they can't seem to even get bills passed that have 80 or 90% support among the
American people like the save act. Um, but what let's,
let's suppose they could get a statute passed that says, you know,
people who are here temporarily and here illegally are not subject to the
jurisdiction in the way the constitution means.
And therefore they are not automatic citizens.
If they deliver children here on our soil while they're temporarily here out
of the court, the court would,
obviously there would be legal challenges to that statute very quickly and it
would go back up to the court and then we're going to get a very interesting
insight on who this court thinks it is.
So the arrogant judicial supremacy response would be,
we already settled that question in the Barbara case. Go away.
Uh, or it could be, uh, we, uh,
think that your criticism of our decision warrants serious
reflection and re deliberation on our part. Uh,
we may come to the same conclusion that we did before,
but we're now going to do it with more cognizant that one of our co equal
branches disagrees with us. Um,
or we may decide that we were wrong, that you're right. And, uh, we,
we, uh, change our role. So that's one way we push back.
The Congress did this with some of the religious liberty cases,
the court decided wrongly. Uh,
it pushed back against the flag burning decision of the case with a
statute, uh, as well. And, and, uh, some things,
some of those were struck down. Some of them, the court kind of, uh,
split the difference and modified their decision a little bit,
but that's the kind of give and take that I think is warranted in a
constitutional Republic with three equal co co equal branches rather than a
regime of, uh, unelected officials that, that claim they are the Supreme,
that judicial supremacy, when they say the word,
that's the end of the discussion. Now,
the other route that is open to us,
if the court refuses to reconsider its decision would be a constitutional
amendment. And let's just talk practical politics here.
Uh, I don't think you could get the two thirds vote in each,
the house and the Senate to propose a constitutional amendment on the way
every other constitutional amendment we've had is, uh, has been adopted. Uh,
but James Madison left us another route,
and that is a convention of the States.
And you could have a resolution passed by 34 state legislatures calling for a
convention of the States to meet,
to propose a single constitutional amendment,
to clarify and restore the original meaning of the 14th amendment.
And then they convene and then, uh, they propose the amendment. Uh, and,
and it could say something simply like subject to the jurisdiction means subject
to the total jurisdiction, not subject to any foreign powers. Uh, and,
and then that goes back to the States.
And if 38 States ratify that amendment,
the Supreme court's decision would be overturned. And I think,
I think we've got the numbers in the States that makes that a very viable
option, but I, I don't want to let Congress off the hook and wait for it.
I want to force that, have them force the hand as well.
Let's see where our elected representatives are coming down on this issue,
force them to take some votes, uh,
on legislation that would push back against this Supreme court's decision. Uh,
and, and, and let the, let the deliberation games begin.
To the point about the route of approach here,
because one thing I found helpful about the description you've just given
is gives us a nice contour of like the different particular
issues that are bound up in this larger category of birthright citizenship.
And it seems like one of the problems is that those issues get wrapped up when in
fact they are quite distinct. So you, you mentioned, for example,
that the amendment itself in question comes from the
matter of giving citizenship to X to freed
slaves and to black Americans more generally.
And that opens you up to, in my view,
the pretty spurious or specious argument that what you really want is a return
to Jim Crow. You know, that,
that kind of thing is just always in the air in our, in our politics. Um,
but as you pointed out, in fact, the,
the open question on the table is,
is a totally distinct and separate one.
And that's to do with this matter of anchor babies,
birth tourism. I mean,
these are the things that I think the American public generally,
and also of course, if you were to resurrect and ask the founders,
they would say, obviously something has gone amiss. If there's,
if that's open to,
if it's open to illegal immigrants or to even nefarious
actors to kind of use the current laws on the books to
just magic citizenship into thin air, then something has,
has gone wrong. Um, I wonder whether you think, I mean,
I'm of two minds about this. I will say like the,
the way that this case came to court,
which was by a Trump's executive order, uh,
was that helpful or, or hurtful to the matter at hand? In other words,
did it make it harder for the court to parse these
issues because they were dealing with the executive kind of making a
statement about this,
rather than if Congress had moved to act in the way that you are now
suggesting it will need to do, if we're going to resolve this issue,
or was it simply necessary to force the case with an executive order?
I guess.
So one of the reasons I disagree with Brett Kavanaugh's off-ramp
strategy here of, uh,
suggesting that Congress could fix this by statute. Um, I mean,
it didn't get any other votes. So, uh,
you've still got a constitutional ruling. Um,
Congress's role therefore is not going to be a direct overturning of the
decision, but a pressure to reconsider the decision.
Um, but one of the reasons I never liked the idea of Congress exercising power
to redefine the subject to the jurisdiction clause, um,
it is because the very reason we have a 14th amendment is the reconstruction
Congress, um, that passed the civil rights act of 1866,
um, thought it was on tenuous constitutional grounds.
So they wanted to under the 13th amendment.
So they wanted the 14th amendment to make it more clearly within their
authority, but two,
they wanted to constitutionalize it so no future Congress could alter the
rule. And, and so, you know,
when you see that that's the driving force for getting the language in the
14th amendment in the first place, so some future Congress couldn't have,
you know,
just repealed the protections for the former slaves that they had attended to
codify the notion that Congress can manipulate the language of the 14th
amendment to come to a different resolution than what it originally meant.
I think it's just, um, is wrongheaded. Um, that's,
but that's not to say they ought not to push it back to say,
we think that's not what it originally meant.
And we're going to keep pushing for what it originally meant,
because that is what we think is binding. It's not a living constitution.
It doesn't alter, uh, but it,
but it is foundational and what it meant at the time,
the people that ratified it, that's what it means. Uh, and, and,
and Senator Howard and Senator Trumbull and a bunch of the others that it means
owing full allegiance, not knowing owing allegiance to any other power.
That's what it means. They were very clear about that. Um, and so, uh,
you know, you kind of push it back. Now, your other part of your question,
was it strategically an error for this to get pushed via a
executive order from the president rather than, uh, a statute in Congress?
And I would have liked to have seen both branches weigh in,
but Congress is rather inept at doing anything these days. Um,
the president forced the issue and the reason that people from one end of the
country to the other are talking about it is because he did two years ago,
five years ago. Uh, I think most people would have said,
if you're born here, you're a citizen. That's really stupid, but that's the,
what that's what the constitution says that a lot of people,
very serious scholars,
but ordinary citizens as well that started looking at the arguments and saying,
you know, you're right. We never did create this as a constitutional rule.
How did we go off rails and how can we get back? Thank you,
president Trump for forcing the conversation and getting us back. Um,
and I think that's what he did.
And the fact that it was not a nine zero decision to strike down his executive
order,
but a five four decision on the constitutional question is
immensely important. I would have rather seen it five,
four the other direction and then we went out. Right.
But the fact that we got four votes on this means not only is it not a frivolous
argument as a lot of left was trying to say, there's a, there's a, uh,
professor at Fordham chastising one of the, one of the more recent,
uh, scholars that has weighed in on this in our, in our, uh,
position, Elon Worman said, you know,
he should be run out of the Academy for pushing such a frivolous argument that
deep darn near got four or five votes for, well,
this is the progressive mentality. You know, if, if, uh,
if you have a different view of things than we have,
you must be crazy and you have no place at the table for even engaging in a
conversation. So we're seeing that kind of reaction from the left here.
But the American people aren't buying it. They're saying, wow,
these arguments have make a lot of sense. Um, and I mean,
the notion that our two major enemies,
geopolitical enemies on the world stage are generating thousands and
tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of American citizens by showing up
for a few days or a month and having them born here and then go back to Russia
or, or to China and has them raised as good little communists.
And we're going to attack the United States when they come of age.
It's just absurd. And, and ordinary people understand how absurd that is.
And the president's executive order was designed to get us back on track for
something that we, the American people had never signed off on in the first
place. And, and, and that goes back to, I think that what I talked about earlier,
the cornerstone, the cornerstone of the declaration,
the universal principle of human equality leaves to certain practical
principles that flow necessarily. And that is if we're all created equal,
nobody gets to rule in another without our consent.
That means the only legitimate purpose of government is to secure rights we have
from God, not from government, based on our consent.
And without consent, the government is not legitimate. That's,
that's the cornerstone.
It's not birth of the soil and it's not even birth of the blood.
We're not subjects of some King perpetually.
We give our consent and it's a bilateral consent.
I often like to give the example,
if Congress today wanted to pass a law that said everybody in Mexico
City are citizens of the United States and we're going to start taxing them.
Well, the people of Mexico City might have something to say about that. Say,
well, thanks for the offer of citizenship,
but given the tax bill that comes along with it, we're not,
we're not too inclined to accept it. Thank you very much.
Well, the opposite side of that coin is equally true.
People don't just get, get, come here and unilaterally,
they claim to American citizenship without our consent. And yet,
that's what people who are arriving illegally are doing.
They are here without our consent.
And the notion that they can create citizens without our consent
vitiates that cornerstone principle of the declaration. Uh, by the way,
you know, I, I give Mexico City as example,
there's still a couple of Indian tribes.
Congress passed a statute in 1924,
conferring citizenship on all native Americans.
And a couple of the tribes still say, Hey, thanks very much for the kind offer,
but we reject it. And they still issue their own passports. So it's great.
You know, it's a,
it's a reminder that consent is a two way bilateral thing,
a two ways three.
And we no longer can make people citizens without their consent.
Then they can demand citizenship recognition from us without our consent.
Um, and, and that flows inexorably from the principle that all men are created
equal,
that we create political communities to vindicate those fundamental God-given
human rights,
and that we have a right to decide who's in that political community as we think
best to secure those fundamental rights. Um, and that's,
that's the whole political theory of the declaration in a nutshell. And I,
I fear that, uh, the majority opinion in this case,
didn't seem to understand that.
Amen to that, John. I can't think of a better place to stop. Uh,
we fit our hour. So we'll table this. Uh,
we'll discuss a few more of these cases next week. Uh, uh,
there's some interesting cases that weren't quite as, um,
spicy as the kids say on constitutional issues, but are nonetheless, uh,
important having to do with presidential power and the Trump administration's
authority, um, over now over temporary protected status for,
for Haitians and Syrians for whether someone in Mexico can claim, uh,
advanced asylum, uh, and, uh,
an interesting case about political speech in a way, uh, among other things.
So we'll, we'll get to those next week, but thanks.
Thanks John for joining us and, uh,
thank you all once again for listening and watching the round table.
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And so, uh, it's our pleasure to speak with you as always.
And we will talk to you all next week.