Following Richard Nixon's victory in the turbulent 1968 election, an amendment threatening to dismantle the Electoral College gained startling momentum. Enter the young senate staffer Michael Uhlmann, whose 1970 report put forward what would become the definitive case for the institution thereafter. The amendment failed, but a torrent of new challenges to our constitutional system now arise ahead of 2028. This week, Former president of American Enterprise Institute Christopher DeMuth joins Spencer Klavan to consider if the Electoral College can still weather the storm of an emboldened Left.
Chapters 00:00 Introductions 01:38 Michael Uhlmann’s “In Defense of the Electoral College” 12:03 State Incentives in Presidential Elections 21:38 Multi-Party Systems and Critiques of the Electoral College 42:33 Closing Remarks
Hello and welcome once again to the Close Read podcast, your official CRB podcast. I'm your host,
the associate editor of the Claremont Review of Books, Spencer Clavin, and I am joined for another
very special 250th anniversary of America episode by none other than Christopher DeMuth. You know
if you've been listening to this podcast regularly that we've been threading in a few
extra pieces and interviews and conversations that are based around celebrating America's
quarter-millennium-long tradition. I'm very glad to be joined by Christopher DeMuth to talk about
one of, I think, the jewels of our constitutional order, and that is the electoral college. It's
under a great deal of rhetorical and sometimes even constitutional assault over the years, but
nobody has been more attentive to this matter and has written more widely than Chris DeMuth.
He worked in the Nixon and Reagan administrations. He was the head of AEI for quite some time,
and he's written in a variety of venues over the course of 50 years about a number of issues
centrally the electoral college, and this includes he's a frequent contributor to
CRP. So Chris, welcome to the podcast.
Spencer, good to be here. Thanks for having me on your show.
Yes, it's great to have you on. I thought we could start. One of the pieces that you've written
about the electoral college is really a eulogy, a tribute, we should say, to the wonderful Michael
Ullman, who was a beloved professor, senior fellow at the Claremont Institute, so somebody
that everyone involved with the Claremont Review of Books knows or has read and has loved in some
way or another. I, when I was just starting out at Claremont, when I showed up as an assistant
editor, it was very soon after that that Ullman unfortunately passed away. And so one of my very
first tasks was to kind of collate this outpouring of love and affection and honor for Ullman,
and also, as I recall, to type up by hand the famous defense of the electoral college that
himself made, because it was only in hard copy and we wanted to have an official authoritative
version. And so I think I spent a lot of time kind of working on or working through
that wonderful piece of writing in defense of the electoral college, which you also spent a great
deal of time discussing in depth in this piece, The Man Who Saved the Electoral College. And I'm
going to try to set the table here by describing what this document is, and then I'll ask you to
correct anything that I've gotten wrong and maybe add some detail in. In 1970, so after the 1968
presidential election, which delivered a very close popular victory to Nixon and a pretty solid
electoral college victory, the issue was raised of the electoral college. The fact that there is
this difference in our system between who wins just the mass of all votes across the country,
and then of course, as I think most people well know, those votes are counted by state and most
of the states, 48 of the states, deliver all their electoral votes in a winner-take-all system
to the candidate that has won that state. And the complaints about this are legion,
it's undemocratic, that it blocks the will of the people and snarls it in this kind of elitist,
overcomplicated system. In this case, the counterfactual case, the idea that there
might've been a situation in which the winner of the popular vote would not have won the electoral
college gave strength to this proposal for a constitutional amendment, which was advanced by
Senator Birch Bay and Representative Emanuel Seller of New York. And they put this forward,
it got a lot of momentum, a lot of traction. And it was then at this time, enter young Mike Ullman,
30 years old, to deliver the minority report as the Senate is getting its opinions together
to consider this proposal. There's a kind of majority opinion in favor, and then there is
Ullman's text, which not only helped to block this amendment, which probably would have very
possibly would have gone through otherwise and genuinely persuaded a lot of people,
but has remained a kind of authoritative argument. It has put these sorts of proposals
for a national popular vote on the back foot. Even though so much has been written on this topic,
people continue to recur to Ullman's text. Tell me if that accurately summarizes the situation
and the importance of this work, but also if you would, I'd love for you to kind of lay out
what some of the arguments are that Ullman advances and what are the key points that have
made this the kind of authoritative response, I guess, or defense of the Electoral College.
It overwhelmingly answered all of the arguments in the majority report, but they were very thin
and somewhat bombastic. What's remarkable is the depth and thoroughness of Mike Ullman's arguments,
which have lasted for 56 years and counting since he set them down. If you look at the debates over
the Electoral College and the proposals to replace it with a national popular vote,
a single nationwide vote where the winner becomes president, many arguments have
been much more substantial than they were in opposition to the Electoral College since then.
Virtually every one of them is quite thoroughly dispatched, in my view, in the Ullman report.
I first encountered it. I knew Mike in the 1970s. We were both involved in the latter part of that
decade in what would become the conservative free market public interest law movement,
which became quite influential in subsequent years. We would also go on to work together in the
Reagan White House. But it was in the late 1970s that my great mentor, Edward C. Banfield of
Harvard, gave me a copy of the report and told me to read it and said that he thought that it was
the finest assessment of the Electoral College that had ever been written and that if he had
his way, every college introductory course to the American constitutional system would include it as
assigned reading. So it cannot be recommended enough. Mike was a modest man. He was an
intellectual activist. He was a great networker, a great raconteur, a great friend to many,
many people. But he was personally modest. I never heard him tout this report and its
fundamental effect on reversing a tide, which had seemed to be inexorable in the late summer of 1970
when he was, as a young aide to Senator Ruska, assigned to write the minority report,
as you said, fresh out of Claremont. These minority views, the Uleman essay, is over twice
as long as the majority report. It has a beautiful structure. It introduces arguments of many
prominent supporters of the Electoral College, Theodore White, John F. Kennedy,
a host of political scientists. Since this is a Claremont podcast, I have to mention that
Harry Jaffa is quoted and cited in this report, which would have been obligatory for Mike coming
fresh out of Claremont. But his own arguments were organized in beautiful fashion and explained
in ways that read very, very differently than a conventional legislative report or a committee
document of any kind. It's a single voice. It pays careful attention to the arguments
against the Electoral College, but it completely transcends them. Every electoral system,
every system for choosing representatives, for choosing executives by vote is going to have
some defects. It is a matter of art to have an electoral system that comports with the larger
aims of a political system. The Electoral College is not perfect, but it has lasted,
as Mike was writing, it has lasted for 200 years. We've had it for another
50 years plus since then. It has been part and parcel of an intricate, highly successful,
extremely durable, and for the most part, stability-enhancing political system that has
been, I think most people would acknowledge or celebrate, the most successful constitutional
system that we have seen in the modern world. How did this come about? It is because the choice of
the national chief executive, the president of this large and growing, highly diverse country
resides primarily at the state level. So our federal government is not in charge
of choosing the successor president, as it is in most political systems. The choice is highly
decentralized, highly localized. Each state is given electoral votes that are equal to its number
of senators, two for each of them, and its number of representatives, one for Montana, a pretty big
handful where I live in Virginia, and a huge number out in California where you are, Spencer.
No longer, actually. I've diminished my influence on the presidential election by moving to Nashville,
Tennessee. Did you move there because Tennessee, as a smaller state than California, has a larger
influence in our presidential election, so your vote is worth a tiny fraction of a bit more than
it was in California? Good point. I hadn't thought about that, but it's a nice little perk. Mostly,
I moved because they were burning Los Angeles to the ground, and I didn't want to get caught in the
sinkhole. But yeah, so this is a good example of people have to take... One of the arguments,
as I understand it, is people have to take Tennessee seriously. You can't just win in
major urban centers on the coast. When 2028 comes along, the candidates will be paying
slightly more attention to you, certainly more attention than they will to California, because we
all know, even as we speak right now, how California is going to come out. The Electoral College,
by organizing the national election by states, where each state votes not directly for a president,
but for electors who then come together for the one-time meeting of the Electoral College,
vote for president, and then disband, obliges candidates to pursue a national strategy.
A regional candidate, where you have strong support in one region, an ideological candidate,
which might be popular in Texas and Florida, but not elsewhere, California, New York, Massachusetts,
but not elsewhere, is forced to court voters, especially median voters, voters in the center
of the spectrum in battleground states, especially large battleground states, and has to put together
a coalition that is based upon the state federalist structure of our Constitution.
That has been an essential guarantor that our president, although he has almost always received
a popular majority, has to campaign for an Electoral College majority that has to be composed
of many different regions of the country, of rural states, as well as urban states,
of various philosophical dispositions, cultural differences between the states.
That has been essential to the stability of our system. In addition...
And you make the point, I should say, in some of your writings, that this moderating effect
begins to operate at the level of the primaries, even though the founders did not anticipate our
two-party system. When the candidates are kind of competing for the nomination of their respective
parties, this is one of the concerns, is that they're going to have to operate on a national
scale. Yes. And I think that the primary system has many defects. I could be a critic of it,
but it has been moderated, mediated by the Electoral College system, which requires that
the partisans who are active in primary season have to think ahead a little bit,
that they cannot simply nominate the person that's closest to their ideological heart,
but somebody who can actually put together a national Electoral College majority come November.
We've seen this in many cases. I think, importantly, in the 2000 election, when in
late spring of the year, March, April, May, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren were the
exciting candidates. Joe Biden was sort of an also-ran. He'd not been doing very well,
but the party elders, led by Barack Obama, understood that the name of the game for the
Democrats in the fall was going to be defeating the incumbent Donald Trump, that the voters that
were going to need to do that, they could have been attracted away from Donald Trump,
but they were frightened by Bernie Sanders' socialism, Elizabeth Warren's economic populism.
They wanted a candidate who would assure the voters that he could calm the streets,
would be a moderate in the American tradition. And in just a few short weeks, Joe Biden,
who'd been trailing, was suddenly the pick of all of the Democratic Party elders.
Pretty quickly, Warren, and then after a little bit of back and forth, Senator Sanders dropped out,
and Biden won the nomination and ran as a moderate. Now, once he was in office,
he governed more like a Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren than a moderate.
Yes, I do recall. I think we all have a kind of...
And it was a one-term president as a result. But that is one example, and it's the kind of thing
I expect that we will see in the years ahead. You can imagine a Mayor Mondami-sized party
attracting a huge amount of attention, as we see in a lot of elections around the country today.
Whether such a party with a strong socialist and, frankly, Islamist base is going to
sell well in the suburbs of the Midwest, in the plain states, is going to be an important
consideration in the Democratic primary. And we have divisions within the Republican
Party as the party copes with its post-Trump future. There are various factions in the party,
and as they contend with each other in the primaries beginning a year and a half from now,
what they will be thinking about is, how do we put together a coalition that can win?
As Mike Uelman emphasizes over and over again in the Uelman Report,
the Electoral College, as part of our larger constitutional system, is majoritarian in spirit,
but above all, it aims to compose what Thomas Jefferson called reasonable majorities,
majorities that have come together through various factions. All of us belong to some
minority or another, whether we think of ourselves as a minority group. All of us have views that
differ in some important respects from those of large numbers of our countrymen. We have to make
peace with each other under the Electoral College in a way that would be badly undermined in a
national popular vote, where the candidates would simply be competing for a numerical national
majority, focusing on large population areas, focusing on national demographic groups,
interest groups, and inevitably, I think everyone agrees, producing a multi-party system where we
have what look more like the primaries that we've been going through in the last few weeks,
the primaries that we've seen in the early days in national elections, but on a national scale,
in a national election, for the person who is to be not only the head of government,
but the head of state. That would be a huge change, and it would be a departure from all of
the components of this complex system that all push us to putting together a majority that is a
reasonable majority that has made peace with large numbers of different sectional,
philosophical interest group sections of the population, and that is always in need
of attracting marginal votes from the other party.
Your point about Mamdani, and we've just had the New York primaries as we're recording this,
so it's become somewhat clear that he's gaining...he's building a little bit of a machine
out there and gaining a certain degree of influence over the Democratic Party.
But it does put one in mind, I think, of the post-Trump future and the possibility that
the populism of varying stripes is going to now have to figure out how to operate on a national
scale. In a piece that you wrote for the Claremont Review of Books called The Electoral College by
Dawn's Early Light, you reviewed a couple of books which renew the argument against
the electoral college, one from a more academic and historical perspective and another
in a more popular journalistic way. Near the end of this essay, you point out that
this matter of a multi-party system and therefore not of a majority victory but of a plurality
victory keeps coming back at the end of all of these sometimes very erudite arguments against
the electoral college, pointing out, as you say, that it has laws like any other system.
You come back again and again to you're actually not contemplating here a more
majoritarian approach. You're contemplating a kind of scrum among a variety of different
subsidiary parties. I wonder, since that's part of our outlook here and we're looking
inevitably at a post-Trump future that includes figures like Mamdani but also,
I suppose, more moderate Democrats and Republicans, what do you think is the future of
this recurring argument against the electoral college? Do you see it rearing its head again
down the line or do you think it's basically been conclusively defeated?
My view is that the electoral college is very deeply embedded, that its 250-year,
closing in on 250-year run is an indication of its durability and though its aims have been
challenged not so much by intellectual arguments, the Birch Bay manual seller of a proposal back
in 1970, others since then such as the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact Initiative,
it has been challenged in modern times more by technological changes, by the internet,
by social media, by instantaneous communications that have made the political parties
less important, made it much more possible to pursue electoral strategies of appealing to
narrow, sometimes highly sectarian groups. But the electoral college has, in some ways,
so far, stood and protected us against the extremes that a sort of internet,
minority-dominated politics would lead us to. The proponents of abolishing the electoral college
point out that it has always been controversial. There have always been proposals going back to
the early 19th century to substantially modify or replace it. And that's true. But the interesting
thing is that in every case, the proponents have essentially lost. And the reason is that many
people in the political system and many average citizens, when considering what the alternative
would look like, have come to appreciate the strengths of the electoral college.
A national popular vote, virtually everybody acknowledges, both the proponents and even if
you look at these two books I reviewed for the Claremont Review, they sort of make life of the
fear-mongering of people like you and me, Spencer, that a national popular vote would lead to
a multi-party system with lots of ideological parties, a system that looks more like Israel's
or Italy's than that of the United States. But if you read their books, by the end,
they pretty much acknowledge that that would be the case. And a big stumbling block of proponents
of a national popular vote is what do you do in a case where we have a national popular vote,
and even in a two-party system with maybe one spoiler, a Green candidate or the Libertarians
or Ralph Nader or Ross Perot, we often have a one-third party coming in. So it's very easy
for the winner of a national popular vote to have less than a majority.
Richard Nixon had less than a majority. We've had many presidents that have had
a plurality of 40 percent or more. And Abraham Lincoln in 1860 had 39.7 percent of the popular
vote but was elected with a solid majority of the Electoral College, and the Electoral College
was crowned in glory on that occasion. So what are we going to do, especially if we have a
multi-party system, and we have a Mandami party, and we have a moderate Democratic party, we have a
couple of billionaire personality candidates from both sides, it's easy to imagine the winner
of a national election having 40, 30, even less than 30 percent. Do we really want a president
that has been voted against by 70 percent of the American public? How do we deal with that?
In 1970, in the proposal that Mike Uelman was dealing with, they were going to hold a runoff
election. Although the proponents of a national popular vote were divided on that, some of them
wanted to have a runoff election, and that was the formal proposal that had passed the House,
and that was proposed before the Senate. But a runoff election, meaning that if nobody got 40
percent of the vote, then the top two vote-getters would run against each other, guaranteeing a
majority in a two-party election. When? Well, Congress will decide. It'll be the week before
Christmas, or it'll be late November. Can they change the date after the general election?
But then what would happen in the time between? We see in multi-party democracies what happens,
which is you've got a proliferation of small parties taking very firm partisan, ideological,
regional positions, and they might get only 10, 15 percent of the vote, but in the interrenum
between the first general and second general elections, they negotiate. And so we end up having
coalition national governments with the secretary of this, allocated to this party. Maybe the
secretary of state or treasury gets something from somebody who holds the balance of power,
even if it had a small part of the national vote. So it doesn't really look like what people think
of national popular vote. We're going to have a majority vote for president. It's going to be a
majority. But if you actually think about how a national popular vote works out, it's very,
very different. It conduces to smaller parties, smaller mandates, and coalitions that are formed
not before the candidate goes out and makes his or her presentation before the general public,
but afterwards. The election has been held, and now they get together in closed rooms
and make deals as to what the government is actually going to look like. It is stumbling
blocks like that that have divided the proponents of a national popular vote time and time again.
And when it gets down to the final votes, these movements, they begin very auspiciously.
Everybody loves this idea, oh, we'll have a popularly elected president,
a majority. He or she will just have strong support, really connect with the voters.
But then when people look at what that actually looks like and how it would undermine the
federalist system, the party system, how it would lead to a president with very,
very different instincts, for example, in dealing with state and local issues,
in dealing with the Congress, then we have had moderates moving away. And by the way,
up until 2000, abolishing the electoral college was a bipartisan cause. You found
substantial numbers of Republicans as well as Democrats who were in favor of a national popular
vote. So it's not simply people from the left moving back into the electoral college column.
That sometimes happens. The key vote change that Mike Uelman won in the fall of 1970 was Eugene
McCarthy of Minnesota, who had always been an advocate of the direct popular vote, who read
the Uelman report, called in this 30-year-old staffer into his office and told him that the
report had changed his mind, and who a few days later signed a letter with Sam Irvin of North
Carolina opposing the national popular vote, reaffirming their allegiance to the great
strengths of the electoral college, which ended up being decisive. That has happened time and
time again over more than two centuries, where at the end of the day, people come to understand
how the electoral college is stable, sensible presidents who are attuned to large sections
of national interests across the continent that would be lost, and in favor of a system with all
sorts of difficult consequences, such as having a president with a 30 percent plurality, or a
president who'd gotten to a majority only by cobbling together emphatic interest groups. So
that tells me that we can look forward to its continuing viability. It's under a lot more
pressure. The separation of powers in Washington is not what it used to be. The executive has
become dominant, not simply under Donald Trump, but under Barack Obama and Joe Biden as well.
Congress is a weaker institution than it was. Federalism is not as strong as it once was,
and both of the major parties are rent by internal factions in a way they weren't in the past.
My view is that these difficulties, when it comes down to designing an electoral system
for the president, are actually going to lead to a continuation of the electoral system.
Let me illustrate that point. The proponents of a direct national election have pretty much
given up on the idea of a constitutional amendment replacing the electoral college
with one form or another of a national popular vote. The reason is that since the 2000 election,
a statistical tie in Florida, very, very close in the national vote, very close
in the electoral college, the idea of a national popular vote has become,
as it was not before, largely a partisan issue. Democrats are in favor of it. A lot of interest
groups in the Democratic Party, such as major components of the Black Caucus that were in favor
of the electoral college in the past as a defender of minority interests, have switched over and are
marching in lockstep. Most Republicans are against it. There's not going to be, even after 2000
and after 2016, when again, as in 2000, the winner of the national popular vote
lost to the electoral college. There've been a lot of newspaper op-eds. There've been some
such as the ones I reviewed for Your Wonderful Magazine, but there have been no major hearings
in Congress, no serious proposals. And that's because people realize now that it's a partisan
issue, it's not going to kick past constitutional muster. So no serious politician is going to
invest the time and energy into what is a losing cause. What has replaced it is this very clever
idea of a national popular vote interstate compact, where states are signing up through
state legislation to a compact, an agreement with other states that says as follows.
As soon as states with 270 votes in the electoral college, which is the majority,
threshold for the electoral college, as soon as that number of states have agreed to do this,
this is what we're going to do. After the election, regardless of how the popular vote
went in our state and therefore how our electoral college votes would go, we are going to cast our
electoral college votes for whomever wins the national popular vote. That is, in their view,
a way to get within the electoral college framework to a national popular vote guarantee.
So it does the two things that they want. It guarantees that the, I'll just say,
the one thing that they want, whoever wins the national popular vote will win the national
election. It guarantees that. And the number of states who have signed up for it has grown.
It now includes, I think, 21, 22 states. They're largely blue states, California, New York,
Minnesota, Illinois, Massachusetts. It's gotten some middle-sized states, a few small states.
And I regret to say my own state, the Commonwealth of Virginia, has joined the
interstate, the popular vote interstate compact since the change in leadership in the state in
Richmond a few months ago. So we now have a good number of states, but they still need six or
seven more. And it is my view that just as in the past, as it gets close to becoming not a matter of
political symbolism and performative politics and giving speeches, but people actually considering
what this compact would do, that support for it is going to erode. In the case where
the national popular vote and the presidential, the electoral college vote is the same,
it's not going to make any difference anywhere. Where it makes a big difference is in a situation
where a state has voted within the state for one candidate. And because the national popular vote
goes the other way, you find out the day after the election, you voted for A, but your states
are going to go for B, whom you loathe. And you went to the poll mainly to vote against B,
and it turns out your state's going to vote for B. Now, if B was going to win anyway,
that wouldn't make any difference. But what about a case where A won the national
electoral college vote, but now because of what your state did, B becomes president,
even though B lost the electoral college, lost the popular...
Pandemonium.
What's going to happen? Pandemonium. And I think as soon as that dawns upon people,
in California, Hillary Clinton won a popular... Her votes exceeded Donald Trump's in 2016 by over
two million votes, but she got 10 million more votes in California, New York, Massachusetts,
and Illinois. So just in those four states, she got nine or 10 million votes more. She won
California by nearly three million votes. People who don't like the electoral college always look
at the election afterwards, and they do a little rejiggering. They change some votes in some states,
but not in others, and they come up with an anomalous result. But if Hillary Clinton had won
in California by only two and a half million votes, still a landslide, and her votes had gone
to Donald Trump in Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and so forth, Donald Trump would have
won the popular vote, but lost the electoral college, at which point, under the National
Popular Vote Initiative, California, having voted by a landslide for Hillary Clinton,
would have cast their vote for Donald Trump, who'd won the national popular vote, but lost
the electoral college, and turned the election. Now, what do you think California Democrats would
have thought of that? I'm sure that would have been very well received and quite peaceably accepted
under the terms laid out. And the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact only makes a difference in
such cases. In other cases, it makes no change from what we've done under the electoral college.
It is only in such cases of what people in the states are going to regard as riotously unfair.
And the people who are pushing to get through a National Popular Vote Interstate Compact say,
they realize, they say to themselves, we have to teach people to forget the states, forget the
state that they're from. Where are you from? Tennessee, California? It doesn't make any
difference. You're voting for a national figure. Don't think about Tennessee interests. Don't think
about what Tennessee depends upon in Washington, about local concerns that you care about. Maybe
the things that drew you from California to Tennessee, forget it when you're voting for
president. It makes no difference. I think that's going to be a hard sell. I think, in fact,
it's a showstopper. Yeah, that's a real loser. There's a great old Eddie Izzard
routine, a comedian who has since become a bit woke and annoying, but his first
big special, Dressed to Kill, he did this thing about Hitler going in to invade Russia after
Napoleon. And he would say, Napoleon went in and he's like, I've got a great idea. I'm going to go
and it's going to be perfect. Oh, no, not going to work. And then Hitler comes along and says,
I've got a totally different plan. I'm going to go on and this time it's going to be great. Oh,
nope, same idea. He has to run away. And this is sort of what you're describing with the
efforts to overturn in various ways the electoral college, which it sounds like is one of the true
gemstones of our constitutional system. And I'm heartened to hear from you that you think it will
endure. We've got to wrap this up as much as I would like to proceed. Thank you very much for
this entertaining, informational, informative, and celebratory 250th special episode. Before I
close out, I will say that all of the articles we've discussed by Chris Demuth are going to be
linked in the description of this episode. You can also go to ccdemuth.com and find various other
writings by Chris and speeches as well. With that, Christopher Demuth, thank you so much
for joining us on The Closed Route. Spencer, thank you. Thank you for the plug. Thank you
for having me on and having the electoral college on your 250th series. Good day.
It's been a pleasure. Thanks very much. And for all of you out there listening,
thanks to you as well. And we'll be back in your feed next time with another
episode from the latest CRB.