A $3.6B founder's honest take on the software market right now

Business, Lending & Investing
2 followers
1 Video View·Jul 7, 2026
Show Notes:
(0:00) Story of Box
(06:30) Enterprise Over Consumer
(10:00) Turning Down Huge Acquisition Offers
(17:05) Angel Investing, Missed Bets, and Investing in Your P&L
(23:00) Aaron’s Contrarian AI Takes: More Jobs, More Work
(30:00) Founder Anxiety, Therapy, and Surviving the CEO Grind
(38:45) The Business Strategy Books Aaron Swears By
(48:00) AI Tools, Software Stocks, and Why SaaS Isn’t Dead
AI Generated·May contain errors
Video Summary
AI GeneratedThe founder of Box discusses the company's 20-year evolution from a college startup to a public enterprise. He explores the strategic pivot to the enterprise market, the psychological challenges of scaling a business, and his contrarian views on AI's impact on labor and the resilience of \"systems of record\" software in an agent-driven future.
Do you know what you're getting into here?
Nope.
All right, let me give you the simplest explanation.
You know how on Twitter you're funnier than the smart guys
and then smarter than the actual funny guys?
We did that in the business podcasting space.
By the way, I was supposed to be prepping for this podcast
and in the last hour, actually, all I did was watch
Millionaire Matchmaker Season 3, Episode 11,
which Aaron, if you remember,
is when your co-founder went on Millionaire Matchmaker.
And so I don't have a whole lot of prep,
but that was a great episode.
Do you remember when he did that?
I do, yes.
Were you in support of that?
Not exactly.
We took a flyer on that one.
The weirder story was they asked for both of us to do it.
Somehow, I had better judgment.
Sam, have you seen this episode?
So I actually met your co-founder, Dylan,
when I was starting my first company in San Francisco.
I didn't have a lot of money and we weren't making any money
and I did part-time work at a scavenger hunt company
and Box was a client one time.
So I got to hang out with him
and he had told me about being on the show.
Wow, really?
By the way, we were at this bar
at the end of the scavenger hunt at 7 p.m.
and he pulled up his laptop and went to the back table
and was working and he couldn't enjoy the scavenger hunt.
Well, I think that's one of the crazier things
about y'all's story.
You've been there for 20 years.
It's kind of like four friends,
started in college type of deal.
Are all four still there now, 20 years later?
So three of us went to middle school
and high school together
and then four of us went to high school together
and we had tried lots of different ideas
throughout middle school and high school.
And then finally, as we went to college,
people split off to different schools
and then this idea kind of emerged
and we all kind of got back together on it
and then dropped out of college in kind of two parts
in 2005 and 2006.
And so we've just been working together for,
I mean, honestly, like almost 30 years on different things,
which is kind of crazy to think about at this point.
So right now we have Dylan is CFO.
He runs a bunch of functions in the company.
He was famous for Millionaire Matchmaker.
Apparently, definitely his main claim to fame at this point.
And then Jeff and Sam.
Jeff has a bit of a farm.
He's kind of getting into the farm world.
And then Sam is at Anthropic on Cloud Code.
And he now is a constant thorn in my side
because every three days somebody says,
the CTO of Box left Box to go to Anthropic,
but he actually retired from Box like six years ago.
But it causes sort of unending viral fodder on that one.
That's pretty incredible that you can found a company,
take it public, and then you go and work at Anthropic.
Isn't the Instagram founder another founder?
I mean, to their credit,
they've done obviously an insane job on recruiting.
So I think it might literally be a requirement
to have been a CTO of a public company
to work there at this point.
But there's like a list of like 10 of these people.
Mike's over there, obviously now with Andre.
Sam on our end built some of the most important software
and infrastructure that we run on to this day.
So he's obviously a huge asset for them.
But they've done an incredible job at recruiting.
Dude, is it true?
So you've been doing this for a long time.
And the idea for Box, I think, was pretty simple.
It's like, hey, you should be able to access your files
wherever you are, not just on one computer.
I think you guys started consumer.
And then is it true there was sort of this
fork in the road moment where you guys went enterprise
and kind of the co-founders had to debate it out?
Is that how that went down?
Yeah, I mean, it always sounds way more dramatic
when we kind of compress it into the brief story.
But it was a multi-month period of kind of like
your classic wandering period that all startups
kind of deal with where you don't know
if you're going to pivot.
You don't know if the business model is going to work.
You don't know if you're going to get
your next round of funding.
Like some things are clicking and working.
Some things aren't.
And we had started, I would say,
not even as a consumer or enterprise.
We kind of started as agnostic to who the user would be.
We just said, hey, you know, it should be,
there should be a secure way to access
your files from anywhere.
Like it was an obvious idea to us.
And then what happened was it started growing,
but consumers, we had this kind of, you know,
very straightforward fork in the road.
Consumers wanted to pay as little as possible.
And they wanted a certain set of features
that you'd have to go and build.
Enterprises wanted to pay a lot more,
but they would need like a hundred times more features.
And as we kind of like thought about like,
well, who do you focus on?
We did eventually kind of conclude,
you know, something really obvious in retrospect.
And I can't like unsee it as they look
at other people's strategies over time.
These were just like totally different markets.
Like the enterprise needing to securely manage
their most important data as an organization
would require just a completely different
set of functionality than what a consumer would need
to back up their photos and access their music
from anywhere.
And those were just different markets.
And there was different business models.
One would pay like $5 a month.
The other would pay maybe $5 million a year.
And like completely different business models,
different markets, different teams you'd have to build,
different products you'd create.
So we did eventually run into, you know,
effectively a fork in the road.
And after a few months of kind of debating it out
and assessing the opportunities and, you know,
people kind of having, you know,
pretty different views on what to do.
We eventually pivoted, you know,
kind of very forcefully into the enterprise.
We, you know, almost burned every boat
other than a couple that we still wanted
a freemium model in the enterprise.
We wanted you to be able to sign up
as a kind of knowledge worker,
but we very firmly wanted to make it
an enterprise-only business model.
And I was actually the most reluctant
and the last one to be convinced to pivot.
So kind of credit to the other founders
and some early employees that I think had more conviction.
But once we collectively had conviction,
then it was very straightforward.
One thing on that decision, enterprise versus consumer.
Dropbox, obviously, I think,
would you say they went the consumer route initially or no?
Because like, you know, can you look back now,
say, oh, you know, one's this billion dollar company.
I think Dropbox is like a $6 billion company.
You guys are just under four.
Like in retrospect,
now that you got the benefit of like seeing it all play out,
was that the, you know, was that the right move
or is that overly simplified?
Hey everyone, really quick.
If you're enjoying this episode on CEO stuff,
so delegating, having hard conversations with your team,
hiring, then I've got something for you.
So the team at HubSpot,
they actually went and put together
a bunch of best practices
that Sean and I use in our own companies.
And they put it together in something
that's really easy to read and understand.
And so if you want to just save yourself
10 years of headache and heartache,
then you should check it out.
I wish we had this a long time ago.
It would have helped me a lot.
But there should be a QR code on your screen
that you can scan or a link in the description.
So check it out.
It's totally free and totally awesome.
Well, it was definitely the right move for us
and where we were.
You know, the way we kind of did the math
was Google had to own the consumer.
You know, we saw the G drive
kind of writing on the wall.
They would want to bundle it with Gmail
and most consumers would sort of be satisfied with that.
And then iCloud added on top of that
and then OneDrive.
And so like the consumer really looked
like a total kind of death pit.
And Dropbox, I would say performed far better
than I would have estimated
if from just a pure like economic standpoint,
I would have thought that the commoditization
would have been much more impactful.
So huge kudos to them on their execution.
And just, you know,
obviously building a world-class product on that front.
What we were very clear on was
the only way that we would not go out of business
was by being enterprise.
Because we just were too convinced
that over enough time that the consumer space
would just be too competitive and too commoditized.
So not only are we, you know,
fantastically happy with the decision,
but I think it was the only outcome
that would have produced really any form of success.
And then I think over the longterm,
like let's just say we add another 10 years to the timeline.
I think the only way to build a very large business
as an independent company in this category
is by being enterprise focused.
Just because like, you know,
where are most dollars gonna go for managing data,
securing data, you know,
kind of caring about how it's governed
in a workflow, it's gonna come from businesses.
And so, and there's actually, you know,
I think relevant lessons as we look at the AI space
is I think most dollars in AI
will eventually be enterprise dollars.
There'll be some, you know,
there'll be fantastic outcomes in consumer, no question,
because there's, you know,
some ways to build consumer businesses out of this.
But by, you know, by and large,
where's intelligence valued,
it's gonna be in the enterprise.
So just as where is software valued,
it's in the enterprise.
And that's where most dollars of technology go.
And other than, you know,
three companies that make money on advertising
in consumer tech.
You're fun to talk to
because you're only a few years older than Sean and I.
We're 37 and 38.
But I feel like you're so much further.
I mean, when we were both like, you know,
19 or 21 years old,
you were on the cover of magazines
and you were like the poster child.
It was like you and Kevin Rose was like,
you know, you could make it.
For me, it was actually the thing I was obsessed with
was when we moved, we dropped out,
we moved to Silicon Valley.
And like, if you remember,
like, you guys would have been just too young,
maybe like 17, 18.
But like, it was like Sam Altman was with Loopt,
was like a double collar.
Yes, that was the person to be in the Valley.
I mean, other than, you know, Zuck and—
He looks exactly the same, by the way.
And he's the person to be again 20 years later.
Well, we like grew up a little bit,
like watching you.
It was really, it's been always really fun.
But I heard some crazy stories
about how you got offered all this money
at a very young age to sell the company.
And I always put myself in that position
where I'm like, what would I do?
And of course, like the reason you are you
and I am me is because I probably would have taken it.
And like, yeah, like I wouldn't have had the poise
like in the like you have had.
But how old were you when you start
first started getting acquisition offers?
And like, can you tell us some of the stories
of what's that like to be such a young person
and like facing like this life-changing amount of money?
Sure. Yeah.
Well, when we first started,
we dropped out of college.
It was four of us living and working in Berkeley.
And we got a call from Yahoo.
And it was the Corp Dev team at Yahoo
that had basically the team
that had more or less just been responsible
for buying Flickr.
So there was this product
that was like in the late 90s, early 2000s
called the Yahoo Briefcase.
And it was sort of one of our predecessors.
So it was an online storage, you know, kind of product.
But it was like you could store
maybe like 50 megabytes of data in Yahoo Briefcase.
And for us, you know, we had finally achieved
a gigabyte of storage that you could have online.
And we were like the modern, simpler, faster, easier,
you know, kind of more up-to-date version
of Yahoo Briefcase.
And we got called in by the Corp Dev team.
And for us, we were like, holy ----,
this is the biggest moment of our lives.
And we were like debating like what acquisition price
would we be willing to take?
And I think like probably the most
we could have ever imagined was like $5 or $10 million.
And we were like, you know, that's our price.
We would definitely take $5 million, you know.
Was it like, all right, on three,
everybody say a number out loud.
One, two, three, $7 million.
I think we didn't even have enough.
We probably felt we would jinx it if we even did that.
So it was more like a very serious discussion.
So we drove down to Yahoo corporate headquarters
in a Nissan minivan that was like totally breaking,
you know, falling apart.
And we did a serious meeting.
We presented our whole strategy.
And, you know, we went through the product.
And I don't know, I don't remember.
It's very hazy, but like, I don't know,
somewhere on the order of probably two weeks later,
we just got like an email saying,
it was really nice meeting you guys.
Thank you for coming by.
And we had done all this buildup in our heads
of like, what would the number be
that we would sell the company for?
And again, any of those numbers,
we would have been just ecstatic about taking.
So it's one of these things where it's like,
you know, we have turned down offers,
but we've also been in situations
where we totally would have taken,
you know, that very early offer
and just taken it off the table.
And then, you know, later as we scaled,
because we've had every problem thrown at us.
We've had rounds that didn't happen
and just like totally busted rounds.
We've had to be bridge loaned by our investors twice.
So there are definitely, you know,
there's definitely, you know,
parts of the journey where we would have,
you know, if anybody has shown up with any offer,
we would have accepted it probably.
And then it's, you know, as these things go,
like when people do actually show up for offers,
your chemicals in your head are totally different.
And you're like, oh my gosh,
like we just got to keep doing this.
And so probably the most classic one that we faced
was a very kind of serious interaction
where we would have, you know,
been I think quite happy about the outcome
on any kind of financial measure,
but we looked at the situation
and we were maybe our mid-20s,
early to mid-20s at the time.
And I think this is now like well-documented
by a bunch of people,
but I think it kind of just happens
probably pretty uniformly,
which is like, you just, you like,
if you really deeply process it
and like in a very intellectual sense
and you're like, okay, this much money,
like this is super interesting,
you know, et cetera.
And then you like start to play out,
like what am I going to do in two years from now
or five years from now or 10 years from now?
We basically just processed,
like we would probably be doing something
just to get back to exactly where we are now.
Like there's, it's unlikely
that we're going to work at this new company
for more than five years each.
Like, so that's not going to happen
because everybody,
every one of our friends that had gotten acquired
had already left their acquired company.
So like that was probably not going to happen.
So then you just look at it and you're like,
okay, well, you're probably trying to do everything you can
just to get back to this exact situation.
But of course you have more cash.
That's obviously positive.
But now we're in this situation.
We've already defied all the odds
of getting here in the first place
and all the things that kind of got in our way.
Like, why don't we just continue to double down on this
given that we still believe the market
is still a hundred times larger.
So it became this very kind of calculated decision,
which is what's the amount of kind of,
you know, how big is this market
still ahead of us?
We thought very large.
Do we like our kind of compounding kind of,
you know, approach
where we think we're getting better every day,
every week, every month at our product and our strategy.
We know that there's going to be a lot of headwinds
and a lot of severe competitive pressure
that we're going to face.
So it's not going to be easy.
And then it basically just came down to like,
you know, the kind of Bezosian
regret minimization framework of like,
of like, what thing are we going to regret more or less?
And we, at least we convinced ourselves
that we would more regret not continuing
and just seeing the next set of cards
and keeping on scaling
more than we would regret, you know,
sort of turning down this offer
and having to start over.
I don't know if that's actually true.
Like what would we have really regretted more?
But, but that was the decision.
It was gut-wrenching.
Like we did an offsite with the four of us.
And how old are you guys?
And how much was the offer?
We were in our mid twenties.
So probably two of us were like 20,
like 25, 24, 23.
And we don't really talk specifically about the offer,
but you know, call it like in the half a billion range.
It's pretty sick.
And that's, and were you guys
taking secondary along the way
to kind of at least have some,
some of that regret minimization,
if it all blew up that like,
at least we got, you know, a safety net here
or no safety net?
Not safety net levels of secondary.
So this was a very different time period in the Valley.
So this was, you know, very early 2010s
and secondary was not,
neither in fashion as much as it is now,
nor were the amounts of capital,
the same level.
So, so I think it was like, you know,
people could, you know,
feel better about the apartment they were renting
as opposed to like,
we're like good on the decision.
You were like the Tito Ortiz of tech, like tech,
you know, like, you know,
the early UFC guys,
they got paid like a thousand dollars to show up
and a $500 if they won.
And like, they like made it popular.
They're like being honored in the hall of fame,
but they like can't see or talk
out of the left side of their face anymore.
I honestly,
if there's like any analogy that works
for my entrepreneurial life,
it would be that.
So, but we, we,
we have had to grind through every,
every worst practice that,
that you could, that you could imagine.
And I mean, we've lived to tell the tale.
You, you have a pretty insane investment portfolio too.
Let me see, Stripe, Figma, Robin Hood,
Airtable, Instacart, Plaid.
Like that's a pretty baller portfolio.
There might be some hallucination on two of those.
Okay.
Maybe Chad, you lied to me.
I think there's some good embedding space
clustering of some of those brands.
Unfortunately.
So I met Dylan Field in the seed round
and what a lovely,
what a lovely character and kid.
Did you send him a nice to meet you email?
Like you Yahoo'd him?
I think I was,
I hope it was like 3% better at the follow-ups,
but I met him and I didn't have the creative imagination
for what he was talking about.
And I obviously should have,
because I believe in cloud-based software for everything.
And he was like,
designers are going to do real-time collaboration on stuff.
And I was like, I don't know, man,
like we, we, we kind of make images fine.
So I was like very,
like I was a huge Luddite on the, on the pitch
and definitely to my detriment,
but unfortunately that would be,
that would be a hallucination.
So I didn't, I didn't get on Figma early enough,
but a few of those, yes.
Has the, what's worked out better,
the box equity or the, the angel portfolio equity?
Are we getting close or,
because like, for example,
we have the podcast got bought by HubSpot and Dharmesh
from HubSpot comes on a bunch
and he made a huge bet into open AI.
And we were like, dude,
you're going to make more off of that
than you did in this like 30 year odyssey of HubSpot.
And he's like, yeah, probably.
I, fortunately, at least for, for other,
other factors, Box, Box is still ahead.
But the big thing I should have done
is hedged on all of our underlying suppliers.
We're like one of the biggest customers
of like Seagate and Western Digital.
And, and so like we could see the stack
that you would need for all of this.
And, and it's, I don't know if you guys have watched
like the SanDisk stock, but like,
this is the, the, just the most insane,
you know, it's just set of memory stocks for,
for these guys.
I don't know what you guys are talking about.
What SanDisk is like an old memory stocks
have gone bananas, right?
Is it SanDisk like a, like a 80s or 70s?
SanDisk is up about what?
3000% maybe in the past two years.
I remember SanDisk, they made like floppies, right?
They made everything.
And they, I mean, we probably wouldn't exist
without SanDisk.
So USB thumb drives were like one of the,
one of the catalyst for, okay,
we should just like move that to the cloud.
So if you just bought SanDisk stock,
like on, on, just cause you were really
into USB thumb drives,
you would be doing fantastically well right now.
Have you seen any cool,
so you're talking about like the,
the companies that have gotten big
because you've been in the ecosystem
or they've been customers
or you've been customers.
What else did you see early on?
Because they were, they were customers.
I mean, way more than I've invested in.
But, you know, I think if you just looked
at probably even our own tech stack
over 20 years and you just,
you just bought the stocks
of what our tech stack represented,
like that portfolio alone would be,
you know, you would have,
you would have every index, exactly.
And that's actually, I mean,
that's sort of generally a phenomenon
right now in the Valley,
which is you can kind of just see like,
you can generally see like what,
what are the engineers using?
And that tells you quite a bit about the future.
Now there could be some misreads
in the signal there,
but I would, I would say within 90% accuracy,
it's going to get you like most
of the investment advice you need.
It's a pretty underrated strategy.
I call it investing in your P&L
because you just go look at the expense items.
And like, I learned this
when we were doing a tech company,
same thing was like, oh,
PagerDuty and Elasticsearch
and all these companies, Slack,
you know, we were one of the first 100 teams
on Slack or something.
And you know, our shitty startup idea didn't work,
but like we, we sure did identify
a bunch of really great underlying tools
whose ideas did work.
I own an e-commerce business
and e-com is a pretty brutal industry,
like pretty low margin type of business,
but I just funneled all the profits
into Shopify and the underlying
like e-commerce stack.
And I've done great.
I've made more money there
than I did in the actual business itself.
But like, I also wouldn't have understood
that ecosystem and like who you couldn't pay me
to switch off of had I not like
gone through the pain of being there.
Yeah. It's interesting.
The funny thing is like,
this data is basically out there
for every investor.
And, and I, I do think that the,
it's probably not kind of leveraged enough,
but yeah, I mean, most,
most of the best practices
are just well-known by engineers very quickly.
That's a really challenging thing
to think about, Sean,
when you're like, well,
I have this business,
that's like a small business
that's probably going to grow quickly.
But then you think like,
I could somehow make more investing
in this already big business.
And in your head, you're like,
it's, it's incredibly matured.
Like it can't like grow more.
Like everyone has that story now.
Originally it was Uber.
Now it's SpaceX.
We all could have invested in SpaceX
when it was worth $80 billion.
And you're like, this is insane.
No way.
Did you see there was a slide deck recently?
Like I think CO2 put it out
or they did this analysis,
which was going from,
do you, do you remember the exact?
It was like $1 to $10 billion.
It's easier to go from $100 billion to a trillion
than $10 billion to $100 billion, I think.
Yeah. You're like more likely
and you get there faster.
It's like, oh, you know,
I, some of these things though
are a little bit tough
simply because we are in a,
you know, we're in a pretty
kind of feverish environment.
So it's always hard to like,
how do you normalize
for the particular multiples
that we're seeing?
And, and is that like
a sustainable investment strategy
versus right now,
where we're in a moment
where that is kind of working
when you look at it backwards.
But yeah, that, that was,
that was definitely counterintuitive
when I saw it.
You have a couple other
kind of contrarian,
you know, you have a good answer
to the Peter Thiel question
of like, what do you believe
that few others would agree with you on?
I'll read you a couple of them.
You know, you're basically like
bullish on the job market.
I think most people think with AI,
all our jobs are gone.
You're like, no,
bullish on the job market.
Other people think with AI,
we're all going to be working less.
I think Elon has said this
and a few others like, you know,
you know, here comes the four-day weekend
every weekend or something.
You're like, no, we're going to be working more.
And that software companies,
like the SaaS companies
are going to do well.
So, you know, jobs,
hard work and software companies,
three things that most people,
I think, feel pretty bearish on.
You have a different opinion.
You want to give us your take
on each one of those?
You know, so much of the idea
that jobs go away or that we do less,
you know, has to come from a place
of effectively a short,
just human creativity and ingenuity
and the idea that there's sort of,
we don't have an insatiable appetite
for more new things.
And I've just seen very limited evidence
that suggests that we don't want
to go and discover the next cure
for the next, you know,
niche problem that people have
or the next new form of entertainment
people want to experience
or the next new consumer product
that people want to go and sell
or the next, you know, new podcast
that wants to be created.
And so, like, if you don't believe
that that's going to happen,
then sure, then you would basically
believe we have that abundance
sort of comes at the expense of jobs
and of us, you know, doing things.
And so that theory has to be
that basically, you know,
the agents are going to do
all of the, effectively,
the useful work,
which then frees us up, you know,
so much that there's really
not much else left.
And I just think we will find a way
to create a ton more work for ourselves
for better or worse.
Like, it's not obvious that my view
is particularly, like, utopian.
Like, I think to some extent,
Elon's vision, to his credit,
is actually a far more utopian one
than the Doomer's.
It's actually funny, like,
because they believe in the same
underlying technology trend.
So they basically both believe
in if you extrapolate out to AGI,
then the Doomer's believe
that destroys us.
And Elon believes that we get this utopia
where everything is just done for us.
And I kind of am more just,
until proven otherwise,
I'm just in a third camp,
which is like, it's like the same progress
of maybe both of those two,
but with more of a pragmatic outcome,
which is like, we use that technology
to just then create a new set of needs
that we have to go
and all kind of support and fulfill.
It's just like a very long list of things
that the world is still going
to effectively value.
Like, the world is gonna still value
in-person education for children.
They're gonna value childcare.
They're gonna value going to a restaurant
and having, you know, human interaction.
They're gonna value going to a show.
They're gonna value like talking
to a financial advisor
that appears to sort of, you know,
have some sense of the market
and your set of needs
and also has 10 other clients
that they can kind of like triangulate with
or, you know, a tax professional
that you can just like, you know,
is like accountable
for if they get the thing wrong,
like their jobs on the line
versus like an agent
that can be just shut off.
And so that's, you're not really sure
what accountability they have.
So like, for all of these reasons,
like humans just stay in the loop.
And so I just think we end up having
still a lot more work for everybody to do.
I would say then the four-hour,
the four-day work week thing
also kind of supposes something different,
which is you basically have to believe
that assuming that anybody
in your sector decides
not to do a four-day work week,
then that company, you know,
with the power of AI
will get 20% more or 25% more output
than you will.
And so which market is gonna basically
have some kind of like collective agreement
that says, no, our category,
everybody in our industry
is only gonna work four days a week.
So it's just like,
it requires such a collective sort of,
like agreement on the part of everybody
that you wouldn't then just like
have some actor in the system decide,
no, I'm just gonna like,
I will just ship more software.
I will sell to more customers than you do,
which then gets everything back
to five days a week.
So that's why it's like just very implausible
for that outcome to really exist.
So check this out.
There's this book, Sean,
you'll like the name of this title.
It's called How to Live on 24 Hours a Day.
And it's a book written in 1908.
You guys should read it.
It's really cool.
I just got it.
And it's all about what happened
after the industrial revolution.
And there's this huge burst
of white collar jobs.
And there's now millions of Americans
as well as Europeans
who now are not in a factory anymore.
And they're doing these white collar jobs.
And then there's all these like housewives.
This is in the book.
And they like, they're like,
now I don't launder our clothing with my hands.
I use a machine.
And I have all this time.
And the white collar workers are like,
we have extra time.
And they're all asking themselves,
well, if we have all this extra time now,
why do we feel busier than ever?
And the whole book is how to make sense
of how to make your 24-hour day,
how to get everything you can out of it.
And it's a little bit of a productivity book.
On the busier than everything,
I mean, it's every startup founder
you've ever met right now
absolutely is busier than ever.
They're way busier than we were before AI.
And the reason for that is because AI,
it's sort of like this deceptive technology
because it lets you get started
on so many things so easily,
but then you still have to complete
all the things you started.
And so you think that like,
I'm just going to deploy all these agents
and then I'm going to like go to the bar
or go hang out.
But when the agents are then done,
somebody still has to be responsible for like,
what do I do next with that information?
What do I do next with that piece of software?
What do I do next with that video clip
that got created?
Like all of that becomes human work again.
So I think every single person
that is like the most AI-pilled right now
is just like,
we're just drowning in work
because we're like kicking off
way more work for ourselves.
And we can't ever get off that treadmill
because of how easy it has become
to just create this work.
Like, I don't know,
like an hour before this call,
I kicked off two kind of processes
that now I didn't even need to start,
but I started them.
And now I'm going to absolutely add
another hour to my day
because I'm going to go and like,
like do whatever,
whatever the agent produced,
I'm going to go and follow up
with all of that work.
Like, and I didn't even have to,
but it was so easy to kick it off
that now I've created more work for myself.
So we're just going to do that for everything.
Here's the one thing you're missing.
You didn't name it.
This is your Jevons paradox.
This is your chance to live on
for the next hundred years.
We need Levi's paradox.
It's basically the easier it is
to do work, the more work you'll do.
And the more tired you'll be
at the end of every day.
Uh, yeah, I, uh, I mean,
if we want to run with that,
we can, we can, we can.
Levi's law, dog.
Come on, we might as well
get some alliteration in there.
Make it a law.
Are you, uh, are you,
so you're working your ass off right now?
I am.
Yeah, it's insane.
We had, um, um, uh,
Replitz, um, CEO on recently.
And, uh, he was amazing.
And he told, he told this story.
Sean's like, that's the realest thing
anyone has ever said.
It was kind of funny,
but he told the story about how
before they kind of took off,
they're kind of a no man's land
or even failing for like,
uh, a handful of years.
And everyone knows this Slack message
or this text message where from,
from an employee that says,
Hey, can we talk?
And he was like, I got like one a day.
And so everyone was quitting.
And like my nervous system,
nervous system was just crashed.
Yes.
Uh, and I, we all go through cycles of that,
but how has your nervous system,
like kept up doing this for 20 years?
Because you've had some crazy ---- happen.
I think that you had like
a hostile takeover attempt.
You said you've had all like
these bridge rounds happen.
I mean, you've like been through so,
so much ---- and I would assume
you don't need to be doing this anymore.
How has your body handled this?
Well, I don't know that my body has handled it,
but, um, but I'd say my,
from a brain standpoint,
um, it's very, very stressful.
Uh, I see a therapist,
um, just like to help me like
calm myself down from an anxiety standpoint,
you know, to Amjad's,
you know, kind of example,
like those are like the worst slack messages.
There's like, if you just ranked all,
like all of the, all of the stressful things,
because you're just like,
like, you know, there's like 40 implications
when a, when a key person leaves,
um, uh, that you then have to like,
like instantly kind of cycle through.
The, probably the reason I keep doing it
is because the upside still exceeds the,
the anxiety and the stress,
the stress and kind of time costs.
And what's your upside?
It's not money at this point,
I would have to imagine.
What is it?
The upside is, is the,
I, you know, for lack of any better explanation,
it's just like the intellectual curiosity
and excitement of building something
and then having that thing be used in the real world
and knowing that like, you know,
you, you get to just move that forward.
Another, another step.
And then right now I'd say it's even amplified
because most of the technology that,
that is being built by everybody else
ends up being something we can also build on top of.
So it's like, there's an unending amount of things
that we get to go in and,
and kind of play with and be a part of.
So, you know,
if we were doing exactly the same thing every single day
and it was, it was totally a grind over like,
you know, I could probably pull that off
for maybe five years.
I don't know that I'd be able to do like a decade of that,
but like I could probably put in five years
of just like total grind.
But this is, you know,
a grind plus just sheer adrenaline
because boom, new model drops.
What's, what's the implication?
What can it do?
You know, how does it touch, you know,
well, for us, we love it
because it all needs unstructured data
and the information that we get to store and manage.
And so whether it's, you know,
new models, new agent work,
you know, what's happening in the landscape,
there's just an unlimited amount of,
of things that you can kind of bite into.
And that makes it very exciting.
Have you almost quit?
When was the time,
when was the time you were closest to bailing?
I would, I would never like personally bail.
So the bails that could exist would be like,
you know, you kind of sell the company
or you like get fired, but you don't fight it.
You never thought about resigning as CEO?
There was a moment like 19 years ago,
where, 18 years ago,
where, you know, am I like a CEO
or am I like a product person?
And then do you have to get in as CEO?
And, and then we just solved that by getting a COO.
And then I was like, oh God, this isn't like,
there's some, like God,
God created a role for people like me,
where like somebody who like wants to do operational stuff
gets to do that.
And then I get to still do product stuff,
but also be CEO.
I was like, holy crap,
whoever came up with this idea,
like is brilliant.
And so that, from that point forward,
that sort of solved any kind of like,
like, you know,
self-doubt I had around like my operational skills.
And then the rest has just been like,
you know, is the company going to work?
And then do we need to veer the company
in a different direction or not?
You said you go to therapy sometimes
and it's been helpful.
What's been an unlock,
you know, either maybe a realization
or is there a win that you could share?
Early on in therapy,
I kind of, it was,
we just like identified,
I don't even know if it's like a word that everybody uses
or only because like,
I've been going to therapy before,
like Chachaputi,
so I didn't like research everything
that you were ever told.
But like she used this term catastrophization
or catastrophize.
And so like maybe that's like a well-known term.
I catastrophize things.
So like, you know,
I get one piece of news
and then I instantly extrapolate out
to like the worst possible outcomes.
Like this one person leaves,
which means the entire company's out of business
because like, you know,
they leave and then they were going to miss this one thing
and that's going to stop working
and then that's going to break
and then, you know, doom.
And by the way,
I think actually like most people,
most AI doomers should probably see a therapist
because it's all just catastrophization.
So for me, like what I basically just started to,
once I could like,
kind of like maybe like understand it
and like name it as something,
you can then feel when it's happening
and then you're like,
you know what?
I know what this is.
I've seen this 20 other times
or 50 other times in this category.
And guess what?
It doesn't mean the end of the world.
The thing doesn't end up blowing up.
It doesn't break everything.
You do recover.
And so that sort of shortens the cycles
of the like anxiety pangs.
Because like previously,
it would be like kind of like,
you might be like knocked out for like three days
because you're just like,
oh my gosh,
this is the end.
This is the end of the whole thing.
And then you go through it enough times
and you're like,
okay, this is like totally survivable.
And then sometimes I almost like,
and now I'm probably like a little bit bipolar on it
because like half the time,
I will just downplay then when something bad happens
because I just,
because I don't have like 100% intuition
on like when to like what level to toggle it.
So then for other people,
I'll just be like,
this is totally fine.
We're going to be totally fine.
There's not a big deal.
And it's just because again,
I've sort of pre-mitigated the catastrophe.
And then other times,
you know, I then still let it loose a little bit.
But that's probably one of the best tools
I've been able to have.
We got to do a thing with Ray Dalio last week
and he had us do like these personality tests
because that's one of his kind of schticks.
I'm like a 99 out of a hundred on being neurotic.
And it bothers you,
you're not a hundred.
Yeah, I stayed up all night.
I'm like,
what questions did I miss?
But I think it's like,
I'm, it's probably jagged
what I'm actually neurotic about.
I think there's only like five things.
I have some like,
like, you know,
my, the most common slack is usually just like this,
something's three pixels off.
And I was just like going through our website
and I just like,
like it got stuck in my head.
Are you a believer in these personality tests?
The way Dalio,
we've had actually a bunch of
really impressive, successful people come on
and almost,
and very much swear by the kind of personality test stuff,
which I had always just thought is horoscope.
Like, that's cute.
Do you want a crystal too?
Like, you know, I didn't,
I didn't really believe.
And now I'm like,
I think enough smart people have told me this
where I'm like,
okay, I should probably reassess my jokes here.
Who else is into him besides Ray?
We had, who was the other person?
Monish was on,
he's, you know, an investor,
I think is very, very smart.
And he was, he's,
he described how his life changed from a,
you know, an assessment that,
that told him like,
Hey, the reason you feel the way you feel
is because you're playing a game of
managing clients and people,
but you actually thrive in solo player,
numbers-based competitive games.
And you know, he,
when he switched to investing,
he like thrived because that's exactly the type of game
that, that rewards.
Yeah. Do you, do you believe in them?
I probably veer more on Sean's end
prior to, to his Ray interaction.
I think, I think it's like fun as like a,
it's usually like always like a good icebreaker
at a, at a corporate offsite.
I've, I've rarely left
being able to do anything actionable about it.
Like, yeah, we know you're red.
Like we, we, we know you're going to be aggressive.
What are we going to do about that information?
We know you're collaborative.
Like it's very obvious you're collaborative.
Well, some people use it for hiring.
They make you do like,
there's a whole company called Culture Amp,
I think it's called,
where you, where you enter,
you enter the job that you need to hire for,
and it tells you what personality type.
And then you have your...
StrengthsFinders does like a hundred million a year
on their, their...
Yeah.
So I, I end up somewhere just in this,
like, I'm told I'm fine with it.
I'm also like, I don't run the business on it.
Like how I talk about people who are religious.
If you want to have your religion, we're good.
Seems like it helps.
Different question, kind of in the same vein
of kind of know thyself.
From what I understand,
you're a pretty big like business strategy nerd.
I've seen, I've heard that you read books
until late at night,
and you've, you've been doing this for a long time.
I've heard that you read books.
You're one of those guys.
You know, when Amjad came on,
he's twice, he's referenced like the,
what's it called?
Like seven powers or five powers
or however many powers there are of defensibility.
There's only seven.
All right, seven.
Yeah.
Are you, if I was to ask people who kind of,
either founders you advise
or people you've worked with,
if I was like, yo, what are Aaron's kind of like,
the frameworks he really like pulls a lot
or tries to like get people to adopt,
what are some of those that you could help teach us?
Yeah, I've read every book.
So I have a pretty good, I have a pretty good,
I believe I have the best set of books at this point.
This is something that I'm,
it's like one of the rare things
I'm like overconfident about.
If founders only read seven powers,
just do seven powers.
That's like obviously good.
But if you add to it, you read positioning.
You know this one?
Yes, I love positioning.
Nobody reads positioning
and then they up their whole market positioning strategy.
So what seven powers does is it,
he's abstracted basically seven other books
in a very compelling way.
And everybody should read seven powers.
But if you don't deeply understand
Innovator's Dilemma and this other book,
Innovator's Solution, it's like this great tandem.
Yeah, they only do give you the problem.
They don't, I've never realized.
Yeah, they don't even know there's an Innovator's Solution.
I mean, he knows how to sell the, you know, sequels.
And so, so-
Innovator Strikes Back, it's the trilogy.
Well, everybody, everybody gives up.
They never read the solution
because they're already like 300 pages into the dilemma
and they're like, oh my God.
So you want to read both the dilemma
and the solution in tandem, like back to back.
You want to read seven powers.
You want to read positioning.
You want to read, you know, for,
it's a little bit more on the fun side,
but Blue Ocean Strategy,
it's good kind of like mostly academic
plus a little bit infotainment.
And then, you know, maybe like crossing the chasm
or inside the tornado.
So if you had the time
and you could be like locked in a room
and read like six books, if you read that,
you will be able to predict 100% of things
that happen in technology, like without fail.
Like you'll know every competitive move
that people are going to make.
You'll know why markets do the things that they do.
You'll understand so much more
than just trying to like wing it
and guess what's going to happen next.
Do you have like an anti-read list
where you think these are popular and people read them,
but you don't think people should?
Yeah, well, there are some kind of like,
you're kind of like classics in like leadership books
that I have not found myself getting as into,
but I do appreciate why people get into them.
It doesn't like trigger my same sort of visceral,
you know, kind of reaction.
I think that they're intending.
You're not a leaders eat last
or a starch it wise type of guy?
Make your bed.
I'm not going to, you know,
because I respect the trade,
I don't want to,
I'm not going to call out anything specifically,
maybe offline I'll mention a couple,
but there are a few where like I'm like 50 pages in.
I'm like, I think this is kind of like
a little bit too trite.
Well, let's use this because right now,
it's easy in hindsight when you read the books
because they're like giving you a case study
from 15 years ago, 20 years ago,
and you can sort of Malcolm Gladwell,
like revisionist history your way
into like any conclusion you want.
Those are the fun ones of, you know,
the ones that were written in like, you know, 93.
And it was like, you know,
digital equipment corporation
will be the largest company on the planet
based on, you know,
and it's like it died two years later, right?
But the right now there's this fog of war with AI
and it's basically Game of Thrones.
You've got like Elon, the King of the North.
He's coming down.
He's trying to make it happy.
You got the Anthropics.
I guess, how do you see this playing out?
Once you think about like seven powers positioning,
when you think about some of the frameworks you have,
do you have any predictions for us
that you can look really smart on
or dumb on in next seven years?
I'm glad you asked because it does.
I should, based on my confidence
on the power of those six books,
I should be able to tell you the answer.
They did not anticipate the AI market.
Just for the record, I think you said,
if you read these books,
you can predict anything
with a 100% hit rate all the time.
Now you just said, I don't know.
Well, partly because there's other factors here
that Al Trite didn't write about.
So he didn't know whether China
would win in open weights models.
No, I mean, there are literally other factors
because we have government,
like government is such an X factor in this.
China is an X factor.
So no idea on these things.
More what these books are good at is like,
it'll be, if you're an entrepreneur,
it'll tell you if your idea is gonna be remotely,
you know, gonna work or not.
And so it works better in kind of like early stage,
like will this company find a category
that it can like wedge into
or will the incumbent more likely take the category?
Like, so I use like innovative dilemma
and innovative solution as an example.
We'll basically tell you 75% of the time,
whether you have a shot as a new startup.
Can you give an example, make it a little more obvious?
Yeah, I mean, like the whole point of innovative dilemma
was everybody kind of thinks
it's like a tech disruption book.
It's like, oh, they got disrupted by a tech or something.
But it's too simplistic.
The key is what innovative dilemma tells you
is if the business model is not something
that the incumbent wants to pursue
because the business model is unattractive to the incumbent.
So if you look at it through that lens,
it will very quickly tell you,
like if you have a new startup,
like is the incumbent gonna find
that business model unattractive or not?
And if it's unattractive, they won't pursue it.
And if it is, then you very much need to assume
that that incumbent is going to try and compete with you.
Then you have to decide, is that a technology
that for whatever reason is like a sustaining technology
that the incumbent is gonna be classically good at
or is it like so hard for them to figure out
that they're not?
And then that tells you things like Google
is gonna obviously get really good at AI
and they're not gonna let the consumer market
just disappear because it's actually
an attractive business model.
There's nothing about having an AI answer
from the Google experience
that would be bad for monetization.
And so everybody that wrote Google off three years ago
it's very obvious that Google wants to go do this one
kind of fully.
Conversely, there's a lot of business models
where like over the years,
we saw like there were a lot of incumbents
that didn't wanna move infrastructure to the cloud
because if they moved to the cloud
instead of having like 10,000 customers,
they would only have like three or four customers.
And that was a totally different business model
for certain software providers
or certain infrastructure providers.
And so you could kind of see
who is gonna be under pressure as the cloud grew.
So I just use these frameworks
because they kind of help you predict again
like how is an incumbent gonna respond?
Are they gonna respond in like a way
that is sort of like closed?
Are they gonna respond with the right set
of kind of mechanisms?
And that just happens all the time.
AI generally is kind of playing out
with not that different of response mechanisms
from the incumbents
that you would also again kind of expect.
Like who's gonna go in and kind of enter each market?
How are they gonna compete, et cetera.
Trey Lockerbie Are you only interested in that,
in this business strategy stuff?
Like whenever I read like Blue Ocean Strategy,
a lot of times I think,
dude, this is for like a business that is,
this is like box.
This is like a multi-billion dollar company
who can swing up and become a tens of billions
or hundreds of billions of dollar company
over the next decade.
Not as much like from an SMB lens.
Like for example, where I live in New York City,
we have this thing called pop-up bagels.
And it's like kind of an interesting take on a bagel.
I think they've actually just raised VC.
Instantly disproving your question.
Trey Lockerbie But like, do you ever think about,
do you ever like nerd out on like,
you know, we were talking about,
I forget the guy's name, Nat Friedman,
who bought the baseball card company.
Matt Turner Matt Turner, sorry.
Do you ever think of it from that perspective?
Trey Lockerbie I do.
I definitely do nerd out,
but only if it like crosses my universe.
So I had a friend actually
that had an online balloon website
and he got, he was selling kind of balloons
to some wholesale, some consumer.
And that was really fun
because we could go and brainstorm,
like how would you do a consumer
or wholesale kind of like party supplies business at scale?
And so, yeah, I mean, it's like,
I don't find myself being able to as much,
but like, it is always fun to get your arms around.
What we were always brainstorming is like,
how do you compete with Party City?
Like, okay.
So like, they've got this one complex thing
because they have physical infrastructure,
which means they have a high retail kind of cost.
So it's hard for them to go as full kind of digital.
And so there was a lot of like,
classic incumbent dilemmas.
I think every, two person startups
that are selling physical things in the real world
run into the exact same market factors
that a software business with VC run into.
Preston Pysh If you were, rewind the clock here,
you're a college student,
when you started Box,
the internet enabled ideas like that.
If you were free, young, hungry to do something now,
what do you think you would want to go build?
Just because of my tolerance for pain,
I would probably end up somewhere
right in the center of the AI craziness.
Just because I'd have to give it a shot.
You're probably doing what we're all doing,
which is at like 9 to 10 p.m.
You're like toying around on Reddit or whatever
and like look at all the nerdy, cool stuff.
What is catching your eye in the past couple of weeks?
Preston Pysh Right now,
nothing has changed sadly in the past couple of weeks,
but my stack is not surprising.
It's like every tab is one of,
or every app icon is one of Codex, Cursor,
Perplexity, Claude, Figma,
like I have everything.
And like Perplexity is like,
if you want like cloud-based computer use
that's going to like really go to the website
and read each line of text,
like I'll click off to Perplexity computer.
If you're just doing basic research,
you have a number of options.
If you're building a prototype website,
I play with a few different tools.
So nothing surprising on that front.
Trey Lockerbie What do you think about
what's going on with the public markets
in terms of software?
Because that's the thing that interests us right now.
I think Sean, he had written down here.
What did you say, Sean?
You think this is a generational buy?
Preston Pysh I said, yeah,
like permission to talk your book.
Is software right now in a generational buy spot
or make the case?
You can talk about it yourself or other companies.
Trey Lockerbie Well, I'm very nervous
about any investment advice on this topic,
simply because you're at the mercy
of many other factors of like,
is it chip trade week,
which just means software goes down no matter what.
And so like, I say, I'll make,
separate investment advice
because I don't know what the right
multiples are at any given moment for this stuff.
I would just say people probably
for the first time ever started tweeting things
like system of record,
nine months ago or whatever.
But if you kind of take out
any of the temporary zeitgeist nature of any of that,
and you just go back to the core
of literally system of record software,
these systems are used as the authoritative place
where your accounting data goes
or your customer data goes,
or in our case, your contracts
and financial documents go.
So these are not the things that like,
are high on the list of,
I'm going to go and just like,
try and build a totally alternative,
different system for,
and I want to build it myself.
And I just want,
because I want to go and, you know,
save a few hundred thousand dollars
or a million dollars.
Like these systems are in the,
in the kind of core guts of these companies.
So that sort of is why a lot of the software
that people say,
oh, I vibe coded it in a week.
That doesn't necessarily equate to well,
then like Ford is going to go
and replace their ERP system
with that vibe coded thing.
Like, yes, you were able to stand up a prototype
that was functional,
but it's just like totally different
from like running your,
your, you know,
enterprise that is held accountable to the SEC
and a global supply chain on powering that.
So that's, that's like why a lot of software
won't go away in the same,
in the same way people think.
But then the upside,
which is much more exciting
is what happens when you have agents
that are running around
and they need to go do all this useful work
in your enterprise.
Well, the useful work they're going to do
is going to require access to data
that's inside these systems.
And it's going to often require
kind of guardrails
that those, that, that,
that the agent is sort of participating
in and ensuring that,
you know, the agent just doesn't go off the rails
and completely change out,
you know, fundamental parts of your ERP data
or your CRM data
or, you know, kind of a core workflow.
So they need deterministic software
that they are kind of participating in
that have the, the right,
you know, walls, the right data access,
the right permissions,
the right workflow design.
That's largely going to come
from existing software
simply because that's where the workflows
have already been built out
in most enterprises.
So there's a lot of actually ways to argue
that there's more upside
to certain software categories
once agents can participate
in those workflows
because you can just do now
way more with that software.
So in our case,
we actually see an increase in usage
because agents are now roaming around
accessing all of this data
and you want them to access the same data
that the user has access to,
which means you want something
that has like reliable permissions
and access controls and whatnot.
So then it really just becomes a question
of like, how do some
of these incumbent software companies
monetize that agentic upside?
And, and I think you're going to see,
you know, mostly it's mostly
like a consumption oriented model.
It'll be on this more,
more of this headless approach.
But I think there's going to be
a ton of usage of software
as a result of the agent,
you know, kind of adoption piece.
But again, hard to then say like,
okay, so what should you buy or sell?
Based on that, you have to,
everybody has to kind of go
and do the work and sort of try
and make a judgment call of like,
what software will get used more
because of agents,
which is what software gets used
less in the future because of that.
Yeah, we were, you know,
we work a lot with HubSpot
and we are friends with Dharmesh
and Brian and those guys.
It's kind of insane.
The market cap is like
two and a half times the revenue
and the revenue is growing 30% a year
or something like that.
It's crazy.
It's crazy, crazy, crazy.
I tend to believe it will go up.
I just don't think that like
a plumber in Missouri
is going to make their own CRM.
Yeah, yeah.
I think the, for good reason,
like we tend to have a, you know,
kind of a simplistic binary approach,
but like you look at vibe coding
and you say, well,
vibe coding must then replace the,
you know, the software
that we already use.
And probably the real answer is,
no, it'll probably just be built
on top of the software
that we already use.
And so it'll be the IT person
going and customizing
their workflow even further,
but on a data stack
that they trust is reliable
and you're going to work,
you know, very effectively.
It's kind of interesting,
the signal that you see.
So Anthropic's biggest announcement
other than Fable
in like the past month
is this thing called Cloud Tag,
where you work with a cloud,
you know, kind of colleague
in a shared way.
Well, guess what system
they launched in Slack?
Why did they do that?
Because the users are already in Slack
and Slack has the right
effectively permission boundaries
to be able to have
a shared collaborative agent
that you would work with.
And why is Cloud Tag so powerful?
It's because it accesses
your software systems
that you can give it access to data.
So Box is one of those data sources
as an example.
So instead of it sort of being like,
well, Cloud wins, so SaaS loses,
you actually can be like,
oh, no, actually,
this is this intelligent substrate.
It offers some set of kind
of very useful use cases,
but then it's probably
going to also exist
within deterministic software
that also has a bunch of use cases
that kind of create value.
So I think once you kind of move on
from the zero-sum nature
of like, you know, OK,
I'm going to go prompt my way
into software every single day
to no, I'm going to have
some software that is always there
that is reliable and deterministic
and I'm going to have intelligence
kind of get added to that
that does more
non-deterministic things.
That's probably like
a more logical balance
that you'd expect in the future.
You're awesome.
You're smart as ----.
We love talking to you.
I mean, you only talk
about the things that I know.
I can give you lots of topics
that I'm not prepared to discuss.
Enterprise CEO
has a take on enterprise.
Wow.
Thanks for coming on, man.
We've enjoyed following you
for a long time.
It's been fun getting to hang out
with you here for a little bit.
That's it.
That's the pod.
