Jun 26, 2026 Market Updates and Analysis Rick Rule says gold's drop below $4,000 rhymes with 1975, when the metal crashed 50% and then rose 8x, and the investors who panic-sold at the bottom missed the entire move. So is this gold selloff the buying opportunity of the decade, or a warning that more pain is coming?
Legendary resource investor Rick Rule, founder of Rule Investment Media, joins Kitco News anchor Jeremy Szafron to break down the gold selloff after the price cracked $4,000 for the first time since November and Bank of America pulled its $6,000 gold target. Rule explains why he's pessimistic on gold in the very near term yet still buying, why he expects the political class to cave on interest rates and return to quantitative easing before year-end, and why he believes the US dollar could lose 75% of its purchasing power this decade, just as it did in the 1970s.
The conversation goes deep on the mining side too: why gold miners are being priced as if gold were only $3,354 an ounce, a 19% discount to spot, why Rule says the safest, best risk-adjusted way to own gold isn't a miner at all but the royalty and streaming companies, the $250 billion copper-streaming wave he sees coming, the one producer he'd own (Agnico Eagle), what he sold and what he's buying now, the real silver setup beyond the solar headlines, the coming mining takeover wave, where in the world he will and won't own a mine, and why copper could run to $10-12.
Rick Rule will be hosting the 2026 Rule Symposium on Natural Resource Investing, July 6-10 in Boca Raton, and Kitco will be there on the ground. The in-person event is sold out, but you can join the livestream and access the replays through the year here: (https://cvent.me/XOqdLa?via=Kitco-News)
CHAPTERS 00:00 Gold Breaks $4,000 01:17 Rates vs Gold 03:55 The 1975 Lesson 08:46 What Breaks First 14:22 The Crash, Then QE 18:31 The Miner Discount 19:52 Royalty & Streaming 27:05 Rick's Portfolio 28:47 The Boca Symposium 32:03 The Silver Setup 39:40 The Takeover Wave 44:50 Where to Own a Mine 48:18 Copper's Warning 50:16 Takeaways
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Rick Rule discusses the long-term bullish outlook for gold and silver, driven by unsustainable U.S. debt and inevitable inflation. While short-term interest rate hikes may cause volatility, Rule views these as buying opportunities. He outlines a strategic approach to precious metals, emphasizing physical gold, streaming companies, and high-quality miners.
Welcome back. I'm Jeremy Safran. All right, gold just broke below $4,000 for the first time since
November. And as we speak, it's clawing back, trading above $4,000 today, about 1% green on
the day. And here's the tale that matters. One of the Wall Street's biggest banks is blinking. Bank
of America just pulled its $6,000 gold target as Wall Street shifts from betting on rate cuts to
bracing for possible rate hikes. So here's a question for today's show. Is the smart money
right to step back from gold here? Or is a bank pulling its target, the kind of moment contrarians
wait for? Now, my guest has spent 50 years in this business. And after a week like this,
his read matters. Stay with us. All right, joining me now is Rick Rule, founder of Rule Investment
Media, a friend to the show. Rick, what a week. Welcome back. Good to have you here.
Pleasure to be with you. And as you suggest, an interesting time for this discussion.
Yeah, yeah. Very topical. Obviously, a lot of people looking. I mean, right now,
gold sitting here testing $4,000. Bank of America just pulled its gold target this week. And I mean,
you've spent 50 years doing the opposite of the crowd. So I mean, I guess we could start with
straight up for the person watching their position right now. Is this a moment to be nervous or a
moment to be buying? I think it depends on your time preference. I think in the very near term
that U.S. policymakers are prepared to allow the market to set the tone of U.S. interest rates.
And that suggests to me that interest rates will go higher in the U.S. If that's correct,
that will continue to strengthen the U.S. dollar and reduce the quotes of all items
denominated in U.S. dollars. That includes, ironically, Canadian dollars and gold.
Longer term, I think that the U.S. political class will capitulate with regards to interest
rate rises. Interest rate rises will make the level of government debt in the United States
increasingly difficult to service. It will, as it did in 1975, have a very deleterious impact
on the long bond market and hence the portfolio values in things like pensions,
retirement funds, profit sharing plans and university endowments. It would also be very
difficult on equities prices as yield oriented instruments became relatively more attractive
based on income yields than dividend paying stocks. And of course, it would raise the
total cost of owning houses and buying consumer durables like cars on time. So, my suspicion is
in the very near term that the U.S. political class will flirt with higher interest rates because
in the real true interest of the economy, long term interest of the economy, that's the right
thing to do. But doing the right thing is seldom anything that troubles the political class of the
U.S. And my suspicion is towards the end of this year, you will see them capitulate and both force
interest rates down to the extent that they can and monetize the debt and deficits, including
the debt associated with the recent Iran conflict through quantitative easing. In the very near term,
I'm pessimistic as to the gold price. Ironically, that's good for me because I'm looking, continually
looking to increase my gold holdings. I, Jeremy, as you know, save in gold while maintaining liquidity
in U.S. dollars. You know, you brought up something interesting. You talked about 1975
there, and it's important because gold had that brutal correction inside what later became a much
larger bull market. What should investors kind of learn from that period that gold can fall hard
even when the long term thesis is right? Well, that's the lesson right there. Younger
investors in particular who didn't live through 1975, I did. There's a lot of things to learn.
In a secular bull market, which is what I believe we're in for gold, you can experience cyclical
declines and you can experience a lot of volatility. In 1975, inflation was becoming
a political issue throughout North America, the United States and Canada. And the consequence of
that is that the U.S. political class, perhaps responding to voters' wishes, decided to tackle
inflation head on. And the way that you did that, of course, was to increase the interest rate.
And while that did stop inflation temporarily in its tracks, it had a very deleterious near
term impact on a lot of sectors. And the consequence of that was that the political class
backed down, drove the interest rate down and signaled to savers and investors worldwide that
short term politics in the United States were more important than protecting the integrity of the U.S.
dollar. The consequence of that in gold price terms is that in the beginning, before the decline,
gold was priced at about 200 U.S. dollars an ounce. As a consequence of that interest rate
rise over nine months, the gold price fell by 50 percent. Gold stocks, by the way, fell further
to 100 dollars an ounce. And the faithful but not really faithful gold bugs who liked gold at 200
decided they didn't like it at 100 dollars. And when they sold out, they missed a subsequent
rise in the gold price from 100 dollar low to an 850 dollar high, which occurred over six years.
Is past prologue? I think yes. I mean, so the key point, the political class
backed down. And I want to stick on that because so because I mean, is the real gold trade not
about inflation itself, but about the moment policymakers decide the pain of fighting
inflation is worse than inflation? I think that's right. And I think it manifests itself
in the gap between the interest rate and what I would describe as the real interest rate.
The most broadly quoted interest rate in the world, the benchmark rate in the world,
is the U.S. 10 year treasury. It's the largest and most liquid savings asset class on the planet.
And it's the one that is an example Bloomberg and S&P used to judge other credits. The
yield on the U.S. 10 year right now is about four and a half. I don't know what it is. Might be
four, four, might be four, six, but in the mid force. And that is what I would call the nominal
interest rate. Here's why. If you believe the number that the U.S. government uses to gauge
inflation, which is the consumer price index, the CPI, you believe that the deterioration in
purchasing power of the U.S. dollar is proceeding along at about 2.8, 2.9%. Let's call it three just
for fun. Which means that if you buy the U.S. 10 year treasury, getting paid, let's say 4.5,
you aren't making 4.5. You're actually losing 1.5. A real interest rate is an interest rate that
provides a compensation for savings slightly in excess of the deterioration of the purchasing
power of the U.S. dollar. And it's this deteriorating real interest rate that I think
ultimately determines the fate and the price of gold. On a day-to-day basis, certainly not.
Narrative and rhetoric and momentum is what matters. But over time, as we learned in the
decade of the 1970s, it is the real interest rate, which is to say the yield above the rate of the
deterioration of the U.S. dollar, that sets the tone for the gold price. By the end of the decade
of the 70s and the early 80s, when Volcker came in, those interest rates rose to the extent that
the U.S. 10 year treasury was yielding in excess of 16%. When the U.S. treasury was yielding 16%
and the underlying rate of inflation was 12%, there was a 400 basis point real yield
in the U.S. treasuries. And that set off a bear market in gold and a bull market in bonds. And
until we have a real yield in the U.S., I think you're going to see over time, sadly, a very,
very strong gold market. Yeah. Yeah. So, I mean, you know, we don't talk price targets. I know you
don't like to do those. And I, you know, give me kind of a level instead. I mean, today, the 1975
lesson is that the political class eventually backs down. Then I guess it's the question is,
you know, how long could the Fed stay tough? I mean, we've got PCE just out today running 4.1%,
the market pricing possible hikes, but also a federal debt load that's much larger than it was
in the 70s. So you were talking about the T-bills there a little bit on the treasury side. What
breaks first? Is it inflation? Is it the consumer? Is it the bond market? Or is it just the Fed's
resolve? I think you are going to see a couple things happen as a consequence of
higher long-term interest rates. Most noticeable immediately will be
the cost of servicing federal, state, and local debt. Those debts are increasing very rapidly.
As increasing fears of inflation slip into the economy, the compensation that savers demand
for savings will go up, which means that either the interest rate will have to be allowed to rise
or the political class will have to monetize that debt with quantitative easing, one or the other.
To the extent that interest rate rises, it will begin to impact the price of consumer credit.
It will begin to impact, as a consequence, the sales of consumer durables, in particular
automobiles. But it will also make housing, which is currently not very affordable in many parts of
North America, even less affordable given the fact that most people finance their accommodation,
and long-term interest rates usually rise in excess of the rates on the U.S. 10-year treasury.
This, of course, will impact the long bond market. Ultimately, as I say, if past is prologue,
witness 1975, it will impact the equities market too. At some point in time, the accumulated
short-term pain likely causes the political class to capitulate. When that capitulation happens,
I suspect that the 1976 lesson passes prologue, that gold unfortunately does. I say unfortunately
because I believe that very well. You know, Jeremy, this is a very long answer to a short
question, but when I look at the aggregate levels, and I'm not talking in Canadian terms because I
don't know the appropriate numbers for Canada, but in American terms, when I look at the aggregate
levels of federal government debt, that's soon to cross $40 trillion or $36 trillion net of the Fed's
balance sheet. But that's the smaller cousin of the problem. The bigger cousin is that the net
present value of unfunded entitlement liabilities in the United States, Social Security, Medicare,
Medicaid, federal government pensions, the Environmental Trust Fund, military pensions,
that number, depending on the discount rate you use, according to the Congressional Budget Office,
is at about $120 trillion. If you combine those two numbers, the aggregate debt in the United
States hovers around $155 trillion, and that number grows by $2 trillion a year in terms of
on-balance sheet deficits. It'll be higher this year. And $2 trillion a year in the net present
value of unfunded liabilities. The only way that I can think of that the United States services
both its on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet liabilities would be to inflate away the obligation.
In other words, maintain the nominal payments while they inflated away the net present value
of those payments. We did that in the United States in the decade of the 70s. In the decade
of the 70s, according to the Office of Management and Budget, the U.S. dollar lost 75% of its
purchasing power over 10 years, which is what I believe happens over the next 10 years. I believe
it's happening as we speak. And the consequence of that or one consequence of that was that the
gold price ran from $35 an ounce to $850 an ounce. I'm not suggesting that we're going to have a 25
fold increase in the gold price now. What I am suggesting is that the increase in the gold price
could easily mirror the deterioration in the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar, which is
to say that gold would maintain its purchasing power while the dollar lost 75% of its purchasing
power. The cleanest version of the gold thesis here is not runway inflation tomorrow, but that
slow transfer of purchasing power away from savers and towards debtors. What you say is
incredibly important. Artificially low interest rates are a subsidy to spenders by savers.
They're an income transfer. Societies don't get richer by spending. They get richer by
saving and investing. This is a self-correcting phenomenon, but the method by which it corrects
is painful for all. Here's what is kind of striking about this past week. The same day
that gold broke, the AI trade came roaring back. Micron blows out. The Nasdaq jumped 2%. The whole
market is leaning on these handful of names. So if that trade cracks, does gold get sold too in
the panic? And then what does the policy response do for resources? In my experience, if you have
a crack, particularly liquidity-inspired crack like 2008, which is to say a crack predicated
on credit concerns, the market takes no prisoners. The sales aren't made by investors. They're made
by margin clerks, and margin clerks sell whatever has a bid, and gold usually has a bid.
Now, the policy response to a market crash has always, in my lifetime with no exceptions,
been artificially low interest rates and quantitative easing, which is to say bailouts.
And what that means is that in the aftermath of the crash, precious metals usually comes back
faster than other investment segments because the market correctly perceives the antidote to this
crash as inflationary in the intermediate term. So my suspicion is that if we had either a credit
related correction, say around concerns in private credit, or if we had a precipitous market decline
as a consequence of disintermediation from technology stocks, it is very likely that
the policy response would be to flood the market with liquidity. And while the initial crash,
from a historical perspective, would likely be tough on gold and gold stocks,
the result of the policy prescription would be extremely bullish for gold.
Yeah, critical distinction in a liquidation. I mean, we saw gold kind of gets sold because
it has that bid. But if the policy response is artificial low rates in QE, then the first move
can obviously be painful and the second move can be bullish. So I mean, is that what we're
kind of looking at right now? I mean, how should investors survive that first leg without missing
the second? That's up to investors. What I've learned is that my view of what's going to happen
in the market in the near and intermediate term is on par with everybody else's, which is to say
lousy. So despite the fact that I think there might be a substantial correction, while I do
maintain liquidity, and as stated, maintaining liquidity costs me as a consequence of a
negative real interest rate, I maintain liquidity because of the possibility, not the probability,
but rather the possibility that there will be a liquidity driven crash. Liquidity that I maintain
will give me the opportunity to take advantage of that crash rather than being taken advantage of.
Separately, I save in gold. I regard gold as wealth. It is liquidity for me too. I proved to
myself in 2010 that I could sell gold when other asset classes became more attractive to me.
But when I look at the future, I'm very cognizant of the fact that neither I nor anybody else I know
has a crystal ball with regards to the immediate future. There are no certainties. There are only
probabilities. And my actions reflect my judgment on the probabilities. And they also reflect the
fact that I'm older. I'm a person of substantial means. No threat to Bill Gates or Bezos or
anybody like that, but a man of some means. And I also enjoy the process. So the actions
that other people are going to take are going to be predicated on their own means and their own
needs. Okay, I got to ask you about miners on this front because it's something we can naturally go
to. I'm not sure if you said this, the Bank of America came out with something this morning.
According to their analysis, the gold mining stocks are being valued as if gold were only
about $3,350 an ounce. So I mean, you know, obviously in plain terms, you can buy a miner
as if gold were roughly $600 cheaper than it is actually now, a 19% discount. And according to the
B of A, the spread inside the group is quite wide. On their coverage,
Wheaton is priced as if gold were near $4,400, while Frank in Nevada is priced as if gold were
only about $2,400. So I mean, when a top royalty name is implying a gold price that is, you know,
far below spot, what is your read? Is the market handing you an opportunity or is pricing a risk,
you know, the headline number kind of hides? I think there's three questions in there,
Jeremy. The first, I think, we think from the work that we do, that the mining companies are
discounting a price of $3,400 as opposed to $3,250 or something, but that's, you know,
that's nibbling around the edges. Who knows? The point is that the gold mining companies are
pricing in substantially lower gold prices. And while I can't speak to the gold prices in 2026,
I'm very constructive as to the gold prices later on in the decade. So I think that the
discount is unwarranted. As to the difference between Wheaton and Franco,
I would suggest that the market is beginning to price into Wheaton the probability that very,
very large streaming transactions will occur over the next two or three years,
which means that Wheaton, although they compete with Franco directly in this market,
will benefit. The type of transaction I'm talking about is the fact that the copper mining industry
needs to raise literally $250 billion over the next 10 years to maintain production.
And cash flows from copper mines or by-product cash flows, pardon me, from gold and silver
production in copper mines is priced by the market at sort of 15 times cash flow in a royalty and
streaming wrapper or six or seven times cash flow in a copper producers wrapper. That means
that a substantial part of the capital stack for this $250 billion raise will come from selling
by-product streams, Wheaton being the largest streamer on the planet. The recent transaction,
the four and a half, pardon me, $4.2 billion transaction between Wheaton and BHP, I think
is the beginning of a trend. And I think that some Wall Street analysts have come to understand
that the criticism of Wheaton was that the big deals that it could do, the deals that spawned
its growth were behind it. And now there's a realization that no, the big deals are in front
of it. And Wheaton may or may not be in the catbird seat. There will certainly be competition
for those deals. That's interesting. So, I mean, if this is the beginning of a trend,
how big can it get? Are we talking about a few large streaming deals or kind of that
structural shift where copper miners increasingly fund development by selling gold and silver
by-product streams? Like you said, I mean, how big do you think this will get?
I think minimally there'll be $50 billion in new transactions in the next 10 years,
minimally. And by the way, that $250 billion number I gave you came out of Metals Week in
London. And they specifically said that that was $250, $2,025, which is to say non-escalated.
They pointed out at Metals Week that the inputs for capital costs to build new mines
is increasing by 8% to 10% compounded annually. So, when I say $50 million,
understand that I mean $50,000, $2,025. Likely, the nominal number will be much higher,
$70 or $80 billion. So, does that mean the kind of best
risk-adjusted opportunity in precious metals may not be the miner with ore body, but the company
financing the mine? Absolutely, positively, yes.
The gap between Wheaton and Franco's cost of capital and their return on capital employed,
if you adjust for certainty, is outstanding, really truly outstanding. The amount of general
and administrative expense necessary to run Wheaton or Franco compared to the
G&A expense of an operating gold mining company is very large. And it's important to remember
that adjusted for the purchase price in the streaming business, your gross is your net,
which means that when an operator has to make a capital expense or a sustaining capital expense,
neither Wheaton nor Franco feel it when there are increased input costs or at the mine level,
increased taxation. Franco and Wheaton don't feel it. On a risk-adjusted basis,
for many investors, the royalty in streaming space from the biggest to the smallest
are likely better places to be. They don't offer the optionality or the leverage
that you see in riskier endeavors. But for the right investor, one who wants to play the trend
while taking as little operational and fiscal risk as he or she can do,
the place to be is the royalty in streaming companies.
So, I mean, for viewers kind of trying to separate the winners from the crowded trade,
what matters most here to you, do you think, is it kind of balance sheet capacity,
or is it more deal pipeline? I mean, we know that we're seeing more discipline management,
or is it the terms of the streams that they're writing right now?
Well, I think the answer to the first question is both. I think, well, you got to define yourself
and not impose the market on yourself. How much risk are you willing to take?
How much volatility are you willing to endure? What sort of upside do you demand?
A speculator, a true speculator, let's say an Eric Sprott, would have no need, no patience
for Wheaton Precious. That's not what a speculator is interested in. A speculator
is interested in optionality or discovery. They're interested in quantum game.
An investor who cares about the trend, which is to say the potential impact on his or her net
worth as a consequence of rising gold prices, but does not want to subject themselves to the vagaries
of operating performance, or inflation in terms of inputs, would be much better off
with structured cash flows like royalty and streaming companies. It depends on who you are
and what your goals are. Yeah. And I mean, in terms of the generalist investor that we always
ask, why aren't they coming back to the marker, right? I mean, do they still just kind of see
streamers as gold proxies rather than a financing platform for the next wave of mine supply?
The generalist investor, in my experience, doesn't understand how to express his or her preference
for the gold equities market because they don't have enough experience. I think,
I'm almost certain here on your back, if you take yourself back to your retail stock brokerage days,
you will remember when the generalist investor came into your office that they required a lot
of education. The market hands out that education. It's generally fairly painful.
My hope is that when the generalist investor comes in the market, he or she starts with physical
gold. They start with a savings asset. If you believe that the gold price is going to go up,
the best way to express your affection really is gold. The rest are second order things. Then
I would hope that they would construct their equities portfolio beginning with the royalty
and streaming companies, divorcing themselves from as many cost externalities as they possibly could.
Then my hope is that they would focus on the best of the best in terms of producers.
That in my mind right now comes down to one name, Agnico Eagle,
and then worry about populating the rest of the portfolio.
Incredible company. Some would say at a discount right now. I want to bring this
into your own book. If the speculator wants optionality and the investor wants
that durable trend with cash flow, where are you personally leaning right now? Are you
allocating more to optionality or more to businesses already converting this trend into cash?
I'm laughing, Jeremy, because I always urge people to be cautious and green eyeshade investors.
All the money I now invest carefully, I made by speculating wildly. I'm this odd mix of cautious
conservative saver and green eyeshade investor and wild speculator. We're in a risk-off environment
right now, which is to say that the tertiary names, the riskier names are selling off harder
than the high quality names. My own portfolio is also under allocated to the riskiest part
of the trade. You may recall, Jeremy, I was fairly public in selling 25% of my junior portfolio
back in October and then selling 80% of my physical silver in January.
I'm in a position where I have more liquidity in my portfolio than is optimal, even given my fears
of the credit market. I personally am attempting to allocate in the exploration names or in the
names that I believe are very likely takeover and amalgamation names. No, I won't name them
because I'm actively trying to buy them. I don't want competition from 100,000 Kitco viewers.
It's true. It's true. Actually, this is a good opportunity here. We can talk about
some of the opportunities that you're looking on the junior space. Just for the audience,
it's a quick break because I want you in the room for this. In just a couple of weeks,
our team is heading to Florida for Rick Rule's Symposium on Natural Resource Investing,
July 6th through the 10th at the Boca Raton, beautiful resort. I'll be there with the
team on the ground, of course, putting these exact questions to the biggest names in the business.
Now, the in-person event, I know, is sold out, but you can still get the whole thing on live
streaming. That replay runs throughout the rest of the year. I think the link is right below the
video, so reserve your virtual seat, then come back. We're going to be getting into silver and
where the money is going. You've been putting this on a long time. We've seen that up. We've
seen that down. I remember just a couple of years ago, Agnico breaking $100 and I had Sean Boyd on
and we were looking at it. I'm just thinking, are you excited about this one now that there's been
a bit of a correction? I'm hugely excited about this. Financial markets are the only markets in
the world, I think, where when the shoppers are in a store and a sale starts, all the shoppers
leave the store. The circumstance that we're talking about today is as true as it was a year
ago or two years ago. The price levels of the companies, despite the obvious advances that some
of them have made in understanding their properties over the last two years, are flat to down, which
means that the lessons that we teach in the conference, the macro lessons, the portfolio
management lessons, the analytical lessons that we teach are much more actionable.
It's important to note at that conference, there are 69 public company exhibitors. In order to
exhibit on our conference floor, you have to be owned in the accounts of the conference sponsors.
Our exhibitors have been vetted. We turned down over 130 applications to exhibit at our conference
because we made a promise to our attendees almost 30 years ago that we wouldn't have an
exhibitor that wasn't vetted. And by vetted, we mean that we knew them and liked them enough
to own them in our own accounts. There's no guarantee, of course, Jeremy, as you know,
that because I own a stock, it goes up. But at most competing conferences, the qualification
to be an exhibitor is merely a check that cashes. Our vetting process is much more extreme.
And I'm delighted by the price levels that exist because I would like to introduce our attendees
to the opportunities afforded by our exhibitors and allow the attendees to learn the lessons that
we teach on the podium in real time to their own benefit when financial goods in our sector are on
sale. Yeah, well said. And I mean, you know, this is beyond company presentations. I mean,
you got a lot of different speakers there. I think we'll be on stage here at some point,
too. I mean, talk to me just a little bit about that macro framework. I mean,
it's coming to fruition. I talked to guests even last year at your show, and their calls are here.
And I do want to get into silver here, Rick, because I mean, the story is kind of bigger
than, you know, the solar headlines everyone continues to repeat. It did get hit obviously
harder than gold, and it's near 58, I think, today. According to the Silver Institute,
the market's been in structural deficit for years in plain terms. Obviously, the world is using more
silver than it produces. At the same time, more silver is mined as a byproduct of copper, lead,
zinc or gold. So a high silver price alone does not quickly bring a wave of new supply.
So put all that together for us. Is silver a buy right here? And if it is, I mean,
do you want the metal of the producers, the streaming names?
Well, you gave a pretty good summary there, Jeremy. I'm going to put you on the main stage.
To me, in my own account, silver is a speculative asset. I buy gold from fear,
and I buy silver for greed. And I believe as a speculation, there are other asset classes that
are cheaper than silver. Among them are the silver stocks. So I personally would express
my fondness for silver, which I'm doing, in the silver equities market.
I had a fairly well-publicized sale of my physical silver in January of this year.
As you know, Jeremy, I always sell hyperbolic up, and I always buy hyperbolic down moves.
We had a hyperbolic up move, but the down move has been much more gradual
in both the silver and the silver stocks. If we get a precipitous decline,
in other words, if we get a capitulation in the silver market, I might be a buyer.
It might get cheap enough that I consider it to be a speculative asset, but it's much more likely
that I will continue to buy the silver stocks as a speculation in favor of silver.
The two points that you made in terms of supply and demand are critical for people to understand,
which is to say that an increase in silver price doesn't necessarily lead to an increase
in silver production, because less than 20% of the silver supply on an annual basis
comes from silver mines. The vast majority comes as byproduct from other mines or from recycling.
The other thing is that the industrial utility of silver is high and is growing every year.
It's important to note those two factors. There are two other factors that I think need to be
added in. A lot of the above-ground supply we can't trace because it's used as informal savings
by people in poor countries with high tax rates like India. We don't actually know what the
rises. Miraculously, some people just hoard and sell it. We learned that during prior silver
squeezes. I think the other thing that people need to understand about silver is that silver
is reactive to momentum, which means exactly that when you are in a structural precious metals bull
market, which I think we're in, by the way, I think we're in a cyclical decline in a secular
bull market, that when momentum is established by gold and the generalist investor comes down
into the precious metals space, attracted by the momentum in gold, the market leadership
changes from gold to silver. We saw that occur in 2025. When the momentum again favors gold,
for a while the gold trade will outperform by a substantial margin the silver trade,
but when leadership changes from gold to silver, silver has explosive up moves. I think a
characteristic of the upcoming bull market in precious metals will be eventually a leadership
transition from gold to silver. I can't tell you when it will occur, but Jeremy, you're not going
to need me to tell you. Well, I'll be reporting on it here, Rick. Okay, let's just assume that
silver equity discount is real, and the answer is not just simply buy everything. I'm not going
to ask you to pick names, but what separates the silver company that is kind of genuinely
mispriced from the one that deserves the discount? In your portfolio, do silver equities deserve
a separate allocation from gold equities right now, or are they just kind of the higher beta
version of the same trade? They don't deserve a higher rating, but I give it to them because
when they perform, they perform so stupidly. So I give them a greed premium, frankly. In terms of
buying silver companies, I think you need to emphasize companies that operate deposits
that are in the best quartile worldwide in terms of production cost, and also in the best quartile
worldwide in terms of return on capital employed. These are rare deposits, and no company will be
entirely comprised of deposits that meet those categories, but that's where you start. Then you
need to take two other things into consideration, at least two other things. One is the pipeline.
Will the company be able to maintain or exceed or increase production in the five to seven year
time frame? I think that's critically important. And then the third is rear looking.
What has the capital allocation track record of the company been over the last 10 years,
and are the people responsible for the good or bad capital allocation still in charge of the
company? A lot of predictive utility in understanding the capital allocation track
records of management teams. Here's something that stands out for me. Gold corrected, obviously,
but the senior producers are still throwing off strong free cash flow. I mean, we're not seeing
aggressive buybacks, special dividends. There's some debt pay down, but not a ton. I mean,
what does the caution tell you about how the people running these mines read the cycle right now?
I think they're being constrained by the industry's track record in the 2000 to 2010 time frame.
That was a ludicrous bull market where the selling price of the material that the companies
produced increased six or sevenfold, and the free cash flow per share fell. It took real skill for
mining industry to screw up a market like that, and they're still being held to account.
I think that changes in two or three years. I think you have a market right now where
the owners of the companies, the shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders,
are insisting on a very rigid fiscal discipline. I think that changes because I think the concern
over the next two years will be the ability of companies to maintain or increase their
production to the extent that they're not making sustaining capital investments, and they're not.
Their ability to produce the cash flows that they're generating today
falls, and I think the concern on Wall Street and Bay Street will go from capital discipline
to avoiding cannibalization. That will require increasing investment in their own pipelines,
and it will also involve a continuation of the mergers and acquisition trend
that we've seen over the last two, two and a half years.
Well, that's a perfect time. It's almost like you're reading my mind because I actually have
an audience question here. I wanted to bring them into this because I got tweeted this morning.
This quote, Rick, we got cheap equity, strong metal prices, and a market that is paying for
good assets usually sounds like the setup for M&A, so why aren't we seeing more deals?
Oh, be patient. We're definitely going to see more deals, and you're going to see all kinds
of different deals. You're going to see strategic acquisitions where big companies consolidate
assets in the vicinity of their existing producing assets. Witness what Agnico Eagle
has been doing both in Scandinavia, but also in the Abitibi. You are going to see non-strategic
assets, lateral acquisitions where companies seek to become bigger, both so that they can
allocate capital over a broader opportunity set, but also because larger companies, larger market
caps have greater trading liquidity, and they benefit from passive ETF and index buying.
Witness the acquisition of Orla by Equinox. No operating synergy, but still one that capital
markets will like. You will also have acquisitions simply where companies with a lower cost of
capital, that is to say a higher share price relative to their net asset value, take over
companies that are less appreciated in the market. You're going to see a lot of this, and then you're
going to see very much like you saw in the first part of the decade, 2000 to 2010, eye-popping
prices paid for exploration success. Exploration budgets among the majors and the large
intermediates has been constrained for 15 years, and the consequence of that is that the exploration
pipelines are depleted. To the extent that you have a discovery, like say the Snowline deposit,
a major discovery in a jurisdiction that's believed to be fairly safe, I think over the
next five years, the prices that are going to be paid for those discoveries
are going to be surprisingly stiff. I remember the success premiums, the discovery premiums
that were paid in the period 1998 to 2004, 2005 as being, let's just say I was astonished by
the prices I was paid for names, as an example, like Arequipa, and I think we're coming on that
again. Yeah, I was going to ask you, the problem is if the producers are still too cautious or if
the sellers kind of refuse to accept these low valuations, right? I mean, the bid's too low,
or are the asks still unrealistic? Well, the beauty here is from a transactional point of view,
the high quality juniors in 2026 have sold off by 30 or 40 percent, which is to say that an
accretive deal can be made at, say, a 50 percent premium to current prices. Agnico just paid much,
much, much more in Finland, and it benefits the seller, partially as a consequence of depressed
share prices, while simultaneously being accretive to the buyer. This is the circumstance where those
transactions take place. This decline in share price that we've seen, decline in enterprise
value, decline in market capitalization, is very, very, very good for M&A. It won't show up next
week, might not show up next month, but it'll certainly show up six months from now if the
market doesn't correct itself. And I mean, for investors, should they be looking for takeover
targets, or is that the wrong way to own the sector because you end up buying weak companies
just hoping for a bid? That depends on how hard they want to work. Most investors want the takeover
premium, but they don't want to do the work to separate the wheat from the chaff, which means
that most investors act like some kid waiting for the tooth fairy. You know, work. For those
investors who are willing to do the work, for those investors who are willing to look for acquisitions
the way the acquirer would, let's say, as an example, if you're a Canadian speculator,
and you are looking for deposits in the Abitibi trend that have already been discovered and
probably aren't big enough as they sit to amortize a mill, but if they were purchased
by somebody with a mill in the region, say an Eldorado or a Kinross or an Agnico Eagle,
they could be developed to leverage off existing inventory, pardon me, infrastructure. If somebody
is willing to do that level of work, then they absolutely positively should be looking for
takeover targets. If their technique for looking for takeover targets is to simply read the industry
press or listen to the BS generated by the investment banks, then don't do it. Buy the
biggest and the best. I've got to ask you to kind of widen the lens here, because where you own a
mine matters just as much as you own, I guess. I mean, geography seems like it's half the game.
Where in the world do you actually want to own a mine right now? And where won't you put a dollar,
no matter how good the deposit, because of the politics or maybe resource nationalism that we've
been seeing? I take an odd view with that. I think that you need to juxtapose so-called political
risk, both with political reality, but also with the size of the prize. I would rather own a very
high quality asset, an asset where the quality is high enough that the government is tempted to
steal it. I don't believe there is a good political jurisdiction. I think there's some improving
political jurisdictions, but I note that even jurisdictions that are believed to be politically
safe are political. If you look as an example at the American response to increased oil prices in
1970s, it was to slap on an excess profits tax. That's backdoor nationalization. It's government
theft. If you look at the response in Alberta to rising natural gas prices 15 years ago,
double the provincial royalty. That's resource nationalism.
Which jurisdictions are improving? I would suggest, and it needs a lot of improvement,
the recent tone in British Columbia reflects a substantial improvement. I think what you've seen
in terms of the politics of BC within the NDP, the socialist party, has been that the rural
trade union constituency has begun to assert itself at the expense of the academic intellectuals,
the sort of Kitsilano crowd that were so anti-mining in BC. I think the increasing
importance of progressive First Nations, particularly the Nishka and the Taltans,
and their impact on the political process in BC is very beneficial for mining. I think
the political change throughout Latin America, with the exception of Brazil,
is extremely encouraging. I don't know how long it lasts. The best jurisdiction in my life in terms
of money in and money out has been Chile. Chile decided four years ago to get even with mining
investors. The consequence of that is that the flow of funds into Chile was halted, and the
Chilean voters threw out the morons. But that can change. The truth is, Jeremy, and this is
something that most North American investors of my vintage don't like to hear. Political
risk is relative, and we tend to discount political risk when it comes from white people
speaking English, stealing through the legislature according to the rule of law.
But that money is just as gone. I've made a lot of money personally in jurisdictions
that are believed to be hard. Bolivia, Congo, Sierra Leone,
South Sudan. In truth, I had 24 very good years in Russia until I had one very bad year.
So I have a much more nuanced view of political risk than many would. But I'm also risk tolerant,
willing to accept volatility, and I'm a longer term investor.
Our time always goes too fast. I said 45 minutes. Of course, we're coming up on 48. So really
quickly, you've lived through the full cycles. What mistakes from the 2000s and 2010s kind of
booms are you watching investors and juniors repeat right now? Is there any?
Nothing yet, but it will come. Markets work, and the cure for high prices is always high prices.
We will see in the next five years, copper rationed by price, which is to say production
declines over the next five years will be such that the current deficits that we see in copper
production will cause copper to be rationed by price. When that happens, companies, banks,
investment banks, and investors will forget that the cure for high prices is always high prices.
The higher copper price will lead to more production at the same time that it incents
copper users to utilize copper in fabrication and other things more efficiently. If we see a move
in the copper price from $6 to some nominal number like 10 or 12, which I think we'll see,
the big thinkers of the world will extrapolate that trend in motion. They will take the rhetoric
behind the escalation in price from $6 to $10 or $12, and they'll extrapolate that to the moon,
and they will lose a boatload of money. Commodity investors always need to remember that the cure
for high prices is high prices, and the cure for low prices is low prices. That doesn't happen in
the three-month timeframe, but it certainly happens in the five or six-year timeframe.
Remember that the higher the price goes, the more that the price verifies the narrative,
the longer the trade has gone on and the riskier the trade has become.
Hey, let me wrap this up for you. I mean, you kind of answered it there, but just bring it
together for the viewer. I mean, gold obviously has pulled back. Silver stocks look cheaper
than silver. Miners are discounting lower metal prices. You're saying M&A premiums can actually
eventually become eye-popping just for someone, and again, I know you're not giving financial
advice, but for someone who wants to act on this market without getting reckless. I mean,
what discipline do you think matters most right now in this volatility?
That's a very, very, very long question. I'm sad to say we could devote an hour to it.
This is self-serving, but go to the real classroom. There's 300 hours of instructional
material there that answers this question. You don't have to spend 300 hours on it. Go to
Introduction to Natural Resource Investing and you'll see the problem that you just asked me
to solve for discussed over three and a half hours, and that's about how long it'll take you
to learn it. Yeah. Yeah. Well said. All right. Rick Ruhl, always appreciate the clarity. We'll
see you at the Ruhl Symposium in Boca Raton. The live stream link is below this video, and
of course, Kitco will be proud to be there on the ground. Appreciate your time today, Rick.
Jeremy, we will be delighted to have you and Kitco at the Natural Resources Investment
Symposium. You have blessed our symposium for many years, and we're very, very grateful for that.
Yeah, I'm happy. And this year, I think even with some of the old colleagues,
Michelle, and quite a few, I think I'm hitting the stage. We're going to talk about
what we see on the other side. So I'm looking forward to it. Thanks again,
Rick. We'll see you soon. Thank you, sir.
All right. That was Rick Ruhl, and I appreciate the candor. Here's where it lands. This week,
some headlines said gold was finished. A major bank pulled its target, and the money rushed back
into the AI trade. Now, Rick's argument is that investors should not stop at the headline. The
real question is whether this is a warning that gold is further to fall, or whether the gap between
$4,000 gold and miners priced near $3,300 is a disconnect serious resource investors should be
studying. Whether he's right is the thing we'll have to watch from here. You decide.
And we'll be going live. Of course, I mentioned there a couple times we're heading to Rick's
symposium down in Boca Raton, Florida, July 6th through the 10th. Now, the in-person room
is sold out, but the live stream and replays are open. The link's in the description. Of course,
Kitco will be bringing it to you from the floor. And for the macro and metal straight, no hype,
hit subscribe, and tell me in the comments, are you buying the gold under $4,000 just about now,
or are you waiting this out to see where it lands? I'm Gerry Safran. For all of us here at
The Epoch Times, thanks for watching.