Peng Liyuan's 3 Bloody Scandals Exposed! Wang Xiaohong Holds Xi’s Biggest Secrets

Amid the fierce power struggle in Zhongnanhai, the news around Xi Jinping's family is tightening. One after another, officials from Xi's political network in Beijing are being drawn into investigations. At this very moment, overseas bloggers who have long defended the Xi family have suddenly come out in force to protect Peng Liwan. They insist that she has no role in any cadre evaluation committee and holds no real power. But isn't that strange? The fire has not even reached her yet, so why rush out in the middle of the night to declare that there is no fire at home? Such eagerness to clear her name suggests there is something they are trying to conceal. Ironically, that very haste only makes people suspect that she may indeed have secrets to hide. So over all these years, what has she been doing behind the scenes, beyond the public eye and unknown to the Chinese people? The death of a former premier and three key witnesses. According to commentator Zhang Feng, the person China's party elders truly resent and ultimately want to bring down is Peng Liwan. But detaining her is no simple matter. Instead, they have been forced to dismantle the network surrounding her piece by piece. As those loyalists are removed, the figures operating behind the scenes gradually come into view. This, Zhang argues, is why it took two years to deal with Ma Xingri before they could move closer to Peng. The question is, why would the elders be willing to pay such a high price and take such enormous risks? What exactly do they hate so much? To answer that, one must turn back to October 27, 2023, at the Dongzhou State Guest Hotel in Shanghai, where former premier Li Keqiang died suddenly at the age of 68. Zhang Feng points to what he describes as a key piece of evidence. Peng Liwan has reportedly been subject to travel restrictions for the past two years, allegedly because of her connection to the Li Keqiang case. The first witness, he says, is Zhang Youxia. During the 2023 military promotion process, Zhang, despite being the first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, was reportedly sidelined. Promotion lists were allegedly bypassed around him and sent directly to what critics called the inner court. Then, in March 2024, Zhong Xiaojun personally asked him to appoint a veteran general twice wounded in combat and still carrying shrapnel to serve as a full-time member of the CMC cadre evaluation committee. What angered Zhang even more was that the committee also included Major General Peng Liwan, whom Zhang describes as a singer and performer. According to Zhang, Peng held influence over the career prospects of senior military officers. For a battle-tested commander like Zhang, this was seen as an unprecedented humiliation. From that point onward, Zhang claims the conflict between Zhang and the Xi family escalated into a life-or-death struggle. The second witness is Xu Qiliang. Zhang argues that Xu's story reveals the extent of Peng Liwan's influence. Xu was originally promoted to the Central Military Commission under Hu Jintao. Later, however, Peng allegedly won him over through their shared Shandong background and the promise of political advancement. Xu subsequently became a key supporter of military reforms favored by the ruling leadership. He was also said to have played a direct role in establishing the CMC cadre evaluation committee and a mechanism known as the six-person task force. When the political winds shifted in 2025, Xu reportedly realized that his past actions would not be easily forgiven. Zhang contends that he chose what he viewed as a soldier's final path, suicide, as an act of apology and a way to protect his family. A former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang says, sacrificed his life to secure peace for his loved ones. The sensitive information Xu possessed was allegedly delivered to the party elders before his death. The third witness is Wang Xiaohong, whom Zhang considers the most significant figure of all. According to him, the Minister of Public Security was investigated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection for six months under a special probe, yet never revealed anything. Why did he remain silent? Overseas sources claim that Wang possesses documents allegedly linked to serious accusations involving China's top leadership couple. Those documents, Zhang says, are Wang's life insurance policy. He may not have spoken, but his silence itself is portrayed as a form of testimony. One witness was compelled to testify, another was driven to death, and the third clung to these secrets as though they were a final testament. In Zhang's view, this is the most dangerous aspect of the entire story. Zhang compares Peng Liyuan to Jiang Qing. The difference, he argues, is that Jiang Qing displayed her power and aggression openly for the whole country to see, whereas Peng Liyuan is portrayed as hiding power behind a smile. By day, she appears as a goodwill ambassador. By night, she is said to exert influence over the most consequential decisions behind the scenes. How power was exercised from behind the curtain? How could a singer and performer who never served on the battlefield wield influence over military promotions? How could she exert pressure on a veteran commander like Zhang Youxia? The answer, according to this account, lies in personnel files and the approval process. Before promotion lists reached Zhang Youxia, the first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, they first passed through Zhong Xiaojun. Overseas sources claim that Zhang had been closely tied to the Xi family since Xi Jinping's days in Zhejiang. He later joined the military and eventually became director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission. The real power of that position lies in deciding which documents reach which leaders and when. As a result, all military promotion lists reportedly passed through this intermediary before arriving on Zhang's desk. Zhang Feng describes this as a modern version of ruling from behind a curtain. There is no need to sit at the center of power if key personnel files can be reviewed and influenced in advance. When the 2023 promotion list reached him, Zhang Youxia was reportedly furious. Zhang claims that the veteran general slammed the table after seeing a list filled with names he barely recognized. If I don't even know who these people are, how can I lead the army? He allegedly demanded. He was then reminded that the selections had been approved by the country's top leadership and by Peng Liyuan. Someone reportedly added, Vice Chairman Zhang, you're nearing retirement anyway. Why are you so concerned? Are you trying to rebel? Enraged, Zhang allegedly ordered security personnel to remove Zhang Xiaojun from the Bayi building immediately. This, Zhang argues, explains why party elders later sought to reassign Zhang. It was not merely a personnel change. It was an attempt to sever the channel linking the military leadership to the so-called inner court. Zhang further contends that what truly shook Xiong Menhai was the alleged disruption of succession norms that had been observed for two decades. Under the retirement rules associated with Deng Xiaoping, Politburo standing committee members aged 67 could remain in office, while those aged 68 were expected to step down. By that standard, both Li Keqiang and Wang Yan, who were 67 at the time of the 20th Party Congress, should have remained. One could have become general secretary and the other premier. Zhang claims this arrangement had already been informally agreed upon by Hu Jintao and senior party elders. Yet at the close of the Congress, the lineup changed unexpectedly. Li Keqiang and Wang Yan exited the political stage, while Tai Chi and Wang Huning, also 67, remained on the standing committee. Zhang argues that the answer lies in what he calls Peng Liwan's ledger of interests. In his view, Li Keqiang and Wang Yan had reputations for being relatively clean by CCP standards. Had they remained in key positions, especially if Wang Yan had become premier, they might have pushed for investigations into major state institutions, financial organizations, and state-owned enterprises. Such efforts, Zhang alleges, could have threatened networks of interests linked to Peng Liwan. To protect those economic interests, as well as political allies such as Ma Xingrui and others associated with her alleged power network, Zhang speculates that Peng may have influenced the top leadership's personnel decisions and helped reshape the final leadership roster. On January 20, 2026, a seminar for provincial and ministerial-level officials was held at the Central Party School. At this symbol of party unity, a dramatic alleged mutiny unfolded, sending shockwaves both inside and outside China. According to reports from overseas organizations, a covert force allegedly built by Wang Xiaohong over many years in Southeast Asia infiltrated the Central Party School disguised as staff members and launched a surprise attack on Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli, the two most powerful figures in the military, inside a conference reception room. While these claims remain unverified, two facts have been officially acknowledged. First, the Ministry of National Defense announced that Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli were under investigation. Second, both vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission simultaneously disappeared from public view on the same day, an unprecedented event in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. Since then, neither man has been seen publicly, whether alive or dead. The incident is widely portrayed as Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan's final desperate attempt to regain control of the military. Overseas sources claim that two weeks later, Peng urgently transferred a trusted major general from Shanghai's armed police system to Beijing in an effort to seize control of the capital garrison and establish a last line of defense for the first family. However, the plan reportedly failed. Most Beijing garrison officers come from long-established revolutionary families and maintain close ties to military elders. After a brief period of confusion, the garrison chose to follow the orders of Liu Yuan and senior military figures rather than submit to the takeover. At the same time, the heavily armored units of the 82nd Group Army, responsible for protecting the capital, were rapidly mobilized and established defensive positions around Beijing, effectively sealing off the city. No military unit publicly declared loyalty to the leadership. Former subordinates of Zhang Yuxia had reportedly already neutralized the army's rifles, while the small contingent of armed police personnel sent from Shanghai was no match for the field army's heavy armor. More significantly, the alleged shootings orchestrated by Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong shattered an unwritten rule that had governed CCP politics since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Power transitions and internal political struggles should not involve bloodshed. Conservative Party elders, including Zheng Qinghong, Zhe Qinglin, and Zhang Dejiang, reportedly urged Xi to follow the example of Hua Guofeng, step down gracefully while retaining personal security and benefits. But the alleged assassination attempt on a senior military leader at the Central Party School crossed a red line. Furious Party elders reportedly concluded that a comprehensive purge was necessary to prevent reckless actors from dragging the CCP into disaster. Following the failed mutiny, Xi Jinping's political downfall was said to have become inevitable. After meeting with Russia's Prosecutor General, Wang Xiaohong disappeared from public view. By June 12, he had gone 16 days without any public appearance or official activity, a sharp contrast to his previously high-profile presence. Overseas sources claim that Liu Jingwo, Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, was directly overseeing the case and that Wang was cooperating with investigators. Meanwhile, a central inspection team has reportedly been stationed inside the Ministry of Public Security with June 23 publicly listed as the deadline for receiving complaints and reports. The fact that a sitting Minister of Public Security has remained absent from public view for 16 consecutive days while under such scrutiny has fueled widespread speculation about his current situation. Why did the alleged mutiny occur? In July 2024, during a closed-door session of the Chinese Communist Party's 20th Central Committee Third Plenum at Beijing's Jingxi Hotel, Xi Jinping was reportedly speaking from the podium when he suddenly began shaking violently, slumped to one side, and collapsed. He allegedly suffered a stroke and fell into a coma. Cai Qi panicked, Li Chang was stunned, and rather than rushing to help, senior officials reportedly focused first on sealing off information and cutting communications. Inside Zhongnanhai, Peng Liwan, the person Xi had relied upon most, was said to be closely monitoring developments from behind the scenes at the Central Military Commission's cadre evaluation committee. Overnight, Xi reportedly realized that her political base, centered around Zheng Xiaojun and the so-called Shandong faction, was no longer strong enough to control the situation. But she underestimated a key reality. Battle-hardened generals do not waste strategic opportunities. Zhang Yaoxia gave the First Family no time to recover. After placing the military on high alert, Zhang immediately contacted Liu Yuan, a highly respected second-generation Red General. Within four hours, Zhang and Liu had reportedly established a network linking retired leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao through what sources describe as a Red Revolutionary Hotline. Taking advantage of the temporary leadership vacuum, Zhang began a sweeping military purge. In November 2024, Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department and a loyal supporter of Xi and Peng, was removed. By March 2025, He Weidong, widely viewed as one of Xi's closest military allies, had also been detained. Within a matter of months, senior officers associated with the once-powerful Fujian-based 31st Group Army Faction were systematically purged and brought before military courts. Peng Liuan's honorary rank of Major General was reportedly revoked, and both Xi and Zhang Xiaojun were removed from the Central Military Commission's Bai building. What allegedly severed the couple's political foundations, however, was an institutional reform promoted behind the scenes by Wen Jiabao. According to this account, shortly after Xi regained consciousness and while he was still struggling to speak, a document was placed beside his hospital bed. Its title was Regulations on the Work of the Party Central Committee's Decision-Making, Deliberation, and Coordination Bodies. What were these bodies? Critics described them as a revival of the mechanism once used by Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun to force Hua Guofeng to relinquish power. The political model associated with the former Central Advisory Commission. Officially, the new body was tasked with coordination, but in practice, it was said to be led by Wen Jiabao. Hu Jintao, Li Ruihuan, Zheng Qinghong, and other retired party elders reportedly participated in its deliberations behind the scenes. Major policy decisions were allegedly no longer determined by the Politburo Standing Committee, but instead by this group of party elders operating on a one-person, one-vote basis. According to these claims, the Politburo Standing Committee was effectively reduced overnight from China's supreme decision-making body to an implementing organ. Commentator Jiang Feng further alleged that Xi was thereafter placed under de facto house arrest at Fengze Garden inside Zhongnanhai. He could still appear in public, receive foreign visitors, and attend official events, but without authorization from the decision-making and coordination body, even travel beyond Beijing's Fifth Ring Road reportedly required special approval from the party elders. The final act of the empress behind the curtain? A recently published collection titled Selected Diplomatic Works of Xi Jinping has drawn attention for an unexpected detail. According to commentator Jiang Feng, the latest material included in the volume ends in November 2025, a cutoff date that reportedly left Zhongnanhai insiders uneasy. Jiang argues that November 2025 coincided with the CCP's fourth plenum when Xi Jinping was allegedly pressured by Jiang Yuxia and party elders to sign a formal transfer of power agreement, accepting a political arrangement modeled on Hua Guofeng's gradual retirement from power. In this interpretation, ending the collection in November 2025 effectively signals the close of the Xi Jinping era. Around the same time, often associated with the Tsinghua University faction, reportedly convened an emergency standing committee meeting and publicly demonstrated loyalty to the emerging political order, making a conspicuous shift in position. Overseas sources further claim that since mid-2024, after Peng Liyuan was allegedly confined to Fengzi Garden in Zhongnanhai, she had not traveled abroad for two years. Her recent visit to Pyongyang has been described as a specially approved farewell appearance. According to these accounts, party elders understood that North Korea offered no realistic avenue of escape to a free country. Meanwhile, Xi Mingzhi, the couple's daughter, was said to have remained in Beijing as a form of political guarantee. As a result, the veil surrounding the ruling family's power has been completely torn away. The upcoming fifth plenum is expected to bring to a conclusion a two-year struggle over power redistribution that has already toppled numerous officials. Zhang Feng argues that China now stands before two very different paths. One is the big-market, small-government model associated with Wang Yang and strongly favored by Wen Jiabao. Supporters believe it could eventually lead China toward political reforms resembling those introduced by Chang Qingkuo in Taiwan. The other is the path associated with Hu Chunhua, often called the Little Hu Jintao. This approach would emphasize strict party discipline and comprehensive investigations into the entire circle surrounding Xi, extending the purge to every level of the former leadership network. Yet whether China moves toward constitutional reform or enters another, even harsher cycle of internal political purges, Zhang contends that one historical verdict is already clear. Xi Jinping and Peng Liwan sought to revive Mao-style far-left policies, preserve power indefinitely, and sustain their vision of personal authority through tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. In the end, however, these ambitions were allegedly crushed by the fierce internal power struggles within Zhongnanhai itself. Zhang concludes with a historical analogy. In the ancient text Mu Xi, the Great Oath, when King Wu of Zhou listed the crimes of the last Shang ruler, King Zhou, the first accusation was neither excessive taxation nor cruel punishments. Instead, it was expressed in six Chinese characters. In modern language, this means he listened only to the woman at his side on matters of state. King Zhou, Zhang notes, was not born a tyrant. Before Daji entered his court, he had ruled securely. Likewise, today's commander-in-chief was not, in his view, inherently ruthless. Many within the party reportedly regarded him as cautious and timid by nature. So Zhang asks, did Peng Liyuan play a role in shaping Xi Jinping's eventual fate? What do you think? Thank you and see you.