Xi Humiliated by Kim Jong-un’s Sister? Peng Liyuan Regains Power? Hu Jintao’s Son Rises

But just hours before Xi Jinping touched down, Kim Jong-un's sister delivered a public slap in the face to Beijing for the whole world to see. At the same time, Xi's opponents were reportedly moving against his allies the moment he left the country. Hu Jintao's son was said to be receiving strong backing from senior party elders. And behind the scenes, Could Peng Liyuan be maneuvering to regain influence over military personnel appointments? Join us as we unpack and analyze these developments in today's program. One figure drew particular attention during Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea, Dong Jun. Recently, the absence of China's defense minister Dong Jun from the Shangri-La dialogue once again sparked widespread speculation. Many observers believed he might be facing serious political trouble. However, from June 8 to 9, Dong Jun appeared alongside Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan during the visit to North Korea, a development that immediately fueled further discussion. Some analysts argue that this could indicate that, following the reported setback involving Zhang Yuxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, CMC, the so-called First Lady faction within the military may be regaining influence. Dong Jun is a member of the Chinese Communist Party's 20th Central Committee. After Li Shanfu fell from favor, Dong was appointed China's new defense minister at the end of 2023. A native of Shandong province, Dong's rise has long been viewed by outside observers as potentially linked to Peng Liyuan, who is also from Shandong. Yet after taking office as defense minister, he was not promoted, as is customary, to either the Central Military Commission or the State Council. As a result, he has been regarded as the lowest-ranking defense minister since the founding of the People's Republic of China. What is even more striking is that during this North Korea visit with Xi Jinping, official Chinese state media barely mentioned Dong Jun at all, almost as if he did not exist. China affairs analyst Li Linyi believes that, at least for now, Dong Jun appears to be politically safe. First, his close ties to Peng Liyuan may indeed be real, providing him with a certain degree of protection. Second, it is possible that he has cooperated with ongoing investigations, including by providing information related to Miaohua. Viewed from this perspective, Dong Jun's public appearance may signal that, after Zhang Yuxi's downfall, Peng Liyuan has begun reasserting her influence over military personnel affairs. In other words, what outside observers call the First Lady faction within the military may be reclaiming some of its former influence. If that assessment is correct, however, it could deal a significant blow to morale within the Chinese military. Independent commentator Du Zheng recently made a similar prediction, suggesting that Peng Liyuan may have regained influence over military appointments. He believes it is not impossible that Dong Jun could eventually emerge as a candidate for vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, or at the very least be elevated to full membership in the CMC. But Xi Jinping's situation may not be nearly so straightforward. A growing number of signs suggest that Xi's own political and military camp is facing mounting challenges and internal pressures as well. Was the Zhejiang faction purged? Xi Jinping hurried back to Beijing on the afternoon of June 9th. While he was receiving a red carpet welcome and a full ceremonial salute in Pyongyang, one of his former protégés from Zhejiang was reportedly coming under investigation back home. On June 8th, the CCP Central Committee approved an investigation into Chen Weijun, former member of the standing committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee and former vice chairman of the regional government. Chen Weijun is not regarded as an ordinary official. He is widely seen as a key figure in the so-called Zhejiang faction associated with Xi Jinping. More importantly, both Chen Weijun and Chen Miner have often been viewed as prominent representatives of Xi's Zhejiang political network. On the surface, the case centers on events in Urumqi, Xinjiang. But according to some analysts, the broader implications could extend to the entire political network that emerged from Zhejiang province. Ultimately, the case is likely to be handled by the Supreme People's Procuratorate, which is currently headed by Yin Yong. What makes this particularly noteworthy is that Yin Yong himself also rose through the Zhejiang political system. Political commentator Jiang Fen argues that Xi's opponents may have deliberately chosen the timing of the move to coincide with Xi's overseas trip. In his view, the strategy effectively forces members of Xi's own camp to investigate and act against one another. If Chen Weijun seeking leniency or self-preservation reveals additional information during the investigation, it could potentially affect other members of the so-called New Zhejiang Army, including figures such as Chen Miner. According to Jiang Feng, the ultimate objective of Xi's opponents may be to undermine the succession prospects of leading Zhejiang faction figures, particularly Chen Miner, ahead of the CCP's 21st Party Congress. Hu Haifeng receives strong backing from party elders. Meanwhile, there are also signs that Xi Jinping's opponents may be gaining momentum. On June 7, both the front page of the People's Daily and the lead headline on page 2 prominently featured reports about the Yangtze River Delta Tsinghua Zhejiang Research Institute. What drew particular attention was that Hu Haifeng, the son of Hu Jintao, worked at the institute for five years. Political commentator Tang Jingyuan argues that although the articles never mentioned Hu Haifeng by name, nearly every line appeared to carry an implicit message of praise for him. Against the backdrop of perceived shifts in Xi Jinping's political standing, Hu Haifeng's status and treatment within the political system also seemed to be rising accordingly. According to this interpretation, the development reflects a broader reality. The political influence of senior CCP elders, such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, may have grown to the point where Xi Jinping can no longer effectively constrain the advancement of the Hu family. In other words, in the ongoing struggle between Xi Jinping and the party elders, some observers believe Xi may now be on the defensive, with the political winds no longer blowing in his favor. North Korea After the 21-gun salute, did Xi Jinping have to swallow his pride? On June 8, Xi Jinping arrived in Pyongyang, beginning a two-day state visit to North Korea. This time, North Korea rolled out its highest-level reception for Beijing. Kim Jong-un and his wife, Ri Sol-ju, personally greeted Xi at the airport. In Kim Il-sung Square, giant portraits of the Chinese and North Korean leaders were prominently displayed at the center of the venue. Flanking them were slogans such as, May China-North Korea Friendship Remain Forever Green and Long Live the Unbreakable China-North Korea Friendship and Solidarity. Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un then ascended the reviewing stand together. A 21-gun salute thundered across the square. There was a full military honor guard, children presenting flowers, crowds waving national flags, bouquets and balloons filling the scene, and chants celebrating China-North Korea Friendship echoing throughout the ceremony. The atmosphere was grand, festive, and meticulously choreographed. Yet, the most noteworthy aspect of the visit was not the red carpet, the artillery salute, or the applause. It was the cold political message hidden behind all the pageantry. Just hours before Xi Jinping arrived, Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un's sister, published an article in Rodong Sinmun, North Korea's official party newspaper. The language was so uncompromising that it left virtually no room for negotiation. She declared that North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state was an absolute red line that can never be compromised. She further emphasized that the policy of continuously strengthening the country's nuclear deterrent established by the nation's leader was a final and irreversible conclusion that must be implemented unconditionally. Kim Yo-jong also directly criticized U.S. officials, saying they had yet to awaken from their outdated illusions. She went on to describe the goal of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a goal jointly reaffirmed by Washington and Beijing following the Trump-Xi meeting in May, as a fabricated lie and an old American tactic for spreading disinformation. Was this a deliberate show of defiance before Xi's arrival? Hong Min, an analyst at South Korea's Institute for National Unification, believes it is quite possible that Pyongyang had already informed Beijing during preparations for the visit that the nuclear issue would not be open for discussion. In other words, Beijing may not have been caught off guard by Kim Yo-jong's article. It may have known about North Korea's position well in advance. If that is the case, what does it imply? It would suggest that on perhaps the most important strategic issue between the two countries, Beijing no longer possesses meaningful leverage over Pyongyang. North Korea has drawn its own red lines, and Xi Jinping can do little more than accept them. On the other hand, if Beijing truly had no prior knowledge of the article, the situation would be even more awkward. In that scenario, Kim Yo-jong's message could be interpreted as a public declaration to the world, issued just before Xi Jinping's plane touched down, that our nuclear weapons are not open to discussion, not even by you. So when Xi Jinping flies to Pyongyang, who really needs whom? Political commentator Wen Zhao argues that this is the central question. From a purely practical standpoint, he contends that a visit to North Korea offers the lowest benefits and the highest risks among all of Xi Jinping's foreign policy destinations. North Korea has neither vast oil resources nor a major consumer market. Unlike Iran, which at least presents opportunities for energy cooperation, North Korea's value to the Chinese Communist Party since the 1990s has essentially rested on two pillars. First, Geopolitics. North Korea serves as a strategic buffer and a tool for counterbalancing US influence in Northeast Asia. Second, Ideology. It allows the CCP to avoid feeling completely isolated by maintaining the appearance of belonging to a broader socialist camp. So why did Xi Jinping still choose to go? According to this analysis, the answer lies in the dramatic shifts in the international landscape over the past year. In early 2026, the US military launched operations against Iran. Meanwhile, Venezuela's Maduro government reportedly collapsed under mounting pressure from Washington. The international network Xi Jinping spent years cultivating, from bricks to partnerships across ASEAN, suddenly appeared far more fragile than before. Among Beijing's key partners, Venezuela had fallen, Iran had been severely weakened, and Russia was being heavily drained by the war in Ukraine. North Korea, meanwhile, China's last major geopolitical outpost, was drawing closer to Russia at an unprecedented pace while simultaneously drifting further from Beijing. Wen Jiao describes this as a retreat to the last stronghold. In his view, a deteriorating international environment has forced Xi Jinping to return to his most fundamental circle of allies. Yet this very retreat also exposes what he sees as the CCP's underlying reality. For years, Beijing has portrayed itself as a force for global stability and a defender of multilateralism. But when confronted with genuine pressure, the only dependable ally left, according to this interpretation, is a small nuclear-armed state governed by a hereditary authoritarian system. Kim Jong-un, moreover, may have come to believe that Beijing was quietly coordinating with Washington on North Korea-related issues behind the scenes. Such a perception would naturally provoke both anger and suspicion in Pyongyang. Under this logic, the deeper purpose of Xi's visit was to personally reassure Kim Jong-un. I have not betrayed you. I will not cooperate with the United States to push for denuclearization. We are still on the same side. The issue was important enough that Xi could not afford to let Kim continue harboring such suspicions while moving ever closer to Moscow. That, according to this interpretation, is the greatest irony of the trip. Xi Jinping traveled to a country that China is officially supposed to patronize and support. Yet the leader of that country appeared freer to act, more uncompromising and more certain of his strategic objectives than Xi himself. Kim Jong-un is no longer in the predicament he faced in 2019 when North Korea was grappling with sanctions pressure and the threat of food shortages. He has found a new strategic partner in Russia and, reportedly, a significant new source of economic support. In other words, North Korea's dependence on Beijing has declined substantially. From this perspective, Xi Jinping's trip to North Korea can be seen as an exercise in political humility. China now needs North Korea more than North Korea needs China. What do you think about these latest developments? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thank you for watching and see you next time.