Evaluating States Risk Management vis à vis Climate Change

Global Affairs Academy
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Jun 12, 2026
An address to the Ninth Annual Cambridge International Law (CILJ) Conference in April 2020, in Panel 3: Climate Change and Public International Law—Overcoming Challenges in Governance, Cooperation and Implementation, by Violetta Ritz, Ph.D. Researcher in International Climate Change Law & Policy, Global Challenges Doctoral Centre, University of Kent.
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Good afternoon, it is a great pleasure to be part of this wonderful and somewhat
experimental encounter. Many thanks to the convenors for giving me this opportunity,
many thanks to Natalie for the introduction and thank you to everyone watching right now.
So this is work in progress and I'm eagerly looking forward to your comments. Now my paper
investigates how scientific methods used to evaluate state's risk management,
can be operationalized in legal terms and potentially applies in the context of climate
litigation. There is a legal argument that has been emerging according to which states
acts and missions that contribute to climate change can amount to a violation of state's
human rights obligations. However there is no clarity or consensus as to the specific content
of state obligations relating to climate change, for example in terms of litigation levels.
To explore ways of how the nature of these obligations can be classified, I draw on the
work by a scientific NGO called Climate Action Tracker and this research organization assesses
government climate action against the 2 to 1.5 degree target of the Paris agreement and it rates
countries into six different categories. In terms of structure, I'll start with a brief doctrinal
analysis of the legal argument, then I focus on Kat's rating methodology and the third part
integrates the legal considerations with Kat's sentencing findings. Now the risks humanity is
facing due to anthropogenic climate change are well known. The IPCC has among others identified
a risk such as risk of death, injury, severe ill health and disrupted or loss of livelihoods.
Several international bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council have recognized a link between
climate change and human rights, but so far none of these international bodies has spoken of a
violation of human rights. However international instruments have been used on the domestic level
by the Dutch Supreme Court in its recent landmark agenda judgment to identify a threatened violation
of human rights due to climate change. The court found among others that the rights to life and the
respect for private and family life in the European convention on human rights give rise
to state positive obligations in the context of climate change and the court ordered the Dutch
government to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. The Dutch court based its interpretation of the
on case law by the European Court of Human Rights, more specifically on the ECTHR's real
intermediate risk doctrine. Likewise a legal argument has been emerging in international
legal scholarship according to which state responsibility for adverse effects of climate
change on human rights can be established on the basis of existing norms of international human
rights law. Human rights in question are among others the right to life, the right to the highest
attainable standard of health, the right to self-determination, just to name a few. Now in this
context a number of questions arise. What is the specific content of state's obligations relating
to climate change? What exactly constitutes an omission or internationally wrongful act?
What levels of emission reductions are required of states to live up to their human rights
obligations? To tackle these questions it appears essential to integrate legal considerations with
findings from climate sciences. To explore ways to do so, the rest of my paper draws on a scientific
assessment of state's climate action by the Climate Action Tract. CUTS is made up of climate scientists
and policy analysts from two research organizations, Climate Analytics and the
New Climate Institute. CUTS is working closely with the PICC, the Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research, which is also a former CUTS consortium member and obviously a close collaborator
of the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. CUTS rates government climate action against
a 2 to 1.5 degree target of the Paris Agreement and it ranks countries into six different categories,
perfectly insufficient, highly insufficient, insufficient, two degrees compatible, 1.5
degrees compatible, and role model. CUTS analyses are based on 40 studies used by the IPCC
and additional calculations run by the CUTS. As of now, out of 33 countries analysed by CUTS
covering approximately 80% of global emissions, 10 are rated as insufficient
and 15 as highly or critically insufficient. The Paris Agreement specifies that state's
risk management vis-a-vis climate change needs to reflect the highest possible emissions and common
but differentiated responsibilities and responsibilities. These obviously are highly
general obligations. What CUTS offers is an assessment of what exactly is needed of states
to achieve the goal of limiting global warming to 2 or 1.5 degrees. CUTS also offers possible
interpretations of what each country's fair share should be. Instead of deciding itself,
what is fair, CUTS constructs a range of options that different scholars consider to be fair.
CUTS shows what temperature rise these different options would lead to. Each rating category
reflects the temperature increase that would come about if all other states were to undertake
risk management with the same relative ambition level. Relatively, CUTS rates the least stringent
part of this fair share range as insufficient, as according to its analyses it would lead to
warming of 2 to 3 degrees. Now, for these scientific findings to be used in the legal
context, they need to be operationalised, so to speak. The reason why this is necessary
can maybe best be expressed in statistical terminology. CUTS findings are presented on
the six categories for use in the legal context. However, we somehow need to recode this scale,
this continuum, into binary terms. Which level of risk management, which rating category,
translates into a compliance with states' obligations in the context of climate change,
and which into a violation of these obligations? Now, how did the Dutch courts, in its groundbreaking
judgement that I mentioned earlier, go about the complex task of deciding what level of
emission reductions is needed for the Dutch state to comply with its obligations?
The court found that the Dutch state had an obligation to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
by at least 25% compared to 1990. How did the court set forth this target? The main factor
the court seems to base its decision on is the extent to which there is support within the
international community for such a target. The court is of the opinion that specifying state's
positive obligations, and each state's share in reducing greenhouse gas emissions,
belongs in principle to the political domain, and that states will have to agree on this amongst
themselves. By among others referring to statements made by the UNFCCC COP conferences up to 2014,
the court finds that there is a high degree of international consensus on the urgent need for
NX1 countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% to 40% by 2020 compared to 1990
levels. This figure is taken from a scenario contained in an IPCC assessment report of 2007,
which said that such a reduction is needed so that global warming is reasonably expected to
be limited to a maximum of two degrees. As the court uses its role as ensuring that the state
is complying at least with its minimum obligation, it settles on the figure of 25%.
Now how does this compare to CAC's assessment? CAC's evaluation is based on scenarios contained
in the latest IPCC report, and it is continuously updated with the latest figures on global and
national emissions, which obviously have changed quite a bit since 2007 when the assessment report
was published, from which the 25% to 40% target was made. CAC finds that for the EU,
the Netherlands is not rated individually, but for the EU a 25% reduction falls at the least
stringent end of CAC's fair share range. According to CAC, if all other countries were to adopt the
same relative emission level, that would lead to global warming higher than two degrees,
at almost three degrees. Now the Dutch court itself notes that it has been recognised for
some years that global warming should not be limited to a maximum of two degrees to
prevent dangerous climate change, but to a maximum of 1.5 degrees, and that it is possible
that dangerous climate change will occur even with less global warming, with a lower concentration
of greenhouse gas. This brings me to argue that the question of what the positive obligation of
states should mean in concrete terms belongs not only to the political or judicial domain,
but the scientific one as well. Of course, a judicial reasoning based on CAC's approach
would not be immune to criticism. CAC is an NGO, one might point, for example, to possible
legitimacy issues. However, I argue that there is great value in CAC's analysis for the way forward
in specifying states' obligations in terms of climate mitigation. CAC offers a transparent
and objective way of tackling this complex task, among others with assessments based on
the latest emissions. Basing decisions on this approach could arguably enhance the legitimacy
of lawmaking and judicial bodies in this field. Thank you very much.
