An address to the Ninth Annual Cambridge International Law (CILJ) Conference in April 2020, in Panel 7: Regulating Risks to Health and Safety—Scientific and Technical Paradigms in International Law, by Prof Dr Stefania Negri, Associate Professor of International Law, School of Law, University of Salerno, and founder and director of the ‘Observatory on Human Rights: Bioethics, Health, Environment’.
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The speaker analyzes the adequacy of the WHO International Health Regulations (IHR) in managing global health crises, using the COVID-19 pandemic as a primary case study. The discussion highlights critical failures in state compliance, the lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the tension between public health measures and the protection of human rights.
Thank you very much. First of all, let me thank you, the conveners of the conference,
Laura Izgorova and Per Chesterfield, for the kind invitation to participate in the webinar,
and also you, Dr. Iotova, for chairing this panel that I'm delighted to share with other
Italian colleagues. Now, turning to my presentation, I'll try to offer and stimulate
in the audience some critical reflections on the adequacy and effectiveness of the
international legal instruments available today to protect public health worldwide
in the face of global risks posed by infectious diseases. Recent outbreaks of emerging and newly
identified communicable diseases like SARS and COVID now, and the violent re-emergence of known
ones like Ebola, have lit the spotlight on the compelling need to guarantee a coherent global
response to serious health threats of international concern. With the dramatic
toll of human lives taken so far, the outbreak of COVID-19, which was declared a public health
emergency of international concern on 30th of January 2020, and then a pandemic on the 11th of
March, is the latest testimony to the need for coordinated response through the application of
the only legally binding instrument of global school, that is the WHO International Health
Regulations. These regulations were adopted for the first time in 1951 by the World Health
Assembly under Article 21 of the WHO Constitution to provide the first universal and coherent legal
regime of global surveillance and control of quarantinable diseases. They were later amended
in 1969 and underwent a major revision in 2005, when it became evident that the narrow scope of
the regulations of 1969 made them no longer fit for purpose. To remedy all relevant shortcomings,
the revised regulations set the new global health governance framework with a view to sharing
responsibilities and fulfilling the duty to cooperate internationally to avoid major public
health emergencies. Within this framework, the regulations also set up a challenging interplay
between public health goals and other collective interests as human rights protection, freedom of
trade, environmental safety, and international security. Today, in line with all others' approach,
regulations encompass a significantly broader spectrum of infectious diseases
and also extend to the natural, accidental, or deliberate release of biological, chemical,
or radionuclear materials, hence conferring on the WHO the competence to address any public
health risk, be it caused by traditional communicable diseases, new or emerging ones,
or any other disease which may spread internationally and represent a serious
risk to global public health. Among the key provisions of the regulations, I wish to single
out those which are crucial for the achievement of the regulations objective, namely to prevent,
protect, against, control, and provide a public health response to the international spread of
disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which
avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade. First of all, under Article 6,
states are mandatorily requested to promptly notify, within 24 hours, events detected by
national surveillance systems which qualify as possible public health emergencies of international
concern. It has serious, sudden, unusual, unexpected events carrying implications for public
health beyond the affected state's national borders and requiring immediate international action.
Under Article 12, the responsibility of determining whether a public health event
falls within this category lies with the WHO Director General, who seeks the views of an
emergency committee, which is an advisory body providing technical advice and views on the
gravity of the situation. Once the Director General has declared the existence of a fake,
temporary recommendations are issued and they are communicated to the states' parties together
with information on any health measure adopted by the states directly concerned by the event.
Article 43 of the regulations allows states' parties to adopt public health measures additional
to those recommended by the WHO, provided that such measures are not more restrictive
on international traffic than any other reasonably available alternative would do,
and that states report such measures within 48 hours from their implementation and provide the
scientific evidence-based justification for their adoption. Now it is known that measures adopted
under Article 43 have been the object of debate and controversy with regard to the required
fair balance between public health needs and human rights protection, for example following
the overreaction of third states to the Ebola outbreak, international organizations such as
the United Nations or the African Union urged states to lift all total bans on travel and trade
because they were adversely impacting on the human rights of the affected populations.
Now the COVID-19 pandemic has revitalized the scholarly debate on the limits and shortcomings
of the international health regulations, especially with regard to the consequences
of state parties' non-compliance with the obligations stemming, for example,
from Article 6 and 43 and the related lack of sanctioning and enforcement powers of the
organization under both the WHO constitution and the regulations. Now the international response
to COVID-19 questions once again the overall fitness of the whole system and in this regard
I would like to focus on a few controversial issues. First of all, compliance with Article 6
obligation of prompt notification. It was reported that the outbreak of the new coronavirus was
detected in China at the end of November, early December 2019, that China notified the event
only on the 31st of December and shared the crucial information and data on the true mortality rate
and the characteristics of the virus even later. According to a good number of politicians, lawyers
and scholars, this negligent behavior delayed the deployment of the international mechanism
of surveillance and control under the regulations and caused irreparable damage to third states.
Even assuming that there was a flagrant violation of Article 6, is there enough
uncontroversial evidence to prove China's responsibility towards the other affected states
and, I would say in these circumstances, towards the international community at large?
Who would assess this responsibility and eventually impose sanctions? Now we know that
Article 56 of the regulations provides for possible resort to an international dispute
settlement mechanism which has never been used so far in the history of the regulation and this
will give you an idea of its usefulness. But consistently with international law and the
principle of consensual jurisdiction, this would require China's acceptance of the jurisdiction
of any possible arbitral tribunal and the same is true for the hypothesis of suing the international
court of justice, apart from the fact that it would be really challenging to find an appropriate
legal basis of jurisdiction to sue the court. And even if we wanted to consider a solution
inspired to the so-called securitization of health, China's permanent member status within
the Security Council is enough to prevent and stop any possible discussion, let alone the adoption
of sanctions. Second point, risk assessment and management under Articles 12 and 13 of the
regulations. The first time the IHR Emergency Committee convened was on the 22nd of February,
but the Director General declared that the COVID outbreak was a public health emergency
of international concern only in the second meeting which took place on the 30th of January,
although we had all the authority to do so independently of the advice of the committee.
So why was this risk assessment so fallacious at the beginning? Had China provided all available
information? Was this alleged delay caused by political reasons or whatever? Now on the 24th
January, the WHO also issued temporary recommendations which did not recommend
any travel or trade restriction based on the current information available, and I stress this.
These recommendations requested China to conduct exit screening at international airports and
ports with the aim of early detection of, and again I stress, symptomatic travellers for further
evaluation and treatment. However, notwithstanding the important scientific discoveries made on the
virus and its transmission dynamics, these recommendations were never revised or updated,
and after two months the Emergency Committee met only yesterday. I must confess I didn't
find any reports so far. Of course, such a prolonged silence is puzzling and can imply
some consequences on the assessment of the legitimacy of additional public health measures
adopted under Article 43. And moving to this, to compliance of this provision,
together with Article 3, paragraph 1 of the regulation, which requires that states parties
respect human rights in implementation of the regulations, we must observe that several states
adopted additional restrictive measures, including a ban on international travel,
strict social distancing measures, compulsory quarantine and even lockdown.
Not all of these states reported such measures to the WHO. Not all of these measures had a
scientific evidence-based justification, since some of them were adopted on the basis of precaution
in the absence of full knowledge of the new virus. Again, an alleged violation of the regulations
with no legal consequences for the responsible states, given the absence of sanctioning and
enforcing measures. Moreover, some additional measures were not adopted in general,
having the medium term proved to be adequate to the exceptional virulence of COVID-19,
and consistent with the new scientific evidence concerning the possible existence
of asymptomatic cases, false negatives, people remaining positive to swab tests even after 50
days, and this was ordinary cases in Italy, for example. So what about the consistency
of these measures with Article 43 requirements, and with the WHO temporary recommendations,
which in fact reflected the scientific evidence available months ago?
Last point, as anticipated, some additional public health measures adopted at domestic level
have heavily impacted on civil rights and freedoms. Several states have declared a
state of emergency and exercised emergency powers to impose restrictions on the population,
derogating in fact from a number of obligations stemming from human rights treaties to which
they are party. However, not all of them have notified this declaration to the United Nations
or the Council of Europe. In compliance with the requirements set out in the derogation clauses
contained in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Italy is a case in point. This has
prevented international human rights bodies from scrutinizing the legitimacy of the restrictions
imposed according to the necessity and proportionality tests, and the Human Rights
Committee has just issued a statement in which it urges states to comply with the notification
obligation set by Article 4 of the Covenant. But here again, even in case of international scrutiny
of the legitimacy under international human rights treaties of these measures,
some of them would have passed the proportionality test only in the bigger terms following the
acquisition of more information on the virus. This poses legal questions concerning the right
timing for such an assessment on case of scientific uncertainty, and also an evaluation
which is more ethical and legal concerning the extent to which human rights guarantees
should differ to scientific data or information. In conclusion, the COVID-19 pandemic has once
again uncovered Pandora's box and revitalized the scholarly discussion on the limits of the IHR
to provide a response to multiple legal problems that emerge when serious global health risks
threaten not only global health, but also democracy and human rights. A further revision
of the IHR would be necessary, and many people are prompting works and studies on this. But we
may ask ourselves how feasible this is in the short term, considering that it took 10 years
to complete the review of the 1969 regulations, from 1995 to 2005 entered into force in 2007.
As international lawyers, I think we should make an effort to propose solutions aimed at making
better use of the existing provisions in order to strengthen the IHR and enhance their effectiveness.
Also borrowing from other branches of international law, I'm thinking about environmental law,
and the successful experiences reported in these fields,
in order to be ready to face the next global risk. Thank you so much.