Situationality of Global Risks The Role of International Organizations in Climate Governance

Global Affairs Academy
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Jun 12, 2026
Situationality of Global Risks: The Role of International Organizations in Climate Governance
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Hello, good afternoon and thank you for this wonderful opportunity to share with you my
research. I will share a little presentation I prepared for this occasion. So today I want to
discuss the role of international organizations in climate governance. To this end, I have analyzed
climate change as a collective action problem. A collective action problem appears when an
individual interest, usually encompassing a short-term perspective, conflicts with a
collective interest that usually embraces a long-term perspective. I am sure that many of
you are acquainted with Ostrom's seminal work on governing the commons. However, her findings were
confined to local resources, confined to small spaces. The question that immediately arises is,
how are we going to translate collective action in larger scales? What characteristics are there,
opportunities, and limits? So the Center for Collective Action Research, CCAR, where I work,
has developed an analytical framework to study large-scale collective action problems.
And their principal characteristics are the following. For instance, the first one refers
to anonymity. If we take climate change as an example, it involves a wide variety of actors
that are not locally confined, and therefore the likelihood of cooperation diminishes.
Anonymity deepens since actors are located across geographical scales, but also includes
a temporal element, present and future generations. Cooperation is less likely to occur in large-scale
action problems due to several forms of heterogeneity, including difference, for
instance, in identity, socioeconomic status, and power asymmetries. Heterogeneity may involve
different perceptions of even of the responsibility towards the problem, and I think this becomes
clearly illustrated in the evolution of the climate change regime. The problem with heterogeneity is
that it diminishes trust and the opportunity to engage in collective action weekends as well.
In this scenario, transparency frameworks are fundamental at global and regional levels,
because the success of collective action rests heavily on the possibility to verify what all
actors are doing, the mechanisms used to implement their obligations, and the challenges to achieve
common goals. Large-scale collective action problems also highlight the problems of uncertainty
and risk regarding the extent and consequences of the problem. If we look to the science of
climate change, it evinces among others, for instance, ocean rising, coastal erosion,
changes in marine and terrestrial ecosystems, and increasing extreme weather conditions.
Imaginaries of our future include scenarios where humanity is not going to be able to survive
if mitigation and adaptation policies are not implemented. Finally, the burden of taking action
is necessarily collective, but the global emphasis and the long-term perspective of
climate change could transform it into something that is distant. The need for global collective
action could increase the percent of futility regarding personal, national, or even regional
efforts. So, I argue that collective action will be fostered when situationality is achieved.
Situationality is a process of spatial or local confinement of global trends. Once it is linked
to a local situation, an idea becomes an action. But how we achieve this situationality?
Concerning situationality, my research focuses on climate change in the Arctic because of the
fundamental role of the cryosphere in the regulation of climate. An interesting political
and legal development concerns the construction of the Arctic as an international legal region.
We know that law and space are intimately connected. So, the legal delimitation of space
will create local, national, regional, jurisdictional boundaries. Those boundaries
will definitely affect the reach of the law. Currently, the Arctic as a distinctive
region is foremost a political construction that combines several areas under national
jurisdiction and areas beyond national jurisdiction. I am particularly interested in the role of
international organizations in fostering collective action and their role in embracing
multiple legal scales and multiple actors. So, I argue that international organizations,
for instance, such as the Arctic Conference, prompts the development of a regulatory unit
beyond the nation-state, in this case, the Arctic. Many international organizations become a platform
to accommodate diverse and even conflicting interests, not only of states, but also of
diverse actors, including, for instance, indigenous communities, industry representatives,
civil society organizations. Taking the Arctic Council again as an example, it has a tripartite
structure that includes states, indigenous participants, and observers. This structure
was, again, the flexibility to engage several scales from local to global, from public to
private. The ability to trigger collective action is then linked to the organizational structure of
the institution, but also with the regulatory capacities. These regulatory capacities can be
roughly classified as lawmaking activities, data collection, analysis and dissemination,
monitoring and supervision, and finally dispute settlement mechanisms.
The organizations I studied concerning climate governance in the Arctic are those that you can
see on your screen, and I focus on their structure as well as their regulatory capacities.
The Arctic Council, the European Union, and BIAC, for instance, has took as a basis for their work
the reports of the IPCC in order to advance and disseminate further scientific reports.
Regional scientific reports, to some extent, for instance, addresses the problems of anonymity
by identifying in a regional scale the actors and economic sectors that contribute to climate change
and those that are specifically affected by it. Depending on the detail level also,
hard and soft law standards could effectively counteract the problems of large-scale collective
action problems. For instance, the technical guidelines and binding revolutions
established under the auspices of the International American Organization, IMO,
concerning shipping activities in the Arctic is a perfect example on this matter. It establishes
clear boundaries regarding the region, in this case the Arctic, which actors are going to take
action, how risks are going to be managed. Overall, I think that breaking complexity
is a necessary first step. International organizations bring the necessary situationality
of global trends. The structure of international organizations is also relevant.
The participation, for instance, of local authorities such as CIMBIAC or indigenous
communities like in the Arctic Council facilitates the translation of global goals into regional and
local settings. Now, some concluding remarks. Well, situationality is yet to be achieved in
climate governance in the Arctic. This stems mainly from the legal status of Arctic institutions.
The Arctic Council, for instance, is the central forum for adopting regional policies for climate
change. However, its soft law status, ad hoc budget, and low political commitment of its
member states preclude it from becoming a regulatory institution. Without this transition
into a treaty-based organization with extended powers, the situation may not change. While data
collection and dissemination is certainly important, the time has come to focus on policy
and further binding regulation. The spatial constraints faced by the European Union affect
situationality negatively. Since the European Union has limited regulatory and supervisory
capacities in the Arctic, its policy has been modest, despite its continuous efforts of the
Arctic identity. There is also a general assumption that polycentric governance systems or
cooperation between international institutions coordinates different legal regimes that are
related, could develop consistent and compatible obligations, and decrease regulatory gaps.
However, in the absence of formal or informal cooperation, there could be a room for
potential confusion, duplication, and even conflicts. So, thank you very much
for your attention, and I am looking forward to answering your questions.
