The U.S. Military is the mightiest fighting force in history. Yet its evolution has been long and complex, and today it is suffering from the damage done by decades of social justice initiatives. Continuing a celebration the U.S.’s 250th year, American Military Project Director Will Thibeau joins Spencer Klavan to examine the pre-revolutionary origins of the Army and consider Donald Trump's efforts to correct Civil Rights-era deviations from its founding design. Plus: the significance of decorum, the often-overlooked implications of the second amendment, and more!
Chapters 00:00 Introductions 01:50 Origins of the Army 08:29 Civil-Military Relationship 21:09 Identity Politics in the Military 31:01 Importance of Ceremony 34:08 Closing Remarks
Spencer Clavin and Will Thibault discuss the evolution of the American military, tracing its journey from citizen-militias to a professional bureaucracy. They analyze the constitutional tension between military power and republican governance, the impact of social engineering on combat logic, and the necessity of restoring civilian authority over the military establishment.
Hello and welcome to The Close Read, your official Claremont Review of Books podcast. I'm
your host, Spencer Clavin, Associate Editor of the Claremont Review of Books, and this is one
of our special 250th anniversary episodes. Not 250th anniversary of the podcast, unfortunately
yet, although we can hope down the line for another quarter millennium, but this is the
anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, of course, America's 250th birthday,
and we would be remiss at Claremont, the Institute for the Study and Upholding of the American Idea,
not to mark the occasion, spend some time in reflection. We've hosted a couple of conversations,
one with Lucas Morel, one with Glenn Elbers on Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War and the
relationship. I really encourage you to go back and listen to those, but I'm very glad today to
be joined by Will Thibault. He's the Director of the American Military Project at our Center for
the American Way of Life, and he's here to talk with us about the military. We thought we could
do a little bit of a discussion on a subject that will come up in future CRBs, but also just
generally has been very much in the news lately and is perhaps an underappreciated or neglected
aspect of our constitutional order, the fact that we have, obviously, an enormous military force,
but more importantly, perhaps, that that force is integrated into a free republic. I'm going to
talk to Will about how that came to be and how we sustain that. Will, it's really great to have
you on. Thanks for being here. Spencer, thank you for having me. It's an honor to be here as always.
My pleasure. I thought we could start with the revolution, since, of course, we're thinking
today about the Declaration and the birth of America. Obviously, there's many famous stories
of the Minutemen and the role that the military played in creating America. There obviously
wouldn't have been an America without military action, but I wonder if you can talk about some
of the threads that were there, the seeds, as it were, of the American military. Well,
what did the military look like in its command structure at the founding and how has it evolved
into the mighty fighting force that we know today? Spencer, so to take one step back before
the revolution, a relevant waypoint in this story, maybe not the starting point, but let's call it a
waypoint, is the French and Indian War. In 1763, a little over a decade before at least the signing
of the Declaration of Independence, the fighting that Lexington and Concord, the French and Indian
War was still very much a formative experience of warfare and combat for the men who would
eventually lead the Continental Army. It was, of course, distinct in who we were fighting and on
whose side Americans or colonial members of the colonies were at that time, but it was still kind
of the anchor point for the professional competence that defined the leadership of the Continental
Army of the revolution. But I think as many know, it was hardly a standing army. In fact,
a standing army was explicitly disavowed formally and informally by the revolutionary
generation. And what you saw was the formation of the institution on the fly. Again, using
as professional of a class as we had, the likes of George Washington with legitimate experience
to lead the Continental Army and then enlisting militias. And it was, I think, a messy arrangement
sometimes because often battles would take place maybe with the Continental Army at the core
of the fighting, but even within sight and sound, different regional, what became state militias
that would support the cause, if you will. This was made possible, I think, by good leadership,
General George Washington at the time, that united these disparate fighting groups
into an effective fighting force. But it was a far, far cry, even what we would see decades later
in the War of 1812, and certainly fairly unrecognizable to most Americans today.
Yeah. I put in mind of a letter that Adams wrote, I think it was after the
revolution, reflecting on what made the forces so successful and what made their effort
ultimately successful. And he goes into detail about the way that the various townships
required their citizens to have arms on hand and be training and drilling in them.
Of course, that puts me in mind also of the Second Amendment, which is sort of this adjacent,
maybe parallel track of the conversation we're having on the one hand,
this military readiness that maybe the founding generation acquires from its experience as
colonists, and then this foundational right of citizens also to be conversant in the ways of
force. Would you say that those two things have sort of split apart? I mean, you often hear now
that the military is so astronomically powerful that the right to bear arms is kind of a separate
thing. It's for personal interest or home invasion or whatever, but no individual militia could ever
go up against the US Army because it's so mighty at this point.
Right. In many ways, I think the Second Amendment has inverted itself in meaning. Today,
like you point out, it's a sign of individualism. It's a sign of autonomy. It's a hobby, of course,
and candidly, I think it can become a little bit of a fetish, even produce a tendency to
live-action role-play and LARPing because there's this desire to control some connection to
self-defense. And it's all well and good. I'm a supporter and someone who partakes.
But what the Second Amendment was at the time was a positive affirmation of a requirement for
national interest. The duty and the need to own firearms for the purposes of a well-regulated
militia was not theoretical. It was not individual in nature, in my opinion. It was
something enshrined, second after all, and I think rightly so, so that the colonies and eventually
the nation would have the ability to rapidly form the institutions required for self-defense.
Of course, Second Amendment advocates still respect that and understand as much, but
it's a very different meeting than what it is today. And you're right, as the Second Amendment
has inverted itself, so has our conception of the professional military, so has the legal
foundations of the professional military, and it is incongruous. It's not to diminish the importance
of the Second Amendment, but it is to show that the Second Amendment was written not for
individuals to do what they want, but to enshrine the duty for every man to fight when called upon.
And that's this, I think, timeless virtue we don't remember enough these days.
Interesting. Yeah. The live-action role-playing element does come in. And as you say, it's sort
of a pastime and an entertainment, and there's something maybe even healthy about it. But right,
it pays to recover this sense of what the point of the whole thing was to begin with.
You speak of the professionalization of the military and even the legal alteration of its
structure. I wonder if you can go into a bit more detail about that. I mean,
my understanding is that sort of over the course of the late 1800s, early 1900s,
in part, among other things, of progressivism, but also as a recognition, I guess, of the
transforming nature of the country through the World Wars, that this became a necessity,
essentially. Has that altered the essence or the nature of the military in other ways that
we maybe don't think about? Yeah, I think so. So we can speed run the 19th century a little bit
here. But to first define terms, a professional means to be paid enough to make a living
performing certain duties without the need to supplement your time or income with other
pursuits. As I see it, this isn't a formal definition, it's to define your existence
personally, socially, and officially as, in the case of our discussion, a soldier
or a military officer. So in other words, this is not a pastime that you have as part of your
civilian life. It will become, for the duration of your time in the military, your sole occupation
Exactly. It is your reason to be here. And even starting in the revolution, starting in the French
and Indian War, the American military fed off of the lessons from the British and French, of course,
but also in particular, especially in the latter half of the 19th century, the construct of the
military. That was a professional officer class, and an officer class steeped in military strategy,
in history, officers who were expected to fight, lead, and win wars. And you saw that,
you saw the preeminence of such a notion in how early we created a place like West Point,
1803, I think if I have it right, one of the oldest existing American institutions of government,
a place that we knew needed to be dedicated to the cultivation, the formation of this professional
officer class. And these were men who spent time in Europe, who fought in the Mexican War
in the late 1840s, and then would be on either side of the Civil War during Abraham Lincoln's
presidency. And the Civil War is, of course, an important waypoint, not necessarily because
things changed at that point, but because you saw this massive mobilization into both the Union and
Confederate armies. Militias were still present, of course, as you certainly know, the units of the
Union Army, let's say, and the Confederate Army were organized around states. And then in
subsidiarity, they were organized around counties and towns. So you very much were fighting with
your neighbors and with kin. And that was significant. And we haven't necessarily retained
that lineage until today, because the Civil War, we still didn't retain, obviously, the
armies of that size. But I would say that was the first time where a professional fighting force of
some meaningful composition and some legitimate permanent bureaucracy remained after a conflict.
It was that bureaucracy that fought the Indian Wars in the West that helped America conquer
the Rocky Mountains and settle the Pacific Northwest down to the coast of California.
And you started to see, I think, the first instance of a permanent military.
Although it was certainly much smaller in size and scope, to be sure.
But it's a relevant waypoint. I think the Indian Wars were interesting. I think it's fascinating
history in and of itself, but it was interesting because it was the first time that we found
something for which to use our military, even outside of formal declared military operations,
the exchanging of a frontline of troops on the battlefield, as was happening in the Civil War.
It was the understanding that, hey, we still have a use on our frontier for an active professional
military that was legitimate, needed, and permanent. I don't think it was quite the
institution it is today, but that was certainly the transition that took place over the 19th century.
Remarkable, yeah. The institutionalization that you're talking about, in some ways, I guess you
can think about it like an amoeba splitting off from the body politic. If you've got a single
celled organism and it's America, it starts to divide and there's messiness to that process.
At a certain point, they're intertwined and they're still, of course, back and forth between
the civilian body and the military. It does create this set of constitutional questions,
as you alluded to, the founders worried about, which is that when the military has this monopoly
on violence, the state monopoly on violence, and when violence is ultimately the last decider in
times of crisis, but we are hoping to decide our political questions through the ballot and not
the bullet, how do you keep the military under control? What does the discipline structure look
like that subordinates this increasingly massive organization with all the power,
all the physical power, at least, to the people's elected representatives?
Can you talk a little bit about that? A lot of it seems to me to be about norms and ethos,
but I mean, I know there's more to it than that. I'm just curious what you think.
Well, and that's where it started. A book that I'd recommend, it's little known,
but I think excellent, is called A Distant Trumpet about the army on the Western frontier
and the Southwest in this book's case, but it really describes the military as a way of life.
When you would, quote, unquote, deploy to the frontier, garrisons would be places of
duty station for the military, but they would also be the homes for the family members of
the military. And that was interesting because it's one thing for the lives of junior enlisted
soldiers to get together and sew, knit, and cook, but it's another thing when their neighbor is the
commanding officer's wife, and it is as if the decorum of the chain of command in what is now
the Uniform Code of Military Justice seeps into the private lives of family members, even though
they are civilians. And I think that's a useful model for how we think about the military in
relation to the rest of civil society. This was a book published in 1957, but it's a book I talk
about a lot since being at Claremont, The Soldier and the State by Samuel P. Huntington. And his
thesis is to first note the exact tension that you hit on, Spencer, to say there is an inherent
tension between a military that is inherently conservative and hierarchical, small c,
conservative, and a society that is inherently liberal, small l, liberal, rights-based,
where the notion of the individual is, I think for better or for worse, sacrosanct,
formally and informally, in American society, and it even was back then. What he notes is that
there has to be a few things for such institutions to exist. First, the military must be given
deference to organize itself and set the bounds for proper conduct within military units, but also
around military units. And that's going to look much different than civil society.
Even in the early part of the 20th century, women would not treat each other differently necessarily
based on your husband's rank. I know there were probably some informal cultural affiliations.
I think there are probably a few army wives who would like a word, but right.
The military that was regarded as true, they were very cohesive cultures that formed around
military garrisons, whether at home or abroad. And that was necessary because you had to maintain
the integrity of the fighting formation that could really truly leave home behind.
Civil society was much different. Segregation in the military lasted as a formal act
through World War II. It was enshrined and accepted that whites would not fight in the
same units as blacks or Asians for that matter. And this was, although perhaps grew improper,
it was a sign that the military beats to the cadence of a different kind of drum
than civil society. What you would expect on the other end as I get to this point is that
there is absolute obedience from the military to the civilian elected leadership, or at least
politically accountable leadership regarding the use and application of military force.
The military can never decide when to go to war domestically or overseas by themselves.
They had to be responsible for the professional conduct and exercise of violence at scale.
It had to be the decision of political leaders who were responsible to voters on when
it was necessary for the state to apply violence at such scale. Not to get ahead of myself, but I
think starting after World War II, certainly in the 1960s, we started to see, again, another
inversion where we lost both the sense of absolute duty of the military to civilian leadership,
and we started to try and shape the internal functions of the military in the mold of our
civil society. You saw an interesting, actually, example of this just recently when Sam Altman
of OpenAI fame, the company behind JATCP, they made this contract with the government to
supply technology for their weaponry. AI people have all these concerns about ethics and so forth,
so they promised that AI wouldn't be used for certain things, but on an earnings call,
Altman basically said, actually, now that we've handed this technology over to the military,
we do not get to make the decisions that you've just alluded to because they are
particularly sacrosanct. So I think there are some of those concerns,
not just in the Trump of it all, which we will get into in just a bit, but
more generally in modern warfare, that's becoming intensely important.
Nat Malkus Well, you're right,
and he made those comments in light of the dispute between another AI company, Anthropic,
and the Department of War over this exact question. Who is responsible? Who makes decisions
about how military force or the accompanying technology and infrastructure that supports
military force? Who makes those decisions and who is responsible for those outcomes?
So I won't jump ahead, but it's exactly right, and it's the exact manifestation of this tension
that I'm describing.
Adam Draper Yeah. I mean,
it was reassuring, I guess, to hear him say that, but it was funny to see him have this nasty
surprise that, actually, all these promises I'm making aren't quite put together. But yeah,
the Anthropic and OpenAI have been having some amazing, fascinating problems with this.
But maybe we can lay the table, because you hinted just a moment ago that this
neat division that Huntington laid out and that's been our way of managing this,
the military organizes itself, but on the other hand, conversely, the military responds with
absolute obedience to the civil authority. That started to break down. Maybe we can lay the table
there a little bit more, because we're going to, in a sec, talk about the notion, true or false,
that Trump and his military critics represent a kind of unprecedented collapse. So before we get
there, what do you mean that some of this stuff has started to waver in recent decades?
It begins with an understanding of the civil rights era. The civil rights era,
broadly, I think, introduced a lot of problems into American society with the demand that,
or at least with the expectation that we should see equal outcomes in representation,
particularly racial representation, at least to start, or presume injustice. And that was,
I think, the cultural, social, and political effect of the Civil Rights Act is that kind of
mindset, that ideology. But what few know, but I think what we've done a good job of making clear
at Claremont, is that the military was really the first institution where the federal government
applied that methodology to the nature of the institution itself. A famous speech that
Secretary Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense at the time, Robert McNamara gave
in 1965 when he established the Defense Race Relations Board, he gave an explicit mandate
that the military would look like the rest of the nation. And it would be the first institution
to assume and succeed in implementing the mandates of the Civil Rights Act.
Now, it's, of course, one thing to realize that it never really got there, but it's bad enough
to demonstrate that he wanted to try and that the military has still been trying to engineer,
again, for lack of a better term, social justice outcomes from an institution that is meant to
exist on a different ideological, political, and operational framework.
Racial equity was the issue in the 1960s. It remained an issue in the subsequent five decades.
It became rights about sex representation, even to an extent representation of
different sexual orientation. It became an issue even of immigrants and immigrant status during
the Biden administration. But the underlying truth, the underlying assumption made,
was that the military should represent civil society and that opportunities,
if you had equal opportunity to have whatever job you wanted as a woman in America,
you should have the equal opportunity to have whatever job you wanted in the military,
even if we can acknowledge that the military is a unique institution because it's the only
institution that exists to kill a lot of people as efficiently as possible,
ideally on behalf of the American interests.
Right. And it's not unique in this, but it therefore has certain requirements
of its members that are not going to be egalitarian, that are going to select for,
for example, men over women most of the time, even if you do open up to it.
Huntington, I think, talks about these two ways that hostile critics of the military
will attempt either in times when the military is unpopular to chip away at it or make it
altogether, but in times when it's popular instead to subvert it. And I think this is
what you're describing is that subversion, subverting the logic of combat. And you and
I have talked about this on other podcasts, subverting the logic of combat from within,
which does bring us in our remaining time to today, because if all of this is taking shape
within the civil rights era, it's certainly accelerated within our lifetimes. And especially,
I think it's fair to say since Donald Trump took office, both the identitarian politics
and the tensions between and among their civilians, military leaders, and political
leaders. There's a narrative, which I assume is not your narrative, that Donald Trump is a kind
of uniquely authoritarian figure who represents this unique threat to the military and its
independence. But people would cite Jim Mattis. I think General Jim Mattis is one of the people
he likes to feud with most. But does it concern you, the current state of the relation between
the president and the military? And if so, what's the shape of that concern?
I'm only concerned because so few people seem to realize that this is the other side of the
Huntington coin playing out in real time. Or I guess it is the reversal of the other
side of the Huntington coin playing out in real time. I guess the veneer that surrounds
President Trump in the military is to try and force us to believe that the military
is something he views as his personal militia or his personal private military force.
That's, of course, not true. It's, of course, absurd just to look at what's happened in our
lives the last 10 years. But the backdrop is important. The military had become an institution
unto itself. It had become, I think, the institution, maybe with the exception of the
intelligence community, where the permanent bureaucratic expertise of the military was seen
worth protecting even against the whims, for, again, another lack of a better term,
the whims of the current political moment or the current president.
Even during the Obama administration, he campaigned on ending both the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. He, I guess, ended the war in Iraq, but quickly restarted it. But it was clear,
and he's even admitted in his book and in other public appearances, that he felt military
generals kind of boxed him in to the choice to, for example, surge troops in Afghanistan.
The professional military grew to have such deference that it was seen as illegitimate
and inappropriate for the politically accountable commander-in-chief to exercise his just dominion
over the use and application of the military that is outlined for him in the Constitution.
What President Trump is doing, what Secretary of War Pete Hegseth is doing, is reclaiming
the political mandate to decide how and when the United States military goes into battle,
goes into city streets to maintain peace and domestic tranquility, and to make key determinations
about how the military is employed. It is seen as so disruptive because we had traveled so far down
the path of, again, unchecked deference to the value of expertise that comes with decades of
service in a professional bureaucracy as complex and unique as the military itself.
So my take, I guess, is that any effort to undo the wounds of the past will be seen as this kind
of bizarre authoritarianism, when in reality, I think it actually will result in a much healthier
balance between the commander-in-chief and the military. The commander-in-chief decides
when to employ the military, and there's no amount of bureaucratic subversion
or, you know, candidly kind of deep state coordination between the U.S. Senate
and the general officer class that should precede or supersede, rather,
any given president's directive.
It follows a pattern that I think we're well familiar with at Claremont and perhaps even
on this podcast, you know, the civil rights era, creating the conditions for increasing deviations
from the constitutional order as such, so that by the time we get to the 21st century, you're looking
at this, you know, the crisis of the two constitutions, as Charles Kessler has called it,
and the things that would be required to restore something that looks like our regime as founded.
They have the flavor of radicalism because they are, in fact, radical departures. We've seen this
a lot in the oral arguments that the Supreme Court is having. Sonia Sotomayor will often
raise with various lawyers, especially lawyers for the Trump administration,
how can we overturn this 40, 50 years of precedent, right? And that is, I think,
the question that we're all facing, and it seems particularly acute in the case of the military.
As we wrap up here, this is a 250th celebration, and you alluded to the discovery that the military
has other uses besides fighting and killing people, even though that's always a primary goal.
One of the things I think that we instinctively know about the military is it's also a source of
pride and honor, right? We, I think, want to honor our military in America. The general populace
if you don't mess with them, they tend to have the instinct to celebrate the military and want
to see demonstrations and celebrations. At ball games and major parades, you get the flyovers and
all sorts of things that I think people really love and care about. Are there things you're
looking to see as July 4th approaches, things that you would advise if you had the president's
ear of how the military should figure into this commemoration?
I'll make a plug for a return to really precise and excellent drill and ceremony. There was the
Army 250th birthday parade in the summer of 2025. Candidly, I think it left a lot to be desired.
When I would talk to friends who are still in the Army, I'd give them grief. I'm like,
do you guys practice drill and ceremony or marching any longer? And their retort would
be, well, we're busy training and getting ready to fight. And while that's a good point,
and I take it for granted that we're a busy, overextended force, I think there is a desire to
reclaim a little bit of the pomp and circumstance that comes with impressive military celebrations
like parades, drill and ceremony, marching, decorum, that is representative of just how
cohesive and organized military units can be. Yes, it is perhaps images we'd most more likely
see these days in Russia or China, but I think it would be a sign that our military is seeking
kind of genuinely unified, a genuine sense of subjugation of the individual to the good of the
whole. And candidly, I'm not sure, at least for ground units like in the Army and the Marine
Corps, I don't think they're too busy where they can't practice some of those more ceremonial
duties a little bit more often. Okay. Well, I'll do my best to
get behind your plug for... I mean, it is from the other side, from the civilian side, I think,
especially in a time of war, which we're in, one that has made a lot of people, the Iran war,
I think has made a lot of people anxious about the future, about its outcome, a recovery of
confidence in the professionalism of the military and just the virtue of the individuals involved
would certainly not go amiss. This has been really a fascinating conversation. I kind of
wish we could carry it out for another hour or so, but we got to wrap it up. Will Tebow,
thank you very much once again for joining us. Thank you, Spencer.