Xi Loses Control of 82nd Troops! 5 Devastating Blows to His Faction

Right after Xi Jinping reopened an old score with Zhang Yuxia, the anti-Xi faction began launching its counterattack. Cai Qi, widely seen as one of the most influential figures in China and often described as the regime's chief domestic administrator, was hit hard. The low-altitude economy business linked to his son, reportedly a money-making machine worth hundreds of billions of yuan, was dismantled across multiple provinces almost overnight, and a key strategic asset was taken away from his camp. Meanwhile, the president of Beijing's top university, who had only recently stood alongside a head of state to sign a major agreement with Russia, was forced out of his position just 72 hours later. Xi Jinping's vision for advancing defense technology also appears to be unraveling. These five coordinated blows from the party elders have significantly altered the balance of power in the ongoing internal struggle. Let's take a closer look at what happened. First, Baoding's power structure was reshuffled overnight, effectively neutralizing the 82nd Group Army. Baoding is a key military stronghold guarding the strategic southern gateway to Beijing. The 82nd Group Army and its special operations forces possess the capability to encircle the capital and maintain control during a crisis, making stability in Baoding a matter of critical importance. In this context, replacing the party secretary of Baoding is akin to changing the lock on the gate of a vital security checkpoint. Deng Xiaolong, a native of Fupingshanxi, was considered a close fellow townsman and trusted ally of Xi Jinping. Some political observers even referred to him as Xi's political godson. He was not only the top official in Baoding, but also a key local guardian of Xiongnan New Area, Xi's flagship project of the century. Baoding and Xiongnan have long been viewed as critical pillars of Xi's political influence. Yet just days ago, provincial authorities unexpectedly announced Deng Xiaolong's removal from office. He was replaced by Zhao Wenfeng, the newly appointed party secretary of Baoding. Zhao is widely seen as a product of the State Council's development and reform system that flourished under former Premier Li Keqiang, and as a prominent member of the more pragmatic Youth League-aligned camp. The most important phase of his career advancement closely coincided with the decade during which Li Keqiang led the State Council. In 2013, the same year Li became premier and began promoting what became known as Li-conomics, Zhao was elevated to head Xi Jiazhuang's Development and Reform Commission while also serving as the commission's party secretary. In June 2022, when Li Keqiang convened a nationwide meeting of 100,000 officials to stabilize the economy and publicly pushed back against strict zero-COVID policies, Zhao was transferred to Zhang Jike as mayor and later became the city's party secretary. He is widely regarded as a career economic official shaped by Li Keqiang's policy circle and the State Council's technocratic tradition. Now, the Central Organization Department has placed a figure so closely associated with Li's legacy in Baoding, a strategic stronghold guarding Beijing's southern approaches. According to commentator Zhang Feng, this signals that the anti-Xi alliance has secured political coordination over the 82nd Group Army. In his view, the gatekeeper of Baoding has, almost overnight, changed from a loyal Xi ally into a steward aligned with the policy legacy of the Li Keqiang era. As a result, any attempt by Xi to exert influence over the 82nd Group Army would now face far greater political obstacles. In addition, major changes have also emerged in military appointments. During a meeting to finalize promotion lists for dozens of company commanders, in the second half of the year, approve the advancement of more than 100 key personnel and allocate tens of millions of yuan for weapons maintenance and defense infrastructure projects, enormous authority was at stake. In the past, all of this power was concentrated behind the closed doors of the brigade commander's office. The brigade commander and a handful of trusted staff officers could decide appointments with just a few marks in a notebook, determining who received promotions and favors. A platoon leader hoping to become a company commander, or an NCO seeking to remain in the military, had to demonstrate absolute loyalty to the brigade commander. This was the breeding ground for factions within the armed forces. It was also the mechanism through which Xi Jinping was said to have promoted loyalists from Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shaanxi, and the primary way local commanders built their own networks of personal allegiance. Now, however, the process has changed. Ballots are counted on the spot, opened on the spot, and made public on the spot. Every vote must be read aloud before the assembled troops, recorded on a public board, and filmed throughout the entire process by two cameras for archival purposes. At the end, representatives of the soldiers and discipline inspectors must sign off immediately and submit the results directly to the Central Military Commission's Discipline Inspection Commission through an online reporting system. According to this account, the new system effectively strips commanders of the discretionary power they once used to cultivate personally loyal followers. Commentator Jiang Feng argues that this is the most damaging move the anti-Xi camp has deployed within the military, a tightly controlled and highly transparent procedure that turns the powerful brigade commanders of the 82nd Group Army into little more than commanders without patronage power, making it extremely difficult for them to build their own factions. In his view, the measure is fundamentally designed as a safeguard against a military coup. What it removes is the ability of senior officers to establish loyal networks within the 82nd Group Army, influence the chain of command, or create instability within the ranks at a critical moment. Second, the overseas financial networks of the Fujian faction are reportedly being dismantled. China is currently seeking to elevate its cooperation with Pakistan to a new level. According to commentator Jiang Feng, however, behind this official narrative lies a broader campaign aimed at cracking down on corruption and money laundering activities linked to the defense industry. Pakistan has long been one of China's largest recipients of military assistance. Jiang argues that within a little-known history of covert operations, military cooperation between the two countries became a lucrative source of off-the-books revenue for generals associated with the former 31st Group Army's Fujian faction, including Miaohua and Heidong. Through arms sales, overseas financial transactions, and the establishment of secret funds, these figures allegedly built extensive networks for moving and concealing money abroad. This time, while the Ministry of National Defense has publicly framed the initiative as an upgrade in bilateral cooperation, Jiang contends that the real development is the direct intervention of Jiang Shengmin, Secretary of the Central Military Commission's Discipline Inspection Commission, who has reportedly taken control of the entire process. On the surface, the effort is presented as expanded cooperation. In practice, according to Jiang, it amounts to a comprehensive audit of defense procurement contracts and overseas financial dealings involving Fujian faction military figures and Pakistan over many years. In his interpretation, this move strikes at what remains of the faction's overseas financial infrastructure, cutting off what he describes as the last major channel of off-the-books funding available to Wang Xiaohong and other remnants of the former 31st Group Army network. Third, the trillion-yuan ATM linked to Kai Qi's son has reportedly been brought down. In late April, the atmosphere inside the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing suddenly turned tense. Several local discipline inspection officials reportedly arrived and publicly detained Zhou Chenghu, a leading figure in China's remote sensing and geospatial research community. News of the incident was kept under wraps for nearly a month before eventually leaking out. Zhou was far from an ordinary scientist. According to commentator Jiang Feng, he controlled what amounted to a money-printing machine within the low-altitude economy sector. A field heavily promoted as a future industry potentially worth more than 10 trillion yuan. Corporate records reportedly show that Zhou was directly linked to more than 20 companies and held equity stakes in 17 enterprises. The company he founded, Zhongqi Yuntu, was publicly known as a drone manufacturer, but Jiang describes it as one of the largest commercial empires in China's low-altitude economy. The company established thousands of intelligent UAV base stations across the country, creating a 24-hour low-altitude remote sensing network. Its Tianwang cloud platform was also among the few drone cloud computing systems officially licensed by China's Civil Aviation Administration. From automated inspection projects for the state grid and China's southern power grid to smart city initiatives and local governance projects, Zhongqi Yuntu reportedly became a dominant supplier in government and state-owned enterprise procurement related to low-altitude remote sensing technology. What drew particular attention, according to Jiang, was the timing. As Zhou's business empire expanded rapidly, the National Development and Reform Commission established a powerful new agency known as the Low-Altitude Economy Development Bureau. One of its deputy directors was Cai Erjin, the son of Cai Qi, a current member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Jiang alleges that this arrangement created a mutually beneficial system. Cai Qi's son, through his position within the NDRC, oversaw approvals, policy direction, financing channels, and lending support, while companies associated with Zhou Chenghu acted as intermediaries that secured projects and allegedly funneled billions of yuan in subsidies into overseas accounts connected to politically influential families. In Jiang Feng's interpretation, bringing down Zhou Chenghu was equivalent to reaching directly into the financial heart of the Cai family's network and seizing its most important ledger. Fourth, Xi Jinping's dream of building a powerful defense industrial complex is reportedly beginning to unravel. Shortly after news broke that Zhou Chenghu was under investigation, another development followed. On May 23, Xu Liuping, the ministerial-level party secretary of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, officially stepped down. Xu was a longtime executive within China South Industries Group, formerly China North Industries Weapons Equipment System, later held senior positions at Chang'an Automobile in Chongqing, and eventually led FAW Group, the manufacturer of the Hongxi vehicles used in military parades and for transporting visiting heads of state. Within the Chinese political system, Hongqi is one of the regime's most symbolic national brands. The sudden downfall of such a figure at the hands of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection was interpreted by the author as a sign that the networks tied to military equipment, state vehicles, and prestige national projects— areas closely associated with Xi Jinping's industrial ambitions— may also be coming under scrutiny. According to this interpretation, senior Communist Party elders appear to be targeting some of the sectors Xi has championed most strongly— the automotive industry, defense manufacturing, and what Beijing calls the New Productive Forces strategy. Why, in John Feng's view, has Xi placed such emphasis on rockets, satellites, automobiles, and other major industrial technologies? John argues that this stems partly from Xi's background as a member of the worker-peasant-soldier-student generation at Tsinghua University. In John's characterization, Xi possesses political instincts and skill in symbolic leadership, but seeks to reinforce his authority through tangible displays of national power and large-scale implementation projects. The challenge, John contends, is that these high-technology sectors depend heavily on experts, engineers, and technocratic officials— all of whom must be entrusted with enormous resources. As a result, the systems can become opaque and difficult to supervise, creating opportunities for corruption. In John's assessment, some of these networks became so entrenched that corruption and money-laundering activities flourished within them on a massive scale. Fifth, Peking University saw an overnight leadership shakeup. According to John Feng, the Communist Party elders have made a decisive move into the institution Xi Jinping most wants to control. Peking University In John's view, Peking University is the commanding height of China's ideological system. It trains future officials and serves as a core stronghold for shaping the political outlook of the country's youth. Whoever controls Peking University, he argues, controls the steady flow of new talent entering the upper ranks of the political establishment. On May 23, Gong Qihuang was removed from his positions as president of Peking University and deputy secretary of the university's party committee. He was replaced by Gao Song, an academician transferred north from Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou. What made the move especially striking was its timing. Just three days earlier, on May 20, during Russian President Vladimir Putin's state visit to Beijing, Gong Qihuang stood prominently in the Great Hall of the People. Dressed in a formal suit and smiling before domestic and international media, he represented Peking University in signing a highly symbolic cooperation agreement between Chinese and Russian universities. At that moment, he appeared to be enjoying the full confidence of the leadership, standing alongside Xi Jinping during a major state occasion. Yet only 72 hours later, he was removed from office. Qihuang characterizes Gong as a figure associated with the Fujian faction and one of the more representative members of Xi Jinping's political network. In his interpretation, the dismissal therefore carries significance beyond a routine personnel change. Who, then, is Gao Song? Gao is a native of Anhui province who earned both his master's and doctoral degrees in chemistry from Peking University and rose entirely through the university's academic system. More importantly, Gong notes, Gao's academic background and professional network were shaped during the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao era and are viewed as having strong connections to the Peking University alumni circles associated with former Premier Li Keqiang. Taken together, Gong argues that these five developments represent a coordinated counter-offensive by senior party elders against Xi Jinping's political network. What do you think of these five alleged counter-attacks by the party elders? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thanks for watching and see you next time.