Xi Reopens Zhang Youxia’s 9-Year-Old Case! Xi’s Ex-Wife's Shocking Confession

Xi Jinping has purged hundreds of generals, tightened control over 1.4 billion people, and consolidated more power than anyone since Mao Zedong. But tonight, the world's most powerful man is facing a problem that no anti-corruption campaign can solve. Who will take his seat after he is gone? Could it be a 32-year-old woman whose face the world has barely even seen? Meanwhile, Jiang Yuxia, one of the most powerful military figures in China, is now reportedly having old records from nine years ago reopened by Xi himself. For what purpose? Let's break it down. Is Xi Jinping reopening Jiang Yuxia's old files? On May 22, 2026, the Chinese Communist Party's Military Procurement Network published a Notice of Dishonesty Penalty against China Aerospace System Engineering Co., banning the company from participating in PLA-wide procurement activities for one year. The disciplinary action was issued by the Procurement Authority of the Rocket Force. What stands out is that the punishment was handed down in May 2026, even though the underlying case dates back nearly nine years. A source with close ties to the Chinese military told the Epoch Times, Corruption in the military can be considered the engine of corruption within the CCP itself. Since the beginning of the reform and opening up era, there were already smuggling operations involving cars. The military exploited the fact that military vehicles were exempt from inspections to transport contraband. Later came kickbacks tied to procurement contracts. Last year, there were even reports that commissions were paid on dual-use military civilian goods sold to Iran, including chips and drone components. After Jiang Yuxia came under investigation, the entire rocket force system, including missile bases in the Northwest Theater, underwent a wave of restructuring. Generals were replaced across the board, and every officer deemed unreliable or promoted during Jiang Yuxia's tenure was reviewed. Once personnel investigations were completed, the authorities moved on to investigating companies. At the highest level, the probe could ultimately reach the former General Armaments Department. Back in October 2012, Jiang Yuxia served as head of the PLA's General Armaments Department. From November 2015 to September 2017, he became the first minister of the newly established Equipment Development Department under the Central Military Commission. According to the CCP-affiliated Global Times, between August 28 and September 1, 2025, the Asset and Procurement Management Bureau of the Rocket Force Logistics Department published 180 notices on the Military Procurement Network, penalizing 74 bidding evaluation experts and 116 suppliers by banning them from military procurement activities. As a result, what is officially described as an anti-corruption investigation into procurement experts increasingly resembles a retrospective purge targeting former senior officials connected to the system. It also raises speculation that months before moving against Jiang Yuxia, Xi Jinping may already have been preparing the groundwork. Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has repeatedly used the banner of anti-corruption to purge rivals within both the CCP and the military. The Jiang Yuxia case, and the reopening of old military procurement records tied to it, appears to be yet another expansion of Xi's broader campaign against his political enemies. Yet beyond the threat posed by rivals, Xi Jinping faces another concern, one just as significant. Xi Peng, a succession battle behind closed doors? Recently, reports and rumors surrounding Xi Mingzhe have suddenly surged both inside and outside China. According to these accounts, the marital power struggle between Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan over the question of a successor has, for now, reached a temporary conclusion. The alleged sequence of events is said to have unfolded like this. Rumors claim that Xi Jinping's original idea was to select one of his illegitimate sons, a boy, to inherit his position. In the tradition of imperial China, this would have been the most orthodox path, father to son, the male heir succeeding to power. But the idea reportedly met fierce resistance from Peng Liyuan. Her stance, according to the rumors, could be summed up in four words, absolutely no compromise. It is even said that she pushed back with the ultimatum, I'd rather die, insisting that their biological daughter, Xi Mingzhe, should be the one to inherit supreme power. In a normal constitutional state, the first lady would of course have no authority in deciding a successor. But in a system that has abolished presidential term limits, hollowed out collective leadership, and concentrated power entirely in the hands of one man, the family affairs of the supreme leader inevitably become affairs of the state. When everything depends on the will of a single ruler, the wishes of the person beside him naturally carry enormous political weight. According to these reports, Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan ultimately reached a consensus. If there must be a successor, it has to be Xi Mingzhe. Not because she was necessarily considered the ideal choice, but because every other option carried even greater risks. If Xi were to elevate an illegitimate son instead, would party elders, the so-called red second generation, technocrats, and senior military officers accept it? If those factions resisted, the entire Xi family could face political ruin. In that sense, this was less a true consensus than the result of having no safer alternative left. Is Xi Mingzhe really suitable? Xi Mingzhe is 32 years old this year, and the only daughter of Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan. Her name was reportedly given by her grandfather, Xi Zhongxun, and is said to carry the meaning, bringing enlightenment to the world, bearing responsibility for the people. Yet the meaning of that name stands in almost complete contrast to the trajectory of her life over the past 32 years. Throughout her entire life, she has never held any official position, never been the subject of any proactively released report by CCP state media, and not a single official front-facing photograph of her has ever been published by Xinhua News Agency, People's Daily, or China Central Television. Is she married? What is her husband's surname? Does she have children? Even within overseas Chinese-speaking circles, two completely contradictory versions still circulate today. One claims she married Liu Hongfeng, who reportedly has a Tsinghua Cornell background. Another claims it was Qin Yuefei who studied at Yale. In the past 32 years, the only time a senior foreign official publicly mentioned her by name occurred just last year. On June 4th of last year, Xi Jinping hosted Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko at Zhongnanhai. But the information did not come from Xinhua or China's foreign ministry. Instead, it was revealed by Belarusian First Deputy Prime Minister Snopkov, who stated on Belarusian national television that the dinner had a family atmosphere, and that both Peng Liyuan and Xi Mingzhi were present. Snopkov even quoted Xi Jinping directly from the dinner table. Xi reportedly told Lukashenko, In history, this is the first time my daughter has accompanied me in this way to dine with a foreign leader. Yet when Chinese state media reported on Lukashenko's visit to China, the entire article was under 400 Chinese characters and completely avoided mentioning Xi Mingzhi's attendance. In other words, until June 2025, the only daughter of the ruler of this so-called global superpower effectively did not exist in the realm of public politics. This stands in stark contrast to another political daughter, Ivanka Trump. Ivanka Trump, now 43, is the daughter of Donald Trump and his former wife, Ivana Trump. During Trump's first presidential term from 2017 to 2021, Ivanka officially served as a senior advisor in the White House. She held a formal title, maintained a public office, had a publicly traceable work schedule, and participated in policy initiatives documented in official records. After Trump left office in 2021, Ivanka returned to Miami, Florida, where she continued her business activities and philanthropic work. Over the past eight years, virtually every major step of her public life has been accessible to But with Xi Mingzhe, everything remains a mystery. So in the end, is Xi Jinping's rumored move to position Xi Mingzhe as a successor really a reluctant choice, a move made because he sees no safer alternative? Ex-wife, Xi Jinping's great ambitions meant nothing to me. Behind this succession struggle lies another often forgotten voice, Kei Lingling, Xi Jinping's ex-wife. In 2015, Kei Lingling made an extremely rare public statement overseas. She married Xi Jinping in 1979 and divorced him in 1982. The marriage lasted only three years. In that account, Kei Lingling made a remark that still sounds striking today. The great ambitions he valued so highly meant nothing to me. She described Xi Jinping as stubborn, rigid, and extraordinarily persistent, someone determined to accomplish great things. He was a man with very strong ideals. I always believed he had tremendous potential. But at that time, his potential meant nothing to me. The power of this statement lies not in the fact that it criticizes Xi Jinping, but in what it reveals. Xi's obsession with power was already deeply ingrained from his youth, to the point that he was willing to sacrifice everything for it, including marriage itself. This perspective is crucial for understanding today's political landscape. Xi Jinping's reported willingness to position Xi Mingzhe as a successor is not necessarily rooted in fatherly affection. If it were purely about paternal love, he would not push his daughter into a system where Xi herself could be politically destroyed at any moment. Rather, Xi Mingzhe is portrayed as the only remaining vessel through which Xi's power could continue beyond his own rule. According to the commentary outlet Daxijiu, Peng Liyuan's determination to promote Xi Mingzhe stems from motives that are just as complex. On one hand, there is the instinct of a mother protecting her daughter. Rather than allowing an illegitimate child of uncertain lineage to overshadow her own daughter, she would rather see Xi Mingzhe take the throne herself. On the other hand, it is also about Peng Liyuan's own place within the structure of power. She is no longer merely a first lady. She is potentially positioning herself as a kind of supreme matriarch behind the throne. In this sense, the quiet testimony of Xi's former wife sheds light on the deeper nature of this internal family struggle. And Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea at this particular moment may be far from coincidental. When these developments are viewed together, they suggest a broader picture. Xi Jinping could be studying and drawing lessons from Kim Jong-un's succession model. In recent years, Kim Jong-un's daughter Kim Ju-ae has appeared frequently in public, interacting confidently with foreign dignitaries and projecting the image of a future national leader. To outside observers, the careful cultivation of a minor into such a symbolic political figure may seem bizarre or even absurd. But within authoritarian systems, the issue of succession has always been the single most important matter of state. Xi Jinping's trip to North Korea may therefore involve more than strengthening China-North Korea strategic ties. At a deeper level, it could also represent a form of on-site observation. Studying how Kim Jong-un has gradually introduced his daughter onto the international stage while signaling dynastic continuity to the world. If, under the bright lights of Pyongyang, the daughters of Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping were ever to appear together publicly, it would resemble nothing less than a large-scale China-North Korea workshop on the future blueprint of princess rule for the next two decades. The problem, however, is that such a blueprint is far harder to implement within the CCP system than in North Korea. North Korea is openly dynastic. From Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il and then Kim Jong-un, hereditary succession has effectively become institutionalized across three generations. The CCP, however, officially bases its legitimacy on anti-feudal, anti-imperial, and anti-hereditary ideology. Even Mao Zedong once attempted to designate Hua Guofeng as his successor, yet Hua was pushed aside after only a few years. Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyan all experienced unstable or prematurely ended political careers. If even Mao Zedong could not fully solve the succession problem, does Xi Jinping really believe he can? The answer, according to this interpretation, is brutal. It is not that Xi believes he can succeed. It is that he no longer has any other option. Looking across today's bureaucracy, Xi Jinping reportedly has almost no trusted confidants left. Kai Qi may function as his number two shadow, but he is not family. Li Chang has allegedly been sidelined. Li Xi is said to be struggling to protect even himself, and Zhang Yuxia appears to have entered the final phase of political liquidation. This, perhaps, is the ultimate fate of dictatorships. The more power you concentrate, the less willing you become to let go. The less willing you are to let go, the more you must rely on family, and the fewer family members available, the fewer choices remain, until every remaining choice becomes extraordinarily dangerous. What do you think about these latest developments? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thanks for watching, and see you next time.