What’s Behind the Suspension of U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan?

Around the Trump-Xi summit, the Taiwan issue remained a focal point of international attention. The proposed $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan became a key bargaining chip. This issue has now seen a new development. Questions from international media are rapidly spreading. Welcome back to Final War with Catherine Hu. On May 22nd, one piece of news sent shockwaves through Washington, Beijing and Taipei at the same time. The proposed $14 billion U.S. arms sale to Taiwan had been suspended. What exactly does this signal? And why did it happen immediately after the Trump-Xi summit? On May 21st, during a Senate defense hearing, acting U.S. Navy Secretary Hung Chiu publicly confirmed that Washington had suspended roughly $14 billion in planned arms sales to Taiwan. According to him, the Trump administration now needs to prioritize ammunition supplies tied to the conflict with Iran. At the same time, he emphasized that foreign military sales would continue whenever the administration considers them necessary. The story was immediately picked up by major international outlets, including Al Jazeera, The Hill, BBC, The Guardian, CBS, and Nikkei Asia. And once the news broke, the backlash spread everywhere. Some began questioning whether Trump was stepping away from Taiwan. Others accused him of sacrificing Taiwan altogether. Many people in Taiwan also started asking the same uneasy question. Had Trump already reached some kind of understanding with Xi? Was Taiwan now being drawn into a broader geopolitical exchange tied to Iran? How should we understand this move? Especially considering that it came right after the Trump-Xi summit. For Taiwan, this is obviously not a positive signal. But there is also no reason to fall into the trap of extreme distrust toward the United States. Because that is precisely the outcome Beijing would most like to see. First of all, a suspension of arms sales is not the same thing as a cancellation. And in reality, this pause was largely anticipated. Many of Trump's public remarks on Taiwan after the Trump-Xi summit were already preparing the ground for it. Trump himself openly described arms sales as a bargaining chip. For preserving the current balance across the Taiwan Strait, if the balance on the CCP side begins to shift, the arms sales could move forward again. And if the balance on Taiwan's side becomes unstable, the sales could just as easily be paused. Objectively speaking, Trump's level of arms sales to Taiwan has far exceeded that of other US presidents. During his first term alone, Washington approved more than $18 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. By comparison, the Biden administration approved only a little over $8 billion. And shortly after returning to office last year, Trump had already pushed through another $11.1 billion package. Less than two months later, a new proposed $14 billion arms sale followed. Precisely because Trump's posture on Taiwan had become so strong, Beijing began applying various forms of political pressure in hopes of encouraging Washington to scale things back. In other words, the decision to pause this $14 billion arms package likely reflects the Trump administration's assessment that tensions across the Taiwan Strait have not yet reached a critical breaking point. And because of that, Washington appears to be slowing the pace for now. Even before this, Trump's announcement that he was preparing to speak with Lai Ching-te had already drawn intense international attention. Well, I'll speak to him. I speak to everybody. The first signal came aboard Air Force One as Trump was returning from Beijing after the Trump-Xi summit. The discussion once again centered on arms sales to Taiwan. Trump said that before making any final approval decision, he planned to speak with Lai Ching-te. Then on May 20th, a reporter directly asked him, before approving arms sales to Taiwan, would he first call President Lai Ching-te? Well, I'll speak to him. I speak to everybody. We have that situation very well in hand. We had a great meeting with President Xi. It was amazing, actually. It was amazing. Many of you were there. We'll work on that Taiwan problem. This was already the second time Trump had publicly indicated that he planned to speak with Lai Ching-te. Two consecutive public remarks like this suggest that Trump was not speaking off the cuff. Because the timing matters. Why would Trump, immediately after discussing Taiwan with Xi, suddenly signal the possibility of a call with Lai Ching-te? These developments clearly appear linked. If Trump truly believed that a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait was imminent, that the risks had already reached a dangerous level, then this would no longer be about preserving the status quo. Under those circumstances, it would make little sense to pause the arms sales. And after the Trump-Xi summit, Trump himself made his position clear. He said he was convinced that Xi would not move against Taiwan during Xi's current term in office. What happens afterward, he implied, is another matter. Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed a similar assessment during a recent media interview. He said, in his view, the party is now placing greater emphasis on pursuing peaceful reunification with Taiwan. And that point matters. Because while Trump is often known for speaking in broad or dramatic terms, Rubio is regarded in Washington as a far more disciplined and careful communicator. He is also widely known as one of the more Taiwan-friendly figures in American politics. Then, why do both Trump and Rubio appear convinced that Beijing is unlikely to move against Taiwan in the near term? In my view, that conclusion almost certainly comes from a broader internal assessment. That assessment likely includes multiple layers. The substance of the recent talks with Xi, intelligence regarding the Eastern Theater Command's military posture, the ongoing internal purges inside the PLA, and perhaps even a clearer understanding of Xi's actual position inside the system. And the conclusion the Trump administration appears to have reached is, overall, a relatively optimistic one. In other words, whether it is Xi himself or the broader leadership in Beijing, they likely all understand one reality very clearly. In the short term, Beijing simply does not yet possess the conditions or the capability required for a move against Taiwan. Of course, there is another side to this. This moment should also make one thing clearer for Taiwan. Taiwan cannot place its own security entirely in someone else's hands, whether it is the United States or Japan. Every country ultimately puts its own national interests first. Even when others are willing to help, they cannot fight Taiwan's fight on Taiwan's behalf. Look at Ukraine. With limited outside support, even after asking for help from all sides, Ukraine built its own large-scale drone industry, and eventually its own drone-based combat system. That changed the dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine battlefield. And that is a case Taiwan should study very carefully. In terms of economic strength, technological capacity, manufacturing power, access to outside support, and even the natural defensive advantages of geography, Taiwan is far ahead of Ukraine. If Ukraine could rely on itself and fight its way toward survival, then Taiwan has even less reason to believe it cannot do the same. But the key is this. Taiwan must first resolve the problem of internal division and Beijing's infiltration. Only then can it truly confront the most fundamental question of survival. So now the real question is, can Xi Jinping's promise not to move against Taiwan during his current term actually be trusted? Can Xi Jinping's promise actually be trusted? To explore that question, let's turn once again to our old friend, Professor Yuan Hongbing, the well-known Chinese legal scholar based in Australia, who has long been known for his access to internal information regarding developments at the top levels of the CCP. Xi's overall strategic direction has not fundamentally changed. He has not given up on the idea of a military operation across the Taiwan Strait. On the contrary, his current objective is to rebuild the command structure of the CCP military before the end of 2026. Then, after a period of internal consolidation and adjustment, he still intends to move on Taiwan sometime between 2027 and 2028. In Xi's view, this would serve as political justification for his long-term rule. That is the strategic goal he is now trying to achieve. Exactly as expected, right? For now, let's set aside the question of whether Xi is truly capable of rebuilding the command structure of the CCP military. What matters here is something else, the dual nature of Xi's message. Professor Yuan also offered another observation. He argued that when Xi spoke at the state banquet about the so-called Thucydides trap, Xi himself may not actually understand the deeper historical meaning behind the concept. After all, what exactly can be learned from the rivalry between Athens and Sparta, two ancient city-states from thousands of years ago, and what historical patterns, if any, does that conflict really represent? Today, the strategic conflict between the CCP regime and the United States is not simply an inevitable confrontation between an established power and a rising one. The deeper issue is something far more ideological. It is Xi's attempt to revive a broader international communist movement and the global ambitions of an increasingly centralized authoritarian system that he believes now pose a direct challenge to the values of freedom and democracy. From that perspective, the tensions between China and the United States are not merely a neutral geopolitical competition between two great powers. Rather, they reflect a larger ideological struggle over the direction of the international order in the 21st century. This is the central issue the world must clearly understand when assessing today's global politics. Here is a revealing example. We have seen that Beijing is willing to compromise on many economic issues. But when it comes to Jimmy Lai, there has been virtually no room for concession. And the reason is actually quite simple. Jimmy Lai has become more than just an individual case. He now represents, in the eyes of many Hong Kong citizens, a symbol of resistance and political freedom under the rule of the party. And under that kind of political pressure, Xi would find it extremely difficult to accept Trump's request. Get the real story behind the CCP's shifting power games and see where US-China relations are headed next. Support the vision of a new China without communism. Subscribe now and join us in bringing the truth to light.