Why is Putin really visiting Beijing? According to explosive claims from a former CCP insider, the answer may not be diplomacy — but oil. After repeated Ukrainian drone strikes crippled Russia’s refining capacity, Moscow increasingly needs China’s massive excess refining system to keep fuel flowing. Meanwhile, China faces its own energy pressures as Middle Eastern and South American oil supplies become less stable. In this program, we break down the hidden energy alliance forming between Beijing and Moscow, the “gray-zone” oil cooperation that may already be underway, and why this secret oil relationship could reshape the global balance of power.
Putin's visit to China is driven by a critical need for refined fuel following Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian refineries. While Russia has crude oil, it lacks processing capacity, whereas China faces severe refining overcapacity. This creates a symbiotic relationship where China provides refined products and processing in exchange for crude oil and strategic leverage.
Alright, he was former legal counsel or chief legal counsel to the Inner Mongolia government,
to actually Hu Chunhua, and he is now in exile in Europe.
He obtained information from his contacts in China and revealed Putin's goal of the
trip on social media.
According to Mr. Du, the most important reason for Putin's visit is oil.
Now, Russia may be an energy superpower, but crude oil and refined fuel are two different things.
Russia's problem is not a lack of crude oil.
The real problem is that after repeated Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian refineries, Russia's
ability to process crude oil into refined fuel products has been severely reduced.
Reuters reported on May 15th that according to its calculations, Ukrainian drone strikes
hit 16 Russian oil refineries between January and May, damaging about 700,000 barrels per
day of refining capacity.
In March alone, the refining units that were hit had a combined capacity close to 1 million
barrels per day.
In April, the damage exceeded that level again.
The scale has been enormous and has systematically weakened Russia's refining system.
So under those circumstances, China has become critical.
China faces the opposite problem from Russia.
It has excess refining capacity.
Now over the past 20 years, China aggressively launched large industrial projects across
the country, massively expanding refineries, petrochemical bases, and fuel supply systems.
And according to misdeduced sources, in November last year, Tsai gave Xi Jinping an important
report, stating that China's demand for refined oil products had already peaked.
It didn't say when it peaked, but it says it already peaked.
It's not going any higher.
China was facing a severe refining overcapacity problem, according to this report that Tsai
Xi gave to Xi Jinping back in November 2025.
So in 2025 alone, China's excess refining capacity reportedly reached 250 million tons.
Now I did a little calculation, so 250 million tons of excess refining capacity is roughly
equivalent to about 5 million barrels per day of refining capacity.
And that's almost equal to 27% of the entire refining capacity of the United States, because
the U.S. has about 18.4 million barrels per day of refining capacity.
And that's significant.
And that was 2025, and now it could be even higher because of the problem I'll tell you later.
So if this excess capacity cannot be absorbed properly, the consequences could be severe.
Factories may shut down, equipment could rust and deteriorate, massive economic losses could
occur, and large numbers of workers could lose their jobs.
But if this excess refining capacity can be converted into export capacity, it could create
foreign trade exports worth trillions of yuan every year.
It would become a major new growth engine for China's exports.
At the time, the CCP reportedly targeted Europe,
Asian countries, and the global south as export markets.
But Russia at the time was not originally considered because Russia itself was
traditionally an energy exporter.
However, after Ukraine's strike capacities improved, and after the United States intensified
pressure on Venezuela and Iran, China's crude oil import channels were also heavily affected.
As a result, China's refinery operations became increasingly constrained.
And because of this, Beijing also began imposing quota controls on refined fuel exports.
Reuters reported last December that China had already issued its first batch of 2026
refined fuel exports quotas, totaling about 19 million tons for gasoline, diesel, and
aviation fuel combined.
Now then, on April 29th, Reuters reported again that China approved exports of 500,000
tons of fuel to destinations outside Hong Kong for May delivery, nearly three times
April's expected shipment level, even though it's still less than half the level from
the same period last year.
So this suggests that compared with last year, China's refined oil exports have been
sharply reduced.
And according to Mr. Du, the reason is not insufficient refining capacity, but a shortage
of crude oil supplies or crude oil imports.
After the sudden deterioration of the situation in Iran and Venezuela, Chinese refineries
faced the problem of excess capacity.
In Chinese, we say having no rice to cook with, meaning they lacked feedstock of crude
oil.
And that is why oil has become one of Putin's most important bargaining chips.
China and Russia are connected by land.
They not only have oil pipelines, but fuel products can also be transported easily by
truck and rail.
The CCP desperately wants crude oil supplies.
While Trump wants China to help Russia ease its refined fuel crisis.
At this moment, Mr. Du says China and Russia are perfectly positioned to cooperate closely
for mutual benefits.
Of course, this cooperation may not appear as large-scale public imports and exports
of gasoline or diesel.
Instead, it may take the form of secret deals.
It will be done as secret deals through corporate contracts, or equipment and spare parts
transfers, or even third country transshipment operations.
But the goal is to expand Chinese purchases of Russian crude oil to provide Russia with
cash flow.
He said of all of those reasons, this one, the last one, the collaboration on oil refinement
is the easiest for outsiders to overlook because many people discuss China-Russia relations
only in terms of anti-American alignment, strategic partnership, but they ignore a basic
reality.
Wars consume oil and China's economy also runs on oil.
If you step back and if you look at today, the only country in the world that simultaneously
has massive refining capacity, the political willingness to help Russia, and the ability
to bypass Western sanctions or systems is China.
And so that's why Putin is coming.
But for China, this is both an opportunity and a risk.
From Beijing's perspective, Putin's visit is certainly an opportunity.
It can fill the idle capacity of Chinese refineries.
And the CCP can also use it to signal to Washington, don't assume that just because you visited
Beijing, China will end in Russia.
China still has the Russia card in its hand.
And China can also use Russia to tie down Europe.
The more Europe focuses its attention and resources on the Russian-Ukraine war, the
harder it becomes for Europe to concentrate on confronting the CCP.
But at the same time, it can also be a risk because if the CCP openly and massively helps
Russia solve its refined oil crisis, Western countries will almost certainly begin targeting
Chinese companies.
Especially if Chinese exports of fuel, equipment or parts are proven to be directly supporting
Russia's military, then the US and Europe could very likely expand secondary sanctions.
But Beijing will avoid publicly and aggressively buying Russian crude oil.
It's going to do what Mr. Du says, a gray zone, right?
So publicly, Beijing will continue to talk about peace, cooperation and normal trade.
In reality, it's going to use private companies, border trade, third country transshipment
to push the transactions forward.
And so this is typical CCP diplomatic style, neutral in words, but taking sides in action,
talking publicly about peace while privately supporting Russia.
So in summary, Putin is not coming to Beijing this time to celebrate friendship.
He's coming to confirm whether Russia's lifeline still exists, including his political
and diplomatic lifeline, as well as his wartime and energy lifelines.
If China continues supporting Russia, then Russia can continue holding on.
But if China starts wavering, Russia's strategic position could deteriorate immediately.
And that's why he's coming personally to Beijing.
And from Xi Jinping's perspective, Putin is a very useful card.
China and the US can negotiate.
But Beijing cannot allow Washington to believe that China will abandon Russia.
And China, Russia can cooperate.
But Beijing also cannot allow Moscow to believe that China can be bought off by the US.
Meanwhile, Europe can be divided.
Japan can be pressured.
Taiwan can continue being threatened.
And that is the game Beijing intends to play.
And in the end, the strategic cuddling is not due to genuine affection.
It's mutual dependence.