The Private Credit Bubble Is Starting To Crack

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May 21, 2026 #finance #financement
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis discussion explores the rise of shadow banking and the decline of the euro-dollar system. It explains how regulated banks' risk aversion after 2008 created a void filled by private credit, which eventually evolved into a speculative bubble. Similarly, the euro-dollar system, once a driver of global prosperity, is now viewed as an obsolete framework that lacks a viable replacement.
How important is this shadow banking or neobanking system that's emerging?
You might hear, well, the Fed, they regulate banks.
These banks have tons of regulations on them, all these, you know,
constraints from the federal government, the Federal Reserve.
But what about these neobanks, these shadow banks?
How important are they to the global economy?
They have become tremendously important.
In fact, I was just talking about this earlier today.
I know you wanted to ask about it.
I mean, this is where the private credit bubble came from.
Now, these shadow banks and private credit have been around for decades.
There's nothing new.
But what happened is, in the aftermath of 2008, as the regulated commercial banking system
took a huge step, actually took 10 steps back, which led to the problems we just talked about
here, the regulated banking system stopped circulating credit to the parts of the economy
where it really needed it, right?
Where economic growth really comes from is from, you know, smaller and mid-sized firms
that take risks and, you know, get loans, and they expand their facilities, and they
grow and get bigger and bigger and bigger.
That's where economic growth comes from.
But in the aftermath of 2008, the regular bank said, I don't want to touch any of that
stuff because I could end up being like Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers.
That's a huge point.
People, you know, Ben Bernanke, the Fed, everybody thinks Bear Stearns was a success
story.
It wasn't.
It was the moment when the system broke because the regular bank said, holy crap, I could
have my equity wiped out.
I don't care about the bank failure.
Me, I'm an executive at a big bank.
I could have my equity wiped out.
I cannot have that happen ever again.
Therefore, we're going to completely change how we operate this regulated bank.
This regulated bank is going to be like, you know, JP Morgan's fortress balance sheet.
If we're going to lend, it's only going to be to the least risky borrowers, like the
federal government.
Why do banks love U.S. treasuries?
Because there's no risk associated with them.
So banks loaded up on treasuries and left the real parts of the economy that needed
credit completely starved of it.
And so eventually, over time, some pioneering Wall Street people said, you know what?
If the regulated banks are going to lend to this part of the economy, there's opportunity
there.
There's real opportunity there.
Let's start doing it.
So they didn't create shadow banks.
They didn't create these private credit funds.
They just took what was existing and adopted it to this, you know, direct lending, leverage
lending framework.
So you saw the huge increase in leverage loans, which is banks originating loans, then selling
them off to these other investors.
And you saw the rise of direct lending itself, which is you set up an investment fund or
what we really call a shadow bank, but it's really an investment fund.
And you borrow money or you get equity capital from all over Wall Street.
You know, the regulated banks who don't want to lend themselves, they'll lend to you because
you've got the right pedigree.
You've got the right name.
You've got the right attitude.
You've got the right, you know, whatever.
You can get funds from the regulated banks, and then you re-lend to the real economy where
the banks don't want to go.
And so like everything else in Wall Street, the shadow banks started out filling a need.
They did exactly what we needed them to do.
We needed them to go into this part of the economy and supply credit.
But like everything else in Wall Street, eventually they go way too far, right?
Because that's what they do.
They start out with a good thing.
They bastardize the hell out of it and realize we can mass produce this stuff because nobody
else is doing it.
And so let's do that.
So even by the time we got to the end of the 2010s, the shadow banking private credit stuff
got to be a little bit out of hand.
I think people started to hear about it in 2018 and 2019, especially where it came to
leverage loans and corporate credit like that.
There was some noises going on, and then COVID hit, the pandemic, the lockdowns, that stuff
got shoved aside.
And it was really 21 and 22, alongside commercial real estate, private credit just went frigging
crazy.
They went nuts.
Everybody bought into the premise that the government had shut everything down.
And when they opened everything back up, they not only had opened everything back up good,
they opened everything back up even better than it was before.
Not everybody, but a lot of people bought into that myth.
They had re-engineered the 2020s in a way that completely erased the legacy of the 2010s.
And so you saw commercial real estate go crazy.
You saw private credit go crazy.
So we took what was a good thing filling a need and turned it into just the latest Wall
Street-fueled bubble.
And that's really where we are today.
The shadow banks became a huge marginal provider of credit and then took it way too far.
They went into, as Jeffrey Gundlach called it last fall, garbage lending and then some.
And that's where these cockroaches have come from.
It's a typical boom-bust cycle.
You start with something good and just go way too far with it.
All right, let's try this analogy of another boom-bust cycle.
There was this Triffin's Dilemma.
The US has their currency, but the rest of the globe maybe needs it in a different way
than the domestic population.
And so this euro-dollar system emerges.
It's great.
It solves all these problems.
Where are we in the boom-bust cycle of the euro-dollar system?
Obviously, there was the dollar system, then the euro-dollar system to fill these gaps
that were needed globally.
Where do we stand today on the boom-bust system of the euro-dollar?
The euro-dollar has long since busted.
That's what we're really talking about.
The 2008 crisis was basically the end, or at least what should have been the end.
The euro-dollar did a lot of good along the way.
But just like we said with the previous example of private credit and shadow banking, it started
out to fill a need, and it did so reasonably well.
It was the secret ingredient behind the prosperity of the 20th century.
It wasn't the prosperity itself.
But you can't have prosperity.
We've got the innovation.
You've got the productive technology.
You've got all this labor markets opening up, capital opening up, and all that stuff.
It didn't create the world, but it made it possible.
So you had monetary flows and capital flows that unlocked all these beneficial factors
that were available.
And it led to widespread prosperity, the likes of which we've never seen before.
But like everything else, toward the end there, it got way out of hand.
We got into the housing bubble.
We got into all sorts of credit bubbles around the rest of the world.
In fact, one bubble became another bubble, which became another bubble.
And eventually, by 2007, it all fell apart.
That's the moment when we should have said, hey, this thing had its day.
It had its time.
We're really done with that.
Let's move on to something else, and let's move in a positive direction.
That's right around the time that we started talking about money for the first time.
I think most people just kind of set it aside, because for 70 years, it looked like nobody
cared.
We didn't need to care.
We didn't have any waves of bank failures.
I mean, yes, there were bank failures.
Even the S&L crisis in the 1980s seemed to prove that point.
We had bank failures, but we didn't have the massive deflation and depression that
usually associated with bank failures, and people didn't connect those dots.
It was really the euro-dollar framework that allowed us to withstand something like that.
But we got to 2008.
Instead of having that conversation, okay, hey, this euro-dollar thing, which nobody
even was aware of at that point, there's this euro-dollar thing.
It's gone as far as it can take us.
It went too far.
It really needs to be redone.
Let's start redoing.
But instead, what did we do?
Well, Ben Bernanke said, well, let's do QE.
Let's try to put the system back together using all of these inappropriate tools.
So the euro-dollar is almost two decades past its useful life, which is why we're
stuck in the system, which has created, first of all, regulated banks that don't supply
nearly enough credit to the world and nearly enough money flow to the world, which has
choked off economic growth all over the planet.
Not all at once.
It's not catastrophic.
It doesn't look like the 1930s.
But it is every bit the sort of depressionary circumstances that you would associate with
these factors or these periods.
And we just talked about the main element of it, which is lack of credit flow.
So the euro-dollar is 20 years or so past its useful life, and there's really nothing
else that is out there that can plausibly, to the same extent, to undertake the functions
of a reserve currency that the euro-dollar system does.
And I think that's one of the biggest problems that people have, not really understanding
what a reserve currency is and what it needs to do.
It's a tenuous grasp.
The only reason we're still on a euro-dollar standard is because there's nothing else.
It doesn't provide widespread benefits.
That's really the case.
A reserve currency needs to allow for intermediation everywhere, which means the currency has
to be available everywhere and it has to be acceptable everywhere.
So anything that's going to replace the euro-dollar system needs to be equally acceptable
across as much of the world as possible, or at least big chunks of it.
Historically speaking, there isn't a single reserve currency.
It's usually regional blocks.
21st century, internationalized, globalized economy, there's no reason we can't have
a single reserve currency.
But it needs to be available everywhere and acceptable everywhere.
The part about being available everywhere is the part that people don't really think
about.
There's a tremendous amount of infrastructure that has gone into it, not somebody putting
together a blueprint design.
It's not like Bretton Woods, where they came together with an imperfect solution to the
big problem of the Great Depression in World War II.
It's a bottom-up system that created all sorts of flexibility and design and adaptability
that can only come with a bottom-up system that was useful for all these many years.
So to replace the currency system that we have now, to me, the analogy is it would be
like starting from scratch with the internet.
It would be recreating the entire network, the hardware, the software, the languages
that are used, everything.
Replace the euro-dollar reserve currency, it'd be similar to replacing the entire internet,
which is why we're stuck with the euro-dollar, because there's nothing that's even close
to doing something like that.
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