When banks pulled back from lending after 2008, the gap didn't stay empty for long. Someone else stepped in, and that market is now worth nearly $2 trillion. Where that money came from, who's holding the risk, and what happens when investors want it back are questions most people in that market still can't fully answer.
In this episode, Leyla Kunimoto, an investor and founder of the newsletter Accredited Investor Insights, has spent years examining private credit funds from the outside. She comes at this from the one angle the industry rarely accounts for: the person writing the check.
Some of what she found while digging into these funds is still surprising, including the same loan valued differently across multiple funds with no requirement to reconcile the difference. And what investors are rarely told when these products are offered through a financial advisor.
00:35 – Private Credit Growth to $2T Market 02:30 – Direct Lending in PE Buyout Deals 06:02 – How Banks Fund Private Credit Firms 08:30 – Why Private Credit Yields Are High 10:23 – Evergreen vs Closed-End Fund Liquidity 13:41 – BDC Discounts and AI Software Exposure 16:42 – Insurance Capital Flow and Conflicts 21:33 – CLO Tranches and Downgrade Risk 24:51 – Loan Marks and Valuation Discrepancies 29:20 – PIK Interest and Rising Credit Stress 31:44 – Why Layla Tracks Private Credit Markets 33:18 – Liquidity Pressure and Systemic Risk
There's a lot of headlines about private credit right now.
Will it create a banking crisis or an insurance crisis?
Today we'll find out.
We sit down with Leila Kunimoto,
who has been actually studying
what's happening with private credit.
She's an investor herself.
She's created this newsletter that's very popular
among the bankers and people in the financial space.
She's here to tell us all about private credit,
what it is, how it works, what are the flaws and problems,
and the areas we should pay attention to.
Leila, it's great to have you on, welcome.
Thank you for having me.
We want to talk to you about private credit.
You've been studying this for multiple years
and you've gotten into the details.
Most people may not understand
what is private credit, how it works,
and there is fear that this private credit
could bring the whole economy down
and create a financial crisis.
Can you tell us, to start with, what is private credit?
Yeah, that's a great question.
And private credit has a really broad definition.
It's all lending that's done
outside of the traditional banking system.
And private credit, to take us back,
to go back in the history of it,
it started in the aftermath of the great financial crisis.
So in 2008, 2009, when banks were mired
in the crisis, when we had that fiasco unfolding,
in the aftermath of that, regulators came in
and severely restricted banks' ability to originate loans.
There were, regulations changed quite substantially,
and the net result was that, for banks,
it became a lot more difficult to originate loans
to borrowers that were outside of a very narrow definition.
So in the aftermath of that, what happened is,
private capital came in and filled the gap.
And by private capital, it's, you know,
we're talking about institutions,
we're talking about endowments,
we're talking about pension plans.
These, all of these companies had capital to deploy,
and asset managers stepped in and said,
okay, since banks can't loan to these companies,
we will raise the capital, go out, and originate loans.
And this is what we've seen over the past 12 years.
Private credit has grown from a very small sliver
of the market to nearly $2 trillion where it stands today.
And it's, you know, over the past so many years,
over the past five years or so,
it's been growing exponentially.
It's a lot of retail money, a lot of individual investors
gained access to private credit.
So that's what we're hearing about on the news.
What are the risks?
Some people are concerned
that there's gonna be significant losses.
The interest rates are high for these private credit loans.
Maybe we need to take another step back
and kind of give a picture of where those loans are.
So private credit encompasses a really wide variety
of different loans.
It's anything from loans secured with real estate
that are, you know, maybe not your mortgages,
but mortgages on large apartment complexes.
There are plenty of private credit lenders
who lend bridge and, you know,
long-term financing on those.
You have loans to private companies,
and that's what we're kind of,
a lot of people think private credit
and they think just that little sliver of the pie.
And those two private companies
are middle market direct lending.
So those loans are originated to borrowers who,
you know, it could be software companies,
it could be all sorts of different companies,
but these are typically companies that are held private.
A lot of them are backed by private equity.
So there's a little bit, there's an overlap.
There's a lot of overlap in the middle market lending
where private equity goes out,
buys out companies via leveraged buyouts,
and that money is provided by private credit lenders
to buy those companies.
So we have this, we have this big ecosystem
and banks over the past so many years,
the bank's involvement has grown too.
Banks can not directly lend to those companies.
If we only look at middle market lending,
at lending to those private companies,
banks a lot of the times
can not lend to those companies directly.
But what they can do is they can lend
to private credit firms.
So a private credit firm will go out,
raise capital from investors, originate loans,
and go to a bank and say,
hey, we have this book of loans.
It's really good collateral.
Will you give us a line of credit?
And banks are happy to provide that
because banks in this situation
are high on the capital stack.
So banks will go out and issue loans
to those private credit borrowers.
So this, and we've talked about private equity
being involved, right?
So we have this big ecosystem
where a lot of the kind of tentacles are intertwined.
So private equity firms own those private credit,
own private companies.
Private credit firms go and lend to those companies
or to those private equity firms to buy the companies.
And then we have the banks who loan money.
They lend money to both private equity
and private credit firms.
How big is it?
It's big, but it's not alarming.
So banks' involvement in private credit
is being closely tracked.
And we're starting to see news stories
and headlines that talk about just how big that is, right?
And over the past so many years,
over the past five years or so,
that has grown rapidly,
but it's nowhere near where it's a systemic risk,
in my opinion.
And banks, how did the banks get involved in this?
Because they were not allowed to lend
to these companies, right?
But if it's an aggregate pool of them,
is that how they got involved?
That's exactly how it's happening.
They cannot lend to the borrowers directly.
A lot of the time,
the bank is not gonna be very willing to lend.
Especially if you're a smaller borrower,
let's say you generate $25 million in EBITDA,
but you have a lot of options on the private side.
You can go to a private credit fund and say,
hey, this is my company's financials.
I would like to grow,
I would like to acquire more customers
or acquire something
or whatever the reason I may have, right?
You can go to a private credit lender and borrow money.
That private credit lender will issue,
let's say 100 loans to companies like yours.
The private credit lender, that is the book.
That is the assets of the private credit fund.
Those loans become the assets.
And let's say the value of those loans is $200 million.
The private credit fund manager can then go to a bank
and say, hey, we have a book of performing loans.
The fair market value of those loans is $200 million.
Can you give us a $50 million line of credit?
And we'll pledge those loans as collateral
on that line of credit.
So this is a very important piece because in this scenario,
when the loans are pledged as collateral to the bank,
what that means is that the bank
is in first repayment position.
If something went sideways with the borrowers,
let's say the book of loans starts deteriorating,
the bank can up their collateral requirement.
It can call the line.
It's gonna be repaid first.
Investors in that same private credit fund are technically,
despite the fact that it's a debt fund,
they are in equity position.
They're behind the bank in repayment priority.
And that's an important piece.
So bank's involvement here is very often,
most of it with this scenario,
most of it is secured with the value of the loans
on the book of lenders.
Is this why these loans pay really high interest
to the investors?
This is a great question.
So typically, right, in the world of finance,
in the world of investing,
the higher the risk, the higher the reward, right?
A lot of these borrowers are sub-investment grade.
So these borrowers could not go to Moody's and say,
hey, you know, can we issue some bonds
and what would the rating be?
And Moody's, even if Moody's went out and did that,
the rating would not be an A paper, right?
It would be sub-investment grade.
So AKA junk bonds.
The reason, so investors expect to be compensated amply
for the amount of risk they take.
This is not like a loan issued to a publicly traded company
with clear financials, a very large borrower
that's rated, let's say AA or whatever,
they're rated above junk level.
A loan to that company technically is lower risk
than a loan to a small company that's generating,
that's privately held,
that's generating $25 million in EBITDA.
And yes, investors are compensated
for the risk they're taking.
There has been a push from the financial community
to have people buy into these private credit instruments
and they're getting high commissions.
We're hearing from different sources
that people are getting a lot of commission
to offer this to their, the financial advisory community
to offer this to their clients.
How does all this pencil out?
So I'm a big believer that incentives drive outcomes
and the industry came and created a product
that's a really attractive offering to retail investors.
Retail investors don't want to be
in a traditional drawdown fund.
So let's go back again.
The vast majority of private credit,
about 80% of all private credit
is held in what's called traditional drawdown vehicles.
And the way those drawdown vehicles work is this.
You investor commit $5 million to a fund.
Typically you're an endowment, let's say.
You commit $5 million to a fund.
The fund manager over the next couple of years
calls that capital as they deploy it.
As they originate those loans,
they will call portions of your capital.
After about two years, all of your capital is deployed.
So they've taken the entire 5 million.
You then have to sit on that investment
for five to seven years until those loans get repaid
and the fund manager pays you back.
I mean, if we're doing the math, right,
that's five to seven years.
A lot of those funds can go up to 10 years
because the fund manager can continue
redeploying capital in the early years.
And when you go with that proposition to a retail investor,
the retail investor, it's not a good sell, right?
I mean, do I want to give up my money for seven years
without having access to it?
So the industry came with a brilliant solution.
They've offered an evergreen fund
and those funds are sold to your point.
They are sold through RIAs, through wealth advisors,
although it's becoming so that you can now,
as a retail investor, you can access those funds directly.
And when those evergreen funds that are accessible
through the wealth channel are offered,
the promise, what they promise
is they promise partial semi-liquidity.
So the way those work is interesting
because you still have a fund
that holds really long-term assets.
Those loans underlying assets in the fund
have a five to seven year life cycle,
but the evergreen funds offer periodic liquidity
up to 5% of outstanding shares per quarter.
So as a retail investor, the proposition is this,
you can deploy all of your capital immediately
and you have some periodic liquidity.
This is the headlines we've heard over the last few months.
A lot of funds have received more than 5% of shares
and the 5% for a lot of them is kind of the cap.
After that, they have to prorate investors.
So a lot of funds, when retail investors
start pulling money out and it's more than 5%,
those funds have to cap redemptions at the 5% and prorate.
And this is what we're hearing.
This is the crux of the matter
with the headlines right now.
People are afraid that there might be significant losses
in these loans.
That's why they're pulling out, right?
What are your thoughts on that?
We are seeing a divergence right now, right?
Over the past six months,
we've seen a pretty sizable divergence
between what public markets value those portfolios at
versus what asset managers value those portfolios at.
And the proxy for us is publicly traded BDCs,
business development companies.
A lot of asset managers have a publicly traded vehicle
that holds those same loans,
but instead of going through an RIA
or through your wealth advisor to access that,
those are traded on the public stock exchanges.
What's happening for the past six months,
there have been a lot of concerns
about quality of those underlying loans, right?
We're hearing SaaSpocalypse, AI is gonna eat software,
private credit happens to have a lot of exposure to software.
Those private credit middle market loans,
about 20 estimates range from anywhere from 20 to 25%.
It could be higher for some BDCs,
but about 25%, let's say,
of all loans in those vehicles are to software companies.
And there's been a lot of concerns
about how those borrowers,
if AI becomes a massive disruptor, as we expect it to be,
how are those borrowers going to be able to repay the loans
if their very existence is threatened by AI?
So in the public markets,
we've seen an exodus of investors from those vehicles.
And right now, as of today, discounts have been higher,
but as of today, they're about 20% on average.
So about 18 to 20% to stated value,
to net asset value as reported by the fund managers.
So in general, the public thinks
that the marks are overstated.
And right now, the price that those assets trade at
is effectively 20% discount to what the stated value is.
In the evergreen vehicles that are accessible
through your RIA channel, through your Wealth Advisor,
because those things are not traded on the public market,
liquidity is provided by the manager
and the manager will redeem investors at the stated marks.
There's a lot of questions like the most,
not investment advice, but it's a pretty obvious thing
where you can redeem at NAV, at the stated value,
take the money at 100% and go and deploy it at 80%
in the public vehicle, in a similar public vehicle.
So we see a discrepancy.
To what extent the marks are accurate,
that's a good question.
There is another side of this
where these funds have gotten involved with insurance.
Like they've been buying insurance companies
and then they're deploying the capital
from these life insurance companies.
So insurance angle is interesting
and they think that is a bigger concern
than banks involvement, to be honest.
And here's how that worked.
So if you are an asset manager,
you have billions of dollars in assets.
For a while, there was a very clear play
that kind of got played out a bit.
And that was, you're generating all of these assets.
You are creating, you're generating all of these loans,
let's say they become assets on your books.
Who do you sell them to, right?
And insurance came in.
So insurance, unlike banks,
with banks, you have the problem of daily liquidity
because you can have your depositors come to you
as we've seen with SVB.
You can have all of your depositors come
and take their deposits out in a matter of 24 hours.
With insurance companies, you don't have that problem.
The liabilities, which is,
deposits are liabilities for the bank, right?
And loans that they issue are assets.
So with insurance companies,
the liability side is a lot longer.
If you're a life insurance company,
you issue policies and they typically last,
you know, five, 10, 20 years.
So your policy holders are far less likely
to come and do a run on the bank
if you're an insurance company,
just because they signed up for a really long term,
for a really long term.
This is, it's a match made in heaven.
When you have assets,
when your firm generates long-term assets,
and when you can buy the other side of that,
where you have, you're generating long-term liabilities,
that's a good match, right?
And this is what happened.
A lot of asset managers, or a good number of them,
went out and bought,
either bought them straight out, like Athene,
Apollo acquired Athene a few years ago,
or gained control of the insurance company's
investment decisions.
And that was Blue Owl with Kovari.
They don't own the insurance company straight out,
but they basically control the investment decisions
on behalf of the insurance company.
So those asset managers, when they did that,
they then were able to put those assets
on the insurance books as assets.
So they're generating assets with one hand,
they're transferring them to the insurance companies
that are affiliated in some cases.
And it's a ready source of capital
for those asset managers, and there's a lot of capital.
Is it opaque?
100%.
Is it other conflicts of interest?
Likely, yes, we can think that, possibly.
Does it work?
It has worked.
For the past so many years, it has worked.
The complexity of this,
and the fact that insurance companies are regulated,
there's no centralized regulation for insurance companies.
Insurance companies are regulated
at the state level.
And the variance there is great.
There are some great people who cover that sector,
have a lot more detail than I do,
but it's, my understanding is that
there's quite a bit of variance between states.
There is some concerns about insurance companies
transferring assets into offshore accounts
and having that on their books
where opacity is further increased.
It's a valid concern.
So it seems like the public market is assuming
there's gonna be at least 20% losses on these loans.
Can the insurance market take the hit?
You mentioned the banks are safer, or safe,
because the exposure is limited,
and then they have the first,
they're the first, they're gonna get their money back.
What about the insurance companies?
Because the insurance companies
are actually the lenders in this scenario.
They are kind of like the retail investors,
they're lending.
Can they handle this 20% of potential loss,
if there is 20% of loss?
The market is not necessarily saying
the losses are gonna be 20%.
The market is saying that we value,
as it stands right now,
we value this book at a 20% discount.
We're only willing to pay 80% of the book value.
What's gonna happen with insurance,
the big concern there is that insurance
doesn't hold the actual loans.
Oftentimes, they will hold CLO equity,
and that's another rabbit hole we can go down.
The loans, the pool of loans,
let's say you're an asset manager
and you have $100 million worth of loans
from 200 borrowers.
You take those 200 borrowers,
200 loans, 200 pieces of assets,
and you collateralize them,
or you securitize them.
You make a CLO,
which is a collateralized loan obligation.
So you blend up those loans.
So you combine them together
and you cut them to pieces.
So essentially, they're diversified.
Precisely, and you trench out the risk,
and you say, okay, the upper trenches
are gonna only get paid 7%, 6%,
or whatever they're getting paid, right?
We'll call them AAA.
We'll go to Moody's, get them rated,
and those things are now called AAA, or double A.
And then as we go down the stack,
there's higher risk and higher coupon yield
with those coupons.
Insurance companies are regulated.
In all cases, they can only hold
certain quality of assets,
or for certain quality of assets, of rated assets,
they have to have a certain amount
of capital on their books.
If the loans are not worth as much as we think they are,
the risk is that the upper trenches,
let's say AAA rated or double A rated trenches,
get re-rated into something lower,
which would then bump up the requirement
for reserve capital.
This is something that is the risk.
The underlying loans themselves,
even if a certain percentage of those loans defaults,
it's not gonna be a zero.
And a lot of those collateralized loan obligations,
there is a period of time
when the manager can swap out loans.
And if one loan starts defaulting,
they'll just swap it out, take it out,
and put a performing loan in its place.
So there's a lot of protections embedded in the structure.
And that's the argument
for why insurance companies hold those assets.
But if re-rating happens,
that triggers a whole other domino effect
for insurance companies.
And that's the concern.
Leila, you've been analyzing this situation
with the private credit.
Are you looking into the companies themselves?
And what kind of companies,
what kind of loans they have?
How realistic are these loans
for the companies to pay them back?
My biggest gripe with private markets
is the lack of transparency
at the portfolio company level.
So if you take a fund,
you can take,
I've written about the biggest ones,
the most recently covered fund
was Blackstone's private credit fund.
It's an 80 billion,
it's 80 plus billion dollars in assets under management.
80 billion dollars worth of loans, right?
So when you start peeling into what's inside
and who are the companies,
you get a list.
And the list shows you the name of the borrower.
It shows you when the loan was originated,
interest rate that they're paying,
and when that loan matures.
It will show you whether the loan is impaired or not.
And it will show you cost versus fair value.
That's the extent.
Let's take a loan to Medallia,
which we have all,
some of us have heard about on the news.
So Medallia was a publicly traded company
that got taken private in a few years ago
by a private equity firm.
It was a large takedown,
multi-billion dollar transaction.
So a lot of private credit companies came in
and issued a loan to buy that company.
That loan shows up on books of about five or six
different private credit lenders.
Some of them are publicly traded.
Some of them are privately non-traded BDCs
and evergreen funds.
That loan was marked.
It's the same loan to the same borrower.
A couple of quarters ago,
Bloomberg wrote a story about that loan.
That loan was marked at different value
by different lenders.
It's the same exact loan,
matures the same day.
And this is the same exact,
but the lenders,
each of the lenders has its own internal valuation process.
So the question becomes,
well, how accurate are the marks?
Which one of those is the truth, right?
Or is any of those,
are any of those marks accurate?
The loan is now the most recent development
is that the private equity firm
is handing the keys to the lenders.
So the lenders are gonna own the company
and this is gonna be,
this is the default situation
and we're gonna see how that plays out
and how far the marks are gonna be written down.
But we still don't know how much EBITDA
that particular borrower generates.
So we had financials of medallia
back when it was a publicly traded company,
when it was publicly traded.
Publicly traded companies
have to file quarterly financials.
Once it got taken private,
we have zero visibility.
Does it generate enough positive cashflow to pay the loan?
We don't know.
Like has the revenue grown since it was taken private?
We have no idea.
And this is a big loan that's kind of in the news.
There are hundreds of small loans
where you wouldn't recognize the name.
It's some privately held company in the Midwest.
It's been privately held for a number of years.
Maybe it changed hands
between a couple of private equity firms
over the last five, 10 years,
but that's the extent.
We have no idea.
And a lot of the borrowers,
a lot of the lenders don't have to report
any of those metrics.
They'll report LTV sometimes.
And I'll say, you know,
our LTV on our aggregate portfolio is 42%.
Some, very few companies will say,
okay, debt service coverage ratio is, you know, 2X,
which means that EBITDA is two times.
So their earnings before interest and tax
is like two times the interest.
And by the way, if that,
if you came to the bank and said,
you know, I'm making $10,000 a month,
and can I get a mortgage that will be $5,000 a month?
They will send you packing, right?
They won't give you, it's too much risk.
But in this scenario, it's very normal.
It's very normal for these companies to pay
half of their income EBITDA.
And we are hearing that some of these companies
are not paying the interest.
They're not able to pay the interest
and they're allowing them to wait on it.
Can you tell us about that?
Yeah, and that is, that's wonderful.
I wish I had that as a personal borrower.
That feature is called payment in kind.
And that means that
there are two kinds of payment in kind.
The one kind is called the good PIK, P-I-K.
And apparently it's good if it's originated with the loan.
So you can go to a, a borrower can go to a lender and say,
hey, you know, I need to borrow $20 million,
but my company is not generating enough free cashflow
to service that debt.
So let's do 20 million at 10% a year,
but instead of cash payments, I will make PIK payments,
which means that at the end of the year,
the loan grows by 10%, by $2 million.
And instead of a cash payment,
you add it to the loan balance.
So at the end of year one, it becomes a $22 million loan.
Then it grows by another 10% from there.
So that is PIK at loan origination.
In the last three, four years,
we've heard about what's called a PIK toggle.
And that's an option for the borrower.
That's a wonderful option where you originate the loan
with cash interest payment, but then two years,
you have the option to turn on that PIK at any time.
And that's, that's considered bad PIK.
Lincoln International calls it bad PIK.
I call it bad PIK.
It means that the borrower, like it gives us a signal
that the borrower is maybe starting to run
into some issues.
Why would, otherwise, why would they choose that option?
Right?
And that's, that's something that's not necessarily,
it's easy to track because you could,
all you got to do is just compare quarterly financials
and see which borrowers were paying cash last quarter
and which borrowers turned on that PIK toggle.
It's, according to industry reports,
it's been growing over the last, over the last year or so.
PIK in general has been fairly steady,
but it's, it's taking up.
It's something that a lot of industry watchdogs are watching
because that's, it's a signal.
It's not necessarily that the sky is falling,
but it's certainly a signal that the borrowers
maybe are struggling with servicing debt.
So based on what you're saying,
and you, you have been studying this for a couple,
can you tell us how you got into it?
Yeah, I am, I'm an investor.
I've been investing in public markets for about 20 years.
And in 2020, I discovered private markets.
And at the time I couldn't find anything written
or any content about this universe
from the perspective of the end user, of the investor.
So when you hear about democratization of alternatives,
you know, bringing alternatives to the masses,
those asset managers are talking about me.
I am it.
I am the democratization, right?
The box stops with me.
I started, I have a background in finance.
I found it very interesting.
And I started going, I started going through books of funds
and I didn't see anybody else doing it.
And at one point, about two years ago,
I started writing about this publicly
because I was getting the same questions
from my fellow investors.
And I started a newsletter, Accredited Investor Insights.
The newsletter has grown to over 16,000 readers
at this point.
And we're being read by every major asset manager,
newspaper, we're being read by ratings agencies,
third party providers,
and of course, thousands of my fellow investors.
Where do you think this will go?
Do you think some investors will lose money?
Do you think insurance companies could get in trouble?
Or do you see that this is not as big as is reported?
I see it as some of the money is gonna get stuck
and it's gonna be a long time
before that money comes back,
especially in drawdown funds.
Some of, and when it comes back,
when all is said and done,
returns are gonna be subpar.
Is it gonna become a zero?
I really honestly don't think so.
I think returns across this universe
are gonna be less than what maybe people were expecting
when they allocated money to it.
But I don't think the sky is gonna fall.
What I do think will happen
is some fund managers are not gonna,
are gonna have a really difficult time with liquidity.
And right now on the news cycle,
we only hear about private credit funds
struggling with liquidity.
The bigger problem there is private equity evergreen funds.
Private credit funds generate organic liquidity.
Loans pay off, borrowers pay cash interest by and large.
For most funds, it's gonna be meeting
that 5% quarterly liquidity
is not gonna be a massive problem.
Now, if you take an evergreen private equity fund
where assets do not generate cash flow,
where they're much more difficult to sell,
where hold periods are much longer.
Now that has potential.
And right now we're not, it's not on the news.
People are not withdrawing money from those funds.
So they're functioning as intended,
but that is something I would watch.
Now, Leila, you have gone through this process
of looking into this from scratch
and with the finance background.
Is there any lessons you've taken
from this whole private credit?
The most meaningless number
in the marketing materials is headline yield.
So a fund that says,
oh, we're paying 9.5% yield to our investors.
It is absolutely, it's a meaningless number.
That 9.5% yield can come from a lot of different sources
other than cash interest that the borrowers are paying.
And my biggest takeaway to investors
who are looking to allocate to this
is learn to read financial statements.
It's not rocket science.
It's, I promise.
If I can do it, you can do it.
Anyone can.
Learn to read financial statements
and understand where your returns are coming from.
Leila Kunimoto with Accredited Investors Insight.
It was great to have you on Market Insider.
Thank you for having me.
What do you think about private credit
after this conversation with Leila?
She's done a lot of efforts of unpacking
what's happening with private credit.
Make sure to tell us by commenting below.
I'm Siamak, this is Market Insider.
We'll see you next time.