Commodity markets are moving through a period where geopolitical shocks are showing up first in price, not in supply. Oil is reacting to conflict risk in the Strait of Hormuz, uranium has reset from earlier lows as demand expectations shift, and copper continues to sit against a backdrop of long running supply constraints. What is less visible in day to day pricing is how limited the system is in its ability to bring new supply online in response.
That constraint does not sit within a single commodity. It reflects years of capital allocation across oil, gas, uranium, and copper where investment has lagged consumption and development timelines extend well beyond typical market cycles. Demand is being driven by infrastructure buildout and electrification needs, while supply remains tied to financing conditions, permitting delays, and depletion across existing production.
Rick Rule, veteran natural resource investor, has spent decades investing through commodity cycles and joins us to break down how these pressures are forming across commodities at the same time. He walks through oil, uranium, and copper through the lens of supply constraints, and what begins to change when markets confront the reality that new supply cannot be added on demand. ----- 01:14 – How Hormuz Impacts More Than Oil 03:32 – Why Energy Security Favors Uranium 05:56 – What Happens if Hormuz Stays Closed 08:51 – Is the Oil Trade Already Crowded? 11:50 – The Billion-Dollar Oil Shortfall 13:45 – Why Oil Companies Won't Spend More 15:05 – Where Oil Producers Still Look Cheap 17:06 – Political Risk Isn't Just Overseas 18:55 – Why More Copper Isn't Coming Soon 22:41 – The $250 Billion Copper Challenge 24:55 – When Copper Prices Double 27:49 – AI's Hidden Copper Demand 29:27 – The 5-Year Commodity Mindset 32:53 – Why Commodity Investors Must Be Contrarians 34:43 – Learning to Profit From What's Hated 38:11 – Free Resources for Commodity Investors 41:55 – Saving in Gold, Trading Silver ----- Let's Stay in Contact: • Substack - https://substack.com/@themarketinsidershow • X (Twitter) - https://twitter.com/MktInsiderShow • Linkedin - https://www.linkedin.com/company/market-insider-show/ ----- 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘴 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘰 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘨𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘰 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘯𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘧𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘔𝘢𝘳𝘬𝘦𝘵 𝘐𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳. 𝘛𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘶𝘳𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯𝘭𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭, 𝘪𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘰𝘳 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘥𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦. 𝘈𝘭𝘸𝘢𝘺𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘭𝘵 𝘢 𝘲𝘶𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘦𝘥 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘣𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘥𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴. 𝘚𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘬𝘴 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘮𝘢𝘺 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘬𝘴.
AI Generated·May contain errors
The demand for natural resources are on the rise significantly globally because of the boom in AI
and also the straight and foremost being closed. Is there a big opportunity in this space right now?
Today we sit down with Rick Ruhl who's an industry veteran. He's going to tell us what's going on in
this space, what kind of opportunities are out there and how to invest in natural resources.
The whole world wants to live the same energy dense materially rich life that you and I live
and for that the global consumption of copper is going to increase. Meanwhile if the future
is in artificial intelligence and data centers the amount of copper that we're going to use
compared to the amount of copper that we use today is staggering. Literally we will use more
copper between today and 2050, 24 short years, than we have used in recorded human history.
I'm Siamak. Welcome to Market Insider. Rick, it's great to have you on. Welcome back.
Thank you for having me back. I enjoy these discussions.
We want to talk to you about the commodities. You're an expert in this field. You know mining
pretty well and you're tracking what's going on with commodities. What are you seeing right now
in the commodity space? Well certainly the thing that's most appropriate in the news is the conflict
in the Straits of Hormuz and the impact that that conflict has had on oil and natural gas prices.
It's also worth noting, although less well known, that in addition to being an important
transshipment point for oil and gas, the Straits of Hormuz control about 40 percent of the world's
export supply of helium. They're important for nitrogen and nitrogenous fertilizers,
sulfur and sulfuric acid. So there's broad disruption across a whole bunch of natural
resource commodities as a consequence of that conflict. Similarly, the damage done to the
economy by higher energy prices, which act like a tax, taking disposable liquidity, if you will,
out of other sectors, has begun to slow the economy as a whole, one would suspect, on a
global basis. And the third impact that we need to talk about that's particularly topical right now
is that the conflict itself has renewed interest in energy security. Your older
listeners will recall the Arab oil embargo, 1972-1973, and the impact that had not only on
oil and gas markets but on energy and energy security generally. One of the unsung beneficiaries
of this conflict, I think, will be the uranium market. Uranium being the only metal with enough
energy density that a fairly small quantity of it, enough to fit in one warehouse, could,
as an example, power Japan for five years or more. There is a forgotten fact that the French
nuclear fleet, the fourth largest in the world, and the Japanese nuclear fleet, the third largest
in the world, were constructed largely in response to the need for energy security that was
evidenced by the Arab embargo. We've had no concern about energy security for 50 years until now,
but those concerns loom large. So yours is a particularly topical question right now.
So do you see uranium surging, and how would you use this information to invest?
Not surging in the near term because it's already surged. The price of uranium in the last five
years has gone from $20 a pound, which was clearly unsustainable, to $85 a pound. $85 a pound,
if we don't suffer too much inflation, is likely to be an incentive price necessary to
increase supply. But demand will absolutely surge.
Many parts of the world, China in particular, have been building nuclear plants at a pretty
good pace. And even in the West, the fact that nuclear power generates reliable baseload power
without generating carbon emissions has meant that interest has returned in places like the
United States, as an example. But the new impetus that you're seeing will, among other things,
greatly increase the pace of Japanese restarts and will cause other parts of the world to look
much more favorably at new plant construction. Will this matter in 2026 or 2027? Likely not.
But when you change the demand picture in 2029, 2030, 2031, what happens is that long-term
natural resource investors can look at the uranium business with a certain calm,
knowing that the ability that we have to increase supplies to meet demand is very limited.
And the consequence of that is that price rises in the out years are an inevitability.
So these are miners, right? So you would point people towards miners of uranium and say,
you've got to look into this as a potential investment. I think there's likely potential
throughout the value creation stream, but I'm much more familiar with the miners.
The miners are probably the easiest part of the value chain to understand. You don't need to know
a whole bunch about enrichment technology to understand that miners will do well during a
period where demand outstrips supply. So in other words, yes, there are probably other ways to play
it, but I would be ill-advised to talk to your listeners about them.
What do you think is going to happen to oil? The prices are going up and down every day. It's like
5% up, 10% down, 5% up, 10% up. It's going up and down. So what are you seeing out there?
Well, you've got to tell me what's going to happen in the Straits. I don't know.
If we don't resolve that conflict quickly, you're going to see another surge up in oil prices. Oil
prices right now reflect the probability of a shortage. They don't yet, except in a couple
parts of the world, reflect a real shortage. So the price rise that we've seen really reflects
hoarding and the sense that real shortages are occurring, but those real shortages are going to
occur very rapidly now if the conflict doesn't resolve itself. I'm not smart enough to tell you
if the conflict resolves itself, although I need to say, not being a foreign policy analyst,
that it seems to me for at least two parties to the dispute, this being the Iranians
and the Israelis, that it would seem that leaderships in both countries view this
conflict as existential, and I'm not smart enough to tell you how it ends.
If it doesn't end, you're going to see sharply higher oil prices. In North America,
we are not going to experience supply shortages. The United States, as an example, is an exporter
of condensate and natural gas. Canada is an exporter of oil. So the two markets,
including Mexico, if you will, as one, will not experience supply shortages. But given the fact
that oil and gas are world markets and that both countries are exporters, what will happen is that
North American consumers will still have to pay world prices for oil and gas. And if the conflict
doesn't resolve itself, you're going to see those prices higher. Longer term, we have an interesting
circumstance coming up. A lot of the marginal demand for oil and the increase in marginal
demand for oil occurs in low-income countries. And in those countries, prices like $120 or $150
a barrel actually leads to demand destructions. You haven't seen, as an example in California,
despite higher gasoline prices and sharply higher taxes, much reduction in driving. I'm sure when
you drove on your way to work this morning, you didn't notice greatly reduced traffic as a
consequence of oil prices. But the response of U.S. consumers versus consumers in Sri Lanka
or Pakistan or someplace like that is very different. And we will see, if this conflict
continues and the oil prices go up, increasing amounts of demand destruction in poor and
frontier markets. Now, do you see these companies, oil companies, that do the work of getting us the
oil, do you see them as being good investment here? And do you see in the long run opportunities
in this field? The answer to that is, in the long run, yes. In the near term, if the conflict
resolves itself, you will see lower oil prices, and hence you will see lower prices for oil and
gas companies. In the longer term, this is a very, very good business. If we had been having this
interview in December of last year or January of this year, I would have told you, this is before
the conflict, of course, that oil and gas were about the only unloved commodities left,
which is to say that the stocks were cheap. Unloved came to a screeching halt,
really, as a consequence of this conflict. Looking longer term, and I think resource
investors need to look in the longer term, irrespective of how this circumstance in the
Gulf resolves itself, the oil and gas industry as a whole, including the state-controlled firms,
have been under-investing in sustaining capital for a very long time. What that means is that
the price that we're seeing today, we would have seen in 2029 or 2030 anyway, because the
cumulative effect of under-investment in sustaining capital means longer-term reductions in
countries producing profiles. By the way, that under-investment in sustaining capital,
looking at the years 2023, 2024, 2025, was about a billion US dollars a day. It was a very,
very, very long- So a billion US dollars a day of under-investment.
Per day of under-investment. Now, this includes the state-owned firms,
and the state-owned firms are instructive. If you look at PDVSA, the national oil company
of Venezuela, or Pimex, the national oil company of Mexico, you can see what systemic
under-investment does. Both of those countries, despite having massive reserves, have lost 80%
of their producing capabilities as a consequence of under-investment. To the extent that that goes
on, I mean, this can be brought back over time, but over time, it takes a long time,
and it takes a lot of money. So whether or not oil and gas companies are a good investment
depends on whether you own any. If you are like me, or people who listen to me,
and you own a lot of oil and gas before the conflict, probably in the near term,
you don't want to be a buyer. If you don't have oil and gas in your portfolio,
thinking, as an example, that Al Gore or Greta Thunberg were right,
we were going to stop using oil in 2030, you need to own these stocks. You need to own some of them.
When you mentioned if the conflict wasn't there, you were predicting the price to be at the level
it is by 2029, 2030. Are you thinking that the supply would fall by X amount of percentage,
based on the information that you've seen with the under-investment of a billion a day?
Yes, absolutely. Systemic under-investment leads to production shortages, and it leads
to production shortages much more quickly than most analysts are willing to admit.
If you'll bring yourself back in your memory to 2020, 2021, the COVID period,
you'll recall that during COVID, there was a lot less demand for transportation fuel, gasoline,
jet fuel, stuff like that, and the oil price fell like a boulder off a bridge,
actually going to zero for a while before settling at about $20 a barrel. Now, at $20 a barrel,
it was costing the industry about $50 or $60 to make a barrel they were selling for $20.
Fairly obviously, they weren't investing. And the consequence of that is that when
the oil price rebounded, it didn't rebound to $60 or $65. It rebounded to $100. These periods
of under-investment lead to production shortages. And in the near term, these production shortages
don't create, in the near term, demand destruction. So you get these price spikes.
The circumstance that we have been involved with, really beginning the end of 2024,
has been systemic under-investment in sustaining capital investments. As well,
in the United States, there's a real reliance on shale basins. And for reasons that we could
go into in another interview, those shale basins, which have very high decline rates,
are particularly susceptible to reductions in sustaining capital investment.
And do you see, what are we doing right now? What are these companies doing right now? Are
they increasing their production capabilities, or are they still in the same trajectory of
not investing enough? Not all companies, but most companies are not investing enough. Wall Street
is rewarding companies that distribute surplus capital to shareholders rather than reinvest.
So ironically, what Wall Street is doing is they're asking the oil industry
to, in effect, cannibalize itself, either by way of share buybacks or high dividends. These are
very popular on Wall Street. Shareholder returns, current shareholder returns are very popular on
Wall Street. And they're penalizing the companies that are a bit stingier with their shareholders
in favor of growing their businesses. So on the one hand, you have companies like Exxon,
which are not only making sustaining capital investments, but investing billions of dollars
in new projects. But you have to compare that with many companies, including almost all of the
state-controlled companies that are deferring sustaining capital investments in favor of
returning capital to shareholders, or in the case of state-controlled companies,
using the free cash flow to maintain politically expedient domestic spending programs.
So you mentioned Exxon, and you mentioned, are there any companies that you're looking at,
or any categories of companies that you would say, these are good potential companies that
are investing in the future, and they will have benefits down the line?
Exxon is one size fits all. It's a very large company. It's an integrated company. So during
periods of low oil prices, they make money in refining and marketing. During periods of high
oil prices, they make money in exploration and production. They're great capital allocators.
It's where you start an oil portfolio. It was much easier for me to recommend Exxon in December and
January at $90 a share. Recommending it at $180 a share is not exactly a no-brainer, particularly
if the circumstance in the Gulf resolves itself. I also hold personally a basket of very high
quality Canadian producers, which are selling at discounts to their American peers because of the
headline political risk in Canada, that headline political risk being a prime minister who,
for reasons of his own, doesn't like the oil business. I believe that the political
circumstance in Canada resolves itself because that same prime minister is a big spender,
and the best source of tax revenue that Canada has in terms of growing is their oil and gas
business. So I believe that his fiscal need will overcome whatever concerns he has about the oil
and gas business, and that Canada will increasingly facilitate transportation options and production
options. So I'm shading my own portfolio to the high quality Canadian names over the American
names. Although the American names aren't necessarily overpriced, the Canadian names
are selling at a much greater discount to net asset value than those American names are.
Do you factor in some risks with companies that are operating internationally because of the
recent geopolitical issues that we're having, or do you, because these companies are probably bigger,
you don't look at them much? Some of the international companies are in effect state
controlled, and those are problematic. As an example, the interference of the French state
and the prior interference of the British state with British Petroleum has been a problem. I know
that's not the political risk you're thinking about. You're thinking about small country
nationalization and stuff like that. We don't like to admit it in the United States,
but in the oil and gas business, the United States is a politically risky jurisdiction.
One need look no further than the governor of California, Gavin Newsom,
to see what political risk looks like. Going to war with the state's oil companies,
going to war with the state's refining industry, shutting down drilling in the Los Angeles basin,
the Santa Barbara basin, large parts of the San Joaquin. Some years ago in the decade of the
seventies, as an example, when the oil price rose, Washington's response, rather than trying
to increase production, was to put in place excess profits tax. In other words, deprive
the industry of the capital it needed to grow in favor of grabbing the cash for politically
expedient domestic spending programs. The same thing happened in the province of Alberta in
Canada, allegedly a free market jurisdiction. So the point is that political risk exists
everywhere in all stripes, in all languages, in all complexions. Before we're too aggressive
criticizing the political risk that might occur in a place like Kuwait or Angola,
we need to look at California and Alberta. Let's move on to copper. And you have been
talking about copper a lot and you've been recommending it, right? You've been seeing
a surge in copper. Can you tell us what's going on with copper now? In copper, we have been
systemically under-invested in exploration, in construction, in development, and we've been
doing so for 30 years. This is a capital-intensive long-term business. There is nothing we can do
right now. Nothing. Not one thing that we can do right now that will prevent a supply shortage
within five years. The only way that we will get away without sharply higher copper prices
would be a synchronized global depression, which would reduce demand simultaneously with supply
falling. Right now, the world is using more copper than it produces. That's okay for a while.
The difficulty is that we don't have enough in the pipeline, enough development projects in the
pipeline. And in the United States, our permitting timelines are so long that there's virtually
nothing that we could do. If you and I decided that as a consequence of that, we were going to
go out and form a company and we were going to go explore for copper, maybe explore for copper in
underexplored areas, which is generally where you're the most successful. It's likely the
regional exploration campaign that you and I funded could be successful in 10 years.
After we found a mine, it would take us three years to drill that mine out. So now we're 13
years. It would take three years after that in a good country to permit and finance the mine and
then two years to build it. So if we started today, 18 years from now, you and I could impact
copper supply. The difficulty is that people weren't doing enough of this 18 years ago.
I was at Metals Week in London at the end of last year, which is a big con fab, you know,
with all the mining industry guys. And there was an interesting paper presented,
and I hope your listeners listen to these numbers. It was estimated that the 10 largest
copper companies in the world need to invest $250 billion over the next 10 years
to maintain supplies at current levels. The difficulty is that current levels aren't sufficient
to meet current demand. And it is estimated that global copper demand before AI and data centers
is growing at between one and one and a half percent compounded. If you believe the numbers
that people like, you know, Google and Amazon are putting out in terms of their data center demands,
we will need to produce more copper between 2026 and 2050 that has been mined in the history of
mankind. I don't think we're up to that, by the way. And the other thing about that $250 billion
number is that that's constant 2025 dollars. It doesn't include inflation. And inflation
in mine construction and for that matter, the inputs in mine operations are running at between
eight and 10 percent compound annually, which means that five years out that $250 billion number
rises by 50 percent. That's a lot of money, a lot of money. And that amount of money is necessary
to maintain current production, which doesn't include anything for an increase in demand
or the fact that we're in a current supply deficit. There is no way that I can see,
short of a global depression, that the copper doesn't get rationed by price.
How much investment is going in right now? Is that the $250 billion?
That's what's needed. We are now coming into a copper construction cycle. For a long time,
when copper was languishing at three dollars a pound, the industry didn't make enough money
to build new mines. Six dollars a pound is not a bad incentive price, but the fact that we haven't
looked for copper for 30 years means that there's not a lot of construction-ready projects to build.
Those projects which are construction-ready, those projects which are ready to build,
are now getting financed. But in this country, in the United States,
where the supply would be of the most concern to you and I, the best copper deposit in the United
States undeveloped is something called the resolution deposit. It's in Arizona, which is
the heart of America's copper country. And it's a huge deposit, well over a billion tons of copper.
And the grade of the copper is over one and a half percent copper by rock volume. The average
mine grade worldwide is about one half of one percent. So this mine is three times the average
grade worldwide. It's well located between a couple of copper mines. There's a highway that
goes across the property, a railroad, power, water. And this thing has been permitting for 28 years.
Been stuck in permitting for 28 years. All of this points to the fact that we're going to
have to get used to higher copper prices. And for investors who are willing to take the time
to identify those few companies that have good project pipelines and the access to the cash
necessary to develop them, those companies will do very well over the next 10 years.
Now make no mistake, looking further out, this resolves itself. The cure for high prices is
always high prices. Over time, if the copper price gets high enough, we'll find a way to use
other materials to substitute for some of the uses of copper. And people will figure out how
to fabricate goods that are made with copper more efficiently. But in the near term, none of those
How do the miners benefit? So when the price goes from $3 per pound to $6 per pound,
how does it work for miners? At $3 a pound, if you were Freeport, as an example, the largest U.S.
copper producer, you were probably making copper for $1.75. So you were doing fairly well selling
copper at $3, but the $3 price wasn't high enough to incentivize new mine construction.
If you were doing okay at $3, you are swimming in cash at $6. You are swimming in cash. And the big
copper producers worldwide, the BHPs, the Rios, the Glencores, the Freeports, the AngloTechs,
these companies are making a lot of money at this price, a lot of money at this price.
The shareholders, after some years of drought, would like some of that money back.
And so the industry is paying fairly generous dividends. But the industry is looking right
straight down the barrel at an incredible capital spend to merely maintain their current levels of
production, never mind increase it to meet the demands, as an example, of rural electrification
in the third world or data centers, electric vehicles, the electrification of everything.
You know, if you think about your life, the wonderful life that we all live in the United
States is really, among other things, a function of our fantastic energy density. The ability that
you have to live in a nice home, to drive on a California freeway to work, to broadcast from a
studio like this, everything that you do is extremely energy dense. And by all accounts,
it's becoming more dense. The way that that electricity gets generated requires copper.
Getting that copper from where it's generated to your home requires copper. Utilizing that
electricity in your home to enjoy the lifestyle that you enjoy today or to power the studio that
you're talking to me from, all requires copper. The whole world wants to live the same energy
dense, materially rich life that you and I live. And for that, the global consumption of copper
is going to increase. Meanwhile, if the future is in artificial intelligence and data centers,
the amount of copper that we're going to use compared to the amount of copper that we use
today is staggering. Literally, if the projections of data center demand are accurate, and I don't
know whether they are or not, by the way, if they're accurate, as I said earlier, we will
use more copper between today and 2050, 24 short years, than we have used in recorded human history.
Wow. And do you recommend any of these international players or do you look at
American, when you look at the mines and the mining operations, how would you go about analyzing them?
You need to diversify thinking that you may not get paid in the near term if there's a recession.
The most efficient copper producers are companies like Glencore, BHP and Rio, which are also large
iron ore producers. Iron ore is particularly economically sensitive. So to the extent that
we have a recession, it may be four or five years before these companies pay off in a big way,
but then they pay off in a very big way. If you are willing to take more chances, you come down
the size scale a little bit, hoping to own a company that will be taken over by a bigger company.
But that's only for people who are prepared to do the due diligence and to do the work.
As we said with oil and gas, if you haven't invested in the copper business, and most people
haven't, it probably makes sense to diversify your portfolio into that, even if you're a believer
in AI. If you're the kind of person who, as an example, is buying NVIDIA as a consequence of the
consumption of their product in AI, understand their product requires energy and it requires
copper. The materials that are the building blocks of AI are grossly underinvested in,
relative to the technology stocks that are expected to be the direct beneficiaries.
And I think the market will rebalance over the next five years.
In terms of the time horizon, when you're looking at these mines,
what's your timeline for investing in them?
You know, it's very odd that you asked me that question. When I was a young man,
I had lots of time on earth. I was very impatient. Now that I'm an old man and time is tight,
what I've learned is that my time preference is irrelevant. I have to take what the market will
give me. In resources, I would suggest that you have to have a five-year timeframe.
I have, over the course of my career, for free, graded almost 100,000 investor portfolios.
People have submitted them to my website and I've ranked their natural resource stocks
one to 10. And what I've learned from grading almost 100,000 natural resource portfolios
is that people make very common mistakes. And one of the most common is that while their strategy
might be correct, their tactics are terrible. If you are investing in a commodity because it
will do well over the five-year timeframe, but you're unprepared to hold stock over a long weekend,
the probability that your tactics and your strategy can combine themselves for a profit,
very, very, very unlikely. Another thing that natural resource investors do is they don't
understand in a capital-intensive cyclical business, you have to go to what is unpopular.
You have to be a contrarian. When the uranium price is at $20 a pound and it costs the industry
$40 a pound to make uranium, which is to say when the PEs are high because there's almost no E,
that's the point in time when you have to buy the stuff. When the price has already moved
and the price move gives you the excuse to buy the narrative, most of the juice is already out
of the trade. People need to understand that. People also need to understand, I think,
that the next 10 years, although there will be fits and starts, will be kind to the whole industry.
We're heading into a period, I think, that's reminiscent of the decade of the 1970s
more than any other period. We're running into a place where the nominal price of commodities
quoted in US dollars will go up simply because the purchasing power of the US dollar will go down.
We are also heading into a period where we are going to face the consequences
of decades of systemic underinvestment in resource supply while the rest of the economy,
where we use the stuff, has grown. Those are inescapable trends. What investors need to know
is that these markets aren't going to increase in lockstep. There's going to be volatility.
There's going to be cyclicality. The markets are going to act like markets used to act before
big tech and, if you will, the investor's road to heaven. People need to understand that. People
need to look at these businesses as businesses. If you look at them as a business and you have
a five-year horizon, I think life is going to be very kind in the commodity sector.
Now, Rick, you mentioned that some of the risk for this mining and also oil and gas
is the political risk inside the countries like the US and other countries as well.
Do you think this kind of risk would go away with the price of these commodities going up
significantly? If the oil prices go to $200 a barrel, would California change their mind?
Is there going to be pressure when the copper prices go up significantly?
Would that mine in Arizona be able to get their permits?
I think political risk increases. I don't think permitting risk increases, but I think the risk
of nationalization or, in California, de facto nationalization through taxation increases.
A politician's job, put bluntly, is to steal from one group of constituencies to reallocate
capital to others, those who vote for him. Oil companies and mining companies have always been
attractive targets to steal from, either by way of domestic politicians and excess profits taxes
or in other countries like Zambia, Peru, and Mexico, where they outright nationalize the
industry. You don't see politicians being particularly eager thieves in sectors where
there's not much money to steal. And I use steal figuratively. I'm not talking about literally
going in with a mask and a gun. I'm talking about changing the fiscal regime, changing the
permitting regime, changing the tax regime. And an increase in commodity prices will always be
accompanied by an increase in the temptation for politicians to divert capital from the
shareholders who cause the wealth to occur in favor of the voters who keep the politicians
in power. That's just the way things work. Rick, you mentioned you need to be a contrarian
and you need to find things when they're hated and they're not priced well. How did you do that?
When did you learn that? In the decade of the 70s, when I was a very young man, I had the good
fortune to be interested in natural resources in the best decade that natural resources ever enjoyed.
And I made what was for a young man from humble beginnings a stunning amount of money. And like
many young men, I thought that my success was due to my intelligence and hard work rather than a
good market. When that decade ended, when the boom ended, I found out just how smart I was,
which is to say not very. I lost all the money I made plus a bit more. That's when I learned that
markets work. I learned that the cure for high prices is high prices and the cure for low prices
is low prices. I learned that in capital intensive cyclical businesses, not just resources, but
things like home builders. If you aren't a contrarian, you're going to be a victim.
There's really no middle ground and it stands to reason. Everybody looks for low PE stocks,
but in a cyclical business, there are times when the commodity price is very cheap,
where the PEs are high because there isn't much E, it's all P. So conventional investors who
think that low PE stocks are attractive need to understand in resources, when the PEs are low,
it's because the commodity prices are high and there's a reset coming. You need to reorient
your thinking to the relationship between commodity price and supply. And you need to learn,
it's a slogan, but it's a true slogan, you need to learn to love hate. In addition to that,
if you are willing to do the work and willing to take the risk,
in other words, if you're willing to speculate a little bit in hopes of outsized returns,
you need to understand too, that hate extends to regions, not just commodities. And you need
to be willing to, if you are going to work and speculate, you need to be willing to look at
countries without bias. You need to understand that money that's stolen from you by a legislature
in English, by white people, according to the rule of law, is just as gone as money that's
stolen from you in more traditional means in the Middle East or Africa, as an example.
Some of my most extravagant gains have come from learning to discount political risk
with less social bias than I had when I was a 20-something. Now, this exposes you to risk,
and it also requires of you that you do work. And to the extent that your listeners
want to enjoy their lives, play with their kids and grandkids or garden or something,
rather than do the work, then just stick to the tried and true, the biggest and the best.
If you're looking for the sort of outsized gains that resource investors frequently are looking
for, then you need to do some work, you need to get outside your comfort zone, and you need
to understand that these are international businesses and that you need to be an international
investor.
And you have some classes on this, right?
I do. If you go to the Rule Classroom, ruleclassroom.com, you will see approximately
350 hours of instructional video at a very good price. It's free. Rule Classroom.com
If you are a resource investor right now and you like what I have to say, you can go to
ruleinvestmentmedia.com. That's ruleinvestmentmedia.com. List your natural resource docs,
and I will rank your portfolios. I've done almost 100,000 other portfolios over 35 years,
and I'll do that absolutely free too. That's a very good price, you know.
Both services are absolutely free. If you want to pay me, I'm happy to take money. Every 90
days, we do a bootcamp on one natural resource topic or another. These are eight-hour-long
deep dives that take place over a Saturday. They cost $99. You can get the information
at the Rule Classroom, ruleclassroom.com. And by the way, that $99 is fully refundable
if you don't think at your sole discretion that you got your money's worth.
Rick, what are you seeing in gold and silver? They did their run. They went up significantly,
and now they're kind of coming back down, or they're leveling.
Traditionally, gold in particular has done well during periods where people are concerned about
the maintenance of their purchasing power in fiat instruments, particularly U.S. dollars.
The weakness that you see in the gold price now, I think, is wholly due to higher U.S. interest
rates and the consequential increase in the U.S. dollar. The gold quote is, of course,
done in dollars, but the higher interest rate makes yield-oriented products more desirous
than they would have been, say, in December of last year. Looking longer term, it's my belief
that as a consequence of debt and deficits in the United States, the fact that we spend more than
we earn, that we will debase the dollar. I think that we're going to inflate our way
out of the government's debt and the unfunded entitlements problem.
Unfortunately, I think that's inevitable. I think that the next 10 years will resemble
nothing so much as the decade of the 70s, where the U.S. dollar, according to the Congressional
Budget Office, lost 75 percent of its purchasing power in 10 years. This is not Rick Rule saying
this. This is the Congressional Budget Office. Given that we owe $40 trillion at the federal
level, and given that we have $120 trillion in unfunded entitlement liabilities, Medicare,
Medicaid, Social Security, that kind of thing, I think it's inevitable that we print our way out
of that circumstance. That will be very hard on pensioners. It'll be very hard on people with
negligible savings. If the U.S. dollar loses 75 percent of its purchasing power, $1,000 worth of
goods and services today will cost you $4,000 10 years from now. Now, think about the impact of
that on a fixed-income person. Conversely, I think that gold will maintain its nominal purchasing
power. A very, very, very fine men's suit today costs you an ounce of gold. A very, very fine
men's suit 10 years from now will cost an ounce of gold. But in U.S. dollar terms, I suspect that
the price of that suit will be up 300 or 400 percent. And what about silver? Do you look at
gold and silver in the same way? I don't. I save in gold. I maintain liquidity in U.S. dollars,
but I save in gold. I've been systematically saving in gold since the year 2000. By the way,
that's returned over 9 percent compounded for 26 years. It hasn't been a bad savings instrument,
despite the fact that it pays me no interest. I speculate in silver. I buy silver during those
periods where it's really, truly hated. So the physical silver that I owned, when it had that
real spike up in January, I decided that it was no longer hated. You know, I mean, the price had
moved from, what, $18 to $75 on its way to $110. That's hardly hate. And there was a hyperbolic
chart straight up. Those charts usually resolve themselves to the downside. And so for me,
silver no longer had a role in my speculative portfolio because I was speculating on the fact
that silver would cease to be hated, and it ceased to be hated. And I found other places to express
my fondness for speculation. I maintained all of my gold holdings, and in fact, I've been
increasing them. Rick Ruhl, it was great to have you back on. Thank you so much for being here.
Pleasure. Thank you. What do you think about investing in natural resources?
And what do you think of this conversation with Rick Ruhl? Do you think it's a good time
to invest in these resources or not? Make sure to tell us in the comments.
I'm Siamak Ghorami. This is Market Insider. We'll see you next time.