The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has transformed a long-standing geopolitical risk into an immediate disruption across global energy markets. What may appear at first as a supply shock is now moving through shipping, refining, and pricing channels that extend far beyond the region. In this episode, we speak with energy expert Skip York from the Baker Institute about how these disruptions are unfolding across supply chains and pricing, and what they may signal for the longer-term outlook for oil supply as underinvestment and limited spare capacity begin to play a larger role. ----- 03:21 – Is US Oil Heading to Asia? 08:20 – Can Alternatives Replace Hormuz? 11:38 – Logistics Risk to Production Risk 13:36 – Iran’s Exports and US Dilemma 15:14 – Winners and Losers in Oil Shock 17:57 – Iran Scenarios and Price Outcomes 20:13 – How Fast Can Supply Recover? 22:41 – Will US Producers Benefit? 23:50 – Long‑Term Oil Price Outlook 26:30 – Venezuela’s Return and Impact 29:19 – Can Shale Be Replicated? ----- Let's Stay in Contact: • Substack - https://substack.com/@themarketinsidershow • X (Twitter) - https://twitter.com/MktInsiderShow • Linkedin - https://www.linkedin.com/company/market-insider-show/ ----- 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘴 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘰 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘨𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘰 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘯𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘧𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘔𝘢𝘳𝘬𝘦𝘵 𝘐𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳. 𝘛𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘶𝘳𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯𝘭𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭, 𝘪𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘰𝘳 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘥𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦. 𝘈𝘭𝘸𝘢𝘺𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘭𝘵 𝘢 𝘲𝘶𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘦𝘥 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘣𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘥𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴. 𝘚𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘬𝘴 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘮𝘢𝘺 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘬𝘴.
Are the oil prices gonna come down
after the conflict with Iran is wrapped up?
Or are there significant structural changes
to the oil markets?
Today we sit down with Skip York,
who's an industry insider,
who has been studying this conflict
and the impact of it on the global supply
of oil, gasoline, jet fuel.
I'm Siamak, welcome to Market Insider.
Well, so what's happened is,
since the Iran conflict broke out about three weeks ago,
we had a sort of, I guess, an unprecedented event
in that for years, there's always been a risk
that there'd be threats
about the Straits of Hormuz being closed.
They've never actually been realized.
This time they actually were.
And so why is that so important to the oil market?
Well, the Strait of Hormuz is a narrow body of water
between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the south,
and then Iran on the north.
At its narrowest point,
that Strait narrows to about 20 kilometers
or sort of roughly 15 miles.
But it's even narrower than that
because the navigable part of the waterway
is about one mile wide,
a little over one mile wide in each direction.
So what that means is,
if you've got something like a large crude oil tanker
or an LNG ship,
they pretty much have to go single file
with plenty of distance in between them
because one mile is such a narrow body of water
that if those ships have to make
any sort of navigational turns or attacks,
they could easily run into each other.
And so that Strait has always been
a very congested part of the energy,
not just the energy world,
but also just the shipping world.
And the risk that it would be closed
is something that had always been talked about,
but I think it had always been thought
as sort of a theoretical exercise.
What we've now seen is that the Iranians
actually have effectively closed the Straits of Hormuz
and not so much by what they've done militarily,
although they have attacked about 15 vessels,
it was really just the risk of that attack
forced the cancellation of a lot of insurance policies
for shipping insurance policies.
And that stuck the ships.
If they were inside the Persian Gulf,
they weren't willing to try to transit the Strait
without insurance.
And if they're outside the Gulf,
they're not willing to come into the Straits.
Now, let me just come back and say,
well, what does that all mean?
The Straits of Hormuz is that that traffic way
in a normal situation is about 20 to 22 million barrels
per day of crude oil and products.
The vast majority of it goes to Asia.
It's also the source of about 20% of the global LNG supply
also transits the Strait of Hormuz.
And that's also been bottled up.
And most of that LNG also goes to Asia.
So we're seeing a real pinch on petroleum energy consumers,
both of crude oil, petroleum products, and natural gas.
We're seeing a lot of, you know,
just a lot of supply dislocation for consumers.
And they're predominantly,
the first impact we're seeing
is really heavily impacted on Asia.
But as the conflict has gone on,
we're now starting to see that supply disruption
start to spread itself across the world
as those Asian consumers go and look
for alternative supplies.
You mentioned that Asia is now coming after
the rest of the world to get the oil.
Are they getting it from the US right now?
We haven't seen much redirection yet.
Predominantly, most oil exported out of the US
was actually going to Europe.
Some was going to Asia.
We haven't seen a lot of redirection yet,
but a lot of this because the oil's already under,
you know, the oil that's loading in March
and in April is already under contract.
And so where we're likely to start to see these changes
in shipping patterns will be sort of later in April
and into May if the conflict persists.
Now for the US, there's a question like,
why do we care about the Strait of Hormuz?
If we go back in the history of the,
if we go back before shale,
we were importing probably somewhere in the neighborhood
of five to six million barrels a day of crude oil
out of the Persian Gulf.
With the shale revolution,
we've managed to squeeze that down
to less than a million barrels per day.
Most of that oil is actually going into California.
The second largest destination is the US East Coast.
But we've sort of taken ourselves off the dependency
on the Strait of Hormuz,
but our allies and friends in Europe and Asia
are still heavily dependent on the Strait.
So from a national security interest,
although we don't need the volume,
our friends and allies do,
and that's why it's a national security concern for the US.
And some people may be wondering
why the prices in the US are going up.
I know it's a commodity when the price goes up,
price goes up everywhere,
but how does that work when you're seeing it
as an insider in this space?
Yeah, so I'll be honest.
When we first started in the first week of March,
probably the first seven to 10 days,
we actually saw product prices increasing
faster than crude prices,
and that caught me by surprise
because I really thought it would go the other way,
that crude prices would go up,
and then after about a couple of weeks,
we would start seeing it translate its way
into product prices.
Like gasoline and other things, right?
When you mentioned products.
Like gasoline and diesel.
I think now, three weeks in,
I think the reason why that was happening
is Europe is gonna become a big part of this story.
For US consumers, Europe is a big part of this story
in that we were importing a lot of gasoline
into the US East Coast from European refineries,
and Europe was heavily dependent on
not only crude oil from the Middle East,
but also diesel and jet fuel from the Middle East.
So when the Straits of Hormuz closed,
two things happened.
There was an immediate try to re-pivoting
of those European refineries
to make less gasoline and more diesel and jet,
and they were also being starved of crude
because they had to go out and find
where they were gonna replace those Persian barrels from.
That's why we saw that happen so quickly in the US
is because we quickly started to see supplies
starting to drop off,
gasoline in particular imports dropping off into the US,
and then there's now just the export incentive
specifically around jet fuel.
Jet fuel has doubled in the last three weeks globally,
and that's true, and that's everywhere in the world,
including the US, and that's because jet fuel
is one of those fuels that you can fuel up in one country
and then fly to another country.
So when there's a supply shortage in one country,
jet fuel prices quickly equilibrate across the world
because airlines start trying to optimize
where do they fuel their aircraft
before they go to the high-cost jurisdiction.
So all prices rise really quickly,
and that's what we're now starting to see in the US,
and we're seeing it kind of,
and once again, I'll kind of point out,
California is another place
where this is disproportionately impacting.
We're seeing gasoline prices rise everywhere in the US,
but they're up 70 to 80 cents in most of the US.
In California, we're seeing prices,
daily average prices that are now
well over a dollar a gallon higher
than they were just three weeks ago,
and that goes back to the,
California is kind of like the Europe.
California gets about 15% of its crude
from the Persian Gulf.
That's now been cut off,
and it gets about 100,000 barrels a day of gasoline
from India and Korea,
and those flows are starting to diminish
because those refiners are now having to figure out
how do they supply their South Korean markets
and their Indian markets.
Exports become sort of a second choice for them afterwards,
and so that's why we're seeing
so much more pressure in California.
We're also seeing pressure on the East Coast,
and then the middle of the country is seeing an increase,
but it's much more muted than we're seeing on the coast.
Now, Skip, before we get into the long-term impacts
of, in general, in the oil markets,
and can you tell us what's happening
with the supply right now?
There are things that different countries
are trying to figure out,
like Saudi Arabia has the pipeline,
and then Iraq is trying to send oil some other ways.
What's happening right now with the supply?
So let's go back to the three commodities
we're talking about.
There's crude oil, petroleum products, and LNG,
and let's look at each one of them individually.
In the crude oil front,
that's about 15 million barrels a day
that was transiting the straits.
We're now down to about,
we're shutting in about eight million barrels a day
of that flow.
We're getting about pickups in flow across Saudi Arabia
from the Persian Gulf side of Saudi Arabia,
westbound towards Yambu in the Red Sea.
We're seeing there's another pipeline
in the United Arab Emirates
that can bypass the Strait of Hormuz,
and we're seeing that pipeline is filled,
and tankers are loading from that facility
outside the Strait of Hormuz.
And you're right, Iraq is trying to flow more oil northbound
in a pipeline that runs from Iraq into Turkey.
They're trying to increase flows on that pipeline.
But those pipelines can't fully make up
the 15 million barrels per day.
So we've seen about eight million barrels a day of it
come off already in the first three weeks.
That likely goes to,
if this conflict extends into April and into May,
we could see that go to another 10 to 12,
10 or 11 million barrels per day.
As we just start running,
as we start, all the alternatives start to fill up.
In refined products, it's a cutoff
because there are no pipelines, product pipelines,
like there are those crude pipelines.
So the only way patrolling products in the Persian Gulf
can get out into the global market
is through the Straits of Hormuz.
And even though traffic is, it's effectively closed,
we are still seeing some traffic,
but we're down about 90% from where we were,
sort of say, the last week in February.
So it's effectively cut off.
Same story with LNG.
LNG doesn't have a pipeline alternative.
That's why you're using LNG tankers.
And those LNG cargoes have stopped flowing
through the Straits of Hormuz.
And then last night, early this morning on March 19th,
we saw an escalation in the conflict
when the Iranians have now attacked
the LNG facility in Qatar at Ras Lafon.
Early reports from the Qataris
are that there's been enough damage at that facility
to take some of those facilities offline
for potentially three to five years.
Now that's an early assessment.
We need to give them a chance
to actually sort of true up that estimate.
But Ras Lafon is responsible for about 20%
of the global LNG supply.
And if those facilities are materially impacted
for three to five years,
that's where we could see the long-term impact
Crude and petroleum products might rebalance fairly quickly
once the Straits reopen.
But if you've damaged Ras Lafon,
reopening in the Straits of Hormuz
doesn't necessarily bring more LNG to the market
because you're not able to produce the LNG.
So it's gonna be really important
to see what those damage assessments are
in Qatar over the next week to 10 days.
You mentioned the conflict is escalating.
What if some of the infrastructure,
the oil infrastructure get hit?
Some refineries have been hit,
but how does that work
and how long does it take to rebuild those infrastructure?
Yeah, that's gonna be very much dependent
on what kind of damage happens.
And that's kind of what the escalation is.
There's been an unwritten rule in the Middle East
for decades that when there's armed conflict,
the energy infrastructure is off limits.
And in any given conflict,
both sides have largely respected that rule.
The one exception before this month
was Iraq when it invaded Kuwait in 1990.
As they evacuated Kuwait,
they lit oil fields on oil wells on fire
as they were evacuating the country.
Now that was expected to take two or three years
to put all those fires out.
And it actually happened over several months
because people were just very highly incentivized
to stop that from happening.
But that's really sort of the exception.
This is the escalation,
is that now if the energy infrastructure
becomes viable targets,
and if we see that escalation
of more energy infrastructure being hit,
then the damage will take longer,
there'll be more damage,
that damage will take longer to repair.
And what could have been sort of a crisis
around the Straits of Hormuz
could turn into a, from a supply crisis,
could turn into a production crisis
because a lot of the facilities have to be repaired
before you can start reloading the tankers again.
And this is where the conflict's getting very dangerous now
from a global economic perspective
because damaging those facilities
could take months, could take years.
And that's where the uncertainty is,
not only is the conflict escalating,
but the uncertainty of what the long-term implications
are escalating as well.
What about Iran's oil?
Is Iran still exporting?
So Iran is still exporting.
It's not the only country that's exporting,
but since Iran is controlling that narrow body of water,
of course they let their tankers through.
And Iran can do two things.
90% of their crude oil gets loaded
at a location called Karg Island
that sits inside the Persian Gulf.
There's another facility that they have
outside of the Straits of Hormuz,
and they're starting to ramp up loading from there as well.
What the U.S. and Israel is so far restrained from
is escalating that conflict
and attacking the energy infrastructure
either on Karg Island or attacking the Iranian tankers
as they come out of the Straits of Hormuz.
That's another thing.
That's another uncertainty that now,
is that now on the table
that we might see the U.S. and Israel
starting to attack those Iranian tankers
that are flowing through.
It's not very much oil,
but it is some oil that's coming out.
And that's kind of, I think,
kind of the insurance card that the Iranians have
is that with the Straits down 90%,
the U.S. is sort of forced into this conundrum of,
do I let the Iranian tankers flow through,
or do I choke off the world's supply of oil even further
by stopping the Iranian tankers
from transiting the Straits of Hormuz?
It's becoming a very delicate
and complicated strategic question for the U.S.
What's happening right now with the oil supply?
That region is impacted.
Who are the losers and who are the winners?
So I think the losers are those Middle East producers
that are trapped inside the Persian Gulf,
which is sort of Kuwait, Iraq, Iran,
and Saudi Arabia and UAE.
Those are really going to be the ones
that feel the brutality of this and the brunt of this,
especially if their infrastructure is materially damaged.
The winners are going to be
every oil producer outside of that region,
because as oil prices lift,
it goes immediately to the bottom line of every oil company
because they're now selling oil that was selling at 65
is now selling at $100 per barrel.
That makes them all much more profitable.
It improves cashflow a lot.
Whether you're a private oil company,
a corporation, or a national oil company,
they're all going to benefit.
That's going to create the incentive to increase production,
but increasing production outside of shale,
increasing production is actually very difficult.
It takes a long time to do it.
So that's why there's not expected
to be much of a production supply response
in the near term outside of the Middle East.
And that's why we're increasingly looking upon
strategic petroleum reserves and drawdowns
like the IEA announced a couple of weeks ago
with 400 million barrels,
a coordinated release of 400 million barrels
that take place over the next few months.
That's really the only short-term alternative.
The one thing I will add is so far,
we're not seeing a reaction in U.S. shale.
So the rig count has only gone up three rigs
since the conflict started,
which is kind of signaling something we'd heard about
we were hearing about late last year
or really kind of coming since COVID
is that the supply chains in shale were very tight,
specifically the cruise that it takes
to complete a fractured well and get it into production.
There had been labor shortages
in that segment of the industry since COVID.
That probably explains why we're not seeing
this big response with more rigs in the field
and more completion crews,
because there's just an equipment,
there's a rig availability issue
and there's a labor availability issue.
And that's gonna take just like anywhere else,
that's gonna take time to unpack those supply chains
and bring more capacity to the market.
And then see, are there shale producers
willing to take up that,
those rigs and those completion crews and put them to work.
That's all gonna play out over the next few months.
Now, in terms of this conflict and after the conflict,
the future of oil prices, what do you see?
There's a couple of scenarios.
One scenario, the Iranian regime is done.
The U.S. will get somebody that's more friendly to the U.S.
and the Western world.
And there is another scenario that the regime will stay.
How would you see the impact of all of this
on prices of oil in these two scenarios?
So if I look at the first scenario,
I think the first scenario where we remove the regime
and there's a new and call it more globally
or regionally friendly regime in place in Iran.
In that scenario, in both scenarios,
oil prices are gonna fall from where they are right now.
I think they fall more in the first scenario,
but I don't think they fall all the way back down
into the 60s because part of what was keeping oil prices
down in the 60s was this big buildup of inventory
that had taken place through late 24 through 25.
We're now using that inventory.
So that's gonna tighten the market up a bit.
So maybe 70 or $75 is the oil price in that first scenario
with regime change.
If you don't change the regime,
you probably still get a return to the flows
that we typically saw out of the Persian Gulf
before the conflict.
The difference is going to be,
my theory is gonna be that as long as the current regime
stays in place, the risk premium that we put
on Middle East barrels is gonna be higher
than what was on in place before the conflict started.
So now maybe you're looking at,
if we're looking at 70 to $75 with regime change,
if the current regime stays in place,
there's probably another five, possibly $10 a barrel
on the price of oil because the risk of,
because that risk of closing down the Straits of Hormuz
is still going to be there.
And now that it's actually happened,
the market's gonna recognize and put a higher value
on that risk because the likelihood is now much higher
that if you've interrupted the Straits once,
you're willing to interrupt it again.
And I think the market will reflect,
the market price would reflect that
in the absence of regime change.
When we talk about this conflict ending,
when it ends, how would the supply come back?
Is there gonna be a lag?
How does that work?
There's going to be a lag and I think the lag,
the length of the lag is a function
of how long the conflict lasts.
If you look at the forward curve
for either WTI or for Brent,
we've seen something very interesting happening
over the last three weeks.
When the conflict first started,
most of the price increase was in the first two months,
which for the Brent contract was the June contract
and the July contract.
By August and September,
we were back down into the low 70s or the upper 60s.
As this conflict has gone on,
we're seeing not only that front price rising from $80,
now we're up to almost $110 for Brent,
but we're also seeing the length of that,
that increase is also starting to stretch out.
We're now at above $80 barrel
all the way through 26 into 2027.
That's a signal that the market thinks it's gonna,
it'll take time to unwind this
and let's just sort of walk through what has to happen.
Well, the first thing is you have to reopen the straits.
Second thing is you have to establish credibility
that the straits can be transited without attack.
The third thing is you've got a bunch of tankers
that are queued up inside the Persian Gulf
and outside the Persian Gulf.
They've got the ones inside the Persian Gulf are loaded.
They need to start moving out
so you can make space for new tankers to come in.
That part is probably several weeks long.
It's not a very long process to get those ships back
and get that flow reestablished.
The third, the fourth part of this scenario
is gonna be how much damage was done to those facilities.
And especially with that escalation that we've talked about
over the last 24 hours.
If those facilities are significantly damaged,
it takes a lot longer to get that outbound flow
back to the 20 to 22 million barrels a day
of crude and oil products moving out
because we don't have the facilities to load them.
So we may solve the logistics problem in a couple of weeks.
But if we've got supply issues
at terminals inside the Persian Gulf,
now we could be looking at months.
And I think that's what the forward curve is pricing in,
that there will be damage to these facilities
and that those facilities will need to be repaired
over months.
And that's why oil prices stay elevated
through the rest of 26 and into 27.
And do you see the American oil companies
benefiting from all of this?
They're definitely gonna benefit through cashflow.
I mean, every increase in oil price,
because their costs really aren't changing,
especially for those producers
that don't have large positions in the Middle East,
they're still producing the same oil
that they were producing in February,
but now prices are 30 to 40% higher
than they were in February.
That's gonna go straight to the bottom line
of those oil companies.
And that's gonna be a proven in their profitability.
The question they're gonna face
is with this increase in cashflow,
what do they do with it?
And if they decide to say,
we would like to put some more money into production,
how long does it take them to allocate that capital
and do those investments and get that production
and get that production response?
But they're gonna be,
we're gonna probably see,
I wouldn't be surprised if we see sort of,
maybe not first quarter,
because two months where we locked in two months at $60.
I wouldn't be surprised if the second quarter
is some of the strongest financial results
we've ever seen for US oil companies.
And where do you see the prices of oil
headed in the long run?
Do you think they're gonna stay at these levels
or are they gonna at the levels you mentioned,
or do you think they're gonna go higher in the future?
I think they eventually come up higher.
So we get out of this crisis,
I think we're going back to a world of,
say, call it 70 to $75 oil.
But over the long term,
as you get into the 2030s and 2040s,
there's gonna be upward pressure on oil prices
because the upstream part of the oil industry
has structurally under-invested for about a decade now.
It was, you know,
a lot of that investment decisions were put on a,
you know, if you think back to 10 years,
10 years ago was the beginning
of the energy transition narrative.
It was the pathway to net zero discussions.
And a lot of upstream companies
intentionally put themselves on an investment path
that said, if the energy transition happens,
I don't want to strand capital anywhere.
So they were investing as if net zero
by 2040 or 2050 was going to happen.
And we haven't seen that investment pattern change yet,
even though the transition appears to be slowing down.
And a lot of these investments take five, seven, 10 years
to realize production.
So the fact that we've been under-investing
for about a decade says that when we get to the end
of the 2020s, end of the 2030s,
if oil demand keeps growing at the rate
that it has been growing,
800,000 to a million barrels a day every year,
then we're gonna get into a much tighter market
in the 2030s than we saw in the last few years.
And that's gonna put upward pressure on prices.
The second reason why I think we're gonna put
upward pressure on prices
is the geology just keeps getting tougher.
Oil prices are always a race
between technology and geology.
And eventually geology wins
because you can have technological innovations
and we're doing things in the industry now
that no one even envisioned five years ago,
let alone 10 years ago.
But eventually the geology gets so tough
that it just gets harder to innovate your way
into a constant price world.
And that's where I kind of think maybe the 2040s
looks more like an oil market
that has even higher prices than we see in the 2030s
because the geology just makes it harder and harder
for the innovation.
And that cost curve starts getting steeper
as we move through the future.
And Skip, while we have you on Venezuela,
how does that impact the oil market
and how does that impact the oil companies here?
So the real impact for Venezuela in the near term
is gonna be U.S. refiners,
specifically those along the U.S. Gulf Coast.
They configured their refineries to run,
a lot of them configured their refineries
to run Venezuelan heavy oil.
They were actually optimizing away from that
with the sanctions on Venezuela
and the rise of light shale oil production.
But the facilities are still there.
The capability to refine Venezuelan heavy
is still in those refineries.
And it's a re-optimization step.
So as oil starts flowing out of Venezuela,
it's predominantly coming to the U.S. Gulf Coast.
And we've kind of seen,
if you look before the sanctions were really,
the really hard sanctions were levied late last year.
If you look at sort of like July, August, September
of last year,
the U.S. was importing about 140,000 barrels a day
from Venezuela.
The latest numbers that we've seen,
the latest weekly numbers,
have that up to 360 to 370,000 barrels a day.
Most of that oil isn't an increase
in production in Venezuela.
It's redirecting oil that was going to China
is now being re-diverted and it's coming into the U.S.
because the U.S. is willing to pay a market price
for that heavy crude oil.
That's in the near term.
For the U.S., for the longer term,
it's what can you do
to increase Venezuelan oil production?
That's where U.S. upstream companies start getting involved.
And then once again,
that's a process that's going to be measured in years.
We've seen some very positive signs
with some sanction relief by the U.S. government.
We've seen some petroleum law reforms
by the Venezuelan government.
But there still has to be that trust factor re-established
of can I deploy capital in Venezuela
and the Venezuelan government
is not going to seize those assets like it did in 1976
and like it did again in 2003.
And that's going to be the key linchpin
for those U.S. companies is that when that,
there's two things that are happening in parallel now.
Re-establishing trust so that Venezuela
becomes an investable environment.
And the second one is assessing
what sort of opportunities are down there.
And there are U.S. oil companies
that are down there now with assessment teams
that are looking through the infrastructure
and looking through the geology
and asking where might the opportunities be?
What could the projects look like?
But before they deploy capital,
that trust factor needs to return.
Those two in tandem, both doing the assessment
and re-establishing trust,
those are probably measured over years.
And so we probably really won't see
a significant improvement in Venezuelan oil production
until we get to the later part of the 2020s
into the early 2030s.
You mentioned the Shell revolution that we've had here.
Is it possible to apply that to other countries
or are they already applying it?
We're seeing it applied in one location.
We're seeing it is in Argentina.
Argentina has seen its oil production almost triple
from about a decade ago.
That is largely a shale oil phenomenon,
just like in the U.S.
In the rest of the world, shale has been lagging.
It's not for a lack of looking.
We looked for a lot of shale gas
in sort of the Baltic countries like Poland.
We looked sort of in Romania
and some of those countries in the Aegean Sea area,
but the companies just didn't really find
commercial discoveries.
And then you've got other parts of the world
where you've got a regulatory issue,
where there's probably a lot of shale potential,
both in oil and gas in the United Kingdom,
but the United Kingdom has a fracking ban in place.
So you can't do horizontal fracking in the UK
and that's kind of stymied up that area.
The two places that where we might see shale emerge next
is China is doing a lot of work
specifically in the Western part of China.
No results to show so far,
but they're very dedicated and committed
to exploration and developing it.
The other one could be Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is just,
it has not only conventional reserves,
but it also has massive shale reserves.
And Saudi Aramco had been pivoting
and trying to develop shale.
Looking specifically for gas was their first play
because they would like to,
in power generation,
they burn about a million barrels a day of oil.
They would like to burn natural gas
and then use that,
that would free up a million barrels a day of oil
for export.
So that's where they've been focused.
Those are two places to watch in the world.
So Argentina is on its way and ramping up.
And it looks like China and Saudi Arabia
might be the next two places where we could see it,
but we still haven't seen really strong results yet.
In terms of this conflict
and what happened with Venezuela,
it looks like China is getting,
kind of losing some of his discounted supply.
What are your thoughts on that?
What's happening with China?
I think that's actually,
there's a lot of truth to that.
I mean, what we know about the Venezuelan volumes
that were flowing to China's,
China did a very unique job of loaning Venezuela money,
is that instead of the loans being repaid back
with dollars or pesos or bolivars or remembe,
they were paid back in barrels of oil.
And that's the actual terms of payments
were barrels of oil to be repaid.
So they were, if you kind of do the math,
they were getting that Venezuelan oil
at about a 10 to $15 a barrel discount
from what that oil would have sold for in the global market.
They've lost that supply.
They've lost that supply now.
Those barrels are now being reared,
are being diverted into the U.S.
and the U.S. is willing to pay the market price for it.
The other place in China that we're seeing
is that they were getting a lot of discounted oil
from Iran and to a lesser extent, Russia.
We might see the Russian volumes coming back into China
because as the Iranian volumes are going down,
but Iran was another place where they were getting
about a million barrels a day of oil from Iran
and they were paying well below the market value for it.
They're now gonna have to pay the market value
for those Venezuelan barrels that they have to replace.
And the Iranian barrels are either gonna become priced
at the world market or those Iranian barrels
come off the market and China's gonna have to go
into the global market to find it.
So they've lost two very significant sources
of discounted crude for themselves.
Skip York, expert in global energy with Baker Institute.
It was great to have you on Market Insider.
Thanks for having me on.
What do you think of this conversation with Skip York?
Do you agree with his assessments?
Let us know in the comments.
I'm Siamak and this is Market Insider.
We'll see you next time.