21st Congress Twist: Jiang's Faction Revolts, Xi Cornered! Wen Jiabao's Bold Move!

According to Li Daoyu, a secret list for the 21st Party Congress has been circulating overseas. It suggests a controversial possibility that Xi Jinping might follow the model of Deng Xiaoping after 1989, stepping down as General Secretary and President in 2027, while retaining his role as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, thereby holding ultimate power behind the scenes as a kind of supreme leader. If this scenario is real, then before the 21st Congress, Xi would have to undertake an extremely risky move. A thorough purge of anyone in the military and security apparatus with even the slightest, say, 0.1% doubt about their loyalty. Because if he were to relinquish his formal titles without firmly controlling the blade, then the Deng Xiaoping model could turn into a Zhao Ziyang tragedy. This may help explain why, since 2024, China's military and security forces have experienced the largest wave of purges in half a century. Is Xi effectively clearing the path for a plan to retire without truly retiring? But power struggles within the Chinese leadership are never that simple. According to many observers, there are currently four groups that could pose a threat to him. First, the elder faction, represented by figures like Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao. Although they no longer hold real power on the surface, they still retain a sense of political legitimacy. Within the system, and even within the military, there are still those who support them, and they are deeply dissatisfied with Xi's disruption of the economy and his breaking of Deng Xiaoping era norms. Second, the remnants of Jiang Zemin's faction, such as Wang Huning and Zhao Leiji. While they remain on the Politburo Standing Committee, they are seen as opportunists who quietly pursue their own interests, possibly waiting for the right moment to turn against Xi. Third, professional officers in the military who have grown desperate amid ongoing purges. They feel increasingly vulnerable in the wake of Zhang Yuxia's downfall, and could become a real threat. This scenario is particularly plausible. They may seek out a high-ranking figurehead to rally around in opposition to Xi. Fourth, provincial officials and the technocratic bureaucracy. Outwardly compliant, they are in reality quietly disengaging and harbor deep dissatisfaction toward Xi Jinping. And in an effort to reduce his enemies, many observers believe Xi Jinping has recently made a dangerous move. If you found this information helpful, take a second to like, share your thoughts in the comments, and if you can, support us by hitting the thanks button below. Your support keeps us going and helps us bring you better content every day. Thank you. Does Xi Jinping seek backing from the Zhang faction? In early April this year, a notable deal was completed. Starbucks China sold a 60% stake in its China business to the private equity firm Boyu Capital. The founder of Boyu Capital is Zhang Xicheng, the grandson of Zhang Zemin. Around the same time, Burger King China also finalized a transfer. A company called CPE Yuanfeng invested $350 million to acquire an 83% stake. The ultimate controller of this firm is Liu Lefei, the son of former Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan. Back in 2016, Boyu Capital had already indirectly invested in Ant Group through a fund. That particular investment nearly got Zhang Xicheng into trouble. In October 2020, Jack Ma criticized financial regulators and was subsequently reined in by the authorities. The Wall Street Journal later revealed that one reason Xi Jinping personally halted Ant Group's IPO was his discovery that Zhang Xicheng and the son-in-law of former Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin were among its hidden investors. At the time, Xi had reportedly considered taking action against Zhang Xicheng. But now, not only has he remained unscathed, he has openly taken over 60% of Starbucks China and is even said to quietly hold around 45% of Beijing's high-end SKP Mall. So what changed? Is Xi now seeking support from the Zhang faction? Why do some believe that Xi has shifted from suppressing the Zhang faction to courting it? To understand this, one has to go back to 2004. Before stepping down as chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Zemin made a tour of Zhejian, effectively to meet Xi Jinping, who was then the provincial party secretary. Xi hosted him with 80-year-old Mao Tai, and the two reportedly drank through the night. After that meeting, Zhang is said to have designated Xi as Hu Jintao's successor, in exchange for a promise that Xi, once in power, would protect the Zhang family's interests. This was the first debt. Later, after Xi came to power, his anti-corruption campaign struck hard at figures like Zhou Yongkang, Xu Taihou, and Guo Boxiang. While it appeared he might pursue Zhang Zemin himself, he stopped short. In return, the Jiang faction supported Xi's 2018 constitutional amendment abolishing term limits. This was the second debt. At the 20th Party Congress, Xi secured another term, while close allies like Li Qiang and Chai Qi rose to power. Hu Jintao was escorted out during the closing ceremony, and his faction was pushed out of the political center. Behind the scenes, this reflected coordination between Xi and the Jiang faction. This was the third debt. Now a fourth debt may be unfolding. Xi's own allies have recently run into trouble, with several senior military figures being purged. Internal discontent has reached a critical point, and with Xi seeking another term at the 21st Party Congress next year, he may need the Jiang faction's continued backing. That could explain the re-emergence of Jiang Shicheng and Liu Lefei. Deals involving Starbucks, Burger King, and Beijing SKP may represent the price of this latest arrangement, not merely economic concessions, but part of a broader political bargain. In August this year, the Chinese Communist Party is set to hold a high-level commemoration marking the 100th anniversary of Jiang Zemin's birth. Historically, only figures such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun have been honored at this level, making Jiang the seventh. Even more striking, the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall is currently undergoing internal renovations, and has been closed from March 16th to August 31, almost exactly spanning the period around Jiang's birthday. There is speculation that the renovation may be intended to prepare an additional memorial section for Jiang Zemin. Xi Jinping may be seeking to elevate Jiang, using the legacy of a deceased leader as a form of political backing for his anticipated reappointment next year. Meanwhile, Jiang Shicheng's father, Jiang Mianheng, has not been targeted at all. He controls Shanghai Alliance Investment Ltd., nominally a state-owned enterprise, but widely seen as a de facto asset of the Jiang family. Why hasn't Xi investigated him? The answer may be straightforward. Probing Jiang Mianheng would effectively shatter the entire arrangement with the Jiang family, and make next year's 21st Party Congress a lost cause. For that reason, Xi needs their support. Clearly, he may be aligning with them to counter another force, the so-called elder faction often speculated about in public discourse. Xi's most formidable rival, the elder faction. On March 27, the 84-year-old Wen Jiabao made an unexpected public appearance. Prior to that, there had been rumors he was under house restriction, having disappeared from view for an extended period with no official updates. His sudden re-emergence sends a very different political signal. Some independent media sources claim that during this period, he personally called the central office and delivered just four words. I want to leave the party. Those four words, it is said, landed like a political nuclear bomb, forcing Xi Jinping to make concessions. Wen, a former premier of the state council, and once the number two figure in the party, carries enormous symbolic weight. If he were to publicly renounce the Chinese Communist Party, the shock would go far beyond what Xi could comfortably absorb, effectively signaling to the world that even the highest ranks of leadership had lost faith in the party. Such a move would deal a devastating blow to the CCP's governing legitimacy. More importantly, if Wen were to formally relinquish party membership and become an ordinary citizen, Xi would lose the legal basis to bind him through party discipline. On the surface, leaving the party might seem like a concession, but in reality it would remove a key weapon from Xi's hands. There are reports that Xi perceived this as a serious threat. In response, Xi Taifeng, head of the Central Organization Department, was reportedly sent to personally pay a visit. Put bluntly, it was an act of appeal, urging Wen to prioritize the bigger picture and not leave the party. In the end, Wen is said to have used those four words as leverage to regain his freedom of movement. This kind of maneuver is not without precedent. According to various accounts, Hua Guofeng, a former top leader of China, quietly left the party around 2001. His reason, the CCP had, in his view, betrayed the legitimate interests of workers and farmers, instead representing corrupt officials and capital. Following him, his chief of staff, bodyguard, confidential secretary and personal driver reportedly also applied to leave the party. At the time, this caused significant internal shock. The then-General Secretary Hu Jintao had to convene meetings to handle the situation. From Hua Guofeng to Wen Jiabao, more than 20 years apart, both senior leaders appear to have treated leaving the party as a last card when pushed into a corner. Seen in a broader context, Wen represents a reform-minded elder bloc within the party, figures deeply dissatisfied with Xi Jinping's direction. This group has long been a thorn in Xi's side. They hold no current office nor command military power, but they possess seniority, decades of accumulated networks within the party, moral authority in society, and the willingness to speak plainly. Over more than a decade of anti-corruption campaigns, Xi has mainly targeted the Jiang faction, figures like Zhou Yongkan, Bo Xilai, and Guo Boxiong. But when it comes to the elder faction, he has yet to find an effective way to contain them, largely because corruption charges are harder to substantiate. Their real threat lies in their ability to speak the truth, voice dissent internally, and influence opinion among retired elites. If the elder faction, represented by Wen Jiabao, were to align with elements of the military against Xi, his position could genuinely be at risk. This helps explain why he might be seeking allies, particularly by reaching out to the Jiang family. The Jiang faction and the elder faction are fundamentally different forces. The Jiang camp has wealth, business networks, and political allies still in power, such as Wang Huning and Zhao Leiji. The elder faction, by contrast, holds seniority, party prestige, and moral standing. Xi is now walking a tightrope between these two forces. Either one could potentially cost him power. In fact, the latent threat from the Jiang faction may be even greater. From the outset, that camp was never fully supportive of Xi's rise. Aligning with them now could be likened to inviting a wolf into the house. Consider the history. During the leadership transition, Hu Jintao carried out a full withdrawal, handing over party, state, and military power entirely to Xi Jinping. Yet, there have been persistent overseas reports that elements linked to the Jiang faction plotted against Xi as many as 10 times. According to NTDTV, during the Beidaihe meeting in the summer of 2012, Zhou Yongkang allegedly orchestrated at least two assassination attempts, one involving a bomb placed in a meeting room and another exploiting a medical check-up at the 301 hospital to administer poison. Against that backdrop, Xi's current move is hard to read. Whether it will ultimately work to his advantage or backfire remains an open question. Where is China headed? According to journalist Li Dayu, the intense power struggle ahead of the 21st Party Congress could have three direct impacts on ordinary people. First, if Xi's faction seeks to stabilize its grip on power, it may escalate threats of reunification by force with Taiwan in the lead-up to the Congress, possibly even provoking limited conflict to secure a political legacy. This would spell disaster for investment markets. Second, the weakening of the CCP's power structure means that over the next year and a half, China's policies could swing wildly like a roller coaster, supporting the real estate sector one day, then cracking down on e-commerce the next. People should not be misled by any outward appearance of stability. Third, the pressure on overseas Chinese communities will likely intensify. Xi Jinping may seek loyalty from abroad to reinforce internal confidence, meaning efforts to enforce a united front could directly affect Chinese communities and students overseas, including those connected to Taiwan. Those who once helped Xi purge others could themselves become the next targets. Figures such as Li Xi, Kai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and even Wang Huning and Wang Qishan have all been subject to rumors of instability. Who among them will be removed from the chessboard before the 21st Congress remains an open question? The final battle leading up to 2027 has only just begun. Qin Gang reportedly dead, 12 sentenced to death. On April 23rd, well-known independent media blogger Wei Yu revealed in her program, Wei Yu on Current Affairs, that a viewer had sent her an encrypted email claiming that Qin Gang is dead. According to the source, three separate channels, including senior military officials, the Nanjing Institute of International Relations, and the Disciplinary Inspection System, have all confirmed that he was executed by lethal injection. A total of 12 people were reportedly executed on the same day, including 10 members of the Rocket Force, formerly the 2nd Artillery, along with the son of former commander Li Yuqiao. Their arrests allegedly took place on the same day a Russian delegation visited China. The reason, according to the source, is not related to the widely rumored Fu Shaoqin affair, but to other undisclosed factors. Qin Gang's story is well-known. In June 2023, after serving less than 7 months as foreign minister, he suddenly disappeared from public view. In July, he was removed from his post. In October, he was stripped of his position as state councillor. By July 2024, the 3rd Plenary Session accepted his resignation and revoked his Central Committee membership. Throughout this entire process, Chinese authorities never provided a clear explanation. Rumors about the Fu Shaoqin affair spread widely online. However, execution over a mistress and an illegitimate child would be unprecedented in CCP history and is considered highly unlikely, as it is not an issue the Party traditionally treats as taboo. In September 2024, The Washington Post reported that Qin had been reassigned to a low-level position at a publishing house under the Foreign Ministry. But staff there said they did not know him. Later, Ming Pao cited sources in Beijing claiming that the individual in question merely shared the same name. In October 2025, several bloggers on X posted photos claiming Qin appeared at an international music festival at the Qihao Art Center, dated October 17th, 2025. Some believed it was really him, while others suspected it was a lookalike. In March 2026, Ming Pao reported that Qin had been demoted to vice-ministerial rank and forced into early retirement, the latest official narrative. However, Weiyu questioned this. If a former national-level official had simply been demoted and retired, why would he completely disappear from public view? Why has there been no public appearance at all? Retired officials typically still attend events, even if quietly. Rumors that Qin is dead began on the very first day of his disappearance. Online speculation has ranged from forced suicide to lethal injection. Official channels have never confirmed Qin Gang's whereabouts, nor whether he is alive. The only entity capable of clarifying the situation is the Chinese government. If Qin were still alive, a single public appearance or a brief video would be enough to dispel all rumors. Yet no such step has been taken. The question remains, why hasn't there been any official denial? Did Jack Ma return to secretly build a national biometric database? One of the most shocking claims sent to Weiyu concerns Jack Ma's return. According to the source, he came back because the CCP used an alleged illegitimate child to pressure him. His assigned task, to collect comprehensive data on ordinary citizens, including blood types, DNA, social networks, family members, full shopping histories and bank account information, then store it all in chip-based archives. In exchange, the CCP reportedly promised him an official rank within the system and allowed him to build a global payment platform capable of competing with PayPal or Visa. This is said to explain his return. After living abroad since late 2022, in Japan, Thailand, the Netherlands and Spain, he gradually reappeared within Alibaba from late 2023. By February 2025, he showed up at Alibaba's Hangzhou headquarters to lead AI strategy. The official narrative is that the AI era required his leadership. However, Weiyu suggests the leaked explanation may not be implausible. Why? First, Alipay has around 1 billion users, effectively capturing the vast majority of Chinese consumer behavior and financial transactions. Alibaba Cloud is also one of the largest cloud infrastructures in China. If a biological database were to be built, there would be no need to create a new system, only to expand data within existing ones. If Jack Ma were to assist in building such a database, even for purposes like organ matching, it would grant authorities unprecedented capabilities. Second, there were rumors in 2023 that Premier Li Qian personally sent people abroad to persuade Jack Ma to return. Clearly not a simple matter. Li has a notably close personal relationship with Jack Ma, is highly politically savvy, and also maintains a strong connection with Xi Jinping. If he successfully negotiated Jack Ma's return, it likely came with certain guarantees. Third, it is widely known that the forces behind Ant Group are far from ordinary. On February 17, 2021, The Wall Street Journal published an investigative report based on interviews with over a dozen CCP officials and government advisers. It revealed that behind layers of opaque investment vehicles was a small circle of Chinese elites, some with ties to powerful political families, figures who posed potential challenges to Xi Jinping. The Wall Street Journal report specifically mentioned Jiang Zicheng, son of Jiang Mianheng and grandson of former CCP leader Jing Zemin, and Li Botun, son-in-law of former Politburo Standing Committee member and CPPCC chairman Cheng Lin, as among the secret investors in Ant Group. Subsequently, on July 14, 2014, The New York Times revealed that Alibaba Group, founded by Jack Ma, had shareholders including Jiang Zicheng, grandson of Jiang Zemin, Chen Yuan, son of CCP elder Chen Yun, He Jinlei, son of former Politburo Standing Committee member and CCDI secretary He Guoxiang, and Liu Lefei, son of former Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yanshan. Chen Yun, He Guoxiang, and Liu Yanshan were all key figures within the Jiang faction. Jack Ma rose to become a giant in internet finance and maintained close ties with former CCP leader Jiang Zemin. His business flourished during Jiang Zemin's rule and expanded further when Jiang remained influential behind the scenes. Taobao and Alipay were established during this period and quickly came to dominate the market. In essence, behind Jack Ma stood powerful interest groups tied to the CCP faction led by Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong. Up to now, Xi Jinping has investigated and dealt with a number of senior financial officials promoted by the Jiang Zeng faction, as well as financial crocodiles who profited in the markets on behalf of that faction. These anti-Xi forces have long been a major concern for him. By early 2022, Wall Street financier George Soros had publicly criticized Xi Jinping on four occasions, calling him the most dangerous enemy of an open society and expressing hope that someone would replace him. Xi may have come to believe that from mainland China to Wall Street, financial elites in both China and the United States, along with the political forces behind them, could be joining forces against him. This could be a fundamental reason why Xi has continued to tighten control over Jack Ma and Ant Group in ways that serve his own interests. Did Zhou Liang secretly contact Jiang Yuxia? Rumors say Wang Qishan has lost even the freedom to eat. There is another noteworthy development. According to Secret China, in March 2026, US-based independent commentator Kai Shengkun revealed that with Xi Jinping's takedown of Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Jiang Yuxia, the internal dynamics of the CCP are undergoing fundamental changes. By bringing down Jiang Yuxia, Xi has effectively alienated much of the princeling elite, military families, and elder factions. What he fears most now may be the potential coordination among a small group of retired top-level officials who still wield influence. Among them, the key figure Xi is most wary of and has repeatedly singled out is former CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan. Kai Shengkun recently stated that when it comes to dealing with Wang Qishan, only one question remains, whether Xi Jinping will ultimately decide to act. The weight of that decision would be enormous. Taking down Wang would send an even stronger signal than the removal of Jiang Yuxia. According to Kai, Xi spent three years laying the groundwork to bring down Jiang Yuxia. Jiang, he says, had been placed by elder figures such as Hu Jintao to oversee the military, restrain Xi, and prevent him from securing another term. After the 20th Party Congress, Xi began systematically dismantling Jiang's influence, starting from the periphery. Jiang Yuxia served as head of the General Armaments Department in October 2012 and later became the first director of the Equipment Development Department under the newly formed Central Military Commission in November 2015, serving until September 2017, when Li Shangfu succeeded him. Kai noted that Xi's campaign began with purging Li Shangfu and Wei Fengyi, the first commander of the Rocket Force, before eventually extending to Jiang Yuxia. At one point, there was a reversal. Jiang Yuxia reportedly struck back by bringing down Xi's close military allies Miaohua and Heiweidong. Both were accused not only of corruption, but also of involvement in alleged plots against the leadership, forcing Xi to cut off his own left and right arms. However, Jiang did not ultimately gain the upper hand, and by January 2026, he too was removed. With Jiang gone, Xi now appears to have very few strong allies within the CCP, aside from Kai Qi and Wang Xiaohong. Meanwhile, Zhou Liang, who had served as a close aide to Wang Qishan for 20 years, has also been dealt with. On April 21, 2026, China's Ministry of Human Resources announced that Zhou Liang had been removed from his post as deputy director of the Financial Supervision Administration. Kai Shengkun revealed that the lead in Zhou Liang's case may have come from testimony or investigations involving Jiang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli. This development reportedly left Xi deeply unsettled. If Zhou Liang indeed had connections with Jiang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli, it would suggest that Wang Qishan's influence extends not only within the Party and among princeling networks, but also into the military. As a result, Wang's situation is becoming increasingly sensitive. Although Wang Qishan appeared to submit after the 19th Party Congress, Xi is believed to view this as merely a tactic of lying low and biding time, rather than genuine surrender. Since then, Xi has steadily purged Wang's network of loyalists. According to insider sources, Xi is still observing Wang for now and has not yet moved decisively against him. But Wang is already under strict control. It is said that Wang Qishan has lost not only his freedom of speech and movement, but even basic personal freedoms such as eating. Everything is under Xi's surveillance. Another view holds that Wang's situation is extremely precarious and that Xi may move against him as a warning to others, clearing obstacles for his continued rule at the 21st Party Congress in 2027. What do you think? Is Qin Gang still alive or not? Is Jack Ma truly helping collect data for the authorities? And what lies ahead for Wang Qishan? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Xi Jinping's number one bodyguard, Wang Xiaohong, has something happened to him? He was absent for a full 28 days and has only recently been suspected of reappearing. But this reappearance is highly unusual. On April 15th, when Vietnamese President Talam visited Beijing, the Xinhua News Agency report on the meeting included a single line at the very end. Kai Qi, Wang Yi, Yin Li, Wang Xiaohong participated in related activities. Just that one line. No close-up photos. No separate report. The only footage showed a distant side-angle shot in which he was almost unrecognizable. Meanwhile, several of his close associates were abruptly replaced. Why is that? He is the Minister of Public Security, the top blade and the most sensitive vault of Xi Jinping's secrets for over 30 years. If something has indeed happened to this key figure, what kind of storm could be looming for Xi Jinping? Let's break it down in today's program. Wang Xiaohong, Xi Jinping's number one confidant. Wang Xiaohong is no ordinary minister. He represents a kind of three-in-one role for Xi Jinping. First, he serves as Xi Jinping's personal security chief. In 1993, when Xi was party secretary in Fuzhou, he personally promoted the then 36-year-old Wang to deputy director of the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau. The two worked closely together for more than a decade. During the years when Peng Liyuan was working and performing in Beijing, Wang Xiaohong was responsible for the security of Xi's family. When Xi's daughter Xi Mingzhi studied at Harvard University, it was also Wang who oversaw her close protection. Xi entrusted both his own safety and that of his family to Wang, a level of trust far beyond ordinary political relationships. After Xi came to power, Wang was appointed minister of public security and state councillor. The ministry's special service bureau fell under his authority. Second, he functions as Xi Jinping's blade, carrying out tasks that cannot be brought into the open. The arrests of Jiang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli are said to have been executed by the special service bureau under Wang Xiaohong. The death of Li Keqiang has also been linked to him. Former lecturer at the People's Public Security University of China, Gao Guangjun, pointed out that Li Keqiang died at the Dongzhou State Guest Hotel in Shanghai under highly secretive circumstances. Li's family reportedly said they had been unable to contact him since late August, suggesting he may have been under control prior to his death. Gao also revealed that around 2018, Xi Jinping established an operations bureau under the Central Military Commission, tasked specifically with assassinations and kidnappings, reportedly overseen directly by Wang Xiaohong or Chen Wenqing. In January this year, both Jiang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli reportedly fell from power at the same time. Various sources point in the same direction. The force carrying out the arrests was the special service bureau under Wang Xiaohong. Arresting a sitting vice chairman of the Central Military Commission is the kind of operation that requires Xi Jinping's most trusted figure, and Wang fits that role. What Wang controls, therefore, is not just the regular public security apparatus, but the very core of the Chinese Communist Party's coercive machinery. Third, he is Xi Jinping's most dangerous vault of secrets. Because he has carried out such operations for Xi, he knows more than almost anyone else who gave the orders, who executed them, and what went wrong along the way. If any of this were exposed, it could be devastating for Xi Jinping. In short, over the past 30 years, Wang Xiaohong has been both the sword and the shield of Xi Jinping. Was Wang Xiaohong Detained for Investigation? From March 15 to 17, Wang Xiaohong traveled to Hanoi, Vietnam alongside Wang Yi and Dong Jun to attend the first ministerial meeting of the 3 plus 3 strategic dialogue mechanism between China and Vietnam— foreign affairs, defense, and public security. On March 18, the three returned to Beijing. Wang Yi went ahead as usual, with nothing out of the ordinary. However, according to reports from independent media sources, when the delegation arrived, Liu Jingwo, Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, CCDI, stepped out of the reception vehicle and told Wang Xiaohong and Dong Jun, Come with us. The two were then taken to the CCDI for separate questioning. A few hours later, the door opened, and Liu Jingwo's secretary told Dong Jun, You may leave. Commentator Kai Shenkun later said that after returning, Dong Jun collapsed onto his bed and only dared to quietly reappear several days later to assess the situation. A sitting defense minister shaken to that extent. Wang Xiaohong, however, was not released. He was placed under liuxi, detention for investigation, and this period reportedly lasted a full 28 days. According to the same sources, the conditions surrounding this detention were as follows. If Xi Jinping wanted to save Wang Xiaohong, he could approach senior party elders and use the house-arrested Zhang Yuxia as leverage in an exchange. If he chose not to intervene, then Wang Xiaohong might reveal everything during interrogation, including details about how Li Keqiang died. This left Xi Jinping facing a difficult dilemma. Saving Wang Xiaohong would effectively mean admitting that he himself had ordered the arrest of Zhang Yuxia, placing himself in serious political danger. Not saving him would mean leaving a man who holds his most sensitive secrets sitting in an interrogation room, potentially ready to talk. Neither option is easy. On April 15th, Wang Xiaohong finally reappeared, but observers noticed a striking detail. On the very same day, the official website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that the Central Inspection Team No. The inspection period was set from mid-April to the end of June, about two and a half months. Then on April 21st, the State Council appointed Liu Wuqian as Assistant Minister of Public Security. Liu has no prior connection with Wang Xiaohong, neither a former subordinate nor a trusted associate. For senior Chinese Communist Party officials, such a chief steward role is typically filled by someone personally loyal, Assigning Wang, an outsider, to this position is, in essence, a form of oversight and a way to dilute his power. Moreover, since last year, several of Wang Xiaohong's close associates have been removed. Xu Ganlu and Chen Siwan were dismissed, while Hu Bincheng was reassigned. Newly appointed vice ministers Yan Weilin and Ling Jifeng also have no known ties to Wang Xiaohong. Another notable detail. In late April, Wang Yi and Dong Zhun traveled to Cambodia for the China-Cambodia 2-plus-2 strategic dialogue between foreign and defense ministers, but Wang Xiaohong was not on the list. Why could Wang Xiaohong become a scapegoat? The relationship between Wang Xiaohong and Xi Jinping closely resembles the earlier relationship between Bo Xilai and Wang Lijun. Wang Lijun also held too many of Bo Xilai's secrets. In 2012, sensing danger, he fled to a U.S. consulate, and Bo Xilai ultimately fell from power. Those who handle the dirty work for the top leadership become more dangerous the more they know. Either they are silenced, or they turn against their patron. Would Xi Jinping use Zhang Youxia to trade for Wang Xiaohong? I don't think so. Based on Xi's past actions, he is willing to discard anyone at critical moments, even those who once helped him consolidate power and carry out anti-corruption campaigns. For Xi, Wang Xiaohong would be no exception. Commentator Kai Shengkun recently posted on X that a single source report claimed Ma Xingri, under intense interrogation pressure, suffered a mental breakdown, nearly lost control, and confessed information involving multiple current and former members of the Politburo Standing Committee. Ma Xingri is a cousin of Peng Liyuan and one of Xi's close confidants, yet Xi ultimately did not protect him. If revelations truly reach the level of the Standing Committee, then this is no longer just a corruption case. It strikes at the very core of Xi Jinping's power structure. Once individuals at that level are implicated, the entire composition of the Politburo Standing Committee could have to be reshuffled. So who might have set the trap for Wang Xiaohong? According to commentator Wei Yu, there are two possibilities. First possibility, Xi Jinping himself initiated the purge. Wang Xiaohong knows too much, so Xi may want to neutralize him before he can speak. This would suggest Xi is strong enough to act against even his closest ally, but it also indicates he increasingly trusts no one, not even those who have risked everything for him. Second possibility, Xi was forced to hand him over. Anti-Xi forces, including factions linked to Zhang Youxia, may have pressured Xi and demanded Wang Xiaohong as part of a political bargain. This would suggest Xi has weakened to the point where he must sacrifice his most trusted aide to maintain balance. Either way, if something has indeed happened to Wang Xiaohong, it signals that Xi Jinping's absolute security perimeter is beginning to collapse. Wang's importance lies not only in the secrets he holds, but also in the loyalty-based security network he built. From elite units within the Ministry of Public Security's Special Operations Forces, to close bodyguards in the Central Guard Bureau, to numerous loyal personnel embedded across local police systems. This chain of loyalty ultimately converges on Wang Xiaohong and from there connects directly to Xi Jinping. This network took 30 years to build. If Wang Xiaohong is purged, that chain will be broken. And once it breaks, who will take over? Will that person command the same level of loyalty? And can Xi Jinping rebuild such trust quickly enough? A netizen offered this analysis After observing the recent series of events, one can discern a certain logic. Xi Jinping currently maintains power through multiple parallel tracks. First, he continues the anti-corruption campaign to eliminate anyone who might obstruct him, while also using the fear generated by the campaign to intimidate officials. Second, he is leveraging weapons-related corruption issues exposed in the Iran war to further purge military generals. Third, he is being forced to purge even his own people. In the case of Ma Xingri, who is connected to Peng Liyuan, he let Ma go. As for Wang Xiaohong, who knows too much, he is using health reasons and anti-corruption as a pretext to strip his power within the Ministry of Public Security. To prove that anti-corruption is not factional infighting, the closer someone is, the more dangerous their position becomes. Fourth, he is restricting the movement of retired senior officials to prevent them from speaking out. Wen Jiabao reportedly exchanged the phrase withdraw from the party for freedom of movement. Fifth, he is keeping the children of party, government and military leaders inside the country. The fact that Wen Jiabao's descendants returned home during the Lunar New Year and were then unable to leave is said to be no coincidence, but rather a form of hostage control. The conclusion this person draws is striking. Xi Jinping's problem is not that his opponents are too strong, but that his style of governance makes everyone feel unsafe. Even those who have risked everything for him may ultimately face purges. In such an environment, no one truly wants to risk their life for him, because the likely outcome could be that he turns against them in the end. What do you think of this analysis? Feel free to leave your thoughts below. Thanks for watching and see you next time.