Session 3: The Objective in Corporate Finance - Reality

Profit Playbook
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In this, the third session of a 36 session corporate finance class,
I hope to continue our discussion of what the right objective in corporate finance should be.
I want to look at alternatives to maximizing stock prices and why they might not provide
a better choice than the traditional objective. In the process, I want to look at why corporate
finance may sometimes lead you down the wrong path and what we can do to protect ourselves.
In the last session, we talked about the objective in corporate finance as being maximizing stock
prices, but we also talked about what can go wrong with that objective. In this session,
I'd like to lay out some alternatives to that objective in corporate finance of maximizing stock
prices, but then circle back and see if we can fix this objective of maximizing stock prices
because we have so much riding on it. So here's where we are. We're in the third session,
and this is going to be the last session that wraps up the objective function.
And in a sense, we're revisiting that central objective of corporate finance,
which is to maximize the value of the business. As we looked at in the last session, there are
lots of things that can go wrong with maximizing stock prices. Stockholders might have very little
power over managers, and managers might put their interests over stockholder interest.
Lenders, if they don't protect themselves, can get an abyss coat.
Firms sometimes lie to financial markets, and sometimes they kind of hold back on information,
and financial markets are often irrational and not that cool. And finally, we talked about large
social costs. So at this stage, we're in a pretty bad place. We've ripped apart maximizing stock
prices as an objective and talked about everything that can go wrong, but we haven't come up with an
alternative. So here are three potential alternatives to consider. The first is to
look for a different approach to corporate governance. What I mean by that is in the
system that I described earlier, it was stockholders who bore the brunt of the responsibility of
keeping managers in line, of firing them if they did a bad job, and hiring good managers.
Perhaps somebody else can take on this role of keeping managers in line. That's what I mean by
a different corporate governance mechanism. The second is maybe we can pick a different
objective. Rather than maximizing stock prices, maybe I can maximize revenues or growth or
market share. Maybe that'll do better. And the third objective is actually a variant of maximizing
stock prices. Maybe we can go back to maximizing stock prices and try to fix all the leakages we
laid out, or at least reduce them to make it less expensive or less costly to maximize stock prices.
So let's start with the first of these choices. Maybe there's a different corporate governance
mechanism out there that'll keep managers in line without all the costs associated with maximizing
stock prices being the objective. And in fact, I'm going to look towards the end of the Second World
War to draw my contrast here. At the end of the Second World War, both Germany and Japan
were in absolute shambles. There was no economy left. But in the next 40 to 50 years, they built
themselves back up into true economic giants, real economic miracles. And in both countries,
they followed a different corporate governance system than the one described in the U.S.
In other words, rather than stockholders bearing the brunt of the responsibility, somebody else took
on the role of keeping managers in line. In Japan, this took the form of kairotsus. Kairotsus are
companies that hold shares in each other. And here's how it's supposed to work. You have 50 companies
that are bound together by cross holdings. If one of the companies is badly managed and badly run,
one of the managers or the rest of the managers get together and replaces the manager of the
managed company. In other words, stockholders have no role to play. Germany had a similar system
with cross holdings. But in the center of every cross holding system in Germany was a bank. So
Daimler was held by Deutsche and Daimler held stock in Allianz. And they all kept an eye on
each other to make sure that none of them were out of line. So that's a cross holding system
where managers took care of their own. In many ways, these are elitist systems where effectively
managers are viewed as better equipped to replace other bad managers. And in the mid-1980s,
both the German and the Japanese systems looked much better than the U.S. system. In fact, there
were corporate strategists in the U.S. who argued that what the U.S. needed to do was be more like
Japan. In the 1990s, you saw the downside of these systems. They were very good at dealing with
individual companies who were badly managed and badly run. They turned out to be not that effective
in dealing with systematic problems. Let me explain. We go back to the Japanese example
of 50 companies that hold shares in each other. Let's assume that one of those 50 companies has
made good loans and the remaining 49 have made bad real estate loans. What do you think's going
to happen? The one company that made good loans is going to replace the other 49 companies' managers
who made bad loans? I don't think so. In fact, here's what Japanese companies did. They got rid
of the few people who were making good decisions. They circled the wagons and they said, what
problem? That was in 1992. 20 years later, they still have the same systematic problems running
through the economy. So the problem with corporate governance mechanisms that are elitist-based
is elitist. Elitists make mistakes, and when they do make mistakes, they hate to admit to those
mistakes. So if you're considering a different corporate governance mechanism, a system where
committees or groups of people are going to decide which companies are well run or badly run,
think about the consequences. Here's a second choice. Maybe you can pick a different objective,
maximizing growth, maximizing earnings, maximizing market share, maximizing margins.
There's nothing wrong with these objectives as long as you recognize them for what they are.
They're intermediate objectives. What I mean by that is maximizing market share for the sake of
maximizing market share makes no sense, right? I could give you 100% market share, but you have to
sell below cost. Who wants that? If you maximize market share, it's because you think you can use
that higher market share to charge higher prices, make more money, and be more valuable.
In other words, these are all means to an end, not an end by themselves. Unfortunately though,
if you pick one of these alternative objectives, they take on a life of their own,
and after a while, people tend to forget the larger objective and focus just on this objective.
That's what again happened to Japanese companies in the late 80s when they got focused on market
share. Managers got rewarded based on market share. They decided that increasing market share at any
cost was a good idea, and they did. And Japanese companies ended up losing money.
So if you're going to pick a different objective, be my guest. But if you do pick that objective,
carry it through to its logical conclusions and ask yourself what the linkage is between
that objective and the value of a business. So that brings me back full circle to maximizing
stock prices. So I'm going to give you my best sales pitch I can for why I think a market-based
solution is still the best. It's not that markets don't make mistakes. They make some
real doozies. But when markets make mistakes, they correct their mistakes quickly. Markets
have no ego. My biggest sales pitch for a market-based mechanism is it's self-correcting.
Let me explain why. Remember those four linkages we talked about? Stockholders have little power
over managers. Managers do whatever they want. Lenders lend money. They don't protect themselves.
They get ripped off. Managers reveal information to financial markets not that well and sometimes
lie, and markets are not that efficient. And finally, there are social costs. Here's what
happens in a market-based mechanism. If stockholders are taken advantage of too much,
at some point in time, they get mad enough that they choose to do something about it.
In other words, they stop throwing their proxies in the trash can and letting the managers vote
those proxies. They look for somebody to bail them out. That's when you start to see the Carl
Icahns, the Bill Ackmans, activist investors pop up and confront managers. And the reason they're
able to do it is because stockholders in those companies are not happy with the managers.
In some cases, you might even see hostile acquisitions. The typical target firm in a
hostile acquisition is not a well-managed, well-run firm. It's a badly managed firm that
has underperformed its peer group, both in terms of profitability and stock prices.
If you take advantage of lenders, as the Nabisco stockholders did, those bondholders
might be hurt, but they learn. And what happened post-Nabisco is bondholders learned. They learned
in what way? They started putting special clauses into bonds to protect themselves
against LBO-like activities, the same kind of activities that made Nabisco bondholders worse
off. So bonds became puttable, which meant that if you did an LBO, those bondholders could take
those bonds back to the company, put them back to the company, and get their face value back.
If you lie to financial markets, we know what happens. Eventually, the truth comes out. And
when it does come out, your stock price collapses. And not only does it collapse, it stays down
because nobody believes you anymore. I can understand why mature companies sometimes lie.
I can never understand why growth companies want to fudge the facts. If the bulk of your value lies
in growth assets, the last thing you want to do is mess with your credibility. And that's what
you're doing when you're playing accounting games. And finally, if you create social costs that are
large enough, at some point in time, you become a target. I use the example of tobacco companies,
where effectively society decides, for whatever reason, fair or unfair, that you've crossed the
that you're now a ripe target for taxes or something worse, maybe lawsuits. So those
are the built-in mechanisms in the market-based solution that allows the system to get back to
steady state. You know what gets in the way? Well-meaning governments and regulators trying
to protect people from their own mistakes. If you're going to pick a market-based solution,
you've got to let the market work its way through. You've got to let people feel the punishment for
mistakes they've made. But I'm going to argue that this corrective mechanism within markets
is in fact what makes it a much more effective mechanism. In fact, I'll use Disney to illustrate
this process. In my last session, I talked about how Disney in 2003 was completely under the
control of Michael Eisner. But he'd done some bad things. He'd made decisions that made stockholders
worse off. And each year he did this, the level of discontent among stockholders kept rising.
Initially, he didn't care because he was powerful enough to brush it away.
But that built up and built up. In fact, by 2003, it was quite clear that stockholders were mad
enough at Michael Eisner that they would actually consider a hostile acquisition bid for Disney.
In fact, in 2003, Comcast tried to make a hostile acquisition bid for Disney. It failed.
But the genie was out of the bottle. Sometime in 2003 and 2004,
Disney eventually recognized that it could not fight off stockholders anymore. Eisner actually
resigned as chairman from the board. George Mitchell became the chairman for the board.
Eisner announced that he was going to try to create more independent directors on the board.
But you could see that he was doing this not because he felt that was the right thing to do,
but because he'd been pushed against the wall. That is the backlash we're talking about.
But stockholders get mad enough, even the most imperial CEOs listen.
Now, Eisner actually failed in fighting off the stockholders. Eventually, he had to step down in
2005. The man who replaced him, Bob Iger, was the anti-Eisner. Anti-Eisner in what sense? He did
everything differently from Eisner. He did not let the ego of past decisions drive his current
decisions. He had a much smaller board. It was a much more independent board. So in 2008,
if you looked at Disney's board, it was an improvement on the 2003 board. And that's not all.
In corporate governance course, where people measure how receptive managers are to stockholders,
Disney had risen up the ranks. It was considered one of the better governed companies in the US.
People were convinced that Iger had turned a new leaf and that Disney had turned with Iger.
But just to show you that even the best intentioned CEOs left to their own devices and
left as CEOs for too long, eventually acquired those imperial CEO characteristics. In 2013,
it looked like Bob Iger was acquiring some bad habits in many ways. One is he'd announced to
the world that he was going to step down as CEO at the end of 2014. He revisited that decision
and decided to stay on at the urging of his board. The external scorekeepers who looked at
Disney discovered that it wasn't as good a company in terms of corporate governance courses as it
was just five years ago. Pressure from below was starting to build up again because Disney seemed
to be going back to bad habits from old days. That actually adds to a point I want to make
about top managers. Maybe just as legislators are term limited, maybe we need to think about
term limits in CEOs as well. Because the longer a CEO stays on as CEO, the more he acquires the
trappings of power and the more the board becomes a captive board. The future will tell us whether
Disney is going to go back to being a company that's receptive to stockholders, but it's a
cautionary note. Thank you very much for listening.
